Catalogue of recommendations for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and best practices Frontiers - Main contents

Document date	26-11-2001
Publication date	12-08-2009
Reference	13243/3/01 REV 3
From	Presidency
To	Working Party on Schengen Evaluation
External link	original PDF
Original document in PDF

COUNCIL OF Brussels, 26 November 2001 (28.01)

THE EUROPEAN UNION (OR. en)

13243/3/01 REV 3

LIMITE

SCH-EVAL 38 COMIX 691

NOTE from : Presidency to : Working Party on Schengen Evaluation Nos prev. docs : 9602/01 SCH-EVAL 22 COMIX 428 9603/01 SCH-EVAL 23 COMIX 429

Subject : Catalogue of recommendations for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and best practices Frontiers

For the record: in the introduction to the Catalogue, a definition of "Member States applying the

Schengen acquis" will be given, taking into account the specific situations of UK/IRL/DK/IS and NO).

(also make a reference to what the Schengen acquis is, i.e. the Convention, the Common Handbook, other Manuals, the reports of the evaluation committees for Germany, Greece and the Nordic countries. The acquis was integrated into the EU by Council Decision ... published in the Official Journal, etc.)

(mention also the fundamentals of the Schengen spirit, i.e. greater freedom and security, including fight against terrorism)

(check terminology in use, for example border controls, border management, surveillance, strategy, model, control, checks ...)

(a distinction where necessary between recommendations or best practices which are only applicable to one type of borders (land, sea, air) shall be added).

(The list contained in the document is indicative, non-exhaustive and subject to change.)

EN

 DG H TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. Integrated border security model (a mechanism of different tiers/filters) .............................3

I. Introduction ________________________________________________________________ 3

II. The four tiers _______________________________________________________________ 4

III. Key elements for the correct application of the Integrated Border Security Model ________ 7

B. Details of recommendations and best practices __________________________________ 10

1. Recommendations/Best practices _________________________________________________________10 1.1 Strategy and organisational structure __________________________________________________10

1.2 Infrastructure ______________________________________________________________________15 1.3 Staff _______________________________________________________________________________19 1.4 Training ___________________________________________________________________________20 1.5 Equipment _________________________________________________________________________22 1.6 Internal coordination ________________________________________________________________26 1.7 International cooperation _____________________________________________________________26 1.8 rules and procedures_________________________________________________________________28 1.9 Particular cases for certain types of border______________________________________________30 1.10 Miscellaneous _______________________________________________________________________38

EN

 DG H

C HAPTER XXXX B ORDERS , BORDER SURVEILLANCE AND BORDER CONTROL

A. Integrated border security model (a mechanism of different tiers/filters)

I. Introduction

An overall border model is an important tool to safeguard internal security and in particular prevent illegal immigration. It means in simplified terms that a set of complementary measures has to be implemented on different tiers. In this respect four tiers can be identified.

(1) Activities in third countries, especially in countries of origin and transit, including the collection of information by Liaison Officers as well as the key role of the consular post abroad in the process of issuing visas.

(2) International border cooperation.

(3) Measures at external borders: border management (border checks and border surveillance).

(4) Further activities inside the territory of the Member States and between Member States.

The coherence between these measures and the way they are applied by Member States is a key to the success of the general border model.

EN

 DG H II. The four tiers

• 1. 

  Activities in third countries, in countries of origin and transit

  (a) The first measure required in terms of time and place is advice from liaison officers and document experts in third countries which are the source of the risks generated by illegal immigration (Article 47 (4) of the Schengen Convention). Officials working abroad for the Member States' consular posts and carriers will be trained by specialists in order to detect document forgeries before actual travel has started.

  When visas are issued and when passengers are transported by air and sea, it is of great importance to detect false and falsified documents in order to prevent unauthorised entry into the Schengen area. The training given by document advisers makes a vital contribution to the detection of such forgeries by officials working for the Member States' consular posts and for carriers.

  (b) In the second stage, a thorough inspection of the application documents submitted must be carried out by the Member States' consular representations when issuing visas (see Articles 15 and 17 of the Schengen Convention and the provisions of

  the Common Consular Instructions on Visas). This includes inspecting documents and making database queries pursuant to Article 96 of the Schengen Convention. Consulates shall guarantee that sensitive information and blank documents are adequately protected and stored.

  The systematic implementation of EC visa regulations should enable the phenomenon of illegal immigration to be effectively tackled at its roots. The importance of intensive Consular Cooperation should be stressed in that context.

  EN

 DG H (c) Carriers are also obliged pursuant to national legislation on the basis of

Article 26(1b) of the Schengen Convention to take all necessary measures to ensure that third-country nationals carried by air, sea or land, in accordance with Article 26(3) of the Schengen Convention have the travel documents necessary for entry into the territory of the Members States. If third-country nationals are set down in a EU Member State without the prescribed documents, the carriers will be subject to sanctions and compelled in principle to take back those passengers. Staff of carriers should be trained. This article of the Schengen Convention has been supplemented by Directive 2001/51/EC i of 28 June 2000 – L 187, 10.7.2001, p. 45.

• 2. 

  Bilateral and international border Cooperation

  (a) International cooperation in the field of border security can be divided into multilateral, cooperation in the field of border management are an efficient tool to increase border security. This can be realised by establishing appropriate working mechanisms such as exchange of information, establishing appropriate

  communication channels, local contact points, emergency procedures, handling incidents in an objective manner in order to avoid political disputes, etc.

  Regional cooperation structures across external borders should also be established

  in sea areas. These initiatives should bring together all countries in the region.

  (b) As regards cooperation with adjacent states, it is considered necessary that transit states lend their active assistance by ensuring that their borders are thoroughly

  secure and by taking measures away from the border, i.e. consistent repatriation practice – if there is no right of abode and there are no impediments based on serious humanitarian grounds or international law (Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, European Convention on Human Rights).

  EN

 DG H 3. Measures at the external borders

The core area of general border strategy is a functioning border management consisting of border checks and border surveillance, based on a risk analysis. Article 6 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement sets out clearly the framework to be implemented by the Common Handbook, the two being complementary. Essential elements of border management are: (1) that all persons crossing the external borders are checked systematically and (2) effective border surveillance is ensured between border crossing-points.

In this respect all appropriate measures must be taken in order to safeguard internal

security and prevent illegal immigration 1 :

Coherent legislation based on the EU/EC-Schengen requirements in the area of border management is needed (for example: border guard act, data protection rules). With regard to infrastructure, appropriate facilities for carrying out border checks and surveillance have to be available. Officials carrying these tasks have to be professional and specially trained. Adequate human resources are required. Exact requirements depend on several factors (geographical situation, volume of border traffic, etc.). Moreover, a clear concept of training (basic and further) is required covering operational skills, knowledge of legislation, languages, etc.

Equipment must be appropriate to the border situation. Functioning internal coordination is needed at all levels (which authorities are competent for which task, no competence "black holes"). Information exchange between competent authorities (border guard, customs, police, judicial authorities) is essential, including a mechanism to solve possible disputes of competence between the authorities. Furthermore, operational issues have to be covered (for example use of compatible communication equipment).

1 Recommendations and best practices see the following part of the document.

EN

 DG H Agreed international/bilateral cooperation has to be implemented in practice on the

spot (Examples: exchange of information, joint controls, handling of readmission situations). The special requirements for the three different types of border (air, sea, land) have to be fulfilled (for example: at airports a separation of passenger flows – international and internal flights – has to be made by physical means or, for minor airports, by a systematically monitored and accompanied flow of passengers).

• 4. 

  Further activities inside the territory of the Member States

  (a) Measures to prevent illegal immigration and cross-border crime should be pursued inside the territory of the Member States by enhanced search, control and

  surveillance measures based on national information and in accordance with national law, where possible on the basis of police cooperation agreements pursuant to Article 39 (4) and (5) of the Schengen Convention. Given that the problems of migration and crime are not subject to geographical restrictions, international traffic routes should in future become main areas of activity for national police forces in accordance with domestic law. However, where public policy or national security so require, a Member State may, after consulting the other Contracting Parties, decide that for a limited period national border checks appropriate to the situation shall be carried out at internal borders

  (b) The last stage in the geographical and time sequence is repatriation in accordance with national law (see Article 23 of the Schengen Convention) of third-country

  nationals who have entered the Schengen area without authorisation, if no right to stay exists and if there are no obstacles based on compelling humanitarian grounds or international law (Geneva Convention on Refugees, European Convention on Human Rights)

III. Key elements for the correct application of the Integrated Border Security Model

In the following summary overview of recommendations and best practices, some basic requirements will be indicated regarding the methodology for the correct application of the Integrated Border Security Model.

EN

 DG H Emphasis should be placed on the coordination of duties between the responsible government bodies in dealing with information, reports and training and in responding to irregularities.

Coordination in these fields should extend to regional and local levels too.

Another key element of the method is to pay attention to the assessment of the situation. Thus, the performance of a border control system should be adjusted in accordance with the prevailing conditions along all its borders. Valid and reliable data should form part of a permanent evaluation which could be shard by other Member States. Where necessary, the allocation of resources should be adapted accordingly.

As a general rule, persons performing border police duties should be specialised trained professionals. Persons with less experience can be used only for auxiliary duties assisting professionals temporarily. No exception is allowed in respect of duties that require any use of personal data, making searches in confidential registers or decisions interfering with an individual's physical integrity or freedom.

To facilitate mutual trust, any State must be able to provide valid and reliable data concerning the situation at all its borders and also the border control measures applied. Knowledge of the

situation at the border relies on knowledge of the performance of border control systems. Reliable estimates concerning border control measures should be based, among other things, on complete knowledge of regional and local circumstances. To attain the above aims and to facilitate cost-effective use of resources, various methodologies should be applied at border controls. Terms such as risk analysis, intelligence, data-flow management, situational awareness, reaction capability and information exchange with other Member States can be used when evaluating and developing these methods.

Risk analysis can be seen as a tool for optimisation of border controls and a way of providing reliable information on the border situation. It should be adapted to the type of borders.

EN

 DG H At practical level this means evaluation of the persons, vehicles, vessels or flights to be

checked. This evaluation is made in the context of a real time tactical situation and thus the methods can be called tactical risk analysis. At the external border, all persons must be checked according to the Common Manual. To detect border crossing crime, extra emphasis should be placed on the checking procedure for risky objects. Personnel should be provided with knowledge of risk indicators, risk profiles and typical modi operandi of border crossing crime. Named special targets of surveillance and control should also be known to personnel. The risk analysis and management of border control need to be backed by systematic intelligence. Border control systems should be able to gather intelligence, analyse it and, finally, utilise the products in field work.

To have a realistic picture of prevailing irregularities for the purposes of medium and long-term operative management, estimates should be made of:

● the level of risk ensured by the authorities in illegal border crossings ● the level of detected irregularities ● the level of estimated undetected irregularities.

The aim here is to show that there are no known places or routes which offer a lower risk of being caught upon illegally entering the territory of Member States. This is to ensure that resources will be allocated optimally along the border in order to maintain a reasonable risk level in border crossing crime. Further, at all managerial levels, the control system should be evaluated in order to find out shortcomings in the system. A shortcoming exists where a border can predictably be crossed illegally with very low risk or no risk at all.

EN

 DG H B. Details of recommendations and best practices

• 1. 

  Recommendations/Best practices

Recommendations Best practices

1.1 Strategy and organisational structure

1.1.1 general strategy for border management + risk assessment

• - 

  establishing a national plan defining the steps to be taken in the countries of

  origin and transit, at external Schengen borders and inside the individual Schengen State

• - 

  border management is a task which requires a high level of professionalism

• - 

  streamlined and functional ministerial competences for border management. Centralised supervision and instructions for border control under the auspices of - the competent public authority is a a ministry working in the field of EU specialised Police/Border Guard force justice and home affairs. (not a military force)

• - 

  effective border management is ensured - border control and surveillance should by supplementing strategy with be executed by professional officials of technology, equipment and staff; the same administration organising

  mobile and stationary, airborne or on border management under a single land/sea, uniformed or plain clothed. national ministry for Justice and/or Home Affairs

EN

 DG H Recommendations Best practices - permanent analysis determines the

allocation of personnel and technical resources;

• - 

  an evaluation is to be made to ensure that border management matches the requirements of Article 6 of the

  Schengen Convention and to consider whether border management has to be adapted. Article 7 requires exchange of all relevant information.

• - 

  at international level border control has to be governed by bilateral agreements

• - 

  cooperation and coordination of the

  responsibilities of the different bodies These agreements/Acts should cover the should be regulated by an official Act whole spectrum of cross-border cooperation,

  i.e. joint risk analysis, exchange of experience, cooperation on training, cooperation on investigation

  1.1.2 Intelligence and data-flow management

• - 

  a two-way information exchange A secure database is established to exchange should be arranged between central and experience between units and to distribute local levels of the border control information on intelligence objects. This authority . database is available for use in border control.

• - 

  the local authorities should be For specified analysis and exchange of instructed to gather information on information, a network of intelligence liaison illegal immigration and other border officers is established to connect different crossing irregularities, analyse it units and different organisational levels.

  locally, and pass it on to central level.

EN

 DG H Recommendations Best practices

• - 

  the central level should compile all information country-wide, process it into usable form and deliver it to local authorities to be used as a tool for tactical risk analysis and operational planning.

- data-flow management can be used as a Information in the intelligence database is means of evaluating the effectiveness of hidden, until a specific inquiry is made. The information exchange within and right to make searches is controlled by a

between authorities involved in border supervisory unit.

control. Availability of and access to vital data and data protection are also elements to be evaluated.

1.1.3 regional or local strategy

• - 

  where appropriate, establish regional plans based on risk assessment

  intensive cooperation of all law enforcement agencies in the national border region

• - 

  cooperation with law enforcement agencies of neighbouring states

• - 

  reception of information from the - creating gates for information from and population must be encouraged and to the public (Internet, etc.)

  transformed into risk analysis and operational activities if necessary

EN

 DG H Recommendations Best practices

1.1.4 organisational (functional) structure

• - 

  coordination of all activities at central, - creating a local and regional regional and local levels coordination mechanism or organisation

  • - 

    establishing specialised - establishing capabilities to fight officers/teams/units to fight

  successfully against border crossing border-crossing crime at different levels crime if needed

• - 

  the organisation should provide highly - the organisational structure provides for specialised services required for border a specialised officer for false and

  checks/surveillance - for example on falsified documents and one with the false documents necessary linguistic skills to be available on every shift or at every BCP

• - 

  specify a lapse of time within which the squad must reach the border in the

  event of an alarm

  1.1.5 availability and permanency

- depending on the situation, ensure availability and permanency of staff

EN

 DG H 1.1.6 Situational awareness and

reaction capability

In green and blue border control, terms of At landborders, the border is subject to situational awareness and reaction capability constant monitoring (human or technical can be used to define the risk ensured in devices). Where this is not feasible, illegal border crossings. specialised sniffer dogs may extend Situational awareness measures how the surveillance time. The dogs should not be authorities are capable of detecting agressive or uncontrolled when meeting cross-border movements and finding illegal border crossers. reasoned grounds for control measures.

In practice, situational awareness depicts how the authorities define the lapse of time and area for three functions: At sea a VTMIS (or compatible) system - detecting movements that could covers the entire maritime area and ports

possibly be attempted at illegal border under evaluation. All vessels are detected crossings and identified by the system. Once

• - 

  identifying the detected targets identified, a vessel remains constantly known

• - 

  analysing identifications by the system. The system is backed up by offshore craft and airplanes. These mobile units make close identification, fill in gaps and retrieve information from outside the

  system. At ports, based on a risk analysis, the port area may be fenced off and monitored constantly. In such cases all persons entering or leaving the port area are checked.

  • - 

    deploy stand-by squads

The reaction capability at sea or land At sea, constant readiness to dispatch a measures the lapse of time required to reach mobile unit, in order to maintain any vessel

EN

 DG H any border crossing movement to be trying to reach the coast under constant controlled and also the time and the means to surveillance. react adequately to unusual circumstances.

The latter also applies also to the situation in airports.

1.2 Infrastructure

1.2.1 entrance and exit control

• - 

  Facilities should be in place to carry out the compulsory entrance and exit

  controls.

• - 

  Entering and exiting border crossing traffic of all kind has to be separated

  1.2.2 organisation of border surveillance

• - 

  border surveillance can be carried out by human resources (supported by

  technical means) or mainly by highly sophisticated man-operated techniques. To ensure efficiency, the means are adapted to the density of population, number of personnel, equipment and migration risk.

• - 

  deployment and spread of infrastructure facilities (buildings, etc.) adapted to

  mobility, number of staff, regional traffic infrastructure and migration risk

EN

 DG H 1.2.3 organisation of the border

crossing point

• - 

  exchange of information with the - building border crossing-point neighbouring country on building a installations with the neighbouring BCP, aiming at a certain degree of country in a coordinated way to achieve coordination (land) adequacy of means (dimensions, lanes, installations) (land)

• - 

  constructing border crossing points, using common experience among

  Schengen partners, depending on

  regional conditions, in perhaps two • signposts to provide information for users versions, one large model and another in different languages (depending on type of a small BCP. Travellers should be of BCP and neighbouring country) or by made familiar with similar procedures internationally used drawings (pictograms)

  • - 

    the delimitation of the BCP and the • a fence around the BCP

  applicable regulations should be readily visible to all

• - 

  Border checks to be carried out in

special control booths or at desks - these installations to be provided to all

relevant national services/authorities - Inside buildings special dedicated desks

or booths shall be provided for the different tasks and be built accordingly

Outside buildings, control booths containing the necessary equipment

• - 

  Unauthorised observation (especially of computer systems) shall be prevented

EN

 DG H - to define standardised criteria for the - flexible control booth which can be

manufacture of control booths (having lifted to oversee the queue of regard to security; technical equipment) passengers waiting

- communication

a suitable communication system must provide instant information on each important situation at any time for all units

1.2.4 separation of passenger flows

Structure

Separation at ports

Ferry passengers to be separated so that external border traffic can never mix with internal traffic between the vessel and the border check. As a general rule, this must be guaranteed by means of physical fixtures

(walls, fences, etc.). In minor ports with only a limited amount of passengers, constructions can be supplemented by surveillance.

Separation at airports

Separate terminals for Schengen and Airports should be re-arranged in order to non-Schengen traffic avoid the possibility of persons or documents, passing from the Schengen-zone to the non-Schengen zone.

EN

 DG H This can be achieved by physical separation - controls at the gate for risk flights through glass or grid walls or by a systematically monitored and accompanied flow of passengers.

Procedures

Identify Schengen and non-Schengen flights

Cooperate as closely as possible with third parties at airports, with special attention to connecting flights

Provide the necessary information in due time Monitor the flights accordingly through a real for the border control authorities. Establish a time system, agreed upon with the civil link with the flight aviation information aviation authority system

Plan buses for transporting passengers from remote parking areas to the dedicated area of the airport.

1.2.5 lanes for controls

Separation between (a) EU and EEA - separate control lanes for EEA nationals, nationals and (b) non-EU/non-EEA nationals for third-country residents and, (airports and sea) depending on the situation, a third lane

for citizens of the neighbouring country Number and capacity of lanes has to fulfil the can be provided in order to facilitate need for fluid and quick but traffic. Where possible adapt the

Schengen-compliant controls situation to the required checks on EEA and non-EEA nationals.

• - 

  hand-in-hand management of traffic flows by all competent authorities of Lanes must be marked clearly for use of both neighbouring states. travellers (private cars, pedestrians, lorries,

EN

 DG H - flexible organisation of control lanes buses, CD/CC if necessary. Markings may be

and securing for a quick and effective adapted to needs in a flexible way. reaction to prosecution or traffic jam. Separate lanes for the different types of border-crossing traffic

• - 

  organisation of border control with priority on entry into the respective state

1.3 Staff

1.3.1 Adequacy - study comparable situations in other

• - 

  effective border control and Member States which could serve as an surveillance requires that the number of example

  staff must be adapted to risk assessment, based on analysis

  1.3.2 selection criteria for recruiting new staff

• - 

  written rules for recruiting new staff

• - 

  physical suitability

• - 

  meet moral and legal requirements

  (criminal (judicial, legal) records, etc.)

  1.3.3 professionalism

• - 

  high level of professionalism based on successfully completed training. (The requirements for this topic are

  presented under "Training")

EN

 DG H - provide for regular evaluation in which

e.g. job satisfaction, effectiveness, social conditions and liability are - provision for rotation of staff measured

1.4 Training

1.4.1 basic training

Operational staff should have successfully completed a training course covering their future tasks, which should include:

• - 

  knowledge of Schengen and the EC/EU

• - 

  basic rules and procedures

• - 

  document checks (valid, falsified - programmes should adapt flexibly to risk documents) assessment

• - 

  rules for entry, stay and exit

• - 

  coordination and cooperation with other agencies

• - 

  special cooperation between Member

  States in the internal border zone (Dublin, readmission, etc.)

• - 

  police cooperation

• - 

  Schengen Information System

• - 

  judicial cooperation

  1

  1.4.2 further continuing education

• - 

  a training programme must be The organisation should provide programmes established with a regular training/briefing and facilities at central and local level to hours for officers as part of working hours accompany officers during their career by

1 The Subgroup recommends adopting a standard training module for border control staff as

well as one specific module on falsified documents.

EN

 DG H offering them education and training on

1.4.3 linguistic training issues which are relevant to their work

• - 

  ability to speak a foreign language encourage staff to learn other languages useful for their work necessary for their work, languages of the neighbouring countries or the countries of origin

  1.4.4 specialised technical training counterfeits and forgeries

• - 

  specialised training in recognising false Specialist officers should train officers at all travel documents BCPs

  1.4.5 Specialised training for management levels - international experience in a similar responsibility is an asset

  • - 

    participation in the CEPOL training programme will in future be advisable

EN

 DG H 1.5 Equipment

1.5.1 Recommended equipment

1.5.1.1. Introduction

The following paragraphs will mention equipment which is thought necessary and should be permanently optimised in the first line and additional requirements in the second line, in trains as well as mobile equipment. It should be stressed that SIS connection and stamps are considered to be key equipment

1.5.1.2. At the first line:

Upon entry and exit at the border crossing points access to the following equipment will be provided:

• - 

  Terminal for consulting SIS and Carplate imaging system national systems. There will be mobile - truck scanning facility terminals at ground control on - radioactivity sensors

  passengers in vehicles in seaports with mobile/stationary X-ray machine ferry traffic and in airports with limited traffic; otherwise fixed terminals.

• - 

  Document examination instrument, with UV light, white overhead light, transmitted light, etc. Number of stamps should be listed for the

• - 

  Magnifying glass x 8/10 different offices

• - 

  Retro-reflective lamp

• - 

  stamps. Pursuant to the Common

  Manual, Schengen entry and exit

EN

 DG H stamps will be provided to all border

crossing points. Information on lost or stolen stamps must be given at the shortest notice to Member States

1.5.1.3. For in-depth controls at the second line

• - 

  image transmitting device Questioned Document Examination System for authentication of travel documents with - availability by electronic means of the infrared and ultraviolet light, filters, etc. Common Handbook

• - 

  Stereo magnifying glass, for example - availability by electronic means of x 40 images of false documents

• - 

  Identification equipment and material

  (including template to compare stamps) - Common Handbook

• - 

  Handbook containing genuine and false passports and ID documents

communication material

• - 

  availability of sets and telephones to communicate during border control to consulates or other authorities in the EU

  1.5.1.4. Mobile equipment

Mobile equipment will be used at border crossing points where there are no fixed positions. The mobile equipment will

EN

 DG H contain:

• - 

  Hand-lamp with UV light

• - 

  Mini-microscope x 30

• - 

  Magnifying glass x 8/10 - mobile SIS terminal

• - 

  Retro-reflective lamp (3M.laminate) - mobile document readable device

• - 

  Hand-lamp for overhead light, transmitted light (Mini Maglite or similar)

• - 

  Template to compare stamps, etc.

• - 

  Stable access to SIS has to be provided

  1.5.2 Checking of trains Train should be under continuous

Trains should be under proper and continuous surveillance from border to border check surveillance from border to border check point (e.g. patrols, technical surveillance, point. Actual border checks may be carried video). out on the moving train, or at the railway Platform area for external traffic trains to be station either on board the train or in the fixed physically separated from internal traffic premises used specifically for those purposes. ones. Possibilities of avoiding border check Border control authorities should have should be prevented and arrival area should effective tools to check travel documents and be under proper control. consult with online databases at their disposal Pre-frontier checks together with border in all cases. All passengers and crew (and authorities of neighbouring third countries train) must be checked according to Schengen may be effective, if the relevant jurisdictional principles (Art6./SIC). requirements are met and reciprocal trust

exists between (a) neighbouring countries and (b) between the Schengen partners. Agree on cooperation with train carriers. This cooperation should, where appropriate, be formalised by providing a list of passengers to border authorities in good time beforehand.

mobile SIS equipment on trains (control

EN

 DG H before crossing the border and on hotspots

1.5.3 Border surveillance A highly centralised technical surveillance

Observation and detection material which system that detects and identifies (camera) provides adequate surveillance of terrain in the target and enables immediate reaction all seasons and weather conditions (day and (patrol). The system is based on sensor fields night) that consist of different types of sensors

(stable and portable) such as active and passive IR-beams, radars, cameras, seismic sensors, etc. The sensor fields and/or individual sensors are installed in accordance with the existing local situation. The system itself is controlled centrally with or by a computer in the OP centre that is capable of commanding and controlling active patrols and requesting reinforcements when necessary.

thermographic cameras (portable, stationary and/or vehicle-based) binoculars, short and long-range versions

depending on the local situation, compatible devices based on radio transmission,

1.5.4 Transportation/Mobility telephone system and/or data connection are advisable with the neighbouring country

Providing transportation depending on local infrastructure, regional conditions (weather, topographic situation, density of population) manpower and migration flows

Transportation services must be available day

EN

 DG H and night

1.5.5 Communication and encryption

Make provision for procedures for secured communications between services

1.6 Internal coordination

- coordination between different national services

(police-customs-border guard)

• - 

  direct and immediate interchange of - meeting between heads of services, at all information between BCPs and border levels

  surveillance force - joint database - building up local headquarters with - joint risk analysis

  authority (Check with E.W.) - joint training - integrated approach involving all

- common operations with joint authorities for tackling the problems of leadership illegal immigration

New item to suggest to Council: In line with national law, cooperation between border control services, law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities

1.7 International cooperation

1.7.1 bilateral agreements

• - 

  At international level border control has to be regulated in bilateral agreements

EN

 DG H 1.7.2 regional cooperation

• - 

  binding, written rules on local and regional

  border-crossing cooperation

• - 

  support the neighbouring border authority through exchanging

  information and transmitting facts of interest to it.

  1.7.3 Liaison Officers

• - 

  establishment of a liaison office for the exchange of informations - Liaison officers to detect false on the basis of conventions or national documents in the consulate or airports law of origin SCH/Com-ex (99) 7 rev.2

  • - 

    cooperation between Liaison Officers

  Nordic cooperation between Liaison Officers could serve as an example for a future EU network.

information exchange with other Member Demand for information exchange is

States on maritime borders contained in Article 7 of the Convention.

Use of EISICS is seen as a recommended practice.

EN

 DG H 1.8 rules and procedures

1.8.1 General aspects

It should be stated that entry and exit controls are to be performed systematically.

Exceptions to exit controls are possible only under special circumstances.

National legislation to allow the relevant authorities for border controls and surveillance the legal possibility of patrolling, surveying and investigating border-related crime, without limiting it to the close border area

1.8.2 Rules for minor border traffic 1

Bilateral agreements are the basis of minor border traffic between neighbouring countries; in any event, information must be communicated to EU-partners.

1.8.3 rules for issuing visas at the border

Visas should in principle be issued at consulates. Only in exceptional circumstances may they be issued at BCPs.

1 Recommendation to the Council: The Council is invited to consider clarifying the rules for minor border

traffic, where attention should be paid to the legal requirements for such agreements, the information to be provided to the other Member States, the geographical delimitation, the target groups of such facilitation, the eventual economical purposes, etc.

EN

 DG H There must be a general manual valid for all

BCPs describing the steps to be carried out for a visa to be issued at the BCP.

all available national and EU Member State information has to be used to make a proper decision

the decision and the major reasons underlying it have to be placed on file

necessary contacts and participation involving other EU Member States to be carried through in a standardised way

• decision to be made by a senior officer

or official of a higher authority

In addition to the compulsory use of SIS and the national watchout-list, recourse should be

1.8.4 procedure for transit passengers had to information from other services

(airport )

1.8.5 Operational aspects of fighting cross-border crime

The operational dimension in fighting cross-border crime is important in border management.

It is therefore important to have legislation which affords all relevant authorities (Border Guard, police, customs, judiciary,

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 DG H etc.) the legal possibility of preventing and detecting border related crime, without limiting it to the close border area.

Member States should describe the framework they have adopted to fight cross-border crime, which:

• - 

  should be based on an analysis of the different types of crime and

• - 

  should include an overview of all relevant factors, such as personnel, equipment and training as well as cooperation between national and international services

  1.8.6 rules for issuing airport transit visas

  set up specialised multidisciplinary units for border-related crime fighting

1.9 Particular cases for certain types of border

1.9.1 Risk analysis

Maritime borders

The volume of vessel movement is usually VTMIS or similar system is used to cover high in relation to the resources available for large maritime areas, where all major traffic control. Tactical risk analysis is therefore remains as identified targets. The authority essential at blue border surveillance to meet responsible for maritime border police duties the demands set out under CM title 2.2. has real-time access to VTMIS. It constantly

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 DG H Vessel movements should be monitored and compares vessel traffic against information vessels identified. Identifications (names of provided by intelligence. The person vessels) should be checked against conducting risk analysis is authorised to background information containing launch control measures or the decision can knowledge on risky vessels. The level of be taken rapidly by other means. Detected control on each particular vessel should be risk is a valid reason for control, no decided according to this reference. The absolutely sure information on ongoing same procedure should be applied to crew violations being needed. and passenger lists The command with operative responsibility for a defined area should maintain reasonable risk levels against known or possibly prevailing irregularities. This should take place in all areas and on all flows of traffic. To this end, the performance of border control authorities' duties should be adjusted in accordance with fresh knowledge of risk factors. This basically concerns mediumterm planning in the operational command. Medium-term methods of evaluating the situation and adjusting countermeasures can be called operative risk analysis.

The operational command should have a realistic picture of prevailing irregularities in the area of responsibility. To that end, figures or estimates should be arrived at for the following:

• type and volume of all vessel movements

between the open sea and coast

• volume of actual control measures

directed at different types of vessel movement

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• (based on above) the level of risk of being

caught in an illegal border crossing

• volume and type of detected irregularities

• volume and type of estimated undetected

irregularities.

cooperation with third parties

Cooperation with all type of carriers should Formalise where possible cooperation with be strengthened carriers in Memoranda of Understanding or in

Agreements

1.9.2 Cargo ships

100% administrative control should be Participation in the EISICS system carried out in advance. Based on this control and available intelligence, a risk analysis should be made. Risk vessels to be checked physically, immediately upon arrival. Control to consist of face-to-face checks of persons on board and/or physical search of ship.

If information concerning the crew and passengers is not available in advance, the ship should be physically met immediately upon arrival.

Passengers shall always be controlled face to face.

In cases of special risk, vessel to remain under constant control of authorities during its stay in a Schengen port. All persons boarding and leaving the ship to be controlled

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 DG H face to face. Information on risk vessels to be relayed to the ship's next Schengen port of destination through the CIREFI early-warning system.

1.9.3 Cruise ships

In principle, the Schengen acquis requires a face-to-face check to be made for all passengers on board cruise ships at first and last port of entry. As a general rule, the passenger must meet all necessary entry or exit preconditions. However, the regulations concerning special circumstances will warrant a lower level of checks if:

• there are a great many passengers on

board,

• only limited time is available for checks,

and

• there are good grounds for believing the

vessel with its passengers to be low-risk

Under these preconditions, only administrative control in the first and last port of Schengen is acceptable. This requires, at the very least, that an SIS query is made on third-country nationals and their passports stamped.

If the check shows on board persons to be refused entry to Schengen territory, special measures are necessary and in the mutual interests of Contracting Parties and shipping companies. The authorities shall ensure that

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 DG H the person remains on board and leaves the port on the vessel. Information on such persons should be relayed to the next Schengen port of destination of the ship, where a similar procedure will apply.

If a cruise ship is a risk in terms of illegal crossing of the external border, special measures are necessary and in the mutual interests of Contracting Parties. Such a vessel shall remain under constant control by the authorities during its stay in a Schengen port. All persons boarding and leaving the ship shall be controlled face to face. In order to embark or disembark, each passenger must meet all necessary preconditions of entry or exit. Information on such persons should be relayed to the next Schengen port of destination of the ship, through the CIREFI early warning system. In the next port, a similar procedure will apply.

The lighter checks described above shall in no way prevent authorities from carrying out more thorough controls or checks anywhere in subsequent ports.

Cruise passengers shall hold a visa complying with the same rules as other persons when entering Schengen territory.

1.9.4 Fishing vessels

Monitoring shall be carried out to ensure that Exchange of information is arranged between

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 DG H fishing vessels coming from third countries Contracting Party and neighbouring third follow the correct procedure. states. The third state reports inter alia

vessels that are leaving its territory and, The Schengen acquis allows administrative especially, boats that have avoided exit checks on crewmembers, if they can be control when leaving Schengen territory. regarded as seamen. Nevertheless, recourse should be had to face-to-face checks and/or physical search of the vessel whenever deemed necessary by risk analysis.

In addition, coastal fisheries mentioned in

CM 3.4.4.4. should be checked occasionally in accordance with proper risk analysis.

1.9.5. Pleasure boats

Monitoring shall be carried out to ensure that Exchange of information is arranged between pleasure boats coming from third countries Contracting Party and neighbouring third follow the correct procedure. states. The third state reports inter alia boats

that are leaving its territory and, especially, boats that have avoided exit control when leaving Schengen territory.

1.9.6 Ships with a great many illegal immigrants on board

Emergency plans shall be set in place to A government body is nominated for interhandle ships with a great many illegal ministerial and inter-agency coordination. immigrants on board, covering the following This body possesses the necessary parallel aspects: representative sub-bodies at regional and

• Apprehend the persons responsible for local levels to facilitate coordination and

illegal transportation with a view to clear division of responsibilities. Adequate further judicial measures powers and resources are made available to

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• Apprehending all persons on board in this structure and especially to those regional

order to take responsibility over the bodies responsible for carrying out physical immigrants with a view to repatriation measures. and in order to guarantee their health and protection rights This structure is held in good readiness to

• Relaying information on risk vessels to facilitate achievement of recommended

other Member States by EISICS and the practice.

CIREFI early warning system Local and regional authorities maintain consistent plans for their participation and cooperation. These plans are regularly tested and developed as instructed by the government coordinating body.

1.9.7 Stowaways

In order to combat the phenomenon of stowaways, authorities should adopt preventive measures against unauthorised boarding/leaving of ships.

1.9.8 Fake crews

In order to combat fake crews as a means of illegal entry, authorities should carry out intelligence operations, exchanges of information, investigative measures and prosecution.

1.9.9 Seamen's identity document

When issuing seamen´s identity documents, The security features of the document are as

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 DG H close attention should be paid to the security for national passports. features of the document.

1.9.10 Transiting seamen

Under the acquis, the captain or the The captain or the shipowner's agent will shipowner's agent shall inform the authorities inform the border control authorities as soon in charge of border control of the arrival of as possible and always at least three days seamen in need of a transit visa and any other prior to the arrival of the seamen, in order to changes in crew composition. expedite procedures for issuing transit visas.

The border control authorities in charge of The authorities can issue transit visas to issuing transit visas to seamen shall check the seamen only after careful verification of the accuracy of the data provided by the captain data provided by the shipowner and or the shipowner´s agent. confirmation by the authorities of the place

where the ship is moored or is expected to moor .

A unit on duty 24 hours a day will be set up to give swift, coordinated answers to requests for transit visas for seamen made at the border.

1.9.11 EISICS

Vessels and their crew and passengers should All Contracting Parties should join the be thoroughly controlled in the first port of EISICS system, which should be arrival in the Schengen area. If the vessel's computerised, in order to ensure that next stop will also be in a port of a information is protected and sent on quickly Contracting State using the EISICS system, to the relevant control authority. then the control authority of the first

Contracting State should, when the vessel is

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 DG H leaving that state, fax the EISICS form to the next port. The EISICS form should list all the relevant information gathered by the control authority on the vessel. The border control in the next port can be less thorough, based on the information received in the

EISICS form.

Electronic data interchange

Member States should encourage the use of electronic data interchange (EDI) at their maritime borders. Electronic data, inter alia to identify crew members, passengers, stowaways – as well as their travel documents – on board a vessel, transferred in good time, should act as a binding substitute for all paper documents in use at the

Schengen border.

Use of EDI should be facilitated by harmonising and standardising legislation on binding force or consequences. Border authorities of the Schengen port where a vessel is leaving its berth should transfer the updated electronic data in good time to the authorities of the next Schengen port of destination.

1.10 Miscellaneous

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