COM(2001)175 - On Proposed New Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services - Draft Guidelines on market analysis and the calculation of significant market power under Article 14 of the proposed Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services

official title

 

Legal instrument	Working paper
Decision making procedure	ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
reference by COM-number265	COM(2001)175
Additional COM-numbers	COM(2001)175
procedure number267	2000/0184(COD)
CELEX number268	52001DC0175

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• 1. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 2. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 3. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 4. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 5. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 6. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 7. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 8. 

  Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 6.9.1991, p.2.
  
   
• 9. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 10. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 11. 

  Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 6.9.1991, p.2.
  
   
• 12. 

  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5, (hereafter Notice on market definition)
  
   
• 13. 

  Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, OJ C 265, 22.8.1998, p. 2 (hereafter, Access notice).
  
   
• 14. 

  Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 6.9.1991, p.2.
  
   
• 15. 

  Case C-209/98, Entreprenørforeningens Affalds
   
• 16. 

  See Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), OJ 1997 L199/32 (the 'Interconnection Directive'); Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision, OJ 1990 L192/1 (the 'ONP Framework Directive'); Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision to leased lines, OJ 1992 L165/27 (the 'Leased Lines Directive'); Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1995 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, OJ 1995 L321/6, replaced by Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1998 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment, OJ 1998 L101/24 (the 'ONP Voice Telephony Directive').
  
   
• 17. 

  Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v Commission
   
• 18. 

  To the extent that the electronic communications sector is technology and innovation-driven, any previous market definition may not necessarily be relevant at a later point in time.
  
   
• 19. 

  Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Framework Directive.
  
   
• 20. 

  Notice on market definition, p.5.
  
   
• 21. 

  See Notice on market definition, par.20.
  
   
• 22. 

  See also, Access Notice, par 46. This test is also known as 'SSNIP' (small but significant non transitory increase in price).
  
   
• 23. 

  In other words, where the cross-elasticity of demand between two products is high, one may conclude that consumers view these products as close substitutes.
  
   
• 24. 

  Case 31/80 L'Oréal
   
• 25. 

  Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed
   
• 26. 

  Communication from the Commission - Status of voice on the Internet under Community law, and in particular, under Directive 90/388/EEC - Supplement to the Communication by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the status and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ C 369, 22.12.2000, p.3.
  
   
• 27. 

  The time frame to be used to assess the likely responses of other suppliers in case of a relative price increase will inevitably depend on the characteristics of each market and should be decided on a case-by case basis. Given the constant technological developments of the telecommunications markets, NRA's should, in principle, evaluate the likely responses of suppliers in a period which is less than one year.
  
   
• 28. 

  United Brands, cit., par 44, Michelin, cit., par 26, Case 247/86 Alsatel v Novasam
   
• 29. 

  Deutsche Bahn v Commission, cit., par 92.
  
   
• 30. 

  See for instance, Case No IV/ML.1025, Mannesmann/Olivetti/Infostrada, par. 17, Case No COMP/JV.23 - Telefonica Portugal Telecom/Médi Telecom.
  
   
• 31. 

  In practice, this area will correspond to the limits of the area in which an operator is authorised to operate. In Case No COMP/M.1650 - ACEA/Telefonica, the Commission pointed out that since the notified joint venture would have a licence limited to the area of Rome, the geographical market could be defined as local; at par.16.
  
   
• 32. 

  The fact that mobile operators can provide services only in the areas where they have been authorised to and the fact that a network architecture reflects the geographical dimension of the mobile licenses, explains why mobile markets are considered to be national in scope. The extra connection and communications costs that consumers face when roaming abroad, coupled with the loss of certain additional service functionalities (i.e., lack of voice mail abroad) further supports this definition; see Case No IV/M.1430 - Vodafone/Airtouch, paras. 13-17, Case No COMP/JV.17 - Mannesmann/Bell Atlantic/Omnitel, para.15..
  
   
• 33. 

  Physical interconnection agreements may also be taken into consideration for defining the geographical scope of the market, Case No IV/M.570 - TBT/BT/TeleDanmark/Telenor, par. 35.
  
   
• 34. 

  Reference may be made, for instance, to the market for backhaul capacity in international routes (i.e. cable station serving country A to country E) where a potential for substitution between cable stations serving different countries (i.e., cable stations connecting Country A to B, A to C and A to D) may exist where a supplier of backhaul capacity in relation to the route A to E is or would be constrained by the ability of consumers to switch to any of the other 'routes', also able to deal with traffic from or to country E.
  
   
• 35. 

  See Notice on market definition, paras. 57 and 58.
  
   
• 36. 

  Evidence should show clear price interdependence at the extremes of the chain and the degree of substitutability between the relevant products or geographical areas should be sufficiently strong.
  
   
• 37. 

  Regulation (EEC) no 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p.1, as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) no 1310/97 of 30 June 1997,OJ L 180, 09.7.1997, p. 1 (hereafter, the "Merger Control Regulation).
  
   
• 38. 

  See also, Joined Cases T-125/97 and T-127/97 The Coca-Cola Company and Others v Commission
   
• 39. 

  Access Notice, par. 45.
  
   
• 40. 

  See Commission decision of 20 May 1999, Cégétel
   
• 41. 

  Directive 96/19/EC, recital 20, OJ L 74 22.3.1996, p.13. See also, Communication from the Commission, Unbundled access to the local loop: enabling the competitive provision of a full range of electronic communication services, including broadband multimedia and high speed Internet, OJ C 272, 23.9.2000, p. 55. Pursuant to point 3.2, 'While categories of services have to be monitored closely, particularly given the speed of technological change, and regularly reassessed on a case-by-case basis, these services are presently normally not substitutable for one another, and would therefore be considered as forming different relevant markets'.
  
   
• 42. 

  Id. at point 3.2
  
   
• 43. 

  It could also be argued that dial-up access to the Internet via existing 2G mobile telephones is a separate market from dial-up access via the public switched telecommunications network. According to the Commission, accessing the internet via a mobile phone is unlikely to be a substitute for existing methods of accessing the Internet via a PC due to difference in sizes of the screen and the format of the material that can be obtained through the different platforms; see Case No COMP/M.1982 - Telia/Oracle/Drutt, para.15, and Case No COMP/JV.48
   
• 44. 

  Case No IV/M.1430 - Vodafone/Airtouch, Case No IV/M.1669, Deutsche Telecom/One2One, par 7. Whether this market can be further segmented into a carrier (network operator) market and a downstream service market should be decided on a case-by-case basis; see Case No IN/1760, Mannesmann/Orange, paras.8-10, and Case No COMP/M.2053 - Telenor/BellSouth/Sonofon, paras 9-10.
  
   
• 45. 

  Case No IV/M.856 - BT/MCI (II), OJ L 8.12.1997. These services are provided on the basis of existing international transmission facilities existing between the countries concerned or through the use of international private leased circuits hired from facilities based operators. In that decision, the Commission considered that cable and satellite networks are not substitutable for the provision of international voice services at the required standard, para.13.
  
   
• 46. 

  Case No IV/35.337, Atlas (OJ L 239, 19.9.1996) paras. 5-7, Case No IV/35617, Phoenix/Global/One (OJ L239, 19.9.1996), par. 6, Case IV/34.857, BT-MCI (OJ L 223, 27.8.1994), Case No IV/M.802 - Telecom Eireann, par. 22.
  
   
• 47. 

  Case No IV/M.975 - Albacom/BT/ENI, par 24.
  
   
• 48. 

  Idem, par 17; From the point of view of end users, audioconferencing was considered a separate market, given that demand substitutes such as videoconferencing were significantly more expensive and it was unlikely that consumers would switch to such services in response to a small but significant permanent price increase (the 'hypothetical monopolist test').
  
   
• 49. 

  Case IV/350518 - Iridium, OJ L 16, 18.1.1997.
  
   
• 50. 

  Case No IV/M.570 - TBT/BT/TeleDanmark/Telenor, Case No IV/M.900 - BT/TELE DK/SBB/Migros/UBS, par. 25.
  
   
• 51. 

  Case No COMP/M.1957 - VIAG Interkom/Telenor Media, par 8.
  
   
• 52. 

  From a demand point of view access to the Internet can be provided at a variety of bandwidths, with low bandwidth service (dial-up service) offered, generally, to residential customers and high-bandwidth service (i.e., dedicated, high speed connections) to business customers, Case no IV/M.1439 - Telia/Telenor, Case No COMP/JV.46 - Blackstone/CDPQ/Kabel Nordrhein/Westfalen, par. 26, Case No COMP/M.1838 - BT/Esat, par 7. In the latter case, the Commission left open the question whether the dial-up market could also be segmented into a residential and a business market (SME) given that business dial-up was being provided on the basis of more sophisticated dial-up mechanisms.
  
   
• 53. 

  Case No COMP/M.1975 - Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmann, Case No COMP/M.2016 - France Telecom/Orange, para.15.
  
   
• 54. 

  For instance, in British Interactive Broadcasting/Open, the Commission noted that for the provision of basic voice services to consumers, the relevant infrastructure market included not only the traditional copper network of BT but also the cable networks of the cable operators, which were capable of providing basic telephony services, and possibly wireless fixed networks see Case No IV/36.359, OJ L 312, 6.12.1999, paras.33-38. In Case No IV/M.1113 - Nortel/Norweb, the Commission recognised that electricity networks using 'Digital Power Line' technology could provide an alternative to existing traditional local telecommunications access loop, par. 28-29.
  
   
• 55. 

  In assessing the conditions of network competition in the Irish market that would ensue following full liberalisation, the Commission also relied on the existence of what, at that period of time, were perceived as potential alternative infrastructure providers, namely, cable TV and electricity networks, Telecom Eireann, cit., para.30. The Commission left open the question whether the provision of transmission capacity by an undersea network infrastructure constitutes a distinct market from terrestrial or satellite transmissions networks, Case No COMP/M.1926 - Telefonica/Tyco/JV, at par. 8.
  
   
• 56. 

  In applying these criteria, the Commission has found that, as far as the fixed infrastructure is concerned, demand for the lease of transmission capacity and the provision of related services to other operators occurs at wholesale level (the market for carrier's carrier services; see Case No IV/M.683 - GTS-HERMES Inc./HIT Rail BV, par 14, M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI, OJ L 116, 4.5.1999, p. 1, Unisource, OJ L 318, 1997, p. 1, Phoenix/Global One, OJ L 239, 1996, p. 57, JV.2, Enel/FT/DT
  
   
• 57. 

  See footnote 25.
  
   
• 58. 

  Fiber optics are currently competitive only on upstream transmission markets whereas wireless local loops which are still to be deployed will target mainly professionals and individuals with particular communications needs. With the exception of certain national markets, existing cable TV networks need costly upgrades to support two ways broadband communications, and, compared with xDLS technologies, they do not offer a guaranteed bandwidth since customers share the same cable channel.
  
   
• 59. 

  See also Case No IV/JV.11 -
   
• 60. 

  .If an undertaking wants to terminate calls to the subscribers of a particular network, in principle, it will have no other choice but to call or interconnect with the network to which the called party has subscribed. In that regard, it is worth mentioning that one NRA has already defined an indirect access market for call origination on individual mobile networks.
  
   
• 61. 

  Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission,
   
• 62. 

  See also recital 20 of the Framework directive.
  
   
• 63. 

  Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission
   
• 64. 

  The absence of any substitutable service or product may justify a finding of a situation of economic dependence which is characteristic of the existence of a dominant position; See Commission decisions, Decca Navigator System, OJ L 65, 1987, and Magill TV Guide:ITP, BBC, RTE, OJ L 78, 1989, p. 43. See also, Case 22/78 Hugin v Commission 1979
   
• 65. 

  See also recital 15 of Regulation No 4064/89
  
   
• 66. 

  United Brands v Commission, cit. The greater the difference between the market share of the undertaking in question and that of its competitors, the more likely will it be that the said undertaking is in a dominant position.
  
   
• 67. 

  Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission,
   
• 68. 

  Case Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, cit., par. 41, Case C-62/86, Akzo v Commission
   
• 69. 

  Notice on market definition, cit., at p. 5
  
   
• 70. 

  See, Determination of Organizations with Significant Power (SMP) for the implementation of the ONP Directive, DG XIII, 1 March 1999, at
  
   
• 71. 

  Idem, at par. 5.2
  
   
• 72. 

  With regard to the interconnection market of fixed and mobile networks, the termination traffic to be measured should include own network traffic and interconnection traffic received from all other fixed and mobile networks, national or international.
  
   
• 73. 

  Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, cit., at para. 48.
  
   
• 74. 

  Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak v Commission
   
• 75. 

  See Access Notice, par 65.
  
   
• 76. 

  For instance, vertical integration is particularly prevalent in digital pay TV markets where content providers usually also control the digital platform.
  
   
• 77. 

  Access Notice, par. 79.
  
   
• 78. 

  Joined cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie maritime Belge and others v Commission
   
• 79. 

  Idem, at para.39.
  
   
• 80. 

  Case T102/96, Gencor v Commission
   
• 81. 

  See Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, SIV and Others v Commission
   
• 82. 

  Case No IV/M.619, - Gencor Lonhro (OJ 1997, L 11, p.30).
  
   
• 83. 

  Gencor v Commission, cit., at par 276.
  
   
• 84. 

  Idem, at par. 277
  
   
• 85. 

  Compagnie Maritime Belge transports and Others, cit., at par 39.
  
   
• 86. 

  See in particular, France and Others v Commission, cit., par 221.
  
   
• 87. 

  Compagnie Maritime Belge, at par 39.
  
   
• 88. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 89. 

  Idem at par. 44.
  
   
• 90. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 91. 

  Idem at par. 45.
  
   
• 92. 

  The use here of the term 'co-ordinated effects' is no different from the term 'parallel anticompetitive behavior' also used in Commission's decisions applying the concept of collective (oligopolistic) dominance.
  
   
• 93. 

  See in particular, Case No COMP/M. 1882 - Pirelli/BICC, Case No IV/M.1527 - OTTO Versand/Freemans, Case No IV/M1225 - Enso/Stora (OJ L 254, 29.9.1999, p. 9), Case No IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First Choice (OJ L 93, 13.4.2000, p. 1), Case No IV/M.1517, Rhodia/Donau Chemie/Albright
   
• 94. 

  As the Commission noted in Price Waterhouse/Coopers
   
• 95. 

  Enso/Stora, cit., at par.67.
  
   
• 96. 

  Idem.
  
   
• 97. 

  See in particular, France and Others v Commission, cit., at par. 226. Large imbalances of market share between the undertakings concerned may render the existence or creation of a collective dominant position highly unlikely, Rhodia/Donau Chemie/Albright
   
• 98. 

  See also Case No IV/M.942 - VEBA/Degussa, OJ L 201, 17.7.1998, p. 102, at par. 44 (market conditions were not found to be transparent). In Enso/Stora the Commission also took into consideration the absence of market transparency regarding such key parameters as supplies and prices together with the existence of secret discounts, cit., at para.68. See also, Pirelli/BICC, cit., 'the results of market investigation indicate that price transparency for LV/MV products is rather low due to absence of meaningful list prices and varying customer-defined specifications. Collusive strategies are thus further complicated', par. 91.
  
   
• 99. 

  A finding of collective dominance may be negated if it can be established that there exist overcapacities distributed among the undertakings concerned 'in a way that would allow for breaking up of parallel anticompetitive behavior', see in particular, Rhodia/Donau Chemie/Albright
   
• 100. 

  See for instance, Enso/Stora, cit., at paras. 75-77.
  
   
• 101. 

  See Case No IV/M.1313 - Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, OJ L 20, 25.1.2000, p. 1, paras. 171 to 174..
  
   
• 102. 

  Idem, at par.174
  
   
• 103. 

  In Price Waterhouse/Coopers
   
• 104. 

  Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, cit., par.176.
  
   
• 105. 

  In other words, while in a 'cartel'-type situation, compliance with an agreed conduct may well be enforced by means of a retaliatory mechanism, in a situation of oligopolistic dominance retaliation may for instance consist of reverting to the pre-price increase market equilibrium.
  
   
• 106. 

  Case No COMP/M.1838 - BT/Esat.
  
   
• 107. 

  Idem, paras 10 to 14.
  
   
• 108. 

  Case No IV/M.1430 - Vodafone/Airtouch.
  
   
• 109. 

  Idem, at par 28. The likely emergence of a duopolistic market concerned only the three largest mobile operators, that is D2 and E-Plus, on the one hand, and T-Mobil on the other hand, given that VIAG Interkom's market share was below 5%. The Commission's concerns were finally removed after the parties proposed to divest Vodafone's entire stake in E-Plus.
  
   
• 110. 

  Case No COMP/M.2016 - France Telecom/Orange, at par. 26.
  
   
• 111. 

  Idem, at paras 39-40.
  
   
• 112. 

  In its Working Document 'On the initial findings of the sector inquiry into mobile roaming charges', the Commission made reference to (i) the existence of a number of economic links that existed between mobile operators, namely through their interconnection agreements, their membership of the GSM Association, the WAP and the UMTS forum, the fact that terms and conditions of roaming agreements were almost standardized, and (ii) the existence of high barriers to entry. In its assessment the Commission also stressed that the fact that the mobile market is, in general, technology driven, did not seem to have affected the conditions of competition prevailing on the wholesale international roaming market, see europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others, at pages. 24 and 25.
  
   
• 113. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 114. 

  Obligations of a nature to substitute temporarily for the absence of competition in a relevant market.
  
   
• 115. 

  See article 21 of the Framework Directive.
  
   
• 116. 

  GATS commitments taken by EC on telecommunications: gats-info.eu.int
  
   
• 117. 

  Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 6.9.1991, p.2.
  
   
• 118. 

  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5, (hereafter Notice on market definition)
  
   
• 119. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 120. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 121. 

  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5, (hereafter Notice on market definition)
  
   
• 122. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 123. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 124. 

  Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 6.9.1991, p.2.
  
   
• 125. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 126. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 127. 

  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5, (hereafter Notice on market definition)
  
   
• 128. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 129. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 130. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 131. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 132. 

  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5, (hereafter Notice on market definition)
  
   
• 133. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 134. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 135. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 136. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 137. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 138. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 139. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 140. 

  Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 6.9.1991, p.2.
  
   
• 141. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 142. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 143. 

  Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 6.9.1991, p.2.
  
   
• 144. 

  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5, (hereafter Notice on market definition)
  
   
• 145. 

  Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector, OJ C 265, 22.8.1998, p. 2 (hereafter, Access notice).
  
   
• 146. 

  Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 6.9.1991, p.2.
  
   
• 147. 

  Case C-209/98, Entreprenørforeningens Affalds
   
• 148. 

  See Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), OJ 1997 L199/32 (the 'Interconnection Directive'); Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the establishment of the internal market for telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision, OJ 1990 L192/1 (the 'ONP Framework Directive'); Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision to leased lines, OJ 1992 L165/27 (the 'Leased Lines Directive'); Directive 95/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1995 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony, OJ 1995 L321/6, replaced by Directive 98/10/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 1998 on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment, OJ 1998 L101/24 (the 'ONP Voice Telephony Directive').
  
   
• 149. 

  Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and Others v Commission
   
• 150. 

  To the extent that the electronic communications sector is technology and innovation-driven, any previous market definition may not necessarily be relevant at a later point in time.
  
   
• 151. 

  Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Framework Directive.
  
   
• 152. 

  Notice on market definition, p.5.
  
   
• 153. 

  See Notice on market definition, par.20.
  
   
• 154. 

  See also, Access Notice, par 46. This test is also known as 'SSNIP' (small but significant non transitory increase in price).
  
   
• 155. 

  In other words, where the cross-elasticity of demand between two products is high, one may conclude that consumers view these products as close substitutes.
  
   
• 156. 

  Case 31/80 L'Oréal
   
• 157. 

  Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed
   
• 158. 

  Communication from the Commission - Status of voice on the Internet under Community law, and in particular, under Directive 90/388/EEC - Supplement to the Communication by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the status and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, OJ C 369, 22.12.2000, p.3.
  
   
• 159. 

  The time frame to be used to assess the likely responses of other suppliers in case of a relative price increase will inevitably depend on the characteristics of each market and should be decided on a case-by case basis. Given the constant technological developments of the telecommunications markets, NRA's should, in principle, evaluate the likely responses of suppliers in a period which is less than one year.
  
   
• 160. 

  United Brands, cit., par 44, Michelin, cit., par 26, Case 247/86 Alsatel v Novasam
   
• 161. 

  Deutsche Bahn v Commission, cit., par 92.
  
   
• 162. 

  See for instance, Case No IV/ML.1025, Mannesmann/Olivetti/Infostrada, par. 17, Case No COMP/JV.23 - Telefonica Portugal Telecom/Médi Telecom.
  
   
• 163. 

  In practice, this area will correspond to the limits of the area in which an operator is authorised to operate. In Case No COMP/M.1650 - ACEA/Telefonica, the Commission pointed out that since the notified joint venture would have a licence limited to the area of Rome, the geographical market could be defined as local; at par.16.
  
   
• 164. 

  The fact that mobile operators can provide services only in the areas where they have been authorised to and the fact that a network architecture reflects the geographical dimension of the mobile licenses, explains why mobile markets are considered to be national in scope. The extra connection and communications costs that consumers face when roaming abroad, coupled with the loss of certain additional service functionalities (i.e., lack of voice mail abroad) further supports this definition; see Case No IV/M.1430 - Vodafone/Airtouch, paras. 13-17, Case No COMP/JV.17 - Mannesmann/Bell Atlantic/Omnitel, para.15..
  
   
• 165. 

  Physical interconnection agreements may also be taken into consideration for defining the geographical scope of the market, Case No IV/M.570 - TBT/BT/TeleDanmark/Telenor, par. 35.
  
   
• 166. 

  Reference may be made, for instance, to the market for backhaul capacity in international routes (i.e. cable station serving country A to country E) where a potential for substitution between cable stations serving different countries (i.e., cable stations connecting Country A to B, A to C and A to D) may exist where a supplier of backhaul capacity in relation to the route A to E is or would be constrained by the ability of consumers to switch to any of the other 'routes', also able to deal with traffic from or to country E.
  
   
• 167. 

  See Notice on market definition, paras. 57 and 58.
  
   
• 168. 

  Evidence should show clear price interdependence at the extremes of the chain and the degree of substitutability between the relevant products or geographical areas should be sufficiently strong.
  
   
• 169. 

  Regulation (EEC) no 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p.1, as last amended by Council Regulation (EC) no 1310/97 of 30 June 1997,OJ L 180, 09.7.1997, p. 1 (hereafter, the "Merger Control Regulation).
  
   
• 170. 

  See also, Joined Cases T-125/97 and T-127/97 The Coca-Cola Company and Others v Commission
   
• 171. 

  Access Notice, par. 45.
  
   
• 172. 

  See Commission decision of 20 May 1999, Cégétel
   
• 173. 

  Directive 96/19/EC, recital 20, OJ L 74 22.3.1996, p.13. See also, Communication from the Commission, Unbundled access to the local loop: enabling the competitive provision of a full range of electronic communication services, including broadband multimedia and high speed Internet, OJ C 272, 23.9.2000, p. 55. Pursuant to point 3.2, 'While categories of services have to be monitored closely, particularly given the speed of technological change, and regularly reassessed on a case-by-case basis, these services are presently normally not substitutable for one another, and would therefore be considered as forming different relevant markets'.
  
   
• 174. 

  Id. at point 3.2
  
   
• 175. 

  It could also be argued that dial-up access to the Internet via existing 2G mobile telephones is a separate market from dial-up access via the public switched telecommunications network. According to the Commission, accessing the internet via a mobile phone is unlikely to be a substitute for existing methods of accessing the Internet via a PC due to difference in sizes of the screen and the format of the material that can be obtained through the different platforms; see Case No COMP/M.1982 - Telia/Oracle/Drutt, para.15, and Case No COMP/JV.48
   
• 176. 

  Case No IV/M.1430 - Vodafone/Airtouch, Case No IV/M.1669, Deutsche Telecom/One2One, par 7. Whether this market can be further segmented into a carrier (network operator) market and a downstream service market should be decided on a case-by-case basis; see Case No IN/1760, Mannesmann/Orange, paras.8-10, and Case No COMP/M.2053 - Telenor/BellSouth/Sonofon, paras 9-10.
  
   
• 177. 

  Case No IV/M.856 - BT/MCI (II), OJ L 8.12.1997. These services are provided on the basis of existing international transmission facilities existing between the countries concerned or through the use of international private leased circuits hired from facilities based operators. In that decision, the Commission considered that cable and satellite networks are not substitutable for the provision of international voice services at the required standard, para.13.
  
   
• 178. 

  Case No IV/35.337, Atlas (OJ L 239, 19.9.1996) paras. 5-7, Case No IV/35617, Phoenix/Global/One (OJ L239, 19.9.1996), par. 6, Case IV/34.857, BT-MCI (OJ L 223, 27.8.1994), Case No IV/M.802 - Telecom Eireann, par. 22.
  
   
• 179. 

  Case No IV/M.975 - Albacom/BT/ENI, par 24.
  
   
• 180. 

  Idem, par 17; From the point of view of end users, audioconferencing was considered a separate market, given that demand substitutes such as videoconferencing were significantly more expensive and it was unlikely that consumers would switch to such services in response to a small but significant permanent price increase (the 'hypothetical monopolist test').
  
   
• 181. 

  Case IV/350518 - Iridium, OJ L 16, 18.1.1997.
  
   
• 182. 

  Case No IV/M.570 - TBT/BT/TeleDanmark/Telenor, Case No IV/M.900 - BT/TELE DK/SBB/Migros/UBS, par. 25.
  
   
• 183. 

  Case No COMP/M.1957 - VIAG Interkom/Telenor Media, par 8.
  
   
• 184. 

  From a demand point of view access to the Internet can be provided at a variety of bandwidths, with low bandwidth service (dial-up service) offered, generally, to residential customers and high-bandwidth service (i.e., dedicated, high speed connections) to business customers, Case no IV/M.1439 - Telia/Telenor, Case No COMP/JV.46 - Blackstone/CDPQ/Kabel Nordrhein/Westfalen, par. 26, Case No COMP/M.1838 - BT/Esat, par 7. In the latter case, the Commission left open the question whether the dial-up market could also be segmented into a residential and a business market (SME) given that business dial-up was being provided on the basis of more sophisticated dial-up mechanisms.
  
   
• 185. 

  Case No COMP/M.1975 - Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmann, Case No COMP/M.2016 - France Telecom/Orange, para.15.
  
   
• 186. 

  For instance, in British Interactive Broadcasting/Open, the Commission noted that for the provision of basic voice services to consumers, the relevant infrastructure market included not only the traditional copper network of BT but also the cable networks of the cable operators, which were capable of providing basic telephony services, and possibly wireless fixed networks see Case No IV/36.359, OJ L 312, 6.12.1999, paras.33-38. In Case No IV/M.1113 - Nortel/Norweb, the Commission recognised that electricity networks using 'Digital Power Line' technology could provide an alternative to existing traditional local telecommunications access loop, par. 28-29.
  
   
• 187. 

  In assessing the conditions of network competition in the Irish market that would ensue following full liberalisation, the Commission also relied on the existence of what, at that period of time, were perceived as potential alternative infrastructure providers, namely, cable TV and electricity networks, Telecom Eireann, cit., para.30. The Commission left open the question whether the provision of transmission capacity by an undersea network infrastructure constitutes a distinct market from terrestrial or satellite transmissions networks, Case No COMP/M.1926 - Telefonica/Tyco/JV, at par. 8.
  
   
• 188. 

  In applying these criteria, the Commission has found that, as far as the fixed infrastructure is concerned, demand for the lease of transmission capacity and the provision of related services to other operators occurs at wholesale level (the market for carrier's carrier services; see Case No IV/M.683 - GTS-HERMES Inc./HIT Rail BV, par 14, M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI, OJ L 116, 4.5.1999, p. 1, Unisource, OJ L 318, 1997, p. 1, Phoenix/Global One, OJ L 239, 1996, p. 57, JV.2, Enel/FT/DT
  
   
• 189. 

  See footnote 25.
  
   
• 190. 

  Fiber optics are currently competitive only on upstream transmission markets whereas wireless local loops which are still to be deployed will target mainly professionals and individuals with particular communications needs. With the exception of certain national markets, existing cable TV networks need costly upgrades to support two ways broadband communications, and, compared with xDLS technologies, they do not offer a guaranteed bandwidth since customers share the same cable channel.
  
   
• 191. 

  See also Case No IV/JV.11 -
   
• 192. 

  .If an undertaking wants to terminate calls to the subscribers of a particular network, in principle, it will have no other choice but to call or interconnect with the network to which the called party has subscribed. In that regard, it is worth mentioning that one NRA has already defined an indirect access market for call origination on individual mobile networks.
  
   
• 193. 

  Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission,
   
• 194. 

  See also recital 20 of the Framework directive.
  
   
• 195. 

  Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission
   
• 196. 

  The absence of any substitutable service or product may justify a finding of a situation of economic dependence which is characteristic of the existence of a dominant position; See Commission decisions, Decca Navigator System, OJ L 65, 1987, and Magill TV Guide:ITP, BBC, RTE, OJ L 78, 1989, p. 43. See also, Case 22/78 Hugin v Commission 1979
   
• 197. 

  See also recital 15 of Regulation No 4064/89
  
   
• 198. 

  United Brands v Commission, cit. The greater the difference between the market share of the undertaking in question and that of its competitors, the more likely will it be that the said undertaking is in a dominant position.
  
   
• 199. 

  Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission,
   
• 200. 

  Case Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, cit., par. 41, Case C-62/86, Akzo v Commission
   
• 201. 

  Notice on market definition, cit., at p. 5
  
   
• 202. 

  See, Determination of Organizations with Significant Power (SMP) for the implementation of the ONP Directive, DG XIII, 1 March 1999, at
  
   
• 203. 

  Idem, at par. 5.2
  
   
• 204. 

  With regard to the interconnection market of fixed and mobile networks, the termination traffic to be measured should include own network traffic and interconnection traffic received from all other fixed and mobile networks, national or international.
  
   
• 205. 

  Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission, cit., at para. 48.
  
   
• 206. 

  Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak v Commission
   
• 207. 

  See Access Notice, par 65.
  
   
• 208. 

  For instance, vertical integration is particularly prevalent in digital pay TV markets where content providers usually also control the digital platform.
  
   
• 209. 

  Access Notice, par. 79.
  
   
• 210. 

  Joined cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie maritime Belge and others v Commission
   
• 211. 

  Idem, at para.39.
  
   
• 212. 

  Case T102/96, Gencor v Commission
   
• 213. 

  See Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89, SIV and Others v Commission
   
• 214. 

  Case No IV/M.619, - Gencor Lonhro (OJ 1997, L 11, p.30).
  
   
• 215. 

  Gencor v Commission, cit., at par 276.
  
   
• 216. 

  Idem, at par. 277
  
   
• 217. 

  Compagnie Maritime Belge transports and Others, cit., at par 39.
  
   
• 218. 

  See in particular, France and Others v Commission, cit., par 221.
  
   
• 219. 

  Compagnie Maritime Belge, at par 39.
  
   
• 220. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 221. 

  Idem at par. 44.
  
   
• 222. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 223. 

  Idem at par. 45.
  
   
• 224. 

  The use here of the term 'co-ordinated effects' is no different from the term 'parallel anticompetitive behavior' also used in Commission's decisions applying the concept of collective (oligopolistic) dominance.
  
   
• 225. 

  See in particular, Case No COMP/M. 1882 - Pirelli/BICC, Case No IV/M.1527 - OTTO Versand/Freemans, Case No IV/M1225 - Enso/Stora (OJ L 254, 29.9.1999, p.
  
  9), Case No IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First Choice (OJ L 93, 13.4.2000, p.
  
  1), Case No IV/M.1517, Rhodia/Donau Chemie/Albright
   
• 226. 

  As the Commission noted in Price Waterhouse/Coopers
   
• 227. 

  Enso/Stora, cit., at par.67.
  
   
• 228. 

  Idem.
  
   
• 229. 

  See in particular, France and Others v Commission, cit., at par. 226. Large imbalances of market share between the undertakings concerned may render the existence or creation of a collective dominant position highly unlikely, Rhodia/Donau Chemie/Albright
   
• 230. 

  See also Case No IV/M.942 - VEBA/Degussa, OJ L 201, 17.7.1998, p. 102, at par. 44 (market conditions were not found to be transparent). In Enso/Stora the Commission also took into consideration the absence of market transparency regarding such key parameters as supplies and prices together with the existence of secret discounts, cit., at para.68. See also, Pirelli/BICC, cit., 'the results of market investigation indicate that price transparency for LV/MV products is rather low due to absence of meaningful list prices and varying customer-defined specifications. Collusive strategies are thus further complicated', par. 91.
  
   
• 231. 

  A finding of collective dominance may be negated if it can be established that there exist overcapacities distributed among the undertakings concerned 'in a way that would allow for breaking up of parallel anticompetitive behavior', see in particular, Rhodia/Donau Chemie/Albright
   
• 232. 

  See for instance, Enso/Stora, cit., at paras. 75-77.
  
   
• 233. 

  See Case No IV/M.1313 - Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, OJ L 20, 25.1.2000, p. 1, paras. 171 to 174..
  
   
• 234. 

  Idem, at par.174
  
   
• 235. 

  In Price Waterhouse/Coopers
   
• 236. 

  Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, cit., par.176.
  
   
• 237. 

  In other words, while in a 'cartel'-type situation, compliance with an agreed conduct may well be enforced by means of a retaliatory mechanism, in a situation of oligopolistic dominance retaliation may for instance consist of reverting to the pre-price increase market equilibrium.
  
   
• 238. 

  Case No COMP/M.1838 - BT/Esat.
  
   
• 239. 

  Idem, paras 10 to 14.
  
   
• 240. 

  Case No IV/M.1430 - Vodafone/Airtouch.
  
   
• 241. 

  Idem, at par 28. The likely emergence of a duopolistic market concerned only the three largest mobile operators, that is D2 and E-Plus, on the one hand, and T-Mobil on the other hand, given that VIAG Interkom's market share was below 5%. The Commission's concerns were finally removed after the parties proposed to divest Vodafone's entire stake in E-Plus.
  
   
• 242. 

  Case No COMP/M.2016 - France Telecom/Orange, at par. 26.
  
   
• 243. 

  Idem, at paras 39-40.
  
   
• 244. 

  In its Working Document 'On the initial findings of the sector inquiry into mobile roaming charges', the Commission made reference to (i) the existence of a number of economic links that existed between mobile operators, namely through their interconnection agreements, their membership of the GSM Association, the WAP and the UMTS forum, the fact that terms and conditions of roaming agreements were almost standardized, and (ii) the existence of high barriers to entry. In its assessment the Commission also stressed that the fact that the mobile market is, in general, technology driven, did not seem to have affected the conditions of competition prevailing on the wholesale international roaming market, see europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others, at pages. 24 and 25.
  
   
• 245. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 246. 

  Obligations of a nature to substitute temporarily for the absence of competition in a relevant market.
  
   
• 247. 

  See article 21 of the Framework Directive.
  
   
• 248. 

  GATS commitments taken by EC on telecommunications: gats-info.eu.int
  
   
• 249. 

  Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 6.9.1991, p.2.
  
   
• 250. 

  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5, (hereafter Notice on market definition)
  
   
• 251. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 252. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 253. 

  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5, (hereafter Notice on market definition)
  
   
• 254. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 255. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 256. 

  Guidelines on the application of EEC Competition rules in the Telecommunications sector, OJ C 233, 6.9.1991, p.2.
  
   
• 257. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 258. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 259. 

  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5, (hereafter Notice on market definition)
  
   
• 260. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 261. 

  Commission proposal for a Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services COM(2000) 393 (OJ C 365 E, 19.12.2000, p.198).
  
   
• 262. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000)386, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.230
  
   
• 263. 

  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities COM(200) 384, OJ C365E, 19.12.2000, p.215
  
   
• 264. 

  Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community Competition law, OJ 1997 C 372, p. 5, (hereafter Notice on market definition)
  
   
• 265. 

  De Europese Commissie kent nummers toe aan officiële documenten van de Europese Unie. De Commissie maakt onderscheid in een aantal typen documenten door middel van het toekennen van verschillende nummerseries. Het onderscheid is gebaseerd op het soort document en/of de instelling van de Unie van wie het document afkomstig is.
   
• 266. 

  De Raad van de Europese Unie kent aan wetgevingsdossiers een uniek toe. Dit nummer bestaat uit een vijfcijferig volgnummer gevolgd door een schuine streep met de laatste twee cijfers van het jaartal, bijvoorbeeld 12345/00 - een document met nummer 12345 uit het jaar 2000.
   
• 267. 

  Het interinstitutionele nummer is een nummerreeks die binnen de Europese Unie toegekend wordt aan voorstellen voor regelgeving van de Europese Commissie.
  Binnen de Europese Unie worden nog een aantal andere nummerseries gebruikt. Iedere instelling heeft één of meerdere sets documenten met ieder een eigen nummering. Die reeksen komen niet overeen met elkaar of het interinstitutioneel nummer.
   
• 268. 

  Deze databank van de Europese Unie biedt de mogelijkheid de actuele werkzaamheden (workflow) van de Europese instellingen (Europees Parlement, Raad, ESC, Comité van de Regio's, Europese Centrale Bank, Hof van Justitie enz.) te volgen. EURlex volgt alle voorstellen (zoals wetgevende en begrotingsdossiers) en mededelingen van de Commissie, vanaf het moment dat ze aan de Raad of het Europees Parlement worden voorgelegd.
   
• 269. 

  Als dag van bekendmaking van een Europees besluit geldt de dag waarop het besluit in het Publicatieblad wordt bekendgemaakt, en daardoor in alle officiële talen van de Europese Unie bij het Publicatiebureau beschikbaar is.