COM(2004)293 - A pro-active Competition Policy for a Competitive Europe

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Contents

  1. Key information
  2. Key dates
  3. Related information
  4. Full version
  5. EU Monitor

1.

Key information

official title

Communication from the Commission - A pro-active Competition Policy for a Competitive Europe .
 
Legal instrument Communication
reference by COM-number49 COM(2004)293 EN
Additional COM-numbers COM(2004)293
CELEX number52 52004DC0293

2.

Key dates

Document 20-04-2004
Online publication 20-04-2004

3.

Related information

 

4.

Full version

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5.

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  • 1. 
    Some Key Issues in Europe's Competitiveness - Towards an Integrated Approach, Communication by the Commission, COM(2003) 704 final.

     
  • 2. 
    COM(2004) 274 final.

     
  • 3. 
    The cost of intra-European and long-distance calls has fallen dramatically and the choice of available services has widened significantly since liberalisation. At the same time, the restructuring of the sector has brought new job opportunities and resulted in an increase in employment. Furthermore, liberalisation in this sector has also created a competitive edge for European manufacturers of telecommunication equipment that have thrived in global competition.

     
  • 4. 
    Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2002) 1420.

     
  • 5. 
    The system of intellectual property rights ensures strong competition to innovate by granting successful innovators with temporary market power over their inventions. When such temporary protection expires intense competition will ensure a rapid adoption of innovations by competitors. Competition also encourages an effective diffusion of successful innovations.

     
  • 6. 
    These findings are based on a large number of studies on the link between competition and productivity. For a comprehensive list of these studies see DG Competition's website at europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ proactive_competition_policy.

     
  • 7. 
    Report from the Commission to the Spring European Council: Delivering Lisbon - Reform for the Enlarged Union (COM(2004) 29 final/2 (available at europa.eu.int/comm/lisbon_strategy/ pdf/COM2004_029_en.pdf ).

     
  • 8. 
    As an example, economic tools allow to better determine whether certain practices such as tying (a strategy where the sale of one product is made conditional on the purchase of an additional product), rebates or territorial restrictions hurt consumers or yield greater efficiency.

     
  • 9. 
    In particular, in order to extend the dialogue with consumer organisations which play a key role in advancing consumers' interests in the internal market, the Commission, as a first step, has established within DG Competition a function of a consumer liaison officer intended to strengthen the interface between competition and consumer policies.

     
  • 10. 
    Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, which replaces Regulation 17/62 as of 1 May 2004 (OJ L1, 4.1.2003). More information on these new rules can be found at europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/legislation/.

     
  • 11. 
    Article 81 of the EC Treaty.

     
  • 12. 
    For instance, Commission Regulation (EC) No 2658/2000 on the application of Art. 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements, OJ L 304/3, 5.12.2000, europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/legislation.

     
  • 13. 
    Guidelines on the applicability of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, para. 25, OJ C 3, 6.1.2001, p.2, europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/legislation

     
  • 14. 
    europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/legislation/entente3_en.html

     
  • 15. 
    Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation). More information on the new rules can be found at europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ mergers/legislation/regulation/.

     
  • 16. 
    Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings N° C 31, 5. 2.2004, p. 3. OJ L 31, 5.2.2004 (europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/ dat/2004/c_031/c_03120040205en00050018.pdf.).

     
  • 17. 
    For information on previous State aid reforms, see the twice yearly State aid scoreboards available at europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ state_aid/scoreboard/. The Spring 2004 scoreboard, to be published shortly, will describe State aid levels in 2002.

     
  • 18. 
    A specific aspect of future practice concerns some existing employment and training measures which are primarily financed by the social partners themselves through collective agreements which impose a levy on all companies in a particular sector. The Commission will follow the future development of the case law in this field very carefully.

     
  • 19. 
    Presidency Conclusions of the European Council 25- 26 March 2004.

     
  • 20. 
    The Commission Communication on the 'Risk capital action plan' (COM(2003) 654 of 4.11.2003).

     
  • 21. 
    For further information see www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.

     
  • 22. 
    The magnitude of harm from cartels is estimated at many billions of Euros annually. The average gain from price-fixing is 10 percent of the selling price but it can vary significantly across cases. A recent OECD survey shows that the cartel mark-up can be very large, as much as 50% or more. (Source: OECD (2002)).

     
  • 23. 
    Information on the leniency programme and guidance on how to launch an application for leniency can be obtained at europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/leniency

     
  • 24. 
    europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ liberal_professions/final_communication_en.pdf

     
  • 25. 
    Some Key Issues in Europe's Competitiveness - Towards an Integrated Approach, Communication by the Commission, COM(2003) 704 final.

     
  • 26. 
    COM(2004) 274 final.

     
  • 27. 
    The cost of intra-European and long-distance calls has fallen dramatically and the choice of available services has widened significantly since liberalisation. At the same time, the restructuring of the sector has brought new job opportunities and resulted in an increase in employment. Furthermore, liberalisation in this sector has also created a competitive edge for European manufacturers of telecommunication equipment that have thrived in global competition.

     
  • 28. 
    Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2002) 1420.

     
  • 29. 
    The system of intellectual property rights ensures strong competition to innovate by granting successful innovators with temporary market power over their inventions. When such temporary protection expires intense competition will ensure a rapid adoption of innovations by competitors. Competition also encourages an effective diffusion of successful innovations.

     
  • 30. 
    These findings are based on a large number of studies on the link between competition and productivity. For a comprehensive list of these studies see DG Competition's website at europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ proactive_competition_policy.

     
  • 31. 
    Report from the Commission to the Spring European Council: Delivering Lisbon - Reform for the Enlarged Union (COM(2004) 29 final/2 (available at europa.eu.int/comm/lisbon_strategy/ pdf/COM2004_029_en.pdf ).

     
  • 32. 
    As an example, economic tools allow to better determine whether certain practices such as tying (a strategy where the sale of one product is made conditional on the purchase of an additional product), rebates or territorial restrictions hurt consumers or yield greater efficiency.

     
  • 33. 
    In particular, in order to extend the dialogue with consumer organisations which play a key role in advancing consumers' interests in the internal market, the Commission, as a first step, has established within DG Competition a function of a consumer liaison officer intended to strengthen the interface between competition and consumer policies.

     
  • 34. 
    Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, which replaces Regulation 17/62 as of 1 May 2004 (OJ L1, 4.1.2003). More information on these new rules can be found at europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/legislation/.

     
  • 35. 
    Article 81 of the EC Treaty.

     
  • 36. 
    For instance, Commission Regulation (EC) No 2658/2000 on the application of Art. 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements, OJ L 304/3, 5.12.2000, europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/legislation.

     
  • 37. 
    Guidelines on the applicability of Art. 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, para. 25, OJ C 3, 6.1.2001, p.2, europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/legislation

     
  • 38. 
    europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/legislation/entente3_en.html

     
  • 39. 
    Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation). More information on the new rules can be found at europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ mergers/legislation/regulation/.

     
  • 40. 
    Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings N° C 31, 5. 2.2004, p. 3. OJ L 31, 5.2.2004 (europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/ dat/2004/c_031/c_03120040205en00050018.pdf.).

     
  • 41. 
    For information on previous State aid reforms, see the twice yearly State aid scoreboards available at europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ state_aid/scoreboard/. The Spring 2004 scoreboard, to be published shortly, will describe State aid levels in 2002.

     
  • 42. 
    A specific aspect of future practice concerns some existing employment and training measures which are primarily financed by the social partners themselves through collective agreements which impose a levy on all companies in a particular sector. The Commission will follow the future development of the case law in this field very carefully.

     
  • 43. 
    Presidency Conclusions of the European Council 25- 26 March 2004.

     
  • 44. 
    The Commission Communication on the 'Risk capital action plan' (COM(2003) 654 of 4.11.2003).

     
  • 45. 
    For further information see www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.

     
  • 46. 
    The magnitude of harm from cartels is estimated at many billions of Euros annually. The average gain from price-fixing is 10 percent of the selling price but it can vary significantly across cases. A recent OECD survey shows that the cartel mark-up can be very large, as much as 50% or more. (Source: OECD (2002)).

     
  • 47. 
    Information on the leniency programme and guidance on how to launch an application for leniency can be obtained at europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ antitrust/leniency

     
  • 48. 
    europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ liberal_professions/final_communication_en.pdf

     
  • 49. 
    De Europese Commissie kent nummers toe aan officiële documenten van de Europese Unie. De Commissie maakt onderscheid in een aantal typen documenten door middel van het toekennen van verschillende nummerseries. Het onderscheid is gebaseerd op het soort document en/of de instelling van de Unie van wie het document afkomstig is.
     
  • 50. 
    De Raad van de Europese Unie kent aan wetgevingsdossiers een uniek toe. Dit nummer bestaat uit een vijfcijferig volgnummer gevolgd door een schuine streep met de laatste twee cijfers van het jaartal, bijvoorbeeld 12345/00 - een document met nummer 12345 uit het jaar 2000.
     
  • 51. 
    Het interinstitutionele nummer is een nummerreeks die binnen de Europese Unie toegekend wordt aan voorstellen voor regelgeving van de Europese Commissie.
    Binnen de Europese Unie worden nog een aantal andere nummerseries gebruikt. Iedere instelling heeft één of meerdere sets documenten met ieder een eigen nummering. Die reeksen komen niet overeen met elkaar of het interinstitutioneel nummer.
     
  • 52. 
    Deze databank van de Europese Unie biedt de mogelijkheid de actuele werkzaamheden (workflow) van de Europese instellingen (Europees Parlement, Raad, ESC, Comité van de Regio's, Europese Centrale Bank, Hof van Justitie enz.) te volgen. EURlex volgt alle voorstellen (zoals wetgevende en begrotingsdossiers) en mededelingen van de Commissie, vanaf het moment dat ze aan de Raad of het Europees Parlement worden voorgelegd.
     
  • 53. 
    Als dag van bekendmaking van een Europees besluit geldt de dag waarop het besluit in het Publicatieblad wordt bekendgemaakt, en daardoor in alle officiële talen van de Europese Unie bij het Publicatiebureau beschikbaar is.