Annexes to COM(2025)148 - ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy

Please note

This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.

dossier COM(2025)148 - ProtectEU: a European Internal Security Strategy.
document COM(2025)148 EN
date April  1, 2025
Agreement.

The EU budget must be protected from misuse to foster radical/extremist views in the Member States. The revised Financial Regulation now includes conviction for “incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence” as a ground for exclusion from EU funding. The Commission will continue to explore the best way of making full use of the toolbox, including when selecting potential beneficiaries. The protection of the EU budget also relies on strong cooperation and information sharing with national authorities, EU agencies and bodies.

Protection from attacks

Beyond investment in preventing radicalisation, an important component of protecting citizens is restricting the means for terrorists and criminals to commit attacks. Action is needed both on the tools terrorists use and to protect the targets at risk of attack.

In addition to actions on firearms, the Commission will also review the rules on explosives precursors to include high-risk chemicals. Public spaces remain the most common targets for terrorist attacks, particularly for lone actors. To protect citizens from harm, the EU Protective Security Advisory programme will be strengthened to conduct vulnerability assessments of public spaces, critical infrastructure and high-risk events, upon request by Member States and financed by the EU budget under the Internal Security Fund. The EU will seek to expand available funding for public space protection. The Commission offers support to Member States authorities and private operators through dedicated guidance and tools, such as the Knowledge Hub on the protection of public spaces 81 , and EUR 70 million have already made available to support public space protection since 2020.

The Commission will also explore introducing requirements for organisations to consider or employ security measures in publicly accessible venues, through engaging with local authorities and private partners

Given manifest vulnerabilities, the EU Strategy on combating antisemitism and fostering Jewish life (2021-2030) will continue guiding Commission’s actions on protecting the Jewish community. The Commission will equally ensure that appropriate tools are in place to support Member States in combatting anti-Muslim hatred.  

The use of drones for espionage and attacks poses an increasing security challenge. The Commission will develop a harmonised testing methodology for counter-drone systems, set up a counter-drone Centre of Excellence and assess the need to harmonise Member States’ laws and procedures 82 .

Foreign terrorist fighters

To identify foreign terrorist fighters returning or entering at the EU’s external borders, data on individuals posing a terrorist threat is needed. To this end, the Commission, together with Europol, will strengthen its cooperation with key third countries to obtain biographic and biometric data on individuals that might pose a terrorist threat, including foreign terrorist fighters, which can then be inserted into the Schengen Information System in full compliance with applicable EU and national legal frameworks. It is therefore crucial that Member States make use of all the existing tools. This includes inserting all relevant information into the SIS, enhancing biometric checks and conducting mandatory systematic checks on all persons at EU external borders 83 . Moreover, the Common Risk Indicators (CRIs) developed by Frontex will continue supporting Member States’ border control authorities to identify and assess the risk of suspicious travel by potential foreign terrorist fighters.

Furthermore, to ensure that Member States maintain access to the battlefield evidence collected by the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL (UNITAD) for the prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters, the Commission, together with Eurojust, will assess the possibility to store this evidence in Eurojust’s Core International Crimes Evidence Database. Moreover, the new European Judicial Counterterrorism Register will continue supporting Member States’ judiciaries in quickly identifying cross-border links in terrorism cases.

Key actions

The Commission will:

·adopt a new EU Agenda on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism in 2025

·sign a new Joint Action Plan on preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism with the Western Balkans in 2025

·develop a new comprehensive prevention toolbox with the EU Knowledge Hub

·evaluate the application of the Terrorist Content Online Regulation in 2026

·amend the EU Crisis Protocol in 2025

·present a legislative proposal to revise the Regulation on the marketing and use of explosives precursors in 2026

·explore the feasibility of a new EU-wide system to track terrorist financing

Member States are urged to:

·enhance biometric checks and conduct mandatory systematic checks at EU external borders

·make full use of the European Judicial Counter-terrorism Register

7.The EU as a strong global player on security

To enhance the EU’s security, we will boost operational cooperation through partnerships with key regions such as our enlargement and neighbourhood partners, Latin America and the Mediterranean region. The EU’s security interests will be taken into account in international cooperation, including by leveraging EU tools and instruments.

Recent years have shown the intrinsic links between the EU’s external and internal security. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, the conflict in Gaza, the situation in Syria and emerging conflicts around the globe have had serious spillover effects on the EU’s internal security. To counteract the impact of global instability on its internal security, the EU needs to actively defend its security interests by addressing external threats, disrupting trafficking routes, and safeguarding corridors of strategic interest such as trade routes. Simultaneously, the EU will continue to be a strong ally to partner countries, working together to enhance global security and build mutual resilience against threats.

In recent years, the EU has taken significant steps to enhance its security cooperation. It has established operational law enforcement and judicial cooperation agreements, as well as other types of arrangements with partner countries. It is actively pursuing additional international agreements, in line with Council negotiating directives, and capacity-building initiatives, facilitated by EU agencies and bodies. Global Europe-NDICI is also crucial in strengthening security with partner countries.

The rules-based multilateral order is a cornerstone to strengthen global security. Security dialogues, including thematic ones, are vital for strengthening these efforts. The implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, along with bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks such as Stabilisation and Association Agreements and Association Agreements, and collaborations with organisations like the UN and NATO, are crucial for developing effective security solutions. The EU will continue to play its part in multilateral fora 84 and will enhance its cooperation with relevant international and regional organisations and frameworks, including NATO, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, Interpol, G7, the OSCE and civil society.

Regional cooperation

As a priority, continuing the EU’s unwavering support to Ukraine, and strengthening the security and resilience of EU enlargement countries, is a political and geostrategic imperative. Supporting the security of the EU should go hand in hand with the accelerated integration of candidate countries in the EU’s security architecture, in parallel to the consolidation of their regional cooperation. The Commission will use the EU’s enlargement policy to support EU candidate countries’ and potential candidates’ capacities to respond to threats, to increase operational cooperation and information exchange, and to ensure alignment with EU principles, legislation, and tools. The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III), as well as the Ukraine, Moldova and Western Balkans Facilities are crucial in strengthening security in both candidate countries and potential candidates.

The EU will also further integrate the neighbourhood partners into the EU security architecture. Through the New Pact for the Mediterranean and the upcoming Strategic Approach to the Black Sea, the Union will aim to continue building regional cooperation and bilateral Strategic Comprehensive Partnerships with a security dimension, when relevant, with regular high level security dialogues. Operational cooperation with North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf will be strengthened, in particular on counterterrorism, anti-money laundering, firearms trafficking and drug production and trafficking, notably captagon.

To address the rise of terrorist and criminal activity and its potential spillover effects in Sub-Sahara Africa, notably the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and West Africa the EU will reinforce support to the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the countries in the region. In line with the EU Maritime Security Strategy 85  the EU will strengthen cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, Red Sea and Indian Ocean to tackle trafficking and piracy, by supporting intra-Africa and regional cooperation, and with support of EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) and the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre (Narcotics) (MAOC-N).

With Latin America and the Caribbean, the EU will strengthen operational cooperation to dismantle and prosecute high-risk criminal networks and disrupt illicit activities and trafficking routes, enhancing cooperation frameworks, such as EU-CLASI (Latin American Committee on Internal Security) and the EU-CELAC Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism on Drugs. Logistic hubs’ resilience and partnerships and follow-the-money approaches will be among the priorities. The EU will further support the development of the Police Community of the Americas (AMERIPOL) to become the regional equivalent of Europol and strengthen judicial cooperation between Member States and the region. The EU will also work with South and Central Asia on shared security challenges related to terrorism, trafficking of illicit goods, including drugs, trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling.

In addition, the EU will support regional cooperation frameworks in third countries to further assist them in stopping illicit trafficking at the source, in line with the principle of shared responsibility for the whole criminal supply chain. Moreover, the EU will do its part to help strengthen the security of logistic hubs abroad, by coordinating joint inspections in third country ports.

Operational cooperation

Global Gateway will support sustainable and high-quality infrastructure projects in digital, climate and energy, transport, health, education and research sectors. The Commission will now include security considerations, where relevant, in the future Global Gateway investments. This will include initiatives critical to the strategic autonomy of the EU and its partner countries, such as infrastructure projects incorporating security assessments and risk mitigation measures.

The Commission will pursue further agreements between the EU and third countries on cooperation with Europol and Eurojust, notably with Latin American countries.

In addition, the proactive participation of non-EU countries in EMPACT is one of the most effective means of strengthening operational cooperation. The EU will further encourage the involvement of third countries, notably the Western Balkans, the Eastern Neighbourhood, Sub-Sahara Africa, North Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean, in the framework. Another tool to step up cooperation with third countries on combatting crime is the Operational Task Forces between Member States and coordinated by Europol, where third countries can participate. The Commission aims to also finalise negotiations for the EU-Interpol international agreement 86 , ensuring a more unified approach to global security threats and fighting transnational crimes.

The Union must be present on the ground in a Team Europe approach. Specialist Union and Member State staff play a critical role in ensuring that the Union’s external action is well informed, coordinated, and responsive. To elevate this approach to the next level, the Commission, supported by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, will reinforce liaison networks and facilitate the deployment of regional Europol and Eurojust liaison officers, in line with the operational needs of Member States.

The EU will seek closer operational law enforcement and judicial cooperation, foster real-time information sharing and joint operations through Joint Investigation Teams in third countries with the support of Europol and Eurojust. The Commission will also support Member States in setting up joint fusion centres bringing together experts and local law enforcement in strategic third countries.

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) tools

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions will also be used to their full potential to better identify and tackle external threats to the EU’s internal security, in line with their mandates set by the Council. To build third countries’ capacities, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission will support CSDP actions with dedicated funding instruments and explore all suitable avenues of funding.

EU restrictive measures are a well-established CFSP tool, also employed for the fight against terrorism. Based on suggestions from the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Member States, or the Commission, the Council could assess how the EU’s existing autonomous restrictive measures (EU terrorist list) could be made more effective, operational and agile. Moreover, they could consider exploring additional restrictive measures targeting criminal networks, in line with CFSP objectives.

Visa policy and information exchange

The EU’s visa policy is a key tool for cooperating with third countries and securing our borders by controlling entry into the EU and setting the conditions for it. The Commission will fully integrate security considerations into the EU visa policy through an upcoming EU Visa Policy Strategy. The Commission will work with the co-legislators to adopt the proposal to revise and streamline the Visa Suspension Mechanism, particularly for specific cases of misuse of the visa-free regime 87 . Third countries will be encouraged to share information about individuals who may pose security threats, which will be entered into EU information systems and databases.

To achieve policy coordination and upstream efforts, unlocking more efficient, swift and smooth cooperation, the Commission will work towards establishing data flow arrangements and explore ways to enhance information exchange for law enforcement and border management purposes with trusted third countries in compliance with fundamental rights and data protection rules.

Key actions

The Commission will:

·conclude international agreements between the EU and priority third countries on cooperation with Europol and Eurojust

·encourage the participation of partner countries in EMPACT to fight organised crime and terrorism

·support EU agencies and bodies in establishing and strengthening working arrangements with partner countries

·further reflect security considerations in EU visa policy through the upcoming Visa Strategy

·strengthen information exchange with trusted third countries for law enforcement and border management purposes

The Commission, in cooperation with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, will:

·make full use of civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions

·coordinate joint inspections in third country ports by 2027

The Commission, in cooperation with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the Member States, will:

·reinforce liaison networks and cooperation in a Team Europe approach

·set up joint operational teams and fusion centres in third countries from 2025 onwards

The European Parliament and the Council are urged to:

·conclude negotiations on the revision of the Visa Suspension Mechanism


8.Conclusion

In a world of uncertainty, the Union’s capacity to anticipate, prevent and respond to security threats needs to be upgraded.

It is not enough to only respond to crises when they occur. We need to sharpen our awareness with a full picture of the threats as they evolve. And to ensure our tools and capabilities are up to the task.

The comprehensive set of measures detailed in this Strategy will help create a stronger Union in the world: a Union that is able to anticipate, plan for, and take care of its own security needs, that can respond effectively to threats to its internal security and hold perpetrators accountable, and that protects its open, free and prosperous societies and democracies.

This demands a change in our mindset on internal security. We will work to help foster a new EU security culture, where security considerations are factored into all our legislation, policies and programmes – from inception to implementation. And where collaboration across policy areas allows us to break new ground.

This is not the task of just one institution, government or actor. It is Europe’s common endeavour.


(1)

  https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf  

(2)

  Flash Eurobarometer FL550 : EU Challenges and Priorities.

(3)

  https://reports.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risks_Report_2025.pdf , p.17.

(4)

  COM (2025) 46 final .

(5)

  JOIN (2025) 130 final .

(6)

  JOIN (2025) 120 final .

(7)

   Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness, p. 23. 

(8)

Sectoral Threat Assessments that will contribute to inform this threat analysis include the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA), the EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (TE-SAT), the Joint Cyber Assessment Report (JCAR), and future assessments of money laundering and terrorist financing threats, risks and methods to be carried out by the Commission and the Anti-money Laundering Authority.

(9)

 COM (2022)119 final

(10)

  https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/europol-frontex_joint_statement_signed_31.1.2024.pdf .

(11)

That is, the networks used by law enforcement, border guards, customs authorities, civil protection, firefighters, medical emergency responders and other key actors for public security and safety.

(12)

EU Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite

(13)

  https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf

(14)

  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52019PC0070 .

(15)

Concluding report of the High-Level Group on access to data for effective law enforcement- 15/11/2024, 4802e306-c364-4154-835b-e986a9a49281_en .

(16)

Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2023 on European Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal proceedings and for the execution of custodial sentences following criminal proceedings, OJ L 191, 28.7.2023.

(17)

 Council conclusions on access to data for effective law enforcement (12 December 2024) https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16448-2024-INIT/en/pdf .

(18)

As reported in the Commission Assessment of the effect given by the Member States to Council Recommendation (EU) 2022/915 of 9 June 2022 on operational law enforcement cooperation (5909/25).

(19)

Regulation (EU) 2024/982 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the automated search and exchange of data for police cooperation and amending Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA and Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) No 2019/817 and (EU) 2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council (the Prüm II Regulation), OJ L, 2024/982, 5.4.2024.

(20)

Directive (EU) 2023/977 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 on the exchange of information between the law enforcement authorities of Member States and repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, OJ L 134, 22.5.2023, p. 1–24.

(21)

Secure Information Exchange Network Application.

(22)

Notably, the Entry/Exit System (EES) will enable Member States to identify third-country nationals at the external borders of the Schengen area and record their entries and exits, allowing for a systematic identification of overstayers. Prior to arrival of a third-country national at the external borders, the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) and Visa Information System (VIS) will allow Member States to pre-assess whether the presence of a third-country national in the EU territory would pose a security risk.

(23)

The MID is one of the interoperability components introduced by Regulation (EU) 2019/818 and Regulation 2019/817.

(24)

  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5047 .

(25)

Passenger Name Record (PNR) and Advance Passenger Information (API) framework established by Directive (EU) 2016/681 (’PNR Directive’) and Regulation (EU) 2025/12, Regulation (EU) 2025/13 (‘API Regulations’).

(26)

See the Commission Joint Research Centre report “Emerging risks and opportunities for EU internal security stemming from new technologies” https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC139674 .   

(27)

 Study on strengthening EU-funded security research and innovation – 20 years of EU-Funded Civil Security Research and Innovation – 2025, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2837/0004501 .

(28)

As laid down in the Niinistö report.

(29)

  EU Innovation Hub for Internal Security | Europol .

(30)

  OJ C/2024/3510 , 30.5.2024.

(31)

  Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC . 

(32)

  Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) .

(33)

The sectors covered by the Directive are energy, transport, banking, financial market infrastructure, health, drinking water, wastewater, digital infrastructure, public administration, space, food production, processing and distribution.

(34)

  EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence 2022 , p.22

(35)

The EU Protective Security Advisors, European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network (EEODN), ATLAS Network, EU High Risk Security Network (EU HRSN), CBRN Security Advisory Group, Critical Entities Resilience Group (CERG).

(36)

  JOIN (2025) 9 final .

(37)

Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023.

(38)

https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/european-action-plan-cybersecurity-hospitals-and-healthcare-providers .

(39)

  COM (2025) 90 final . 

(40)

COM (2025) 89 final.

(41)

Such as on 5G networks, telecommunications, electricity, renewable energy and connected vehicles.

(42)

https://cybersecurityventures.com/global-ransomware-damage-costs-predicted-to-reach-250-billion-usd-by-2031/ .

(43)

  https://counter-ransomware.org/ .

(44)

Available through the No More Ransom project, https://www.nomoreransom.org/en/index.html .

(45)

  https://strategic-technologies.europa.eu/about_en#step-scope .

(46)

 e.g. EuropHPC JU  https://eurohpc-ju.europa.eu/index_en , the Quantum Flagship Homepage of Quantum Flagship | Quantum Flagship , the 3C networks (COM(2024) 81 final) and the EU Cable Action Security Plan (JOIN(2025) 9 final).

(47)

  Recommendation on a Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography | Shaping Europe’s digital future .

(48)

https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-quantum-communication-infrastructure-euroqci .

(49)

DSA Elections Toolkit for Digital Services Coordinators 2025  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/dsa-elections-toolkit-digital-services-coordinators .

(50)

Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024.

(51)

  Digital Education Action Plan (2021-2027) - European Education Area .

(52)

COM (2024) 570 final.

(53)

Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities, ST/8744/2024/INIT, OJ L, 2024/2642, 9.10.2024.

(54)

Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security, OJ L 97, 9.4.2008, p. 72–84.

(55)

  JOIN (2023) 8 final .

(56)

  COM (2025) 30 final .

(57)

  COM (2025) 85 final .

(58)

Directive 2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, OJ L 216, 20.8.2009

(59)

 Most notably through Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 on serious cross-border health threats.

(60)

  https://www.eucpn.org/ .

(61)

Including recent EMPACT cases.

(62)

https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU-SOCTA-2025.pdf.

(63)

https://administrativeapproach.eu/sites/default/files/page/files/eu-jha-council-9-10-june-conclusions-administrative-approach-org-crime.pdf .

(64)

 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council, COM(2023) 234 final , Brussels, 3.5.2023.

(65)

  https://www.amla.europa.eu/index_en .

(66)

  Directive (EU) 2024/1260 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on asset recovery and confiscation, OJ L, 2024/1260, 2.5.2024.

(67)

  Global Anti-Scam Report 2024 .

(68)

  COM (2020) 607 final

(69)

  COM (2022) 209 final and  COM (2024) 60 final . 

(70)

  COM (2023) 641 final .

(71)

  Directive (EU) 2024/1712 of 13 June 2024 amending Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, OJ L, 2024/1712, 24.6.2024.

(72)

  COM (2023) 755 final  and  COM (2023) 754 final . 

(73)

  Toolbox addressing the use of commercial means of transport to facilitate irregular migration to the EU .

(74)

Including the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).

(75)

 The Commission will also support finalising the Regulation on measures against transport operators that facilitate or engage in trafficking in persons or smuggling of migrants, COM(2021) 753 final .

(76)

  Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024.

(77)

EU Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL), European Network of Prosecutors for the Environment (ENPE), EnviCrimeNet and EU Forum of Judges for the Environment (EUFJE).

(78)

  Committee of experts on the protection of the environment through Criminal Law (PC-ENV) - European Committee on Crime Problems .

(79)

Notably through the establishment of the e-Justice Communication via Online Data Exchange (eCODEX) and European Criminal Records Information System - Third Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN).

(80)

By 31 December 2024, 1426 removal orders have been issued to take terrorist content down or block access thereto, the large majority of which targeting Jihadist terrorist content but also right-wing terrorist content.

(81)

  Knowledge Hub on the Protection of Public Spaces .

(82)

Following from the set of key actions in the 2023 Counter-drone Communication,  COM(2023) 659 final .

(83)

In full compliance with the Schengen Borders Code and Screening Regulation.

(84)

Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Global Coalition against Da’esh, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), the Christchurch Call Foundation, the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.

(85)

  JOIN (2023) 8 final .

(86)

Council Decision (EU) 2021/1312 of 19 July 2021 & Council Decision (EU) 2021/1313 of 19 July 2021.

(87)

  COM (2023) 642 .