Vragen over EU hulp aan Egypte - Main contents
Als lid van de begrotingscontrolecommissie heeft Thijs vandaag schriftelijke vragen gesteld aan de Europese Commissie naar aanleiding van een kritisch rapport van de Europese Rekenkamer over de hulp aan Egypte. De Rekenkamer heeft onderzoek gedaan naar de manier waarop de Europese Commissie voor en na de Arabische Lente financiële steun heeft gegeven aan Egypte voor de opbouw van goed bestuur en de bescherming van mensenrechten. Volgens de Rekenkamer was deze hulp ondoeltreffend.
Zo bleek onder andere dat programma's voor mensenrechtenorganisaties waren geannuleerd. Ook was het beheer van de overheidsfinanciën door de Egyptische autoriteiten ver onder de maat en heeft de Europese Commissie hier onvoldoende consequenties aan verbonden.
De Europese Commissie heeft aangegeven dat ze al veel van de aanbevelingen van de Rekenkamer heeft opgevolgd. Thijs wil graag weten waarom de Commissie bepaalde keuzes heeft gemaakt bij het uitgeven van de hulp en hoe de verbeteringen nu worden doorgevoerd.
De vragen die Thijs heeft gesteld:
On June 18, 2013, the European Court of Auditors published a special report (no 4) on "EU cooperation with Egypt in the field of governance". In this report, the ECA made several highly critical observations on the way approximately €1 bln of aid has been spent.
In its report, the ECA states that an ENPI programme on human rights and civil society was not based on lessons learned and that it has been implemented by, amongst others, organisations linked to the Mubarak regime. Commission merely replied that it was too early to change the approach with lessons learned. Is the Commission improving its design of programming in such a way that lessons learned are taken onboard?
A number of CSO projects did not achieve their objectives due to interference by or lack of agreement with Egyptian authorities; in April 2012, a CSO programme under ENPI had to be cancelled. But, even though democracy and human rights are EU policy priorities, very limited funding has been made available under other financial instruments, such as EIDHR, which would not need strong cooperation and agreement by the Egyptian authorities. Why did the Commission not make more funding available through these channels?
The ECA highlighted that the Commission has not carried out a mapping exercise of Egyptian NGOs. In its reply the Commission said that the mapping was taking place in 2013. Why is this done at such a late stage?
Why did the Commission not decide to follow up on its severe criticisms on human rights violations with a suspension of aid, even partially and/or temporarily?
The Commission did not ask the Egyptian authorities to establish a Public Finance Management (PFM) plan even though 60% of the EU assistance was channelled through sectoral budget support (SBS). Why did the Commission not use SBS - in general, much easier to control - to address the shortcomings in PFM?
The ECA also criticises the fact that the Commission did not set clear criteria for PFM reform. Why did the Commission stick to its "dynamic" approach even though clear benchmarks were needed according to the ECA? And why did the Commission continue with the disbursement of budget support even though the Egyptian authorities did not want to put PFM reform on the agenda of the Informal Economic Dialogue?
Afbeelding: http://www.sxc.hu/photo/1170863