COM(2000)743 - Evaluation of Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements

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Legal instrument	Report
reference by COM-number975	COM(2000)743
Additional COM-numbers	COM(2000)743
CELEX number978	52000DC0743

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• 1. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 2. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 3. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 4. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 5. 

  See Article 11 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p.25, hereinafter referred to as Regulation 1475/95 or the Regulation.
  
   
• 6. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 7. 

  Commission notice concerning Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ C 17, 18.1.1985, p. 4 (hereinafter referred to as the notice on Regulation 123/85), and Clarification of the activities of motor vehicle intermediaries, OJ C 329, 18.12.1991, p. 20 (hereinafter referred to as the notice on intermediaries).
  
   
• 8. 

  See Article 1 of Regulation 1475/95. Used motor vehicles are thus not covered by the Regulation. The same applies to tractors as their main use is not on public roads. The separate distribution of spare parts or the provision of servicing without any connection to the distribution of vehicles is not covered either.
  
   
• 9. 

  These questionnaires have also been published together with a press release on the Commission's web site under:
  
   
• 10. 

  This report covers in principle the distribution and servicing of all types of motor vehicle. It is, however, more specifically focused on passenger cars in view of the replies received following the sending of the questionnaires. Moreover, most of the issues identified by the Commission in the application of the Regulation also concerned passenger cars. If the findings concern something specific related to commercial vehicles, such as trucks or buses, this will be specified.
  
   
• 11. 

  See Annex VIII of the report for further details.
  
   
• 12. 

  Competition Commission, New cars, A report on the supply of new motor cars within the UK, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry by Command of Her Majesty, April 2000, 737 pages (hereinafter referred to as the UK Competition Commission report).
  
   
• 13. 

  UK Competition Commission report, pt. 1.20.
  
   
• 14. 

  Following the termination of the EU-Japan consensus at the end of 1999, Japanese suppliers are now also free from quantitative restrictions on their supplies to the EU car market.
  
   
• 15. 

  Commission Green Paper on vertical restraints in EC Competition policy, COM(96)721, p.1.
  
   
• 16. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 17. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 18. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 19. 

  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336, 29.12.1999 p. 21-25, hereinafter referred to as the new block exemption on vertical restraints.
  
   
• 20. 

  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1983/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive distribution agreements, OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, p. 1; Corrigendum OJ L 281, 13.10.1983, p. 24.
  
   
• 21. 

  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements, OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, p. 5; Corrigendum OJ L 281, 13.10.1983, p. 24.
  
   
• 22. 

  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of franchise agreements, OJ L 359, 28.12.1988, p. 46.
  
   
• 23. 

  IP/99/286, 7.5.1999. See also the Green Paper on vertical restraints in EC competition policy, COM/96/0721 FINAL - Executive summary p.ii, footnote 2.
  
   
• 24. 

  In most countries, a limited number of new vehicles are also distributed to final consumers by the manufacturers themselves (so-called direct sales), by sales outlets connected to the manufacturer or via commercial agents.
  
   
• 25. 

  Purely qualitative selective distribution is in general considered to fall outside Article 81 (1) for lack of anti-competitive effects. For the conditions under which this is true see Commission Guidelines on vertical restraints, pt. 185; adopted by the Commission on 24 May 2000, Official Journal C 291 of 13.10.2000, page 1.
  
   
• 26. 

  See e.g. Article 1(d) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336, 29.12.1999.
  
   
• 27. 

  See, for example, the Fourth Report on Competition Policy, 1974, point 87.
  
   
• 28. 

  International Car Distribution Programme (ICDP), Research Paper 6/99, 'Beyond the block exemption II, the build-up to 2002', by Dr. A. Tongue, September 1999, (hereinafter ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II' 6/99, p. 8-11.
  
   
• 29. 

  This is even a stronger restriction in comparison to quantitative selection of the number of dealers in a given sales territory (see above pt. 0).
  
   
• 30. 

  See Article 2 of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95.
  
   
• 31. 

  See below 0 on page 89 of this report.
  
   
• 32. 

  See also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.10 et seq., in particular pt. 2.14 and pt. 2.38.
  
   
• 33. 

  See recital 3 of Commission Regulation (EEC) 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ L 15, 18.1.1985, p. 16 (hereinafter referred to as Regulation 123/85) and recital 3 of Regulation 1475/95, which call the use of similar networks of vertical agreements containing restrictions of competition 'cluster'.
  
   
• 34. 

  See in particular recital 3 of Regulation 123/85 and of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 35. 

  See Judgment of the Court of 28 February 1991, Delimitis Henninger Bräu,
   
• 36. 

  It is true that in Europe e.g. Korean car manufacturers were able to increase their market share from 0.1% in 1990 to 2.7% in 1998 (see ACEA position paper regarding the European Commission's questionnaire on the application of the automobile block exemption, page 12, published in the internet under: www.acea.be/acea/BEMVD.pdf). As regards the UK market, since 1990, notably Chrysler and Daewoo have entered the market and took between them about 2% of the market in 1999 (see UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.89.). However, see also ICDP, 'Multi-franchising, Developments and Impact of Sales Channel Management of Automobile Manufacturers', by M. Hoffmeister and R. Heinerberg, Research Paper 1/98, (hereinafter: ICDP, 'Multi-franchising' 1/98), p. 60: ICDP underlines that the speed of penetration is much faster, when existing dealers are used to access a new market. Therefore it was relatively easy for Korean and Malaysian makes to cover the entire United States of America, where multi-marketing is more widespread than in Europe, without investing heavily in brand exclusive new car dealerships.
  
   
• 37. 

  See recital 13 and Article 6 of Commission Regulation 2970/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336, 29.12.1999, p. 21.
  
   
• 38. 

  All these products are covered as from 1 June 2000 with regard to their distribution agreements by the new block exemption on vertical restraints.
  
   
• 39. 

  For specific reasons, dealers in Finland may sell different brands in their exclusive territory.
  
   
• 40. 

  Dell and Gateway computers, for example.
  
   
• 41. 

  Commission Regulation 67/67EEC of 22 March 1967 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements, as amended by Regulation (EEC) 2591/72 of 8 December 1972 and by Regulation (EEC) 3577/82 of 23 December 1982, OJ 57, 25.3.1967, p. 849 (Special Edition 1967, p. 10).
  
   
• 42. 

  Commission decision of 13 December 1974 - Bayerische Motoren Werke AG - OJ L 29, 3.2.1975, p. 1.
  
   
• 43. 

  See Fourth Report on Competition Policy, 1974, point 86.
  
   
• 44. 

  Article 4 (1)(1) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 45. 

  Recital 5 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 46. 

  Article 3(10)(a).
  
   
• 47. 

  Article 3(10)(b).
  
   
• 48. 

  Article 3(11) and the end of recital 5.
  
   
• 49. 

  Recital 6 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 50. 

  See article 4 (1)(1)(e) of Regulation 123/85; however, according to article 5 (1)(1)(a), 2nd indent of Regulation 1475/85, manufacturers are obliged to request from their dealers to offer after sales services in order to benefit from the block exemption.
  
   
• 51. 

  Commission Decision of 13 December 1974 - Bayerische Motoren Werke AG - OJ L 29, 3.2.1975, p. 1, point 24.
  
   
• 52. 

  Recital 4, 1st to 3rd sentences, of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 53. 

  Recital 4, 4th sentence, of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 54. 

  Article 3(8) and (9).
  
   
• 55. 

  Recital 9 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 56. 

  Recital 12, last sentence, of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 57. 

  Recital 9 of Regulation 123/85. This possibility is generally referred to as passive sales.
  
   
• 58. 

  Article 13(11) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 59. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(d).
  
   
• 60. 

  Article 5(1)(1)(a) and (b).
  
   
• 61. 

  Article 3(2) to (5).
  
   
• 62. 

  Recital 7 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 63. 

  Article 5(2)(1)(a).
  
   
• 64. 

  This quality standard can be imposed in view of the importance of vehicle safety; see recital 8 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 65. 

  Article 3(4) and recital 8 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 66. 

  Article 6(2) and recital 23 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 67. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(a) and recital 13 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 68. 

  These periods could be shorter if a dealer was a new entrant to the distribution system and the period of the agreement or the period of notice for termination of the agreement was the first agreed by the dealer.
  
   
• 69. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(c) and recital 15 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 70. 

  Article 4(1)(3) to (5).
  
   
• 71. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 72. 

  See recitals 4 and 25 of Regulation 123/85 and recitals 4, 7 and 30 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 73. 

  See recital 26 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 74. 

  Article 6(1)(8).
  
   
• 75. 

  Article 3(8)(b) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 76. 

  Second indent of Article 5(1)(1)(a) of Regulation 1475/95. This obligation was not explicitly mentioned in Regulation 123/85, although difficulties in obtaining after-sales services from network dealers was mentioned as one reason for withdrawing the benefit of the former Regulation; see Article 10(2) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 77. 

  See recital 17 of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95.
  
   
• 78. 

  Pursuant to Article 3(3) of Regulation 1475/95, multi-marketing is permissible although it is subject to the condition imposed by the car manufacturers that it is done on separate premises, under separate management, in the form of a distinct legal entity and in a manner which avoids confusion between makes.
  
   
• 79. 

  Pursuant to Article 3(4) of Regulation 1475/95, this is only permitted if a third party cannot benefit unduly from investments made by a supplier, notably in equipment or the training of personnel.
  
   
• 80. 

  See Article 10(13) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 81. 

  Article 6(1)(5) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 82. 

  Article 5(2)(2) and (3).
  
   
• 83. 

  Article 3(3) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 84. 

  Article 6(1)(9) and (10) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 85. 

  Article 6(1)(11) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 86. 

  Article 6(1)(12) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 87. 

  Article 6 of Regulation 1475/95. By contrast, Regulation 123/85 contained only three black clauses in Article 6.
  
   
• 88. 

  See Article 6 of Regulation 1475/95
  
   
• 89. 

  See Article 6(1)(1) to (5) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 90. 

  See Article 6 (1)(6) to (12) and recital 20 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 91. 

  Notice on Regulation 123/85, see footnote 4, page 7.
  
   
• 92. 

  See Commission press release IP(95) 648, 21.6.1995, p. 3.; since the entry into force of Regulation 1475/95 the clarification however only concerns those provisions which on substance have been left unchanged by this Regulation. This is not the case for example for Article 10 (4) of Regulation 123/85: see Article 8 (3) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 93. 

  The word 'right' in this context may give rise to misunderstandings, because neither Regulation 123/85 nor Regulation 1475/95 creates any obligation for dealers to sell a vehicle to a consumer which could be enforced by a consumer against a dealer.
  
   
• 94. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(d) of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95 contains the so-called 'availability clause'.
  
   
• 95. 

  See Article 13(10) of Regulation 123/85 and Article 10(10) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 96. 

  Article 6(7) of Regulation 1475/95, leads to a similar result as Article 5(1)(2)(d) which concerns passenger cars. Pursuant to Article 6 (7) a manufacturer looses the benefit of the block exemption if it systematically or repeatedly refuses to deliver to its dealers, commercial vehicles, trucks or buses corresponding as regards their specifications to those in the country where the vehicles will be registered. The notice on Regulation 123/85 is therefore not up to date as regards this point. See also the section 6.3.2.2., page 110, of this report on the availability of vehicles for cross-border sales.
  
   
• 97. 

  See also recital 31 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 98. 

  The text of the notice states that this supplement has to be a 'further supplement' to the one charged for passenger cars corresponding to a model within the normal contract programme (see previous bullet point). This could be interpreted as meaning that no such supplement can be charged if a consumer buys a car out of the normal product programme of the dealer (for further details see also below pt. 0 on page 102).
  
   
• 99. 

  Notice on intermediaries, see footnote 4, page 7.
  
   
• 100. 

  Article 3(11) of Regulation 123/85 and Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 101. 

  Commission Decision of 4 December 1991 ECO System v Peugeot, OJ L 66, 11.3.1992, p. 1, upheld by the Court of First Instance judgment of 22.4.1993 Peugeot v Commission, Case T-9/92
   
• 102. 

  See Commission press release IP(95) 648, 21.6.1995, p. 3.
  
   
• 103. 

  Article 3(8)(b) of Regulation 123/85; this prohibition has been limited in scope by Regulation 1475/95, Article 3(8)(b) which only prohibits personalised advertisements outside the contract territory.
  
   
• 104. 

  Document IV/9509/95; available on the Internet under: europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/aid/en/car.
  
   
• 105. 

  See: europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/aid/en/car_hotlines_en.
  
   
• 106. 

  Pursuant to Article 11 of the Regulation, the Commission has to evaluate on a regular basis the application of the Regulation with a particular focus on price differentials between the different Member States. Such is the purpose of this report.
  
   
• 107. 

  An extract of each report, which figures among the most popular publications of the Directorate-General for Competition, is also made available on the Competition Directorate-General website: europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/aid/en/car199911.pdf.
  
   
• 108. 

  For the most recent press release on car prices on 1.5.2000, see IP/00/781 of 13 July 2000; also published on the Internet under: europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/aid/en/car.
  
   
• 109. 

  See e.g. ICDP, Research Report 4/98, 'Beyond the block exemption, an analysis of vertical restraints and retail competition in the European Car Industry' by A. Tongue and J. Brown, hereinafter: ICDP 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98. On pages 25 and 27, this paper lists in more detail the benefits that it believes the current system of distribution has brought to the various categories of operators concerned. It also explains the burdens that the system creates for dealers.
  
   
• 110. 

  See also, for further details, ACEA, www.acea.be.
  
   
• 111. 

  See ICDP 'Future of the dealer- the evolving retailer', 4/99, p. 10; ICDP 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 10; A. Card in: OECD Proceedings, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector', July 1997, by M. Harbour, (hereinafter: OECD, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector'), p. 95.
  
   
• 112. 

  The import limitations for Japanese cars still existed when Regulation 1475/95 was adopted in 1995.
  
   
• 113. 

  See, for example, ICDP , 'Beyond the block exemption'", 4/98, p. 43; ICDP ,Revenue management - how the car industry can learn from airlines" by Jonathan Brown, Managment Briefing n° 2, p. 8.
  
   
• 114. 

  See, for example, for mergers/take-overs BMW/Rover (Commission Decision M.416, 14.3.1994), Ford/Mazda (Commission Decision M.741, 24.5.1996), Toyota/Daihatsu (Commission Decision M.1326, 6.11.1998), Daimler-Benz/Chrysler (M.1204, 22.7.1998), Renault/Nissan (Commission Decision M.1519, 12.5.1999), and Ford/Volvo (Commission Decision M.1452, 26.3.1999).
  
   
• 115. 

  For example, multi-purpose vehicles, off-road vehicles, convertibles, coupés.
  
   
• 116. 

  As to the car market in the United Kingdom, see UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.82 et seq.
  
   
• 117. 

  While in the European Union, the three largest car manufacturers (Volkswagen group, PSA group and General Motors group) had a combined market share of 41% (1998), the three major groups in the USA (General Motors, Ford and DaimlerChrysler) attained a combined market share of 72% (1998; source: www.autofacts.com), and the three major groups in Japan (Toyota, Nissan and Honda) had a combined market share of 59% (1998; source: www.japanauto.com).
  
   
• 118. 

  See subsection 0, page 10, of this report.
  
   
• 119. 

  See pt. (20) of this report.
  
   
• 120. 

  The following exceptions have been found: Fiat has appointed two importers respectively in Greece and Portugal; in a number of cases (in particular Japanese manufacturers), Luxembourg is handled by the Belgian importer, and in one case (Rover) imports into Finland and Sweden are handled by the importer of its parent company (BMW). The German importer of Honda also handles distribution in Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria, while its French importer also serves the Italian and Spanish markets. General Motors Europe performs a co-ordinating role in distribution throughout Europe, while actual distribution is undertaken by National Sales Organizations primarily owned by General Motors Corporation (GMC, USA); Adam Opel (D), Vauxhall (UK) and GM Espana are all directly owned by GMC and have significant manufacturing operations. A comparable situation prevails for Ford of Europe.
  
   
• 121. 

  Only a small number of dealers are owned by a manufacturer or a supplier. However, a small number of producers rely on independent importers for distribution of their brand; this is true in particular in the case of Volkswagen and some Japanese manufacturers.
  
   
• 122. 

  In particular the French producers PSA and Renault control a more significant number of their dealers, and DaimlerChrysler realise a great deal of its sales in Germany through wholly-owned 'Niederlassungen' and independent undertakings called 'agents'.
  
   
• 123. 

  In Germany, Volkswagen and Audi service outlets act as commercial agents for a main dealer or for a sub-dealer. Also in Germany, DaimlerChrysler is distributing its cars through affiliates ("Niederlassungen") and 'agents', which order cars from one of the affiliates or from another 'agent'. In Italy, DaimlerChrysler uses some of its service outlets as 'agents', which order cars from a main dealer. Other Italian service outlets of DaimlerChrysler are sub-dealers. DaimlerChrysler 'agents' sell in the name and act on behalf of the manufacturer or importer with whom he has concluded an agreement.
  
   
• 124. 

  A great part of direct sales generally concerns the manufacturers' staff, in particular in Member States where the manufacturer has production facilities, and other reserved customer groups such as armed forces, diplomats or employees of suppliers, who normally submit individual orders. In addition to that, manufacturers supply - either directly or assisted by a dealer - to fleet owners, such as national authorities, leasing and rental companies, and other undertakings which normally order larger quantities. The proportion of direct sales in manufacturer's total sales varies with the Member State concerned and may attain 20% of total sales. A particular situation occurs in the United Kingdom, where up to 80% of all sales are so-called 'direct' and 'assisted' fleet sales, while in Germany, as the next most important market for fleet sales, they account for about 40% of total sales; see: Consumers' Association 2000, 'The forecourt revolution: the future of the car industry', Policy Report (hereinafter: CA 2000 'The forecourt revolution').
  
   
• 125. 

  ICDP 'The US Legal Framework for Car Distribution' by Philip Wade, Executive Briefing, 9/2000. In the USA the key laws affecting automotive distribution are mostly state laws. In Japan the Antimonopoly law does not contain detailed rules on motor vehicle distribution like in the EC block exemption regulation.
  
   
• 126. 

  ACEA; European Car Distribution Handbook 1998; CECRA (European Council for Motor Trades and Repairs) estimates that currently about 100 000 dealerships (including sub-dealers) are involved in car distribution.
  
   
• 127. 

  Few sub-dealers, or none at all, are involved in the distribution of the Seat, Citroën, Honda, BMW and Renault brands. Sub-dealers are much more frequently made use of in the distribution of the Mercedes-Benz, Fiat, Volkswagen and Toyota brands. See also ACEA / European Car Dealer Handbook 1998; M. Habour in: OECD, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector' p. 155; Financial Times Automotive, "The Future of Automotive Distribution, Evolution or Revolution-, A.T. Kearney, 1998, p. 12, which, however, gives a different picture.
  
   
• 128. 

  In most southern European markets such as France, Italy and Spain, the number of sub-dealers in comparison to main dealers is particularly high, while in other markets, such as Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom, sub-dealers play a very limited role; see also: CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution', p. 22.
  
   
• 129. 

  An example of this development is Ford, which has converted its smallest dealers into pure service outlets. The declared objective was to provide better quality, consistent servicing across the network and a more professional overall brand image.
  
   
• 130. 

  FT 'The Future of Automotive Distribution, Evolution or revolution-', 1998, p. 33; CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution', p. 20.; in this context, see also the overview: ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 16, Chart: 'Car Advertising Expenditure in France - 1996'.
  
   
• 131. 

  ACEA.
  
   
• 132. 

  See ACEA / European Car Dealer Handbook, 1998 (sales per dealer outlet in Germany and the Netherlands of 133 corresponded to the average); ICDP, 'Multi-franchising, Developments and Impact of Sales Channel Management of Automobile Manufacturers', by M. Hoffmeister and R. Heinerberg, Research Paper 1/98, (hereinafter: ICDP, 'Multi-franchising' 1/98), p. 24.
  
   
• 133. 

  Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, France, Netherlands.
  
   
• 134. 

  Spain, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom.
  
   
• 135. 

  See OECD, 'Market Access Issues in Automobile Sector' points 7-11.
  
   
• 136. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 29-30.
  
   
• 137. 

  The so-called 'list prices'.
  
   
• 138. 

  OECD 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector', p.8. Section 6.2.1.3 of this report gives more precise figures provided by car manufacturers.
  
   
• 139. 

  See also OECD, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector ', points 7 to 11.
  
   
• 140. 

  CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution'.
  
   
• 141. 

  Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 142. 

  Because these countries are large and thinly populated, single-brand dealerships are not a viable economic option.
  
   
• 143. 

  NFR 1970:2.
  
   
• 144. 

  See also (NO 1972:24, 1973:36) Bernitz, Ulf, Marknadsrätt p. 86, Juristförlaget, second edition 1986.
  
   
• 145. 

  OECD, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector', p. 11 and 12.
  
   
• 146. 

  The commercial policy followed to date by car manufacturers and component manufacturers aims to promote high quality parts. Thus, sales of spare parts of non-corresponding quality with the original ones are considered negligible.
  
   
• 147. 

  The trend towards outsourcing has become very common among car manufacturers; for more details see D. Audet: "L'accès au marché dans le secteur automobile," p. 30, published in l'Observateur of l'OECD, December 1999.
  
   
• 148. 

  In particular, Renault introduced the new brand 'Motrio' and Ford the brand 'Motorcraft'. "La pièce adaptable detrônera-t-elle l'origine -", Auto Info, 1099, 21.1.2000, p. 34; Guaranteeing Survival of the Independent Aftermarket, PriceWaterhouseCoopers for FIGIEFA - FMA/FAM, May 2000, slides 36 et seq. (hereinafter PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 'Guaranteeing Survival', May 2000).
  
   
• 149. 

  "La pièce adaptable détrônera-t-elle l'origine -", Auto Info, 1099, 21.1.2000, p.34; For example, Lear Corporation Plc manufactures spare parts both for Fiat Auto SpA and for the independent after-market - IAM -, UNIPART manufactures spare parts both for Honda and for the IAM. This element is underlined by several Commission decisions regarding merger operations between spare-parts producers, Decisions of 31 July 1991, Case IV/M012 Varta v Bosch (OJ L 320, 22.11.1991, p. 26) and of 29 May 1991, Case IV/M043 - Magneti Marelli v CEAc. (OJ L 222, 10.8.1991, p. 38) and Commission Decision of 15 October 1993, Case IV/M.337 - Knorr-Bremse v Allied Signal (OJ C 298, 4.11.1993)..
  
   
• 150. 

  Recital 27 and Article 6(1)(9) and (10) of Regulation 1475/95; see also section 0, page 82 and section 0, page 93 of this report.
  
   
• 151. 

  This is also true for authorised dealers, who have to prepare for resale second-hand cars taken in with the sale of a new car.
  
   
• 152. 

  ACEA / European Car Dealer Handbook, 1998.
  
   
• 153. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II', 6/99, p. 15-18; CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution' p. 28.
  
   
• 154. 

  Cars sold in the 1970s had to be serviced every 5 000 km; today the service interval is 20 000 km and in some instances 30 000 km.
  
   
• 155. 

  For a comprehensive view of the phenomenon, see: ICDP, 'After-sales in Europe' by P. Wade, L. Buzzavo; T. Chieux, K. Zellmer, J. Kiff, 2/97 (hereinafter: ICDP, 'After-sales in Europe'.) p. 99; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 'Guaranteeing Survival', May 2000 slides 20ss. and 79ss..
  
   
• 156. 

  Light repair and maintenance of automotive vehicles accounts for some 40% of the overall market for repair and maintenance of automotive vehicles and represents a very profitable activity; see also Commission Decision of 31 May 1999, Case No IV/1526 - Ford v Kwik-Fit.
  
   
• 157. 

  In France, the major independent fast-fit chains are usually owned by supermarket chains or organised in franchise networks. In 1995, the fast-fit chains in France were: Feu Vert (162 outlets), Midas (266 outlets), Norauto (120 outlets), Speedy (365 outlets), Stationmarche (104 outlets). In 1995, in the UK the leading national service chains included: Halfords owned by Boots (136 outlets), Lex Autocentres owned by Lex group (96 outlets), Apple Car Clinics owned by Kwik-Fit (65 outlets), Flexi Car Care Centres owned by Caffyns dealer group (32 outlets). ICDP, 'After-sales in Europe', 2/97.
  
   
• 158. 

  For simple and standardised car repairs, dealers offer service packages at a predetermined price. Moreover, some dealers have reacted by offering some services without prior appointment. They also have introduced longer openings hours.
  
   
• 159. 

  Decision 6556 of Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato, 12 November 1998, Case C/3270 - Magneti Marelli/Midas International, Boll. 46/1998 (428 outlets in Europe) and Commission Decision of 31 May 1999, Case IV/1526 - Ford v Kwik-Fit (1 907 outlets in Europe).
  
   
• 160. 

  Regulation 1475/95 expressly provides that authorised dealers are obliged to honour the manufacturer's warranty, to perform free servicing and vehicle recall work on vehicles even if they were supplied by another dealer in the same or another Member State. This provision ensures that a final consumer can have the benefit of these guarantees available from every dealer of the manufacturer's network throughout the Community, irrespective of the place of purchase of the car. It has however to be noted that this obligation is limited to the extent to which the dealers are obliged under the terms of their dealership to service vehicles which they themselves have supplied (Article 5(1)(1)(a), recital 12 of Regulation 1475/95).
  
   
• 161. 

  Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, OJ L 171 , 07/07/1999 p. 12; see in particular Article 3.
  
   
• 162. 

  The extension of warranty is, again, particularly common in the United Kingdom.
  
   
• 163. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II', 6/99, p. 13 to 17 and ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p.37.
  
   
• 164. 

  Development of Intranets between car manufacturers, importers and dealers should allow the customer order to be easily accessible to all sectors of the supply chain.
  
   
• 165. 

  Dealers are induced by the manufacturer to order sufficient number of cars to cover the planned production for a certain period of months.
  
   
• 166. 

  See ICDP, 'Future of the Dealer, The Evolving Retailer', Research Report 4/99, (hereinafter ICDP, 'Future of the Dealer'), p. 24-27; an example is BMW (Yahoo, Deutschland Finanzen, 10.2.2000).
  
   
• 167. 

  ICDP considers that intra-brand competition between dealers will inevitably be reduced partly as a result of moves to introduce lean distribution; ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 4.
  
   
• 168. 

  See for example: OECD 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector', p. 168-169.
  
   
• 169. 

  See M. Harbour and D. Jones, 'Creating Profitable Customers Fulfilment, Applying Lean Thinking to Car Distribution' and G. Williams, 'European New Vehicle Supply - the long Road to Customer Push Systems' in the ICDP Journal Summer 1999 -. ICDP estimates that the European industry would make the following gains by introducing vehicle and part supply systems on a lean model for vehicles: 4 billion euro per annum in operating costs and 11.4 billion euro in stock reduction and for parts: 6 billion euro in stock reduction. It estimates that savings as a percent of price total for a car could amount to: 2% (reduced discounting), 2.5% (reduced physical and managerial stock holding costs), 2.5% spending cost reductions, and 4% order mix. A change to the approach of pricing could also produce further profit improvements. For these latter figures, see: ICDP 'Management Briefing No 1', J. Brown 'Flexible pricing to match demand with supply'.
  
   
• 170. 

  The Smart car was originally developed through a joint venture (Micro Compact Car -MCC) between Mercedes-Benz and SMH (manufacturer of Swatch watches). MCC is now fully owned by DaimlerChrysler.
  
   
• 171. 

  Financial Times Automotive, 'The future of Automotive Distribution', 1998, p. 58; the Smart car distribution network is to be expanded substantially (de.biz.yahoo.com of 29.2.2000).
  
   
• 172. 

  As to the different types of automotive e-commerce models see ICDP "Who's afraid of 'infomediaries'- The task for the car distribution industry in the information age" by Leonardo Buzzavo", Management Briefings No. 3/2000, p. 8:
  
   
• 173. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II', 6/99, p. 14.
  
   
• 174. 

  Source: Periodical, 1-2 February 2000, from the Swedish Association for Motor Retail Trades and Repairs (Motorbranschens Riksförbund, MRF).
  
   
• 175. 

  ICDP, "Vehicle sales
   
• 176. 

  It is said the overall distribution policy will not change for three main reasons: (1) consumers need to touch and feel 'in the real world' a really emotional product, (2) cars cannot be delivered by mail (unlike books from Amazon.com for instance), (3) pre-delivery inspection and used vehicle exchange can only be dealt with physically by a dealer.
  
   
• 177. 

  The importers refer to the US market where in 1999 5% of the new vehicles were sold via the Internet and 35% chosen via the Internet according to the importer, who believes that there will be a similar trend in Europe. Frankfurter Allgemeine, Le Soir.
  
   
• 178. 

  Mc Kinsey: forecast to expand at a compound annual growth rate of 104% in western Europe for 1998-2002.
  
   
• 179. 

  FT 'The future of Automotive Distribution', 1998, p. 82.
  
   
• 180. 

  The fees to be paid by dealers are
   
• 181. 

  Inchape and Bilia, two of the leading European distributor and dealer groups, have both acquired parts of the company. Inchape has acquired 100% of Autobytel in the UK and Bilia has acquired the exclusive rights for the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland).
  
   
• 182. 

  ICDP, 'Electronic new media and car distribution', 07/98, p. 16.
  
   
• 183. 

  ICDP, 'Electronic new media and car distribution', 07/98, p. 21.
  
   
• 184. 

  'Renault ouvre ses portailes sur le web', Autoinfo 25 February 2000. In particular, Renault is going to establish several web sites: renault.site, to inform final consumers on products and services of the car manufacturer and to sell new vehicles; carevia.com, to sell used vehicles of all brands; a multi-make web site, developed together with other car manufacturers, to inform consumers on models of different makes; renault.net, to organise the commercial activity of its network.
  
   
• 185. 

  In September 1999, Vauxhall became the first car manufacturer to sell a range of cars exclusively on the net. However, the sale of these cars is still the responsibility of the dealer. Nevertheless, the choice of vehicle, the test drive the used-car trade-in, and the vehicle delivery can be arranged by the consumer from his home. The consumer can also conclude the sales contract with the dealer electronically.
  
   
• 186. 

  'Renault met le turbo', Argus de l'automobile, 17.2.2000. As regards Fiat, the experiment was limited to Italian consumers and went on only for a period of 4 months. Only a small number of vehicles were sold.
  
   
• 187. 

  'Rush is on for online sales', Financial Times Auto, 29.2.2000, p. II.
  
   
• 188. 

  'Fast-track drive on the road to e-commerce', Financial Times Auto, 29.2.2000, p. I; see also the joint B2B-market place 'Covisint' of Ford, GM, DaimlerChrysler and Renault/Nissan under: www.covisint.com/.
  
   
• 189. 

  The Internet is considered an important tool for reaching the objectives of price transparency and harmonisation, since it has an enormous potential for cross-border shoppers and could act as a mechanism for creating a true European single market. In this regard, see ICDP study 'Future directions for European car distribution: Evolution or Revolution-', synthesis of ICDP2 research 1996-98 by M. Harbour with J. Brown, P. Wade and the ICDP research team, Research Paper 11/98, September 1998, (hereinafter: ICDP, 'Future directions for European car distribution'), 11/98, p. 10.
  
   
• 190. 

  See e.g. eEurope, An Information Society for All, Communication on a Commission initiative for the special European Council Lisbon 23 and 24 March 2000 published under: europa.eu.int/comm/information_society/eeurope
  
   
• 191. 

  See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 'Guaranteeing Survival' May 2000, slides 15 et seq.
  
   
• 192. 

  E.g. a dealer who sells only small cars or four-wheel-drive cars or sports cars.
  
   
• 193. 

  Notice on intermediaries, section 2(a), 2nd paragraph and section 2(b), last paragraph.
  
   
• 194. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 50.
  
   
• 195. 

  For example, negotiations took place between the French supermarket chain Auchan and Fiat with a view to cooperation for the sale of the Lancia Epsilon model in France. It was envisaged that the 118 supermarkets would act as commercial agents of the local Fiat dealers. Le Monde, 1.10.1999. The agreement was apparently not concluded due to the dealers' opposition.
  
   
• 196. 

  A recent example: in August 2000, the German supermarket group Edeka made promotion about the sale of the Smart car from DaimlerChrysler. Edeka wanted to sell a package consisting of a portable PC
   
• 197. 

  FT 'The Future of Automotive Distribution', study, p. 28-30.
  
   
• 198. 

  Windscreen wipers, seat covers, brake pads, car alarms, stereos, roof racks, tyres, lubricants and batteries.
  
   
• 199. 

  FT 'The Future of Automotive Distribution', study, p. 163.
  
   
• 200. 

  Some of these complaints are about obstacles to parallel trade committed before the entry into force of Regulation 1475/95 on 1 October 1995. However, under Regulation 1475/95 and also under the Commission's first motor vehicle block exemption, Regulation 123/85, the protection of parallel trade was one of the core elements for the exemption of motor vehicle distribution agreements (see e.g. notice on Regulation 123/85, chapter I 1; see also Court of First Instance judgment of 6 July 2000 Volkswagen v. Commission, case T-62/98, pt. 241).
  
   
• 201. 

  See section 0, page 22, for more details.
  
   
• 202. 

  OJ L 124, 25.4.1998, p. 60; see also Press Release IP/98/94, 28.1.1998. Volkswagen has challenged this decision before the Court of First Instance.
  
   
• 203. 

  Court of First Instance judgment of 6 July 2000 Volkswagen v. Commission, case T-62/98. The CFI decided that the measures adopted by Volkswagen, such as the bonus policy, by which it sanctioned export sales through non-payment of the bonus normally granted for domestic sales, the restrictive supply policy, the behaviour towards consumers who were discouraged from buying new cars in Italy and through control, warnings and sanctions in respect to Italian dealers, restricted parallel trade and infringed Article 81 (1). In contrast, the CFI considered that it had not been established with sufficient evidence that Volkswagen had introduced some measures on which the fine was based, especially the split margin system to limit parallel exports.
  
   
• 204. 

  A statement of objections (SO) is the first step in a formal proceeding by which the Commission informs undertakings in writing of the objections that it raises against them in view of an alleged breach of EC competition rules; the undertakings concerned have the right to comment on the SO, which in no way prejudges the outcome of a case.
  
   
• 205. 

  See Memo/99/22, 16.4.1999 and Note BIO aux bureaux nationaux BIO/99/407, 27.10.1999. The proceedings against DaimlerChrysler and the Volkswagen (price fixing for the Passat) are not yet finalised. The Commission is currently analysing the replies to the statement of objections submitted by these car manufacturers
  
   
• 206. 

  See press release IP/00/1028 of 20/9/2000.
  
   
• 207. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 208. 

  XXVII Report on Competition Policy, 1997, First Part, section I, B 3 and Press Release IP/97/740, 4.8.1997.
  
   
• 209. 

  See recital 30 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 210. 

  Article 3(10) and (11) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 211. 

  See Article 3(8) of Regulation 1475/95 (right to carry out passive sales, and right to actively seek customers outside the contract territory unless this is done through personalised advertising).
  
   
• 212. 

  Typically, reserved clients comprise company staff, national authorities, employees of international organizations, larger undertakings and leasing and rental companies. The right of direct sales can however be excluded according to Article 2 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 213. 

  See, for example, ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p.33; Auto Infos 1100, 11.2.2000, p.14.
  
   
• 214. 

  These Commission Reports are published twice a year. For further details, see section 0, page 27, of this report.
  
   
• 215. 

  For instance, Mercedes-Benz in Germany or Fiat in Italy are manufacturers who are traditionally strongly present in their respective home markets; on the other hand, these manufacturers have to apply different market strategies in countries where they face competition from strong domestic producers.
  
   
• 216. 

  See also report by Lehman Brothers, 31.7.1998, analysing price differentials for various products across the European Union.
  
   
• 217. 

  Value Added Tax.
  
   
• 218. 

  See Annex VI, ACEA, 'Motor vehicle taxation in the European Union', Summary Table, 1999 for details.
  
   
• 219. 

  See also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.205 et seq.
  
   
• 220. 

  On 1 January 1999 in Belgium, Germany, Finland, Spain, France, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal.
  
   
• 221. 

  For an analysis, see section 0, pt. 0 page 103, of this report.
  
   
• 222. 

  See Commission Decision of 28.1.1998 (Case IV/35.733 - VW, OJ L 124, 25.4.1998, which mentions the situation in Italy, where, in 1995, the Italian lira had devalued substantially against the German mark and the Austrian schilling, and Volkswagen did not sufficiently raise its prices in Italy, because it feared losing market shares against its Italian competitors; or IP/99/554 concerning the situation in the UK; here, it was mentioned that so called 'windfall profits' can occur in cases where the currency of an export market (example: pound sterling) is re-evaluating against the domestic currency of a manufacturer (example: German mark), and where the latter does not reduce its prices in the re-evaluating currency.
  
   
• 223. 

  See section 0, pt.0, page 104 of this report for an analysis.
  
   
• 224. 

  Article 5 (2)(d) and Commission notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter I 1.
  
   
• 225. 

  See also 0, page 24,pt. 5th bullet point
  
   
• 226. 

  See Commission notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter II 2; see also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.103 and 2.104: according to the UK Competition Commission, for most cars the original planning and development includes left-hand and right-hand variants. Thus the design costs of these variants should be part of the general production cost of the relevant model and be spread across the whole production volume of that car model. Consequently, for the vast majority of new cars a supplement based on planning and development and/or production costs does not seem to be justifiable.
  
   
• 227. 

  For further information, see pt. 0 et seq., page page 106, of this report.
  
   
• 228. 

  For more information, see pt. 0 et seq., page 103, of this report.
  
   
• 229. 

  For details see section 0, page 97, of this report.
  
   
• 230. 

  In general not more than 6 weeks.
  
   
• 231. 

  The most common examples of such corresponding cars are cars with right-hand-drive specification for the United Kingdom and Ireland purchased in mainland Europe and cars with engine versions meeting road tax-exempted emission standards in Germany.
  
   
• 232. 

  See the Commission's Car Price Reports.
  
   
• 233. 

  For the purpose of the table, market shares are calculated for a certain geographical area of the European Union, or for individual Member States and for the total passenger car market.
  
   
• 234. 

  Source: ACEA, CCFA.
  
   
• 235. 

  Source: ACEA.
  
   
• 236. 

  See for details ACEA, 'Western Europe New Passenger Car Registrations', 1999.
  
   
• 237. 

  See section 6.3.1 of this report.
  
   
• 238. 

  See Article 3(3) and recital 7 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 239. 

  Important examples are Volkswagen/Audi, BMW/Rover, General Motors/Saab.
  
   
• 240. 

  A particular case is the joint distribution of Renault/Volvo in the Nordic countries, a legacy of the former cross-shareholding between both companies.
  
   
• 241. 

  See also UK Competition Commission report, pts. 2.177 and 2.178, 7.4 and chapter 9. In this context see also Frank Verboven 'The markets for gasoline and diesel cars in Europe', discussion paper n° 2069, February 1999, Centre for Economic Policy Research, p. 2, 35: this study on price differentials between a given car model equipped with a diesel engine and a petrol engine comes to the conclusion that 70% to 85% of the price difference is attributable to price discrimination; the remaining percentage follows from the higher costs due to differences in specifications. The fact that such price discrimination is possible is one element which seems to indicate that inter-brand competition in the car sector might not be as strong as it is generally believed.
  
   
• 242. 

  Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation 1475/95 provide that the warranty has to be honoured by any dealer in the European Union, irrespective of the place of purchase of the car; in fact, all manufacturers have introduced such provisions in their service booklets.
  
   
• 243. 

  See section 0, page 43, of this report.
  
   
• 244. 

  Article 6 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 245. 

  See Article 6 (1)(12) and recital 28 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 246. 

  See recital 4 and Article 5 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 247. 

  See: ICDP, 'After-sales in Europe' by P. Wade, L. Buzzavo, T. Chieux, K. Zellmer, J. Kiff, Research paper 2/97 of July 1997 (hereinafter: ICDP 'After-sales in Europe' 2/97), p. 74; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 'Guaranteeing Survival', May 2000, slides 71 et seq.
  
   
• 248. 

  ICDP 'After-sales in Europe' 2/97, p. 77.
  
   
• 249. 

  ICDP 'After-sales in Europe' 2/97, p. 78.
  
   
• 250. 

  For example, the Internet has a site where one can download all diagnostic codes for Chrysler cars.
  
   
• 251. 

  ICDP 'After-sales in Europe' 2/97, p. 78.
  
   
• 252. 

  See in particular Article 6(12) of Regulation 1475/95, which obliges vehicle manufacturers to give the independent repairers full and non-discriminatory access to technical information.
  
   
• 253. 

  See recital 4 and Article 5 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 254. 

  Article 5 of Regulation 1475/95
  
   
• 255. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption' 4/98, p. 58. ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II' 6/99, p. 17.
  
   
• 256. 

  Ford UK has established pure service outlets in the United Kingdom, see Commission Press Release IP/97/740 of 4.8.1997 and XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy, 1997, First Part, Section I, B 3; further examples are Daewoo in the United Kingdom, who have contracted a retail group to provide after-sale support (for details, see Financial Times Automotive, p. 29), and
   
• 257. 

  See also ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 58.
  
   
• 258. 

  Source: Commission information; this view is shared by importers, who consider that a separation of the activities would make it more difficult for consumers to obtain appropriate servicing.
  
   
• 259. 

  Certain consumers' associations see a positive effect of a link for customer relations, while others would be in favour of a split; some criticise cross-subsidisation between sale and servicing activities.
  
   
• 260. 

  In particular, the manufacturers' selling companies and importers.
  
   
• 261. 

  Recital 4 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 262. 

  See, for example, ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 58 - 60.
  
   
• 263. 

  See L'Argus de l'automobile, 24.2.2000, p. 48. According to this article, STVA, a company belonging to SNCF, the national French railway company, operates 15 centres in France. In these centres, new Ford cars are checked by specialists of STVA as regards the mechanics, as regards the conformity with national regulations and equipped with additional specifications. The vehicles are delivered to French Ford dealers in a condition which allows them to deliver the car to their customer. STVA carried out these services on 16% of all new vehicles registered in France in 1998. A major Japanese car manufacturer carries out pre-delivery inspections before a car is handed over to a dealer. The latter can then deliver the car to his customers without a further inspection.
  
   
• 264. 

  ICDP, 'Future of the dealer', 4/99, p. 10.
  
   
• 265. 

  ICDP, 'Future of the dealer', 4/99, p. 10; ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II', 6/99, p. 15 - 17; ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 59.
  
   
• 266. 

  Article 5 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 267. 

  This view is shared by the importers, who consider that a separation of the activities would make it more difficult for consumers to obtain appropriate servicing.
  
   
• 268. 

  OECD, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector ', p. 16; ICDP, 'Future Direction for European Car Distribution', p. 19.
  
   
• 269. 

  See also ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', Research Report No. 4/98, p. 39, 58; ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II', 6/99, p.1, 14, 15; ICDP, 'Future Directions for European Car Distribution', 11/98; see also the UK Competition Commission's report, pt. 2.419 to 2.423; it takes the view that the car manufacturers or importers should not be able to insist on dealers offering servicing and repair services.
  
   
• 270. 

  The main reason put forward by the dealers is that the manufacturers can end their contracts with two years notice without reason and that it is difficult to become a dealer of another major manufacturer in case of termination of their contract.
  
   
• 271. 

  Article 10(6) gives a definition of spare parts: 'spare parts' are parts which are to be installed in or upon a motor vehicle so as to replace components of that vehicle. They are to be distinguished from other parts and accessories, according to trade usage.
  
   
• 272. 

  The spare parts of matching quality may be used for the repair of cars outside the warranty if the repair is not done in the context of a recall action; see Article 4 (7) and 10 (11) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 273. 

  Article 5 (1)(2)(c). Aggregation of discounts would induce dealers to purchase original spare parts in order to have higher discounts from the car manufacturers.
  
   
• 274. 

  Dealers' freedom in the choice of their source of supplies still encounters limits linked to safety and consumer satisfaction: spare parts must correspond in quality to those produced and distributed by the car manufacturer; the manufacturer is enabled by the Regulation to verify the quality of those parts; dealers can be induced to use original spare parts only for work under guarantee, free servicing and vehicle-recall work. Finally, there is a general obligation upon dealers to inform customers on the use of non-original spare parts.
  
   
• 275. 

  The position of spare-parts producers on this issue will be explained more fully in section 6.2.2 'Has the access of spare parts producers to dealer networks improved-'.
  
   
• 276. 

  Article 4(1)(8) and (9) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 277. 

  Article 6 (1)(10) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 278. 

  Article 5(2) of the former Regulation 123/85 also contained provisions regarding the duration and the termination of dealer agreements. These provisions were less favourable to the dealer, since distribution and service agreements could be for a period of at least four years or for an indefinite period. The period of notice for normal termination of the agreements was at least one year.
  
   
• 279. 

  Almost all the German car manufacturers and Honda, Nissan and Toyota reduced their number of dealers in Germany. General Motor did so in Italy.
  
   
• 280. 

  Some manufacturers offer their ex-dealers a service outlet contract. Otherwise, if the dealer does not want to stop his activities, he becomes an independent repairer or an intermediary; see also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.258: it also points out that it is difficult for a dealer to switch the make and to become a dealer of another manufacturer. Moreover, under pt. 2.259, it points out that the manufacturer can also veto the sale of the ongoing business even to another dealer of the same network.
  
   
• 281. 

  In Germany, based on an analogy with the rules applicable to commercial agents, dealers can get compensation for goodwill if their contract is ended.
  
   
• 282. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(c).
  
   
• 283. 

  See also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.273 to 2.279 and 6.105 et seq.
  
   
• 284. 

  Pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of Regulation 1475/95, manufacturers can 'reserve' themselves the right to sell vehicles to certain categories of customers. However, dealers must be prevented from selling vehicles to these customers too.
  
   
• 285. 

  In the United Kingdom, discounts set by car manufacturers to fleet operators vary from 30% to 35% of the vehicle's price; see: CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution,' p. 35.
  
   
• 286. 

  Article 6(1)(6) and Article 6(2) and (3) of Regulation 1475/95. Article 6(2) of Regulation 123/85 contained a similar provision.
  
   
• 287. 

  As to the situation in the UK: see UK Competition Commission report, pts. 2.280 to 2.296, which explain in detail the various measures used by car manufacturers/importers to limit UK dealers' freedom to set their retail prices or discounts.
  
   
• 288. 

  Article 4(1)(3): Sales targets are determined taking into account sales previously achieved in the territory and forecast sales for the territory and at national level.
  
   
• 289. 

  Pursuant to Article 4(1)(3) of Regulation 123/85 the manufacturer could set the sales targets unilaterally.
  
   
• 290. 

  See Explanatory Brochure on Regulation 1475/95, reply to question 13: this states that 'minimum requirements' as to sales agreed for a shorter period 'than one year' may result in an automatic loss of the benefit of the group exemption
   
• 291. 

  Cf. Article 4 (1)(3) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 292. 

  Article 3(1)(3).
  
   
• 293. 

  Article 5(2)(1), see also the Commissions' brochure on Regulation 1475/95, question 7: Such objective reasons exist if the obligations prevent a dealer from operating on an economically viable basis.
  
   
• 294. 

  See Commission brochure on Regulation 1475/95, question 8.
  
   
• 295. 

  See : ICDP, 'Multi-Franchising', 1/98, p.26, (hereinafter referred to as 'Multi-Franchising').
  
   
• 296. 

  ICDP, 'Multi-Franchising' p. 26 and 35.
  
   
• 297. 

  ICDP, 'Multi-Franchising' p. 45.
  
   
• 298. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 299. 

  See Article 11 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p.25, hereinafter referred to as Regulation 1475/95 or the Regulation.
  
   
• 300. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 301. 

  ICDP, 'Multi-Franchising', 1/98, p.50.
  
   
• 302. 

  See section 0, page 38, of this report for more detailed information on multi-brand dealerships.
  
   
• 303. 

  Examples are VW/Audi, , Ford/Jaguar, Fiat/Lancia/Alfa Romeo dealers.
  
   
• 304. 

  If confirmed, such action would contravene Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 305. 

  See also section 0, page 70,of this report and UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.328 to 2.339; the UK Competition Commission concludes that the rules on multi-make dealerships contained in Regulation 1475/95 have negative effects on prices, reduce the choice of type of retailer from which consumers may buy cars and reduce innovation in car retailing.
  
   
• 306. 

  Article 4(1)(3) on the annual setting of sales targets; Article 4(1)(4) on stock requirements; Article 4(1)(5) on demonstration vehicles and Article 5(3) on the termination of dealer agreements.
  
   
• 307. 

  However, the UK Competition Commission in its report, pts. 2.125, 2.310 and 2.293, mentions that sales targets are set at levels which 50% of all dealers cannot achieve and which are unrealistic. Moreover, it found out that dealers are reluctant to ask for arbitration because they are afraid that the manufacturer could terminate the dealer contract with two years notice if a dealer dares to ask for arbitration. It therefore concludes that in practice sales targets are set unilaterally by the manufacturers.
  
   
• 308. 

  Section 0, page 82, of this report.
  
   
• 309. 

  Article 3(5), and Article 6(1)(9).
  
   
• 310. 

  Article 6(1)(10) and (11) and Article 6(1)(3).
  
   
• 311. 

  Recital 27 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 312. 

  "La pièce adaptable détrônera-t-elle l'origine-" in Auto Info, 1099 of 21.1.2000, p. 34.
  
   
• 313. 

  Article 10(1)(6) of the Regulation defines 'spare parts' as parts which are to be installed in or upon a motor vehicle so as to replace components of that vehicle and leaves the distinction from other parts and accessories to trade usage.
  
   
• 314. 

  Article 6(1)(11).
  
   
• 315. 

  They base this assumption on the fact that independent garages are usually small and remote, do not advertise their activity and, as they purchase small volumes of spare parts, do not obtain favourable conditions. Moreover, since cars are becoming more complex goods which require more investment in equipment and training, independent repairers will be excluded from qualified repair and maintenance.
  
   
• 316. 

  For further details, see section 0, page 43, of this report and PriceWaterhouseCoopers 'Guaranteeing Survival', May 2000, slides 72 et seq.
  
   
• 317. 

  Article 3(10)(b).
  
   
• 318. 

  Article 6(1)(12).
  
   
• 319. 

  Article 3(1)(10)(b).
  
   
• 320. 

  Article 6(1)(12).
  
   
• 321. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/99, p. 59-60; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 'Guaranteeing Survival', May 2000, slides 21 et seq.
  
   
• 322. 

  Article 6(12).
  
   
• 323. 

  One manufacturer asked for a payment of
   
• 324. 

  However, even this monthly fee is said to be too expensive for very small ("family business") garages.
  
   
• 325. 

  Directive 98/69/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 1998 relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles and amending Council Directive 70/220/EEC, OJ L 350, 28.12.1998, p. 2.
  
   
• 326. 

  See Annex XI, point 3.1.2. of the above Directive.
  
   
• 327. 

  Autoinfo 1101, dated 25.2.2000, p. 19.
  
   
• 328. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 329. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 330. 

  See Article 11 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p.25, hereinafter referred to as Regulation 1475/95 or the Regulation.
  
   
• 331. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 332. 

  Commission notice concerning Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ C 17, 18.1.1985, p. 4 (hereinafter referred to as the notice on Regulation 123/85), and Clarification of the activities of motor vehicle intermediaries, OJ C 329, 18.12.1991, p. 20 (hereinafter referred to as the notice on intermediaries).
  
   
• 333. 

  According to manufacturers, the intensifying competition resulting from the ever-widening source product offer forces them to increase their advertising spending. In 1998, car manufacturers spent
   
• 334. 

  Source : ACEA.
  
   
• 335. 

  'Pricing in Euroland' - Lehman Brothers European Strategy - 31.7.1998.
  
   
• 336. 

  Source : INSEE. Consumer price index up 5.6%, new car price index down 0.5% over 1995-98 period.
  
   
• 337. 

  Source : Statistisches Bundesamt.
  
   
• 338. 

  Recital 31 of Regulation 1475/95 and notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter II. 1.
  
   
• 339. 

  Notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter II. 1.
  
   
• 340. 

  ICDP; 'Beyond the block exemption'; 4/98, p. 32.
  
   
• 341. 

  'Pricing in Euroland' - Lehman Brothers European Strategy - 31.7.1998.
  
   
• 342. 

  House of Commons, Session 1998-99, Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, 'Vehicle Pricing', 1998, p. 36, pt. 31.
  
   
• 343. 

  Article 3(8)(b) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 344. 

  Article 3(8)(b) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 345. 

  Article 10(3) of Regulation 123/85 and Article 8(2) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 346. 

  Article 10( 4) of Regulation 123/85 and Article 8(3) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 347. 

  Chapter II of the notice on Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 348. 

  For further details, see section 0, page 27, of this report.
  
   
• 349. 

  The 12% threshold was initially part of the 'black clause' of the draft of Regulation 123/85. If this percentage had been exceeded, it would have led to a temporary suspension of the contractual clause which prevents the resale of vehicles to independent resellers.
  
   
• 350. 

  In this context, it can be left open whether or not this threshold, which is a rule of thumb, is appropriate or not.
  
   
• 351. 

  See e.g. the Commission's Car Price report with car prices on 1.11.1999 and the press release on this report, IP/00/121, 7.2.2000; Commission's Car Price Report with car prices on 1.5.2000 and the press release on this report, IP/00/781, 13.7.2000.
  
   
• 352. 

  See ACEA press release of 22.7.1999 (www.acea.be/acea/press_releases); see also Annex VI of this report and diagram 13 on page 67.
  
   
• 353. 

  These are the 12 countries for which prices were published in the car price reports until 1.11.1998. (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom).
  
   
• 354. 

  Starting with the car price report showing prices on 1.5.1999, all 15 Member States, including now Denmark, Finland and Greece, were included.
  
   
• 355. 

  Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden.
  
   
• 356. 

  For the purpose of this diagramm each of the car prices contained in the EU Commission's car price reports is converted into an index, whereby the cheapest price in a certain country equals 100%. For the other countries the index for each car is determined accordingly. For each date shown in the diagramm an average of these indexes is calculated on a country to country basis. The average of the latter is then used to draw the lines shown in the above diagramm.
  
   
• 357. 

  The United Kingdom is also a country with low car taxation. It is not included in this diagram because the prices for this country are for right-hand-drive cars.
  
   
• 358. 

  Until November 1998, the car price report gave prices for 12 Member States only. Denmark, Greece and Finland were excluded because car taxes in these countries are close to 100% or even higher. However, from May 1999 onwards, the car price report covers all 15 Member States.
  
   
• 359. 

  The three Member States which have car taxes close to or higher than 100% (Denmark, Greece, and Finland) of the net price of the car were not taken into account for the period 1 November 1996 to 1 November 1998.
  
   
• 360. 

  Chapter II, pt.1.
  
   
• 361. 

  Chapter II, pt. 2, second paragraph.
  
   
• 362. 

  Notice on Regulation 123/85 Chapter II, pt. 2, first paragraph. For example, such a supplement for a corresponding model would be the right-hand-drive supplement for a car purchased in Denmark. In this case, the dealer could use the possibility mentioned in the notice and charge this 'further supplement'.
  
   
• 363. 

  The UK Competition Commission came to the same conclusion. See in particular its report, pts. 2.202 and 2.226.
  
   
• 364. 

  According to the findings of the UK Competition Commission in its report, pt. 7.190 et seq., in 1998 parallel trade in right-hand-drive cars accounted for 0.5% of all new cars registered in the UK; as regards parallel imported cars registered by private customers, these accounted for 1% of the registrations. However, these percentages varied from make to make and could be as high as 3% of all registrations of new BMW cars and over 5% of all registered new Mercedes cars.
  
   
• 365. 

  It is noticeable that no car manufacturer in its reply to the questionnaire mentioned the level of parallel trade as a criteria to be taken into account when determining prices - a reason could be that parallel trade is negligible
  
   
• 366. 

  COM(95) 503 final, 31.10.1995.
  
   
• 367. 

  Recital 31 of Regulation 1475/95; Chapter II, pt. 1, last paragraph, of the notice on Regulation 123/85, also addresses this issue and states that 'Particular account will be taken, for an appropriate period, of alterations of the parities within the European monetary system or fluctuations in exchange rate in a Member State'.
  
   
• 368. 

  See Article 11 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p.25, hereinafter referred to as Regulation 1475/95 or the Regulation.
  
   
• 369. 

  Article 10(4) in conjunction with Article 5 (1)(2)(d).
  
   
• 370. 

  Article 8(3) in conjunction with Article 5(1)(2)(d).
  
   
• 371. 

  Chapter II, pt. 2.
  
   
• 372. 

  See also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.103 and 2.104: according to the UK Competition Commission, for most cars the original planning and development includes left-hand and right-hand variants. Thus the design costs of these variants should be part of the general production cost of the relevant model and be spread across the whole production volume of that car model. Consequently, for the vast majority of new cars a supplement based on planning and development and/or production costs does not seem to be justifiable.
  
   
• 373. 

  The supplements are published for all models and Member States in mainland Europe mentioned in the Commission's car price reports, as far as right-hand-drive versions of cars exist.
  
   
• 374. 

  For one model, it was between 25% and 40%, for another between 10% and 31% of the price for a left-hand-drive car, depending on the country of purchase. Following the Commission's intervention, this manufacturer adopted a new approach: it now charges a very small amount which takes into account the different costs for the production of left- and right-hand-drive cars. This sum was increased by a mark-up for extra administrative and distribution costs. The right-hand-drive supplement is now around 3% of the recommended price for left-hand-drive models.
  
   
• 375. 

  For most European manufacturers, the ratio of production between left-hand-drive cars and right-hand-drive cars is around 90:10; however, for Rover, this ratio seems to be close to 50:50 (see UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.103); for most Japanese manufacturers, the ratio is also close to 50:50. If the ratio between left-hand and right-hand drive cars is close to 50:50, the supplement can only be based on higher distribution and administrative costs.
  
   
• 376. 

  The lower supplement they had asked for in previous years was either a pure estimate of the above costs or was only based on a partial recovery of the costs, e.g. the higher costs for the production of those parts which are specific to a right-hand-drive car.
  
   
• 377. 

  For further details, see UK Competition Commission report, pts. 2.143 et seq. and 3.53 et seq.
  
   
• 378. 

  CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution', p. 23 and p. 36.
  
   
• 379. 

  The Motability scheme which provides cars to disabled British citizens is the largest owned fleet in the UK. It is said to purchase 7% of the new cars sold in the UK.
  
   
• 380. 

  CA 200, 'The Forecourt Revolution', p.23 and p. 36; Autopolis, 'Report to government select committee on car pricing in the UK', 1998, published in the Internet under: www.autopolis.com/think; see comments on slide 10 (hereinafter Autopolis 'Report to government select committee').
  
   
• 381. 

  Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders.
  
   
• 382. 

  Statement by Mr Thomson, Chief Executive of the SMMT, 9.11.1998, before the Trade and Industry Committee, see Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, 'Vehicle Pricing', p. 42.
  
   
• 383. 

  Pt. 5.91 et seq.
  
   
• 384. 

  Autopolis, 'Report to government select committee', 1998, see comments on slide 11, 6th dot.
  
   
• 385. 

  Prices have to include car taxes in this context because they reflect the prices consumers have to pay for a car bought in their domestic market. Pre-tax prices are only relevant for an analysis of cross-border purchases of new cars.
  
   
• 386. 

  See e.g. 'Problèmes économiques' 2603, 10.2.1999, p. 29 ; source Conjoncture-Paribas, December 1998.
  
   
• 387. 

  In Member States where the manufacturer has entrusted an importer with the role of a wholesaler, the importer will discuss the sales targets with the dealers and report the overall sales figures back to the manufacturer.
  
   
• 388. 

  See Article 4(1)(3), first alternative.
  
   
• 389. 

  See Article 4(1)(3), second alternative.
  
   
• 390. 

  See Article 4(1)(3), second alternative.
  
   
• 391. 

  See Article 4(1)(4) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 392. 

  For further details, see section 0, page 87, and section 0, page 90, of this report.
  
   
• 393. 

  By increasing production or by reallocating cars which - in the planning - should have been distributed in other Member States.
  
   
• 394. 

  See Article 3(10(a) of Regulation 1475/95: car manufacturers cannot prohibit such cross-supplies within their own network.
  
   
• 395. 

  Pt. 2.311 et seq.
  
   
• 396. 

  Pursuant to Article 3(10)(a) of Regulation 1475/95, such cross-supplies may not be prohibited.
  
   
• 397. 

  This report covers in principle the distribution and servicing of all types of motor vehicle. It is, however, more specifically focused on passenger cars in view of the replies received following the sending of the questionnaires. Moreover, most of the issues identified by the Commission in the application of the Regulation also concerned passenger cars. If the findings concern something specific related to commercial vehicles, such as trucks or buses, this will be specified.
  
   
• 398. 

  Only three of the car manufacturers which replied to the Commission's questionnaire pursue a policy which aims at harmonising delivery times.
  
   
• 399. 

  Article 2 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 400. 

  See Article 3(8) and recital 9 of Regulation 1475/95, see also Chapter I of the notice on Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 401. 

  Recital 16 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 402. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(d).
  
   
• 403. 

  Articles 6(1)(7) and (8) of Regulation 1475/95 and Chapter I, 1 of the Communication on Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 404. 

  Recital 26 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 405. 

  This right of dealers stems from Article 6(1)(7) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 406. 

  See also footnote 89 of this Report.
  
   
• 407. 

  For details, see section 0, page 61, of this report.
  
   
• 408. 

  See Commission Decision of 28 January 1998, Case IV/35.733 - VW, OJ L 124, 25.4.1998, p. 60.
  
   
• 409. 

  Which is a priority for him in view of the sales targets and in view of the higher economic attractiveness of such customers who will come back to the dealer for after-sales services.
  
   
• 410. 

  Article 4(3).
  
   
• 411. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(d).
  
   
• 412. 

  Some car manufacturers maintain that this is the case.
  
   
• 413. 

  Article 6(1)(7).
  
   
• 414. 

  Case IV/M.1672.
  
   
• 415. 

  Article 3(10)(a).
  
   
• 416. 

  As to the reasons for the limited number of cross-supplies, see also above pt. 0 on p. 114.
  
   
• 417. 

  see pt. 0 on p. 88 of this report.
  
   
• 418. 

  UK Competition Commission Report, pt. 2.316 to 2.318.
  
   
• 419. 

  Article 3(11); for details, see also notice on intermediaries.
  
   
• 420. 

  Chapter 2(c) of the notice on intermediaries.
  
   
• 421. 

  The text of the notice makes reference especially to Articles 3(8)(a) and (b), and (9) and Article 4(1)(3) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 422. 

  Art. 3 (8) (b) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 423. 

  Art. 3 (8) (b) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 424. 

  See Chapter 2 (a) of the notice on intermediaries.
  
   
• 425. 

  See Chapter 2 (c) of the notice on intermediaries.
  
   
• 426. 

  For further details see also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 7.53ss.
  
   
• 427. 

  Article 3(10)(a).
  
   
• 428. 

  See recital 4, sentence 3.
  
   
• 429. 

  See recital 4, end of sentence 4.
  
   
• 430. 

  Article 6(1)(12).
  
   
• 431. 

  Article 5(1)(1)(a), first indent, and Article 4(1)(6).
  
   
• 432. 

  As is the case for cars sold in the UK; see the Commission car price reports, which indicate the length of the warranty in the different Member States. One Japanese manufacturer seems to extend the warranty for its cars to 5 years (see: l'Argus de l'Automobile, 3.2.2000, p. 6.).
  
   
• 433. 

  Article 5(1)(1)(a) and recital 12 of the Regulation.
  
   
• 434. 

  Recital 12 of the Regulation.
  
   
• 435. 

  Without any charge for the consumer who claims the warranty.
  
   
• 436. 

  Article 5(1)(1)(a), Article 4(1)(1)(e) and recital 12 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 437. 

  According to Article 4(1)(1) of the Regulation, manufacturers can impose on their dealers certain qualitative standards as regards the training of the personnel and the equipment of their after-sales departments.
  
   
• 438. 

  'Secret Service' in: Which- Magazine, September 1999, p. 8.
  
   
• 439. 

  'The 1999 Lex Report on Motoring', p. 70; AA, 'Consumer information for motorists', Surveys of motorists and the garage trade and proposals for actions, 1996, p. 3; see also 'The Castrol Car Service and Customer Satisfaction Trend Tracker' by Brian Taylor, published by The Automotive Strategies Group, January 2000, p. iii.
  
   
• 440. 

  'The 1999 Lex Report on Motoring', p. 70;
  
   
• 441. 

  Self-employed mechanics, fleet workshops, mobile servicing units and black economy repair (see 'The Castrol Car Service and Customer Satisfaction Trend Tracker', p. 93).
  
   
• 442. 

  'The Castrol Car Service and Customer Satisfaction Trend Tracker', p. ii.
  
   
• 443. 

  'Drive down your car running costs' in: Which- Magazine, March 1998, p. 20
  
   
• 444. 

  1994 OCU study.
  
   
• 445. 

  As to the details of this diagram: the 'traditional' system in countries such as Germany is characterised by dealers with relatively low unit throughput and high service retention which helps to ensure profits. In the Netherlands similar retail volumes per dealer are seen to those in Germany; however, dealers there have a much weaker hold on the provision of auto servicing as the independent market has made greater inroads. In contrast to the northern markets, the southern markets are 'unbundled' . Here the main dealer sells cars but is flanked by a multitude of service sub-dealers. Fairly high new unit sales keeps the main dealer in business even though much of the service revenue goes to sub-dealers. As regards the UK, it is said to be in the worst position: more than half of all the cars which pass through the books of the dealer (shown in the above diagram with an O) are fleet purchases which contribute very little to the dealer's revenue. The sales to private consumers by UK dealers are much lower (shown in the diagram with an () and are said to be 'declining'. The diagram also shows that British consumers use the dealers only to a very small extent for the repair and maintenance of cars (in particular once the warranty has expired); see CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution', p.29.
  
   
• 446. 

  Second indent of Article 5(1)(1)(a) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 447. 

  Article 4 (1)(1)(c) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 448. 

  See article 3 (8) (b) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 449. 

  t is also worth to note that general advertising or promotion on the Internet, that reaches customers in other distributors' exclusive territories and which is a reasonable way to reach consumers outside those territories (in particular the consumers inside the dealers own territory) are considered as passive sales in the sense of Regulation 2790/99; see Commission Notice Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, pt. 50, 2nd indent and pt.
   
• 450. 

  Article 3(6) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 451. 

  Article 3(9) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 452. 

  Article 3(8)
  
   
• 453. 

  A major car manufacturer has relied on these provisions to justify its opposition to any commercial relation between its dealer and such internet operators.
  
   
• 454. 

  E.g. up to now all dealers have to focus on a sales territory, which is always a geographically defined territory of a Member state (see article 1 and 4 (1)(3) of the Regulation). Futhermore an Internet operator may have a particular interest in advertsing by electronic means vis-à-vis a large range of customers. This may be in contradiction with the obligations which can be imposed on a dealer pursuant to acticle 3(8). .Dealers have also to have a physical showroom within their sales territory which corresponds to the standards of the manufacturer (see article 4(1)(1)(a)). These criteria, which an Internet dealer can not meet, are criteria of a distribution system based on territorial exclusivity and on quantitative selection of the distributors.
  
   
• 455. 

  Article 5(1)(1)(a).
  
   
• 456. 

  Article 3(10)(a).
  
   
• 457. 

  Article 3(11) of the Regulation states that a dealer cannot sell motor vehicles within the contract range or corresponding goods to final consumers using the services of an intermediary unless that intermediary has prior written authority from such consumers to purchase a specified motor vehicle or where it is taken away by him, to collect it.
  
   
• 458. 

  According Article 3(10) of the Regulation, a dealer cannot supply vehicles to a reseller not belonging to the distribution system.
  
   
• 459. 

  This problem has been pointed out by intermediaries operating via the internet who state that their activity could be seriously damaged by Article 3(11) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 460. 

  Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13, 19.1.2000, p. 12.
  
   
• 461. 

  Press release IP/99/915, 30.11.1999.
  
   
• 462. 

  The main obstacles for supermarkets to become a dealer are: since manufacturers operate quantitative selection, there is no 'right' of a supermarket to be appointed as a dealer. Moreover, the geographic area in which a supermarket operates is in Europe already allocated to one or several dealers as an exclusive territory. Dealers can therefore object to the appointment of a supermarket (or another dealer) in their sales territory.
  
   
• 463. 

  Notice on intermediaries, Chapter 2 (b), last paragraph.
  
   
• 464. 

  The brand identity of manufacturers is protected e.g. by Article 3 pt. 3 of Regulation 1475/95, which stipulates that a dealer may only sell another make in separate premises under separate management and in the form of a distinct legal entity. Moreover, Article 3 pt. 4 protects any investment made by manufacturers in the after sales service area of the dealers, notably in equipment and training, form being used for the servicing of cars from other makes.
  
   
• 465. 

  See Article 4 (1) pt. 1: The manufacturer can oblige dealers to comply with minimum standards, in particular (a) the equipment of the business premises and the technical facilities for servicing; (b) the specialised, technical training of staff, (c) advertising, (d) the collection, storage and delivery of contract goods or corresponding goods and sales and after sales servicing, (e) the repair and maintenance of contract goods, in particular as regards the safe and reliable functioning of motor vehicles.
  
   
• 466. 

  Article 5 (5), 1st indent of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 467. 

  See Article 4 (2) pt. 2 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 468. 

  However, territorial protection is not absolute. Dealers have to face a certain degree of intra-brand competition under the Regulation: Other dealers can advertise outside their contract territory and actively promote sales by other means than personalised advertising (see Article 3 pt. 8 of Regulation 1475/85). They are also allowed to sell cars to customers having their residence or head office in another dealers territory. They are not however normally submitted to price competition from high volume independent resellers.
  
   
• 469. 

  Such as financial aid, technical and IT assistance, supply of additional services which can be offered together with the sale of a new vehicle, such as credits for the financing of new vehicles, leasing, insurance.
  
   
• 470. 

  See Article 6 (2) of Regulation 123/85 and Article 6 pt. 6 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 471. 

  Recitals 4 of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95. Recitals 6 of both Regulations indicate that account was taken of the consumers interest in readily availability of spare parts.
  
   
• 472. 

  See Article 3 pt. 4 of Regulation 123/85 and Article 3 pt. 5 of Regulation 1475/95; Article 4 (1) pt. 1of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95.
  
   
• 473. 

  Mentioned in Recital 8 of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95.
  
   
• 474. 

  Article 6 (2) of Regulation 123/85 and Article (6) pt. 6 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 475. 

  See ICDP Research Report 4/98 'Beyond the block exemption', p. 28.
  
   
• 476. 

  This aim is underlined in both Regulations and the Notice on Regulation 123/85. Recitals 9 and 16 of Regulation 123/85 and 1475/95, Notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter I, (1) and Chapter I, (3) regarding the possibility to use an intermediary to purchase a motor vehicle in another Member State.
  
   
• 477. 

  Article 5 (1) pt. 2 d) of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95; see also Art 6 pt. 7 of Regulation 1475/95 for all types of vehicles.
  
   
• 478. 

  See Article 5 (1) pt. 1 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 479. 

  Article 3 pt. 11 of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95; Notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter I (3); see also Notice on Intermediaries.
  
   
• 480. 

  Article 3 pt. 8 of Regulation 123/85 prohibited active sales outside the dealers contract territory; however dealers were allowed to advertise their products in media which covered their contract territory first, even if these media were also distributed outside the contract areas. Article 3 pt. 8 lit b) of Regulation 1475/95 allows active advertising without geographic limitation as long as it does not amount to personalised advertising.
  
   
• 481. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 482. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 483. 

  Block exemption regulations, such as Regulation 1475/95, are meant to facilitate the application of EC Competition rules by national courts and authorities (see Notice on cooperation between the national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 81 (ex Article 85) and 82 (ex Article 86) of the EC Treaty OJ C 39, 13/2/1993, p. 6 and Commission Notice on cooperation between national competition authorities and the Commission in handling cases falling within the scope of Articles 81 (ex Article 85) and 82 (ex Article 86) of the EC Treaty, OJ C 313, 15/10/1997, p. 3). However, according to Article 10 of Regulation 123/85 and Article 8 of Regulation 1475/85 as well as Article 7 (2) of Regulation 19/65 EEC as amended, only the Commission and the authorities of the Member States can withdraw the benefit of the block exemption.
  
   
• 484. 

  CFI Judgement of 18/09/1992 (Case T-24/90) Automec ./. Commission ("Automec II"), ECR. p.II-2223; see also Notice on the co-operation between the national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 81 (ex Article 85) and 82 (ex Article 86) of the EC Treaty, OJ C 39 of 13/02/1993, p. 6, CFI Judgement of 24/01/1995 (Case T-114/92) BEMIM ./. Commission, ECR p. II-147.
  
   
• 485. 

  CFI Judgement (Joint Cases T-185/96, T-189/96 et T-190/96) of 21/01/1999, Riviere Auto Service v. Commission, ECR 1999, p. II-0093 (VAG France); Court Judgement (Case C-282/95 P) of 18/03/1997, Guérin (Volvo) v. Commission, ECR 1997, p. I-1503.
  
   
• 486. 

  CFI Judgement (Case T-23/90) of 12/07/1991, Peugeot SA v. Commission (Eco System), ECR 1991, p. II-0653; Commission Decision confirmed by the CFI Judgement (Case T-9/92) of 22/04/1993, Peugeot SA v. Commission (Eco System), ECR 1993, p. II-0493 and the Court Judgement (Case C-322/94) of 16/06/1994, Peugeot SA v. Commission (Eco System), ECR 1994, p. I-2727; see also XXIII Report on competition policy, 1993, p.222.
  
   
• 487. 

  CFI Judgement (Joint Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 et T-123/96) of 13/12/1999, SGA v. Commission (not yet published); CFI Judgement (Joint Cases T-9/96 and T-211/96) of 13.12.1999, Européenne Automobile Sarl v. Commission (not yet published).
  
   
• 488. 

  Court Judgement (Case C-226/94) of 15/02/1996, Grand Garage Albigeois SA ./. Massol, ECR 1996, p. I-0651; Court Judgement (Case C-309/94) of 15/02/1996, Nissan France SA ECR 1996, p. I-0677; Court Judgement (Case C-128/95) of 20/2/1997 Fontaine, ECR 1997, p. I-967; Court Judgement (Case C-41/96) of 5/6/1997 VAG Händlerbeirat/SYD-Consult, ECR I p. I-3123; see also, cases IV/35137 Trabisco , IV/35149 Serieys and IV/35150 Aqueducs c/ dealers XXVIII. Report on competition policy, 1998, p. 190, 191.
  
   
• 489. 

  Indices, based on recommended retail prices for selected models; expressed in euro including taxes (source: Commission, Report on Car Prices within the EU, 1/11/1999.
  
   
• 490. 

  See Article 11 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p.25, hereinafter referred to as Regulation 1475/95 or the Regulation.
  
   
• 491. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 492. 

  Commission notice concerning Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ C 17, 18.1.1985, p. 4 (hereinafter referred to as the notice on Regulation 123/85), and Clarification of the activities of motor vehicle intermediaries, OJ C 329, 18.12.1991, p. 20 (hereinafter referred to as the notice on intermediaries).
  
   
• 493. 

  See Article 1 of Regulation 1475/95. Used motor vehicles are thus not covered by the Regulation. The same applies to tractors as their main use is not on public roads. The separate distribution of spare parts or the provision of servicing without any connection to the distribution of vehicles is not covered either.
  
   
• 494. 

  These questionnaires have also been published together with a press release on the Commission's web site under:
  
   
• 495. 

  This report covers in principle the distribution and servicing of all types of motor vehicle. It is, however, more specifically focused on passenger cars in view of the replies received following the sending of the questionnaires. Moreover, most of the issues identified by the Commission in the application of the Regulation also concerned passenger cars. If the findings concern something specific related to commercial vehicles, such as trucks or buses, this will be specified.
  
   
• 496. 

  See Annex VIII of the report for further details.
  
   
• 497. 

  Competition Commission, New cars, A report on the supply of new motor cars within the UK, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry by Command of Her Majesty, April 2000, 737 pages (hereinafter referred to as the UK Competition Commission report).
  
   
• 498. 

  UK Competition Commission report, pt. 1.20.
  
   
• 499. 

  Following the termination of the EU-Japan consensus at the end of 1999, Japanese suppliers are now also free from quantitative restrictions on their supplies to the EU car market.
  
   
• 500. 

  Commission Green Paper on vertical restraints in EC Competition policy, COM(96)721, p.1.
  
   
• 501. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 502. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 503. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 504. 

  Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336, 29.12.1999 p. 21-25, hereinafter referred to as the new block exemption on vertical restraints.
  
   
• 505. 

  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1983/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive distribution agreements, OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, p. 1; Corrigendum OJ L 281, 13.10.1983, p. 24.
  
   
• 506. 

  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements, OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, p. 5; Corrigendum OJ L 281, 13.10.1983, p. 24.
  
   
• 507. 

  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of franchise agreements, OJ L 359, 28.12.1988, p. 46.
  
   
• 508. 

  IP/99/286, 7.5.1999. See also the Green Paper on vertical restraints in EC competition policy, COM/96/0721 FINAL - Executive summary p.ii, footnote 2.
  
   
• 509. 

  In most countries, a limited number of new vehicles are also distributed to final consumers by the manufacturers themselves (so-called direct sales), by sales outlets connected to the manufacturer or via commercial agents.
  
   
• 510. 

  Purely qualitative selective distribution is in general considered to fall outside Article 81 (1) for lack of anti-competitive effects. For the conditions under which this is true see Commission Guidelines on vertical restraints, pt. 185; adopted by the Commission on 24 May 2000, Official Journal C 291 of 13.10.2000, page 1.
  
   
• 511. 

  See e.g. Article 1(d) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336, 29.12.1999.
  
   
• 512. 

  See, for example, the Fourth Report on Competition Policy, 1974, point 87.
  
   
• 513. 

  International Car Distribution Programme (ICDP), Research Paper 6/99, 'Beyond the block exemption II, the build-up to 2002', by Dr. A. Tongue, September 1999, (hereinafter ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II' 6/99, p. 8-11.
  
   
• 514. 

  This is even a stronger restriction in comparison to quantitative selection of the number of dealers in a given sales territory (see above pt.
  
  0).
  
   
• 515. 

  See Article 2 of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95.
  
   
• 516. 

  See below 0 on page 89 of this report.
  
   
• 517. 

  See also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.10 et seq., in particular pt. 2.14 and pt. 2.38.
  
   
• 518. 

  See recital 3 of Commission Regulation (EEC) 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ L 15, 18.1.1985, p. 16 (hereinafter referred to as Regulation 123/85) and recital 3 of Regulation 1475/95, which call the use of similar networks of vertical agreements containing restrictions of competition 'cluster'.
  
   
• 519. 

  See in particular recital 3 of Regulation 123/85 and of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 520. 

  See Judgment of the Court of 28 February 1991, Delimitis Henninger Bräu,
   
• 521. 

  It is true that in Europe e.g. Korean car manufacturers were able to increase their market share from 0.1% in 1990 to 2.7% in 1998 (see ACEA position paper regarding the European Commission's questionnaire on the application of the automobile block exemption, page 12, published in the internet under: www.acea.be/acea/BEMVD.pdf). As regards the UK market, since 1990, notably Chrysler and Daewoo have entered the market and took between them about 2% of the market in 1999 (see UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.89.). However, see also ICDP, 'Multi-franchising, Developments and Impact of Sales Channel Management of Automobile Manufacturers', by M. Hoffmeister and R. Heinerberg, Research Paper 1/98, (hereinafter: ICDP, 'Multi-franchising' 1/98), p. 60: ICDP underlines that the speed of penetration is much faster, when existing dealers are used to access a new market. Therefore it was relatively easy for Korean and Malaysian makes to cover the entire United States of America, where multi-marketing is more widespread than in Europe, without investing heavily in brand exclusive new car dealerships.
  
   
• 522. 

  See recital 13 and Article 6 of Commission Regulation 2970/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336, 29.12.1999, p. 21.
  
   
• 523. 

  All these products are covered as from 1 June 2000 with regard to their distribution agreements by the new block exemption on vertical restraints.
  
   
• 524. 

  For specific reasons, dealers in Finland may sell different brands in their exclusive territory.
  
   
• 525. 

  Dell and Gateway computers, for example.
  
   
• 526. 

  Commission Regulation 67/67EEC of 22 March 1967 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of exclusive dealing agreements, as amended by Regulation (EEC) 2591/72 of 8 December 1972 and by Regulation (EEC) 3577/82 of 23 December 1982, OJ 57, 25.3.1967, p. 849 (Special Edition 1967, p. 10).
  
   
• 527. 

  Commission decision of 13 December 1974 - Bayerische Motoren Werke AG - OJ L 29, 3.2.1975, p. 1.
  
   
• 528. 

  See Fourth Report on Competition Policy, 1974, point 86.
  
   
• 529. 

  Article 4 (1)(1) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 530. 

  Recital 5 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 531. 

  Article 3(10)(a).
  
   
• 532. 

  Article 3(10)(b).
  
   
• 533. 

  Article 3(11) and the end of recital 5.
  
   
• 534. 

  Recital 6 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 535. 

  See article 4 (1)(1)(e) of Regulation 123/85; however, according to article 5 (1)(1)(a), 2nd indent of Regulation 1475/85, manufacturers are obliged to request from their dealers to offer after sales services in order to benefit from the block exemption.
  
   
• 536. 

  Commission Decision of 13 December 1974 - Bayerische Motoren Werke AG - OJ L 29, 3.2.1975, p. 1, point 24.
  
   
• 537. 

  Recital 4, 1st to 3rd sentences, of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 538. 

  Recital 4, 4th sentence, of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 539. 

  Article 3(8) and (9).
  
   
• 540. 

  Recital 9 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 541. 

  Recital 12, last sentence, of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 542. 

  Recital 9 of Regulation 123/85. This possibility is generally referred to as passive sales.
  
   
• 543. 

  Article 13(11) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 544. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(d).
  
   
• 545. 

  Article 5(1)(1)(a) and (b).
  
   
• 546. 

  Article 3(2) to (5).
  
   
• 547. 

  Recital 7 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 548. 

  Article 5(2)(1)(a).
  
   
• 549. 

  This quality standard can be imposed in view of the importance of vehicle safety; see recital 8 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 550. 

  Article 3(4) and recital 8 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 551. 

  Article 6(2) and recital 23 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 552. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(a) and recital 13 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 553. 

  These periods could be shorter if a dealer was a new entrant to the distribution system and the period of the agreement or the period of notice for termination of the agreement was the first agreed by the dealer.
  
   
• 554. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(c) and recital 15 of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 555. 

  Article 4(1)(3) to (5).
  
   
• 556. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 557. 

  See recitals 4 and 25 of Regulation 123/85 and recitals 4, 7 and 30 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 558. 

  See recital 26 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 559. 

  Article 6(1)(8).
  
   
• 560. 

  Article 3(8)(b) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 561. 

  Second indent of Article 5(1)(1)(a) of Regulation 1475/95. This obligation was not explicitly mentioned in Regulation 123/85, although difficulties in obtaining after-sales services from network dealers was mentioned as one reason for withdrawing the benefit of the former Regulation; see Article 10(2) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 562. 

  See recital 17 of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95.
  
   
• 563. 

  Pursuant to Article 3(3) of Regulation 1475/95, multi-marketing is permissible although it is subject to the condition imposed by the car manufacturers that it is done on separate premises, under separate management, in the form of a distinct legal entity and in a manner which avoids confusion between makes.
  
   
• 564. 

  Pursuant to Article 3(4) of Regulation 1475/95, this is only permitted if a third party cannot benefit unduly from investments made by a supplier, notably in equipment or the training of personnel.
  
   
• 565. 

  See Article 10(13) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 566. 

  Article 6(1)(5) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 567. 

  Article 5(2)(2) and (3).
  
   
• 568. 

  Article 3(3) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 569. 

  Article 6(1)(9) and (10) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 570. 

  Article 6(1)(11) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 571. 

  Article 6(1)(12) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 572. 

  Article 6 of Regulation 1475/95. By contrast, Regulation 123/85 contained only three black clauses in Article 6.
  
   
• 573. 

  See Article 6 of Regulation 1475/95
  
   
• 574. 

  See Article 6(1)(1) to (5) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 575. 

  See Article 6 (1)(6) to (12) and recital 20 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 576. 

  Notice on Regulation 123/85, see footnote 4, page 7.
  
   
• 577. 

  See Commission press release IP(95) 648, 21.6.1995, p. 3.; since the entry into force of Regulation 1475/95 the clarification however only concerns those provisions which on substance have been left unchanged by this Regulation. This is not the case for example for Article 10 (4) of Regulation 123/85: see Article 8 (3) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 578. 

  The word 'right' in this context may give rise to misunderstandings, because neither Regulation 123/85 nor Regulation 1475/95 creates any obligation for dealers to sell a vehicle to a consumer which could be enforced by a consumer against a dealer.
  
   
• 579. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(d) of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95 contains the so-called 'availability clause'.
  
   
• 580. 

  See Article 13(10) of Regulation 123/85 and Article 10(10) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 581. 

  Article 6(7) of Regulation 1475/95, leads to a similar result as Article 5(1)(2)(d) which concerns passenger cars. Pursuant to Article 6 (7) a manufacturer looses the benefit of the block exemption if it systematically or repeatedly refuses to deliver to its dealers, commercial vehicles, trucks or buses corresponding as regards their specifications to those in the country where the vehicles will be registered. The notice on Regulation 123/85 is therefore not up to date as regards this point. See also the section 6.3.2.2., page 110, of this report on the availability of vehicles for cross-border sales.
  
   
• 582. 

  See also recital 31 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 583. 

  The text of the notice states that this supplement has to be a 'further supplement' to the one charged for passenger cars corresponding to a model within the normal contract programme (see previous bullet point). This could be interpreted as meaning that no such supplement can be charged if a consumer buys a car out of the normal product programme of the dealer (for further details see also below pt. 0 on page 102).
  
   
• 584. 

  Notice on intermediaries, see footnote 4, page 7.
  
   
• 585. 

  Article 3(11) of Regulation 123/85 and Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 586. 

  Commission Decision of 4 December 1991 ECO System v Peugeot, OJ L 66, 11.3.1992, p. 1, upheld by the Court of First Instance judgment of 22.4.1993 Peugeot v Commission, Case T-9/92
   
• 587. 

  See Commission press release IP(95) 648, 21.6.1995, p. 3.
  
   
• 588. 

  Article 3(8)(b) of Regulation 123/85; this prohibition has been limited in scope by Regulation 1475/95, Article 3(8)(b) which only prohibits personalised advertisements outside the contract territory.
  
   
• 589. 

  Document IV/9509/95; available on the Internet under: europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/aid/en/car.
  
   
• 590. 

  See: europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/aid/en/car_hotlines_en.
  
   
• 591. 

  Pursuant to Article 11 of the Regulation, the Commission has to evaluate on a regular basis the application of the Regulation with a particular focus on price differentials between the different Member States. Such is the purpose of this report.
  
   
• 592. 

  An extract of each report, which figures among the most popular publications of the Directorate-General for Competition, is also made available on the Competition Directorate-General website: europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/aid/en/car199911.pdf.
  
   
• 593. 

  For the most recent press release on car prices on 1.5.2000, see IP/00/781 of 13 July 2000; also published on the Internet under: europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/aid/en/car.
  
   
• 594. 

  See e.g. ICDP, Research Report 4/98, 'Beyond the block exemption, an analysis of vertical restraints and retail competition in the European Car Industry' by A. Tongue and J. Brown, hereinafter: ICDP 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98. On pages 25 and 27, this paper lists in more detail the benefits that it believes the current system of distribution has brought to the various categories of operators concerned. It also explains the burdens that the system creates for dealers.
  
   
• 595. 

  See also, for further details, ACEA, www.acea.be.
  
   
• 596. 

  See ICDP 'Future of the dealer- the evolving retailer', 4/99, p. 10; ICDP 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 10; A. Card in: OECD Proceedings, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector', July 1997, by M. Harbour, (hereinafter: OECD, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector'), p. 95.
  
   
• 597. 

  The import limitations for Japanese cars still existed when Regulation 1475/95 was adopted in 1995.
  
   
• 598. 

  See, for example, ICDP , 'Beyond the block exemption'", 4/98, p. 43; ICDP ,Revenue management - how the car industry can learn from airlines" by Jonathan Brown, Managment Briefing n° 2, p. 8.
  
   
• 599. 

  See, for example, for mergers/take-overs BMW/Rover (Commission Decision M.416, 14.3.1994), Ford/Mazda (Commission Decision M.741, 24.5.1996), Toyota/Daihatsu (Commission Decision M.1326, 6.11.1998), Daimler-Benz/Chrysler (M.1204, 22.7.1998), Renault/Nissan (Commission Decision M.1519, 12.5.1999), and Ford/Volvo (Commission Decision M.1452, 26.3.1999).
  
   
• 600. 

  For example, multi-purpose vehicles, off-road vehicles, convertibles, coupés.
  
   
• 601. 

  As to the car market in the United Kingdom, see UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.82 et seq.
  
   
• 602. 

  While in the European Union, the three largest car manufacturers (Volkswagen group, PSA group and General Motors group) had a combined market share of 41% (1998), the three major groups in the USA (General Motors, Ford and DaimlerChrysler) attained a combined market share of 72% (1998; source: www.autofacts.com), and the three major groups in Japan (Toyota, Nissan and Honda) had a combined market share of 59% (1998; source: www.japanauto.com).
  
   
• 603. 

  See subsection 0, page 10, of this report.
  
   
• 604. 

  See pt. (20) of this report.
  
   
• 605. 

  The following exceptions have been found: Fiat has appointed two importers respectively in Greece and Portugal; in a number of cases (in particular Japanese manufacturers), Luxembourg is handled by the Belgian importer, and in one case (Rover) imports into Finland and Sweden are handled by the importer of its parent company (BMW). The German importer of Honda also handles distribution in Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria, while its French importer also serves the Italian and Spanish markets. General Motors Europe performs a co-ordinating role in distribution throughout Europe, while actual distribution is undertaken by National Sales Organizations primarily owned by General Motors Corporation (GMC, USA); Adam Opel (D), Vauxhall (UK) and GM Espana are all directly owned by GMC and have significant manufacturing operations. A comparable situation prevails for Ford of Europe.
  
   
• 606. 

  Only a small number of dealers are owned by a manufacturer or a supplier. However, a small number of producers rely on independent importers for distribution of their brand; this is true in particular in the case of Volkswagen and some Japanese manufacturers.
  
   
• 607. 

  In particular the French producers PSA and Renault control a more significant number of their dealers, and DaimlerChrysler realise a great deal of its sales in Germany through wholly-owned 'Niederlassungen' and independent undertakings called 'agents'.
  
   
• 608. 

  In Germany, Volkswagen and Audi service outlets act as commercial agents for a main dealer or for a sub-dealer. Also in Germany, DaimlerChrysler is distributing its cars through affiliates ("Niederlassungen") and 'agents', which order cars from one of the affiliates or from another 'agent'. In Italy, DaimlerChrysler uses some of its service outlets as 'agents', which order cars from a main dealer. Other Italian service outlets of DaimlerChrysler are sub-dealers. DaimlerChrysler 'agents' sell in the name and act on behalf of the manufacturer or importer with whom he has concluded an agreement.
  
   
• 609. 

  A great part of direct sales generally concerns the manufacturers' staff, in particular in Member States where the manufacturer has production facilities, and other reserved customer groups such as armed forces, diplomats or employees of suppliers, who normally submit individual orders. In addition to that, manufacturers supply - either directly or assisted by a dealer - to fleet owners, such as national authorities, leasing and rental companies, and other undertakings which normally order larger quantities. The proportion of direct sales in manufacturer's total sales varies with the Member State concerned and may attain 20% of total sales. A particular situation occurs in the United Kingdom, where up to 80% of all sales are so-called 'direct' and 'assisted' fleet sales, while in Germany, as the next most important market for fleet sales, they account for about 40% of total sales; see: Consumers' Association 2000, 'The forecourt revolution: the future of the car industry', Policy Report (hereinafter: CA 2000 'The forecourt revolution').
  
   
• 610. 

  ICDP 'The US Legal Framework for Car Distribution' by Philip Wade, Executive Briefing, 9/2000. In the USA the key laws affecting automotive distribution are mostly state laws. In Japan the Antimonopoly law does not contain detailed rules on motor vehicle distribution like in the EC block exemption regulation.
  
   
• 611. 

  ACEA; European Car Distribution Handbook 1998; CECRA (European Council for Motor Trades and Repairs) estimates that currently about 100 000 dealerships (including sub-dealers) are involved in car distribution.
  
   
• 612. 

  Few sub-dealers, or none at all, are involved in the distribution of the Seat, Citroën, Honda, BMW and Renault brands. Sub-dealers are much more frequently made use of in the distribution of the Mercedes-Benz, Fiat, Volkswagen and Toyota brands. See also ACEA / European Car Dealer Handbook 1998; M. Habour in: OECD, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector' p. 155; Financial Times Automotive, "The Future of Automotive Distribution, Evolution or Revolution-, A.T. Kearney, 1998, p. 12, which, however, gives a different picture.
  
   
• 613. 

  In most southern European markets such as France, Italy and Spain, the number of sub-dealers in comparison to main dealers is particularly high, while in other markets, such as Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom, sub-dealers play a very limited role; see also: CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution', p. 22.
  
   
• 614. 

  An example of this development is Ford, which has converted its smallest dealers into pure service outlets. The declared objective was to provide better quality, consistent servicing across the network and a more professional overall brand image.
  
   
• 615. 

  FT 'The Future of Automotive Distribution, Evolution or revolution-', 1998, p. 33; CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution', p. 20.; in this context, see also the overview: ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 16, Chart: 'Car Advertising Expenditure in France - 1996'.
  
   
• 616. 

  ACEA.
  
   
• 617. 

  See ACEA / European Car Dealer Handbook, 1998 (sales per dealer outlet in Germany and the Netherlands of 133 corresponded to the average); ICDP, 'Multi-franchising, Developments and Impact of Sales Channel Management of Automobile Manufacturers', by M. Hoffmeister and R. Heinerberg, Research Paper 1/98, (hereinafter: ICDP, 'Multi-franchising' 1/98), p. 24.
  
   
• 618. 

  Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, France, Netherlands.
  
   
• 619. 

  Spain, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom.
  
   
• 620. 

  See OECD, 'Market Access Issues in Automobile Sector' points 7-11.
  
   
• 621. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 29-30.
  
   
• 622. 

  The so-called 'list prices'.
  
   
• 623. 

  OECD 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector', p.8. Section 6.2.1.3 of this report gives more precise figures provided by car manufacturers.
  
   
• 624. 

  See also OECD, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector ', points 7 to 11.
  
   
• 625. 

  CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution'.
  
   
• 626. 

  Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 627. 

  Because these countries are large and thinly populated, single-brand dealerships are not a viable economic option.
  
   
• 628. 

  NFR 1970:2.
  
   
• 629. 

  See also (NO 1972:24, 1973:36) Bernitz, Ulf, Marknadsrätt p. 86, Juristförlaget, second edition 1986.
  
   
• 630. 

  OECD, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector', p. 11 and 12.
  
   
• 631. 

  The commercial policy followed to date by car manufacturers and component manufacturers aims to promote high quality parts. Thus, sales of spare parts of non-corresponding quality with the original ones are considered negligible.
  
   
• 632. 

  The trend towards outsourcing has become very common among car manufacturers; for more details see D. Audet: "L'accès au marché dans le secteur automobile," p. 30, published in l'Observateur of l'OECD, December 1999.
  
   
• 633. 

  In particular, Renault introduced the new brand 'Motrio' and Ford the brand 'Motorcraft'. "La pièce adaptable detrônera-t-elle l'origine -", Auto Info, 1099, 21.1.2000, p. 34; Guaranteeing Survival of the Independent Aftermarket, PriceWaterhouseCoopers for FIGIEFA - FMA/FAM, May 2000, slides 36 et seq. (hereinafter PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 'Guaranteeing Survival', May 2000).
  
   
• 634. 

  "La pièce adaptable détrônera-t-elle l'origine -", Auto Info, 1099, 21.1.2000, p.34; For example, Lear Corporation Plc manufactures spare parts both for Fiat Auto SpA and for the independent after-market - IAM -, UNIPART manufactures spare parts both for Honda and for the IAM. This element is underlined by several Commission decisions regarding merger operations between spare-parts producers, Decisions of 31 July 1991, Case IV/M012 Varta v Bosch (OJ L 320, 22.11.1991, p. 26) and of 29 May 1991, Case IV/M043 - Magneti Marelli v CEAc. (OJ L 222, 10.8.1991, p. 38) and Commission Decision of 15 October 1993, Case IV/M.337 - Knorr-Bremse v Allied Signal (OJ C 298, 4.11.1993)..
  
   
• 635. 

  Recital 27 and Article 6(1)(9) and (10) of Regulation 1475/95; see also section 0, page 82 and section 0, page 93 of this report.
  
   
• 636. 

  This is also true for authorised dealers, who have to prepare for resale second-hand cars taken in with the sale of a new car.
  
   
• 637. 

  ACEA / European Car Dealer Handbook, 1998.
  
   
• 638. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II', 6/99, p. 15-18; CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution' p. 28.
  
   
• 639. 

  Cars sold in the 1970s had to be serviced every 5 000 km; today the service interval is 20 000 km and in some instances 30 000 km.
  
   
• 640. 

  For a comprehensive view of the phenomenon, see: ICDP, 'After-sales in Europe' by P. Wade, L. Buzzavo; T. Chieux, K. Zellmer, J. Kiff, 2/97 (hereinafter: ICDP, 'After-sales in Europe'.) p. 99; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 'Guaranteeing Survival', May 2000 slides 20ss. and 79ss..
  
   
• 641. 

  Light repair and maintenance of automotive vehicles accounts for some 40% of the overall market for repair and maintenance of automotive vehicles and represents a very profitable activity; see also Commission Decision of 31 May 1999, Case No IV/1526 - Ford v Kwik-Fit.
  
   
• 642. 

  In France, the major independent fast-fit chains are usually owned by supermarket chains or organised in franchise networks. In 1995, the fast-fit chains in France were: Feu Vert (162 outlets), Midas (266 outlets), Norauto (120 outlets), Speedy (365 outlets), Stationmarche (104 outlets). In 1995, in the UK the leading national service chains included: Halfords owned by Boots (136 outlets), Lex Autocentres owned by Lex group (96 outlets), Apple Car Clinics owned by Kwik-Fit (65 outlets), Flexi Car Care Centres owned by Caffyns dealer group (32 outlets). ICDP, 'After-sales in Europe', 2/97.
  
   
• 643. 

  For simple and standardised car repairs, dealers offer service packages at a predetermined price. Moreover, some dealers have reacted by offering some services without prior appointment. They also have introduced longer openings hours.
  
   
• 644. 

  Decision 6556 of Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato, 12 November 1998, Case C/3270 - Magneti Marelli/Midas International, Boll. 46/1998 (428 outlets in Europe) and Commission Decision of 31 May 1999, Case IV/1526 - Ford v Kwik-Fit (1 907 outlets in Europe).
  
   
• 645. 

  Regulation 1475/95 expressly provides that authorised dealers are obliged to honour the manufacturer's warranty, to perform free servicing and vehicle recall work on vehicles even if they were supplied by another dealer in the same or another Member State. This provision ensures that a final consumer can have the benefit of these guarantees available from every dealer of the manufacturer's network throughout the Community, irrespective of the place of purchase of the car. It has however to be noted that this obligation is limited to the extent to which the dealers are obliged under the terms of their dealership to service vehicles which they themselves have supplied (Article 5(1)(1)(a), recital 12 of Regulation 1475/95).
  
   
• 646. 

  Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, OJ L 171 , 07/07/1999 p. 12; see in particular Article 3.
  
   
• 647. 

  The extension of warranty is, again, particularly common in the United Kingdom.
  
   
• 648. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II', 6/99, p. 13 to 17 and ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p.37.
  
   
• 649. 

  Development of Intranets between car manufacturers, importers and dealers should allow the customer order to be easily accessible to all sectors of the supply chain.
  
   
• 650. 

  Dealers are induced by the manufacturer to order sufficient number of cars to cover the planned production for a certain period of months.
  
   
• 651. 

  See ICDP, 'Future of the Dealer, The Evolving Retailer', Research Report 4/99, (hereinafter ICDP, 'Future of the Dealer'), p. 24-27; an example is BMW (Yahoo, Deutschland Finanzen, 10.2.2000).
  
   
• 652. 

  ICDP considers that intra-brand competition between dealers will inevitably be reduced partly as a result of moves to introduce lean distribution; ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 4.
  
   
• 653. 

  See for example: OECD 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector', p. 168-169.
  
   
• 654. 

  See M. Harbour and D. Jones, 'Creating Profitable Customers Fulfilment, Applying Lean Thinking to Car Distribution' and G. Williams, 'European New Vehicle Supply - the long Road to Customer Push Systems' in the ICDP Journal Summer 1999 -. ICDP estimates that the European industry would make the following gains by introducing vehicle and part supply systems on a lean model for vehicles: 4 billion euro per annum in operating costs and 11.4 billion euro in stock reduction and for parts: 6 billion euro in stock reduction. It estimates that savings as a percent of price total for a car could amount to: 2% (reduced discounting), 2.5% (reduced physical and managerial stock holding costs), 2.5% spending cost reductions, and 4% order mix. A change to the approach of pricing could also produce further profit improvements. For these latter figures, see: ICDP 'Management Briefing No 1', J. Brown 'Flexible pricing to match demand with supply'.
  
   
• 655. 

  The Smart car was originally developed through a joint venture (Micro Compact Car -MCC) between Mercedes-Benz and SMH (manufacturer of Swatch watches). MCC is now fully owned by DaimlerChrysler.
  
   
• 656. 

  Financial Times Automotive, 'The future of Automotive Distribution', 1998, p. 58; the Smart car distribution network is to be expanded substantially (de.biz.yahoo.com of 29.2.2000).
  
   
• 657. 

  As to the different types of automotive e-commerce models see ICDP "Who's afraid of 'infomediaries'- The task for the car distribution industry in the information age" by Leonardo Buzzavo", Management Briefings No. 3/2000, p. 8:
  
   
• 658. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II', 6/99, p. 14.
  
   
• 659. 

  Source: Periodical, 1-2 February 2000, from the Swedish Association for Motor Retail Trades and Repairs (Motorbranschens Riksförbund, MRF).
  
   
• 660. 

  ICDP, "Vehicle sales
   
• 661. 

  It is said the overall distribution policy will not change for three main reasons: (1) consumers need to touch and feel 'in the real world' a really emotional product, (2) cars cannot be delivered by mail (unlike books from Amazon.com for instance), (3) pre-delivery inspection and used vehicle exchange can only be dealt with physically by a dealer.
  
   
• 662. 

  The importers refer to the US market where in 1999 5% of the new vehicles were sold via the Internet and 35% chosen via the Internet according to the importer, who believes that there will be a similar trend in Europe. Frankfurter Allgemeine, Le Soir.
  
   
• 663. 

  Mc Kinsey: forecast to expand at a compound annual growth rate of 104% in western Europe for 1998-2002.
  
   
• 664. 

  FT 'The future of Automotive Distribution', 1998, p. 82.
  
   
• 665. 

  The fees to be paid by dealers are
   
• 666. 

  Inchape and Bilia, two of the leading European distributor and dealer groups, have both acquired parts of the company. Inchape has acquired 100% of Autobytel in the UK and Bilia has acquired the exclusive rights for the Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland).
  
   
• 667. 

  ICDP, 'Electronic new media and car distribution', 07/98, p. 16.
  
   
• 668. 

  ICDP, 'Electronic new media and car distribution', 07/98, p. 21.
  
   
• 669. 

  'Renault ouvre ses portailes sur le web', Autoinfo 25 February 2000. In particular, Renault is going to establish several web sites: renault.site, to inform final consumers on products and services of the car manufacturer and to sell new vehicles; carevia.com, to sell used vehicles of all brands; a multi-make web site, developed together with other car manufacturers, to inform consumers on models of different makes; renault.net, to organise the commercial activity of its network.
  
   
• 670. 

  In September 1999, Vauxhall became the first car manufacturer to sell a range of cars exclusively on the net. However, the sale of these cars is still the responsibility of the dealer. Nevertheless, the choice of vehicle, the test drive the used-car trade-in, and the vehicle delivery can be arranged by the consumer from his home. The consumer can also conclude the sales contract with the dealer electronically.
  
   
• 671. 

  'Renault met le turbo', Argus de l'automobile, 17.2.2000. As regards Fiat, the experiment was limited to Italian consumers and went on only for a period of 4 months. Only a small number of vehicles were sold.
  
   
• 672. 

  'Rush is on for online sales', Financial Times Auto, 29.2.2000, p. II.
  
   
• 673. 

  'Fast-track drive on the road to e-commerce', Financial Times Auto, 29.2.2000, p. I; see also the joint B2B-market place 'Covisint' of Ford, GM, DaimlerChrysler and Renault/Nissan under: www.covisint.com/.
  
   
• 674. 

  The Internet is considered an important tool for reaching the objectives of price transparency and harmonisation, since it has an enormous potential for cross-border shoppers and could act as a mechanism for creating a true European single market. In this regard, see ICDP study 'Future directions for European car distribution: Evolution or Revolution-', synthesis of ICDP2 research 1996-98 by M. Harbour with J. Brown, P. Wade and the ICDP research team, Research Paper 11/98, September 1998, (hereinafter: ICDP, 'Future directions for European car distribution'), 11/98, p. 10.
  
   
• 675. 

  See e.g. eEurope, An Information Society for All, Communication on a Commission initiative for the special European Council Lisbon 23 and 24 March 2000 published under: europa.eu.int/comm/information_society/eeurope
  
   
• 676. 

  See PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 'Guaranteeing Survival' May 2000, slides 15 et seq.
  
   
• 677. 

  E.g. a dealer who sells only small cars or four-wheel-drive cars or sports cars.
  
   
• 678. 

  Notice on intermediaries, section 2(a), 2nd paragraph and section 2(b), last paragraph.
  
   
• 679. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 50.
  
   
• 680. 

  For example, negotiations took place between the French supermarket chain Auchan and Fiat with a view to cooperation for the sale of the Lancia Epsilon model in France. It was envisaged that the 118 supermarkets would act as commercial agents of the local Fiat dealers. Le Monde, 1.10.1999. The agreement was apparently not concluded due to the dealers' opposition.
  
   
• 681. 

  A recent example: in August 2000, the German supermarket group Edeka made promotion about the sale of the Smart car from DaimlerChrysler. Edeka wanted to sell a package consisting of a portable PC
   
• 682. 

  FT 'The Future of Automotive Distribution', study, p. 28-30.
  
   
• 683. 

  Windscreen wipers, seat covers, brake pads, car alarms, stereos, roof racks, tyres, lubricants and batteries.
  
   
• 684. 

  FT 'The Future of Automotive Distribution', study, p. 163.
  
   
• 685. 

  Some of these complaints are about obstacles to parallel trade committed before the entry into force of Regulation 1475/95 on 1 October 1995. However, under Regulation 1475/95 and also under the Commission's first motor vehicle block exemption, Regulation 123/85, the protection of parallel trade was one of the core elements for the exemption of motor vehicle distribution agreements (see e.g. notice on Regulation 123/85, chapter I 1; see also Court of First Instance judgment of 6 July 2000 Volkswagen v. Commission, case T-62/98, pt. 241).
  
   
• 686. 

  See section 0, page 22, for more details.
  
   
• 687. 

  OJ L 124, 25.4.1998, p. 60; see also Press Release IP/98/94, 28.1.1998. Volkswagen has challenged this decision before the Court of First Instance.
  
   
• 688. 

  Court of First Instance judgment of 6 July 2000 Volkswagen v. Commission, case T-62/98. The CFI decided that the measures adopted by Volkswagen, such as the bonus policy, by which it sanctioned export sales through non-payment of the bonus normally granted for domestic sales, the restrictive supply policy, the behaviour towards consumers who were discouraged from buying new cars in Italy and through control, warnings and sanctions in respect to Italian dealers, restricted parallel trade and infringed Article 81 (1). In contrast, the CFI considered that it had not been established with sufficient evidence that Volkswagen had introduced some measures on which the fine was based, especially the split margin system to limit parallel exports.
  
   
• 689. 

  A statement of objections (SO) is the first step in a formal proceeding by which the Commission informs undertakings in writing of the objections that it raises against them in view of an alleged breach of EC competition rules; the undertakings concerned have the right to comment on the SO, which in no way prejudges the outcome of a case.
  
   
• 690. 

  See Memo/99/22, 16.4.1999 and Note BIO aux bureaux nationaux BIO/99/407, 27.10.1999. The proceedings against DaimlerChrysler and the Volkswagen (price fixing for the Passat) are not yet finalised. The Commission is currently analysing the replies to the statement of objections submitted by these car manufacturers
  
   
• 691. 

  See press release IP/00/1028 of 20/9/2000.
  
   
• 692. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 693. 

  XXVII Report on Competition Policy, 1997, First Part, section I, B 3 and Press Release IP/97/740, 4.8.1997.
  
   
• 694. 

  See recital 30 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 695. 

  Article 3(10) and (11) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 696. 

  See Article 3(8) of Regulation 1475/95 (right to carry out passive sales, and right to actively seek customers outside the contract territory unless this is done through personalised advertising).
  
   
• 697. 

  Typically, reserved clients comprise company staff, national authorities, employees of international organizations, larger undertakings and leasing and rental companies. The right of direct sales can however be excluded according to Article 2 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 698. 

  See, for example, ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p.33; Auto Infos 1100, 11.2.2000, p.14.
  
   
• 699. 

  These Commission Reports are published twice a year. For further details, see section 0, page 27, of this report.
  
   
• 700. 

  For instance, Mercedes-Benz in Germany or Fiat in Italy are manufacturers who are traditionally strongly present in their respective home markets; on the other hand, these manufacturers have to apply different market strategies in countries where they face competition from strong domestic producers.
  
   
• 701. 

  See also report by Lehman Brothers, 31.7.1998, analysing price differentials for various products across the European Union.
  
   
• 702. 

  Value Added Tax.
  
   
• 703. 

  See Annex VI, ACEA, 'Motor vehicle taxation in the European Union', Summary Table, 1999 for details.
  
   
• 704. 

  See also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.205 et seq.
  
   
• 705. 

  On 1 January 1999 in Belgium, Germany, Finland, Spain, France, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal.
  
   
• 706. 

  For an analysis, see section 0, pt. 0 page 103, of this report.
  
   
• 707. 

  See Commission Decision of 28.1.1998 (Case IV/35.733 - VW, OJ L 124, 25.4.1998, which mentions the situation in Italy, where, in 1995, the Italian lira had devalued substantially against the German mark and the Austrian schilling, and Volkswagen did not sufficiently raise its prices in Italy, because it feared losing market shares against its Italian competitors; or IP/99/554 concerning the situation in the UK; here, it was mentioned that so called 'windfall profits' can occur in cases where the currency of an export market (example: pound sterling) is re-evaluating against the domestic currency of a manufacturer (example: German mark), and where the latter does not reduce its prices in the re-evaluating currency.
  
   
• 708. 

  See section 0, pt.0, page 104 of this report for an analysis.
  
   
• 709. 

  Article 5 (2)(d) and Commission notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter I 1.
  
   
• 710. 

  See also 0, page 24,pt. 5th bullet point
  
   
• 711. 

  See Commission notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter II 2; see also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.103 and 2.104: according to the UK Competition Commission, for most cars the original planning and development includes left-hand and right-hand variants. Thus the design costs of these variants should be part of the general production cost of the relevant model and be spread across the whole production volume of that car model. Consequently, for the vast majority of new cars a supplement based on planning and development and/or production costs does not seem to be justifiable.
  
   
• 712. 

  For further information, see pt. 0 et seq., page page 106, of this report.
  
   
• 713. 

  For more information, see pt. 0 et seq., page 103, of this report.
  
   
• 714. 

  For details see section 0, page 97, of this report.
  
   
• 715. 

  In general not more than 6 weeks.
  
   
• 716. 

  The most common examples of such corresponding cars are cars with right-hand-drive specification for the United Kingdom and Ireland purchased in mainland Europe and cars with engine versions meeting road tax-exempted emission standards in Germany.
  
   
• 717. 

  See the Commission's Car Price Reports.
  
   
• 718. 

  For the purpose of the table, market shares are calculated for a certain geographical area of the European Union, or for individual Member States and for the total passenger car market.
  
   
• 719. 

  Source: ACEA, CCFA.
  
   
• 720. 

  Source: ACEA.
  
   
• 721. 

  See for details ACEA, 'Western Europe New Passenger Car Registrations', 1999.
  
   
• 722. 

  See section 6.3.1 of this report.
  
   
• 723. 

  See Article 3(3) and recital 7 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 724. 

  Important examples are Volkswagen/Audi, BMW/Rover, General Motors/Saab.
  
   
• 725. 

  A particular case is the joint distribution of Renault/Volvo in the Nordic countries, a legacy of the former cross-shareholding between both companies.
  
   
• 726. 

  See also UK Competition Commission report, pts. 2.177 and 2.178, 7.4 and chapter 9. In this context see also Frank Verboven 'The markets for gasoline and diesel cars in Europe', discussion paper n° 2069, February 1999, Centre for Economic Policy Research, p. 2, 35: this study on price differentials between a given car model equipped with a diesel engine and a petrol engine comes to the conclusion that 70% to 85% of the price difference is attributable to price discrimination; the remaining percentage follows from the higher costs due to differences in specifications. The fact that such price discrimination is possible is one element which seems to indicate that inter-brand competition in the car sector might not be as strong as it is generally believed.
  
   
• 727. 

  Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation 1475/95 provide that the warranty has to be honoured by any dealer in the European Union, irrespective of the place of purchase of the car; in fact, all manufacturers have introduced such provisions in their service booklets.
  
   
• 728. 

  See section 0, page 43, of this report.
  
   
• 729. 

  Article 6 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 730. 

  See Article 6 (1)(12) and recital 28 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 731. 

  See recital 4 and Article 5 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 732. 

  See: ICDP, 'After-sales in Europe' by P. Wade, L. Buzzavo, T. Chieux, K. Zellmer, J. Kiff, Research paper 2/97 of July 1997 (hereinafter: ICDP 'After-sales in Europe' 2/97), p. 74; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 'Guaranteeing Survival', May 2000, slides 71 et seq.
  
   
• 733. 

  ICDP 'After-sales in Europe' 2/97, p. 77.
  
   
• 734. 

  ICDP 'After-sales in Europe' 2/97, p. 78.
  
   
• 735. 

  For example, the Internet has a site where one can download all diagnostic codes for Chrysler cars.
  
   
• 736. 

  ICDP 'After-sales in Europe' 2/97, p. 78.
  
   
• 737. 

  See in particular Article 6(12) of Regulation 1475/95, which obliges vehicle manufacturers to give the independent repairers full and non-discriminatory access to technical information.
  
   
• 738. 

  See recital 4 and Article 5 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 739. 

  Article 5 of Regulation 1475/95
  
   
• 740. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption' 4/98, p. 58. ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II' 6/99, p. 17.
  
   
• 741. 

  Ford UK has established pure service outlets in the United Kingdom, see Commission Press Release IP/97/740 of 4.8.1997 and XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy, 1997, First Part, Section I, B 3; further examples are Daewoo in the United Kingdom, who have contracted a retail group to provide after-sale support (for details, see Financial Times Automotive, p. 29), and
   
• 742. 

  See also ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 58.
  
   
• 743. 

  Source: Commission information; this view is shared by importers, who consider that a separation of the activities would make it more difficult for consumers to obtain appropriate servicing.
  
   
• 744. 

  Certain consumers' associations see a positive effect of a link for customer relations, while others would be in favour of a split; some criticise cross-subsidisation between sale and servicing activities.
  
   
• 745. 

  In particular, the manufacturers' selling companies and importers.
  
   
• 746. 

  Recital 4 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 747. 

  See, for example, ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 58 - 60.
  
   
• 748. 

  See L'Argus de l'automobile, 24.2.2000, p. 48. According to this article, STVA, a company belonging to SNCF, the national French railway company, operates 15 centres in France. In these centres, new Ford cars are checked by specialists of STVA as regards the mechanics, as regards the conformity with national regulations and equipped with additional specifications. The vehicles are delivered to French Ford dealers in a condition which allows them to deliver the car to their customer. STVA carried out these services on 16% of all new vehicles registered in France in 1998. A major Japanese car manufacturer carries out pre-delivery inspections before a car is handed over to a dealer. The latter can then deliver the car to his customers without a further inspection.
  
   
• 749. 

  ICDP, 'Future of the dealer', 4/99, p. 10.
  
   
• 750. 

  ICDP, 'Future of the dealer', 4/99, p. 10; ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II', 6/99, p. 15 - 17; ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/98, p. 59.
  
   
• 751. 

  Article 5 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 752. 

  This view is shared by the importers, who consider that a separation of the activities would make it more difficult for consumers to obtain appropriate servicing.
  
   
• 753. 

  OECD, 'Market Access Issues in the Automobile Sector ', p. 16; ICDP, 'Future Direction for European Car Distribution', p. 19.
  
   
• 754. 

  See also ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', Research Report No. 4/98, p. 39, 58; ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption II', 6/99, p.1, 14, 15; ICDP, 'Future Directions for European Car Distribution', 11/98; see also the UK Competition Commission's report, pt. 2.419 to 2.423; it takes the view that the car manufacturers or importers should not be able to insist on dealers offering servicing and repair services.
  
   
• 755. 

  The main reason put forward by the dealers is that the manufacturers can end their contracts with two years notice without reason and that it is difficult to become a dealer of another major manufacturer in case of termination of their contract.
  
   
• 756. 

  Article 10(6) gives a definition of spare parts: 'spare parts' are parts which are to be installed in or upon a motor vehicle so as to replace components of that vehicle. They are to be distinguished from other parts and accessories, according to trade usage.
  
   
• 757. 

  The spare parts of matching quality may be used for the repair of cars outside the warranty if the repair is not done in the context of a recall action; see Article 4 (7) and 10 (11) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 758. 

  Article 5 (1)(2)(c). Aggregation of discounts would induce dealers to purchase original spare parts in order to have higher discounts from the car manufacturers.
  
   
• 759. 

  Dealers' freedom in the choice of their source of supplies still encounters limits linked to safety and consumer satisfaction: spare parts must correspond in quality to those produced and distributed by the car manufacturer; the manufacturer is enabled by the Regulation to verify the quality of those parts; dealers can be induced to use original spare parts only for work under guarantee, free servicing and vehicle-recall work. Finally, there is a general obligation upon dealers to inform customers on the use of non-original spare parts.
  
   
• 760. 

  The position of spare-parts producers on this issue will be explained more fully in section 6.2.2 'Has the access of spare parts producers to dealer networks improved-'.
  
   
• 761. 

  Article 4(1)(8) and (9) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 762. 

  Article 6 (1)(10) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 763. 

  Article 5(2) of the former Regulation 123/85 also contained provisions regarding the duration and the termination of dealer agreements. These provisions were less favourable to the dealer, since distribution and service agreements could be for a period of at least four years or for an indefinite period. The period of notice for normal termination of the agreements was at least one year.
  
   
• 764. 

  Almost all the German car manufacturers and Honda, Nissan and Toyota reduced their number of dealers in Germany. General Motor did so in Italy.
  
   
• 765. 

  Some manufacturers offer their ex-dealers a service outlet contract. Otherwise, if the dealer does not want to stop his activities, he becomes an independent repairer or an intermediary; see also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.258: it also points out that it is difficult for a dealer to switch the make and to become a dealer of another manufacturer. Moreover, under pt. 2.259, it points out that the manufacturer can also veto the sale of the ongoing business even to another dealer of the same network.
  
   
• 766. 

  In Germany, based on an analogy with the rules applicable to commercial agents, dealers can get compensation for goodwill if their contract is ended.
  
   
• 767. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(c).
  
   
• 768. 

  See also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.273 to 2.279 and 6.105 et seq.
  
   
• 769. 

  Pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 of Regulation 1475/95, manufacturers can 'reserve' themselves the right to sell vehicles to certain categories of customers. However, dealers must be prevented from selling vehicles to these customers too.
  
   
• 770. 

  In the United Kingdom, discounts set by car manufacturers to fleet operators vary from 30% to 35% of the vehicle's price; see: CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution,' p. 35.
  
   
• 771. 

  Article 6(1)(6) and Article 6(2) and (3) of Regulation 1475/95. Article 6(2) of Regulation 123/85 contained a similar provision.
  
   
• 772. 

  As to the situation in the UK: see UK Competition Commission report, pts. 2.280 to 2.296, which explain in detail the various measures used by car manufacturers/importers to limit UK dealers' freedom to set their retail prices or discounts.
  
   
• 773. 

  Article 4(1)(3): Sales targets are determined taking into account sales previously achieved in the territory and forecast sales for the territory and at national level.
  
   
• 774. 

  Pursuant to Article 4(1)(3) of Regulation 123/85 the manufacturer could set the sales targets unilaterally.
  
   
• 775. 

  See Explanatory Brochure on Regulation 1475/95, reply to question 13: this states that 'minimum requirements' as to sales agreed for a shorter period 'than one year' may result in an automatic loss of the benefit of the group exemption
   
• 776. 

  Cf. Article 4 (1)(3) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 777. 

  Article 3(1)(3).
  
   
• 778. 

  Article 5(2)(1), see also the Commissions' brochure on Regulation 1475/95, question 7: Such objective reasons exist if the obligations prevent a dealer from operating on an economically viable basis.
  
   
• 779. 

  See Commission brochure on Regulation 1475/95, question 8.
  
   
• 780. 

  See : ICDP, 'Multi-Franchising', 1/98, p.26, (hereinafter referred to as 'Multi-Franchising').
  
   
• 781. 

  ICDP, 'Multi-Franchising' p. 26 and 35.
  
   
• 782. 

  ICDP, 'Multi-Franchising' p. 45.
  
   
• 783. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 784. 

  See Article 11 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p.25, hereinafter referred to as Regulation 1475/95 or the Regulation.
  
   
• 785. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 786. 

  ICDP, 'Multi-Franchising', 1/98, p.50.
  
   
• 787. 

  See section 0, page 38, of this report for more detailed information on multi-brand dealerships.
  
   
• 788. 

  Examples are VW/Audi, , Ford/Jaguar, Fiat/Lancia/Alfa Romeo dealers.
  
   
• 789. 

  If confirmed, such action would contravene Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 790. 

  See also section 0, page 70,of this report and UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.328 to 2.339; the UK Competition Commission concludes that the rules on multi-make dealerships contained in Regulation 1475/95 have negative effects on prices, reduce the choice of type of retailer from which consumers may buy cars and reduce innovation in car retailing.
  
   
• 791. 

  Article 4(1)(3) on the annual setting of sales targets; Article 4(1)(4) on stock requirements; Article 4(1)(5) on demonstration vehicles and Article 5(3) on the termination of dealer agreements.
  
   
• 792. 

  However, the UK Competition Commission in its report, pts. 2.125, 2.310 and 2.293, mentions that sales targets are set at levels which 50% of all dealers cannot achieve and which are unrealistic. Moreover, it found out that dealers are reluctant to ask for arbitration because they are afraid that the manufacturer could terminate the dealer contract with two years notice if a dealer dares to ask for arbitration. It therefore concludes that in practice sales targets are set unilaterally by the manufacturers.
  
   
• 793. 

  Section 0, page 82, of this report.
  
   
• 794. 

  Article 3(5), and Article 6(1)(9).
  
   
• 795. 

  Article 6(1)(10) and (11) and Article 6(1)(3).
  
   
• 796. 

  Recital 27 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 797. 

  "La pièce adaptable détrônera-t-elle l'origine-" in Auto Info, 1099 of 21.1.2000, p. 34.
  
   
• 798. 

  Article 10(1)(6) of the Regulation defines 'spare parts' as parts which are to be installed in or upon a motor vehicle so as to replace components of that vehicle and leaves the distinction from other parts and accessories to trade usage.
  
   
• 799. 

  Article 6(1)(11).
  
   
• 800. 

  They base this assumption on the fact that independent garages are usually small and remote, do not advertise their activity and, as they purchase small volumes of spare parts, do not obtain favourable conditions. Moreover, since cars are becoming more complex goods which require more investment in equipment and training, independent repairers will be excluded from qualified repair and maintenance.
  
   
• 801. 

  For further details, see section 0, page 43, of this report and PriceWaterhouseCoopers 'Guaranteeing Survival', May 2000, slides 72 et seq.
  
   
• 802. 

  Article 3(10)(b).
  
   
• 803. 

  Article 6(1)(12).
  
   
• 804. 

  Article 3(1)(10)(b).
  
   
• 805. 

  Article 6(1)(12).
  
   
• 806. 

  ICDP, 'Beyond the block exemption', 4/99, p. 59-60; PriceWaterhouseCoopers 'Guaranteeing Survival', May 2000, slides 21 et seq.
  
   
• 807. 

  Article 6(12).
  
   
• 808. 

  One manufacturer asked for a payment of
   
• 809. 

  However, even this monthly fee is said to be too expensive for very small ("family business") garages.
  
   
• 810. 

  Directive 98/69/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 1998 relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles and amending Council Directive 70/220/EEC, OJ L 350, 28.12.1998, p. 2.
  
   
• 811. 

  See Annex XI, point 3.1.2. of the above Directive.
  
   
• 812. 

  Autoinfo 1101, dated 25.2.2000, p. 19.
  
   
• 813. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 814. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 815. 

  See Article 11 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p.25, hereinafter referred to as Regulation 1475/95 or the Regulation.
  
   
• 816. 

  Pursuant to EEA Joint Committee decision 46/96 of 19 July 1996 amending Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 291, 14.11.1996, p. 39-40), Regulation 1475/95 is also applicable in the EEA Member States. This report therefore covers the EEA even if normally reference is made only to EU Member States.
  
   
• 817. 

  Commission notice concerning Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ C 17, 18.1.1985, p. 4 (hereinafter referred to as the notice on Regulation 123/85), and Clarification of the activities of motor vehicle intermediaries, OJ C 329, 18.12.1991, p. 20 (hereinafter referred to as the notice on intermediaries).
  
   
• 818. 

  According to manufacturers, the intensifying competition resulting from the ever-widening source product offer forces them to increase their advertising spending. In 1998, car manufacturers spent
   
• 819. 

  Source : ACEA.
  
   
• 820. 

  'Pricing in Euroland' - Lehman Brothers European Strategy - 31.7.1998.
  
   
• 821. 

  Source : INSEE. Consumer price index up 5.6%, new car price index down 0.5% over 1995-98 period.
  
   
• 822. 

  Source : Statistisches Bundesamt.
  
   
• 823. 

  Recital 31 of Regulation 1475/95 and notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter II. 1.
  
   
• 824. 

  Notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter II. 1.
  
   
• 825. 

  ICDP; 'Beyond the block exemption'; 4/98, p. 32.
  
   
• 826. 

  'Pricing in Euroland' - Lehman Brothers European Strategy - 31.7.1998.
  
   
• 827. 

  House of Commons, Session 1998-99, Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, 'Vehicle Pricing', 1998, p. 36, pt. 31.
  
   
• 828. 

  Article 3(8)(b) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 829. 

  Article 3(8)(b) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 830. 

  Article 10(3) of Regulation 123/85 and Article 8(2) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 831. 

  Article 10( 4) of Regulation 123/85 and Article 8(3) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 832. 

  Chapter II of the notice on Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 833. 

  For further details, see section 0, page 27, of this report.
  
   
• 834. 

  The 12% threshold was initially part of the 'black clause' of the draft of Regulation 123/85. If this percentage had been exceeded, it would have led to a temporary suspension of the contractual clause which prevents the resale of vehicles to independent resellers.
  
   
• 835. 

  In this context, it can be left open whether or not this threshold, which is a rule of thumb, is appropriate or not.
  
   
• 836. 

  See e.g. the Commission's Car Price report with car prices on 1.11.1999 and the press release on this report, IP/00/121, 7.2.2000; Commission's Car Price Report with car prices on 1.5.2000 and the press release on this report, IP/00/781, 13.7.2000.
  
   
• 837. 

  See ACEA press release of 22.7.1999 (www.acea.be/acea/press_releases); see also Annex VI of this report and diagram 13 on page 67.
  
   
• 838. 

  These are the 12 countries for which prices were published in the car price reports until 1.11.1998. (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom).
  
   
• 839. 

  Starting with the car price report showing prices on 1.5.1999, all 15 Member States, including now Denmark, Finland and Greece, were included.
  
   
• 840. 

  Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden.
  
   
• 841. 

  For the purpose of this diagramm each of the car prices contained in the EU Commission's car price reports is converted into an index, whereby the cheapest price in a certain country equals 100%. For the other countries the index for each car is determined accordingly. For each date shown in the diagramm an average of these indexes is calculated on a country to country basis. The average of the latter is then used to draw the lines shown in the above diagramm.
  
   
• 842. 

  The United Kingdom is also a country with low car taxation. It is not included in this diagram because the prices for this country are for right-hand-drive cars.
  
   
• 843. 

  Until November 1998, the car price report gave prices for 12 Member States only. Denmark, Greece and Finland were excluded because car taxes in these countries are close to 100% or even higher. However, from May 1999 onwards, the car price report covers all 15 Member States.
  
   
• 844. 

  The three Member States which have car taxes close to or higher than 100% (Denmark, Greece, and Finland) of the net price of the car were not taken into account for the period 1 November 1996 to 1 November 1998.
  
   
• 845. 

  Chapter II, pt.1.
  
   
• 846. 

  Chapter II, pt. 2, second paragraph.
  
   
• 847. 

  Notice on Regulation 123/85 Chapter II, pt. 2, first paragraph. For example, such a supplement for a corresponding model would be the right-hand-drive supplement for a car purchased in Denmark. In this case, the dealer could use the possibility mentioned in the notice and charge this 'further supplement'.
  
   
• 848. 

  The UK Competition Commission came to the same conclusion. See in particular its report, pts. 2.202 and 2.226.
  
   
• 849. 

  According to the findings of the UK Competition Commission in its report, pt. 7.190 et seq., in 1998 parallel trade in right-hand-drive cars accounted for 0.5% of all new cars registered in the UK; as regards parallel imported cars registered by private customers, these accounted for 1% of the registrations. However, these percentages varied from make to make and could be as high as 3% of all registrations of new BMW cars and over 5% of all registered new Mercedes cars.
  
   
• 850. 

  It is noticeable that no car manufacturer in its reply to the questionnaire mentioned the level of parallel trade as a criteria to be taken into account when determining prices - a reason could be that parallel trade is negligible
  
   
• 851. 

  COM(95) 503 final, 31.10.1995.
  
   
• 852. 

  Recital 31 of Regulation 1475/95; Chapter II, pt. 1, last paragraph, of the notice on Regulation 123/85, also addresses this issue and states that 'Particular account will be taken, for an appropriate period, of alterations of the parities within the European monetary system or fluctuations in exchange rate in a Member State'.
  
   
• 853. 

  See Article 11 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p.25, hereinafter referred to as Regulation 1475/95 or the Regulation.
  
   
• 854. 

  Article 10(4) in conjunction with Article 5 (1)(2)(d).
  
   
• 855. 

  Article 8(3) in conjunction with Article 5(1)(2)(d).
  
   
• 856. 

  Chapter II, pt. 2.
  
   
• 857. 

  See also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.103 and 2.104: according to the UK Competition Commission, for most cars the original planning and development includes left-hand and right-hand variants. Thus the design costs of these variants should be part of the general production cost of the relevant model and be spread across the whole production volume of that car model. Consequently, for the vast majority of new cars a supplement based on planning and development and/or production costs does not seem to be justifiable.
  
   
• 858. 

  The supplements are published for all models and Member States in mainland Europe mentioned in the Commission's car price reports, as far as right-hand-drive versions of cars exist.
  
   
• 859. 

  For one model, it was between 25% and 40%, for another between 10% and 31% of the price for a left-hand-drive car, depending on the country of purchase. Following the Commission's intervention, this manufacturer adopted a new approach: it now charges a very small amount which takes into account the different costs for the production of left- and right-hand-drive cars. This sum was increased by a mark-up for extra administrative and distribution costs. The right-hand-drive supplement is now around 3% of the recommended price for left-hand-drive models.
  
   
• 860. 

  For most European manufacturers, the ratio of production between left-hand-drive cars and right-hand-drive cars is around 90:10; however, for Rover, this ratio seems to be close to 50:50 (see UK Competition Commission report, pt. 2.103); for most Japanese manufacturers, the ratio is also close to 50:50. If the ratio between left-hand and right-hand drive cars is close to 50:50, the supplement can only be based on higher distribution and administrative costs.
  
   
• 861. 

  The lower supplement they had asked for in previous years was either a pure estimate of the above costs or was only based on a partial recovery of the costs, e.g. the higher costs for the production of those parts which are specific to a right-hand-drive car.
  
   
• 862. 

  For further details, see UK Competition Commission report, pts. 2.143 et seq. and 3.53 et seq.
  
   
• 863. 

  CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution', p. 23 and p. 36.
  
   
• 864. 

  The Motability scheme which provides cars to disabled British citizens is the largest owned fleet in the UK. It is said to purchase 7% of the new cars sold in the UK.
  
   
• 865. 

  CA 200, 'The Forecourt Revolution', p.23 and p. 36; Autopolis, 'Report to government select committee on car pricing in the UK', 1998, published in the Internet under: www.autopolis.com/think; see comments on slide 10 (hereinafter Autopolis 'Report to government select committee').
  
   
• 866. 

  Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders.
  
   
• 867. 

  Statement by Mr Thomson, Chief Executive of the SMMT, 9.11.1998, before the Trade and Industry Committee, see Trade and Industry Committee, First Report, 'Vehicle Pricing', p. 42.
  
   
• 868. 

  Pt. 5.91 et seq.
  
   
• 869. 

  Autopolis, 'Report to government select committee', 1998, see comments on slide 11, 6th dot.
  
   
• 870. 

  Prices have to include car taxes in this context because they reflect the prices consumers have to pay for a car bought in their domestic market. Pre-tax prices are only relevant for an analysis of cross-border purchases of new cars.
  
   
• 871. 

  See e.g. 'Problèmes économiques' 2603, 10.2.1999, p. 29 ; source Conjoncture-Paribas, December 1998.
  
   
• 872. 

  In Member States where the manufacturer has entrusted an importer with the role of a wholesaler, the importer will discuss the sales targets with the dealers and report the overall sales figures back to the manufacturer.
  
   
• 873. 

  See Article 4(1)(3), first alternative.
  
   
• 874. 

  See Article 4(1)(3), second alternative.
  
   
• 875. 

  See Article 4(1)(3), second alternative.
  
   
• 876. 

  See Article 4(1)(4) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 877. 

  For further details, see section 0, page 87, and section 0, page 90, of this report.
  
   
• 878. 

  By increasing production or by reallocating cars which - in the planning - should have been distributed in other Member States.
  
   
• 879. 

  See Article 3(10(a) of Regulation 1475/95: car manufacturers cannot prohibit such cross-supplies within their own network.
  
   
• 880. 

  Pt. 2.311 et seq.
  
   
• 881. 

  Pursuant to Article 3(10)(a) of Regulation 1475/95, such cross-supplies may not be prohibited.
  
   
• 882. 

  This report covers in principle the distribution and servicing of all types of motor vehicle. It is, however, more specifically focused on passenger cars in view of the replies received following the sending of the questionnaires. Moreover, most of the issues identified by the Commission in the application of the Regulation also concerned passenger cars. If the findings concern something specific related to commercial vehicles, such as trucks or buses, this will be specified.
  
   
• 883. 

  Only three of the car manufacturers which replied to the Commission's questionnaire pursue a policy which aims at harmonising delivery times.
  
   
• 884. 

  Article 2 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 885. 

  See Article 3(8) and recital 9 of Regulation 1475/95, see also Chapter I of the notice on Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 886. 

  Recital 16 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 887. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(d).
  
   
• 888. 

  Articles 6(1)(7) and (8) of Regulation 1475/95 and Chapter I, 1 of the Communication on Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 889. 

  Recital 26 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 890. 

  This right of dealers stems from Article 6(1)(7) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 891. 

  See also footnote 89 of this Report.
  
   
• 892. 

  For details, see section 0, page 61, of this report.
  
   
• 893. 

  See Commission Decision of 28 January 1998, Case IV/35.733 - VW, OJ L 124, 25.4.1998, p. 60.
  
   
• 894. 

  Which is a priority for him in view of the sales targets and in view of the higher economic attractiveness of such customers who will come back to the dealer for after-sales services.
  
   
• 895. 

  Article 4(3).
  
   
• 896. 

  Article 5(1)(2)(d).
  
   
• 897. 

  Some car manufacturers maintain that this is the case.
  
   
• 898. 

  Article 6(1)(7).
  
   
• 899. 

  Case IV/M.1672.
  
   
• 900. 

  Article 3(10)(a).
  
   
• 901. 

  As to the reasons for the limited number of cross-supplies, see also above pt. 0 on p. 114.
  
   
• 902. 

  see pt. 0 on p. 88 of this report.
  
   
• 903. 

  UK Competition Commission Report, pt. 2.316 to 2.318.
  
   
• 904. 

  Article 3(11); for details, see also notice on intermediaries.
  
   
• 905. 

  Chapter 2(c) of the notice on intermediaries.
  
   
• 906. 

  The text of the notice makes reference especially to Articles 3(8)(a) and (b), and (9) and Article 4(1)(3) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 907. 

  Art. 3 (8) (b) of Regulation 123/85.
  
   
• 908. 

  Art. 3 (8) (b) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 909. 

  See Chapter 2 (a) of the notice on intermediaries.
  
   
• 910. 

  See Chapter 2 (c) of the notice on intermediaries.
  
   
• 911. 

  For further details see also UK Competition Commission report, pt. 7.53ss.
  
   
• 912. 

  Article 3(10)(a).
  
   
• 913. 

  See recital 4, sentence 3.
  
   
• 914. 

  See recital 4, end of sentence 4.
  
   
• 915. 

  Article 6(1)(12).
  
   
• 916. 

  Article 5(1)(1)(a), first indent, and Article 4(1)(6).
  
   
• 917. 

  As is the case for cars sold in the UK; see the Commission car price reports, which indicate the length of the warranty in the different Member States. One Japanese manufacturer seems to extend the warranty for its cars to 5 years (see: l'Argus de l'Automobile, 3.2.2000, p. 6.).
  
   
• 918. 

  Article 5(1)(1)(a) and recital 12 of the Regulation.
  
   
• 919. 

  Recital 12 of the Regulation.
  
   
• 920. 

  Without any charge for the consumer who claims the warranty.
  
   
• 921. 

  Article 5(1)(1)(a), Article 4(1)(1)(e) and recital 12 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 922. 

  According to Article 4(1)(1) of the Regulation, manufacturers can impose on their dealers certain qualitative standards as regards the training of the personnel and the equipment of their after-sales departments.
  
   
• 923. 

  'Secret Service' in: Which- Magazine, September 1999, p. 8.
  
   
• 924. 

  'The 1999 Lex Report on Motoring', p. 70; AA, 'Consumer information for motorists', Surveys of motorists and the garage trade and proposals for actions, 1996, p. 3; see also 'The Castrol Car Service and Customer Satisfaction Trend Tracker' by Brian Taylor, published by The Automotive Strategies Group, January 2000, p. iii.
  
   
• 925. 

  'The 1999 Lex Report on Motoring', p. 70;
  
   
• 926. 

  Self-employed mechanics, fleet workshops, mobile servicing units and black economy repair (see 'The Castrol Car Service and Customer Satisfaction Trend Tracker', p. 93).
  
   
• 927. 

  'The Castrol Car Service and Customer Satisfaction Trend Tracker', p. ii.
  
   
• 928. 

  'Drive down your car running costs' in: Which- Magazine, March 1998, p. 20
  
   
• 929. 

  1994 OCU study.
  
   
• 930. 

  As to the details of this diagram: the 'traditional' system in countries such as Germany is characterised by dealers with relatively low unit throughput and high service retention which helps to ensure profits. In the Netherlands similar retail volumes per dealer are seen to those in Germany; however, dealers there have a much weaker hold on the provision of auto servicing as the independent market has made greater inroads. In contrast to the northern markets, the southern markets are 'unbundled' . Here the main dealer sells cars but is flanked by a multitude of service sub-dealers. Fairly high new unit sales keeps the main dealer in business even though much of the service revenue goes to sub-dealers. As regards the UK, it is said to be in the worst position: more than half of all the cars which pass through the books of the dealer (shown in the above diagram with an O) are fleet purchases which contribute very little to the dealer's revenue. The sales to private consumers by UK dealers are much lower (shown in the diagram with an () and are said to be 'declining'. The diagram also shows that British consumers use the dealers only to a very small extent for the repair and maintenance of cars (in particular once the warranty has expired); see CA 2000, 'The Forecourt Revolution', p.29.
  
   
• 931. 

  Second indent of Article 5(1)(1)(a) of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 932. 

  Article 4 (1)(1)(c) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 933. 

  See article 3 (8) (b) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 934. 

  t is also worth to note that general advertising or promotion on the Internet, that reaches customers in other distributors' exclusive territories and which is a reasonable way to reach consumers outside those territories (in particular the consumers inside the dealers own territory) are considered as passive sales in the sense of Regulation 2790/99; see Commission Notice Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, pt. 50, 2nd indent and pt.
   
• 935. 

  Article 3(6) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 936. 

  Article 3(9) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 937. 

  Article 3(8)
  
   
• 938. 

  A major car manufacturer has relied on these provisions to justify its opposition to any commercial relation between its dealer and such internet operators.
  
   
• 939. 

  E.g. up to now all dealers have to focus on a sales territory, which is always a geographically defined territory of a Member state (see article 1 and 4 (1)(3) of the Regulation). Futhermore an Internet operator may have a particular interest in advertsing by electronic means vis-à-vis a large range of customers. This may be in contradiction with the obligations which can be imposed on a dealer pursuant to acticle 3(8). .Dealers have also to have a physical showroom within their sales territory which corresponds to the standards of the manufacturer (see article 4(1)(1)(a)). These criteria, which an Internet dealer can not meet, are criteria of a distribution system based on territorial exclusivity and on quantitative selection of the distributors.
  
   
• 940. 

  Article 5(1)(1)(a).
  
   
• 941. 

  Article 3(10)(a).
  
   
• 942. 

  Article 3(11) of the Regulation states that a dealer cannot sell motor vehicles within the contract range or corresponding goods to final consumers using the services of an intermediary unless that intermediary has prior written authority from such consumers to purchase a specified motor vehicle or where it is taken away by him, to collect it.
  
   
• 943. 

  According Article 3(10) of the Regulation, a dealer cannot supply vehicles to a reseller not belonging to the distribution system.
  
   
• 944. 

  This problem has been pointed out by intermediaries operating via the internet who state that their activity could be seriously damaged by Article 3(11) of the Regulation.
  
   
• 945. 

  Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ L 13, 19.1.2000, p. 12.
  
   
• 946. 

  Press release IP/99/915, 30.11.1999.
  
   
• 947. 

  The main obstacles for supermarkets to become a dealer are: since manufacturers operate quantitative selection, there is no 'right' of a supermarket to be appointed as a dealer. Moreover, the geographic area in which a supermarket operates is in Europe already allocated to one or several dealers as an exclusive territory. Dealers can therefore object to the appointment of a supermarket (or another dealer) in their sales territory.
  
   
• 948. 

  Notice on intermediaries, Chapter 2 (b), last paragraph.
  
   
• 949. 

  The brand identity of manufacturers is protected e.g. by Article 3 pt. 3 of Regulation 1475/95, which stipulates that a dealer may only sell another make in separate premises under separate management and in the form of a distinct legal entity. Moreover, Article 3 pt. 4 protects any investment made by manufacturers in the after sales service area of the dealers, notably in equipment and training, form being used for the servicing of cars from other makes.
  
   
• 950. 

  See Article 4 (1) pt. 1: The manufacturer can oblige dealers to comply with minimum standards, in particular (a) the equipment of the business premises and the technical facilities for servicing; (b) the specialised, technical training of staff, (c) advertising, (d) the collection, storage and delivery of contract goods or corresponding goods and sales and after sales servicing, (e) the repair and maintenance of contract goods, in particular as regards the safe and reliable functioning of motor vehicles.
  
   
• 951. 

  Article 5 (5), 1st indent of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 952. 

  See Article 4 (2) pt. 2 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 953. 

  However, territorial protection is not absolute. Dealers have to face a certain degree of intra-brand competition under the Regulation: Other dealers can advertise outside their contract territory and actively promote sales by other means than personalised advertising (see Article 3 pt. 8 of Regulation 1475/85). They are also allowed to sell cars to customers having their residence or head office in another dealers territory. They are not however normally submitted to price competition from high volume independent resellers.
  
   
• 954. 

  Such as financial aid, technical and IT assistance, supply of additional services which can be offered together with the sale of a new vehicle, such as credits for the financing of new vehicles, leasing, insurance.
  
   
• 955. 

  See Article 6 (2) of Regulation 123/85 and Article 6 pt. 6 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 956. 

  Recitals 4 of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95. Recitals 6 of both Regulations indicate that account was taken of the consumers interest in readily availability of spare parts.
  
   
• 957. 

  See Article 3 pt. 4 of Regulation 123/85 and Article 3 pt. 5 of Regulation 1475/95; Article 4 (1) pt. 1of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95.
  
   
• 958. 

  Mentioned in Recital 8 of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95.
  
   
• 959. 

  Article 6 (2) of Regulation 123/85 and Article (6) pt. 6 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 960. 

  See ICDP Research Report 4/98 'Beyond the block exemption', p. 28.
  
   
• 961. 

  This aim is underlined in both Regulations and the Notice on Regulation 123/85. Recitals 9 and 16 of Regulation 123/85 and 1475/95, Notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter I, (1) and Chapter I, (3) regarding the possibility to use an intermediary to purchase a motor vehicle in another Member State.
  
   
• 962. 

  Article 5 (1) pt. 2 d) of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95; see also Art 6 pt. 7 of Regulation 1475/95 for all types of vehicles.
  
   
• 963. 

  See Article 5 (1) pt. 1 of Regulation 1475/95.
  
   
• 964. 

  Article 3 pt. 11 of Regulations 123/85 and 1475/95; Notice on Regulation 123/85, Chapter I (3); see also Notice on Intermediaries.
  
   
• 965. 

  Article 3 pt. 8 of Regulation 123/85 prohibited active sales outside the dealers contract territory; however dealers were allowed to advertise their products in media which covered their contract territory first, even if these media were also distributed outside the contract areas. Article 3 pt. 8 lit b) of Regulation 1475/95 allows active advertising without geographic limitation as long as it does not amount to personalised advertising.
  
   
• 966. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 967. 

  Article 11(3), OJ L 145, 29.6.1995, p. 25.
  
   
• 968. 

  Block exemption regulations, such as Regulation 1475/95, are meant to facilitate the application of EC Competition rules by national courts and authorities (see Notice on cooperation between the national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 81 (ex Article 85) and 82 (ex Article 86) of the EC Treaty OJ C 39, 13/2/1993, p. 6 and Commission Notice on cooperation between national competition authorities and the Commission in handling cases falling within the scope of Articles 81 (ex Article 85) and 82 (ex Article 86) of the EC Treaty, OJ C 313, 15/10/1997, p.
  
  3). However, according to Article 10 of Regulation 123/85 and Article 8 of Regulation 1475/85 as well as Article 7 (2) of Regulation 19/65 EEC as amended, only the Commission and the authorities of the Member States can withdraw the benefit of the block exemption.
  
   
• 969. 

  CFI Judgement of 18/09/1992 (Case T-24/90) Automec ./. Commission ("Automec II"), ECR. p.II-2223; see also Notice on the co-operation between the national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 81 (ex Article 85) and 82 (ex Article 86) of the EC Treaty, OJ C 39 of 13/02/1993, p. 6, CFI Judgement of 24/01/1995 (Case T-114/92) BEMIM ./. Commission, ECR p. II-147.
  
   
• 970. 

  CFI Judgement (Joint Cases T-185/96, T-189/96 et T-190/96) of 21/01/1999, Riviere Auto Service v. Commission, ECR 1999, p. II-0093 (VAG France); Court Judgement (Case C-282/95 P) of 18/03/1997, Guérin (Volvo) v. Commission, ECR 1997, p. I-1503.
  
   
• 971. 

  CFI Judgement (Case T-23/90) of 12/07/1991, Peugeot SA v. Commission (Eco System), ECR 1991, p. II-0653; Commission Decision confirmed by the CFI Judgement (Case T-9/92) of 22/04/1993, Peugeot SA v. Commission (Eco System), ECR 1993, p. II-0493 and the Court Judgement (Case C-322/94) of 16/06/1994, Peugeot SA v. Commission (Eco System), ECR 1994, p. I-2727; see also XXIII Report on competition policy, 1993, p.222.
  
   
• 972. 

  CFI Judgement (Joint Cases T-189/95, T-39/96 et T-123/96) of 13/12/1999, SGA v. Commission (not yet published); CFI Judgement (Joint Cases T-9/96 and T-211/96) of 13.12.1999, Européenne Automobile Sarl v. Commission (not yet published).
  
   
• 973. 

  Court Judgement (Case C-226/94) of 15/02/1996, Grand Garage Albigeois SA ./. Massol, ECR 1996, p. I-0651; Court Judgement (Case C-309/94) of 15/02/1996, Nissan France SA ECR 1996, p. I-0677; Court Judgement (Case C-128/95) of 20/2/1997 Fontaine, ECR 1997, p. I-967; Court Judgement (Case C-41/96) of 5/6/1997 VAG Händlerbeirat/SYD-Consult, ECR I p. I-3123; see also, cases IV/35137 Trabisco , IV/35149 Serieys and IV/35150 Aqueducs c/ dealers XXVIII. Report on competition policy, 1998, p. 190, 191.
  
   
• 974. 

  Indices, based on recommended retail prices for selected models; expressed in euro including taxes (source: Commission, Report on Car Prices within the EU, 1/11/1999.
  
   
• 975. 

  De Europese Commissie kent nummers toe aan officiële documenten van de Europese Unie. De Commissie maakt onderscheid in een aantal typen documenten door middel van het toekennen van verschillende nummerseries. Het onderscheid is gebaseerd op het soort document en/of de instelling van de Unie van wie het document afkomstig is.
   
• 976. 

  De Raad van de Europese Unie kent aan wetgevingsdossiers een uniek toe. Dit nummer bestaat uit een vijfcijferig volgnummer gevolgd door een schuine streep met de laatste twee cijfers van het jaartal, bijvoorbeeld 12345/00 - een document met nummer 12345 uit het jaar 2000.
   
• 977. 

  Het interinstitutionele nummer is een nummerreeks die binnen de Europese Unie toegekend wordt aan voorstellen voor regelgeving van de Europese Commissie.
  Binnen de Europese Unie worden nog een aantal andere nummerseries gebruikt. Iedere instelling heeft één of meerdere sets documenten met ieder een eigen nummering. Die reeksen komen niet overeen met elkaar of het interinstitutioneel nummer.
   
• 978. 

  Deze databank van de Europese Unie biedt de mogelijkheid de actuele werkzaamheden (workflow) van de Europese instellingen (Europees Parlement, Raad, ESC, Comité van de Regio's, Europese Centrale Bank, Hof van Justitie enz.) te volgen. EURlex volgt alle voorstellen (zoals wetgevende en begrotingsdossiers) en mededelingen van de Commissie, vanaf het moment dat ze aan de Raad of het Europees Parlement worden voorgelegd.
   
• 979. 

  Als dag van bekendmaking van een Europees besluit geldt de dag waarop het besluit in het Publicatieblad wordt bekendgemaakt, en daardoor in alle officiële talen van de Europese Unie bij het Publicatiebureau beschikbaar is.