Annexes to COM(2023)630 - Defence of Democracy - Main contents
Please note
This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2023)630 - Defence of Democracy. |
|---|---|
| document | COM(2023)630 |
| date | December 12, 2023 |
2. Countering disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference
Protecting Europe’s democracies from the threats and harmful effects of disinformation, information manipulation and interference, in particular from foreign actors, has been a priority of the EU in recent years82.
Such manipulative influence operations and disinformation campaigns seek to undermine democratic debate and exacerbate societal division. Such operations are often well-funded, state-sponsored and carried out by hostile actors and, as such, constitute a security threat to EU democracies83. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlighted and heightened the risk to the European information space, with the Kremlin increasingly engaging in disinformation campaigns and foreign interference operations and using them as a strategic and coordinated instrument to threaten security, democracy and support its war of aggression84. The conflict in the Middle East following the Hamas terrorist attacks in Israel has also triggered widespread disinformation and hate campaigns85. This is exacerbated by digitisation, including design features of online platforms that allow to disseminate disinformation with unprecedented speed and efficiency, as well as new tools powered by artificial intelligence able to be used by malicious actors.
When asked how often they believed they were exposed to disinformation, 35% of respondents in a recent Eurobarometer survey answered ‘often’ or ‘very often’, and 33% answered ‘sometimes’. The respondents perceived online social networks to be the primary medium via which they were most frequently targeted (64%), followed by television (36%), online newspapers and news magazines (22%) and video-sharing websites (21%)86.
Under the EDAP, the EU has stepped up efforts to improve its capacity to react to this new and evolving threat landscape – both domestically and internationally. Existing cooperation has been strengthened within the Commission, between the EU institutions and services and beyond, involving relevant stakeholders in civil society, academia and private industry, as well as international partners. The EU has stepped up its strategic communication response to disinformation through the Commission’s Network against Disinformation (NaD). The EEAS-managed Rapid Alert System (RAS) has continued to provide common situational awareness and share effective approaches to responding to the threat of FIMI 87 with Member States, EU institutions and international partners. Initiatives include detection, active pre- and debunking, and targeted campaigns addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as a comprehensive and constant reaction to Russian state-sponsored disinformation around its war of aggression against Ukraine88. The results have been shown in the ability to be effective in addressing challenges more rapidly and in a more coordinated manner. This has also made a broader contribution to democratic resilience.
International cooperation has been strengthened with support to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism89 and close cooperation with NATO has continued, with FIMI highlighted as one of the key security threats for EU-NATO cooperation90. The EU-US Trade and Technology Council and the EU-US Summit statement of October 2023 gave further impetus to close transatlantic cooperation on the threat, in particular to advance on the strategic cooperation and enhancing interoperability of approaches to tackle FIMI91. The EU has also made effective use of its diplomatic tools to counter FIMI and foreign interference, most notably through the adoption of restrictive measures imposed on individuals and media outlets involved in information manipulation and interference following the war of aggression against Ukraine. This has been complemented by the development of a reinforced EU Toolbox to counter foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI)92 which offers a common analytical framework and methodology to collect systematic evidence of FIMI incidents to help improve the understanding of tactics, techniques and procedures used to manipulate and interfere93. This complements the work of the EEAS StratCom Task Forces to raise awareness and build capacity, support EU Delegations and conduct outreach to civil society. The objective is to make it harder for FIMI actors like Russia and China to manipulate the EU’s and neighbouring information environments94.
A centrepiece of the Commission’s approach to fighting disinformation has been its work to ensure more accountability for online platforms. 52% of Europeans think that online platforms should do more to prevent the spread of false and misleading information95. The Digital Services Act obliges providers of very large online platforms and of very large online search engines to regularly assess the systemic risks their services may present to society, including to the freedom of expression, or the risk of their services being used as a tool for disinformation campaigns, not least in view of protecting electoral processes96. As a key way to mitigate such risks97, they are invited to participate in establishing voluntary codes of conduct and crisis protocols. An example is the ambitious new Code of Practice on Disinformation signed in June 2022 by a wide range of signatories98. Importantly, the Code also comes with a solid monitoring framework and a Transparency Centre to ensure transparency and accountability. In January and September 2023, the Code’s signatories, including online platforms, reported on progress, providing an unprecedented level of information on the way they implement their commitments to fight disinformation.
In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the Commission is carrying out a pre‑election dialogue and collaboration with online platforms and other signatories of the Code. In addition, the work within the Code is also focusing on addressing harmful potential of the new AI-powered tools that could be used in disinformation and foreign interference campaigns. Concluding the negotiations on the proposed AI Act is a priority in this context, as it would put in place the necessary guardrails and transparency on the use of AI99.
In order to empower citizens to make informed decisions, the Commission supports a broad range of innovative projects to fight disinformation under various EU programmes, in particular by civil society organisations and education and training institutions, or with the involvement of journalists, with a view to promoting media and digital literacy and helping citizens identify disinformation, both within the EU and beyond100. As part of the Digital Education Action Plan (2021-2027), the Commission published Guidelines for Teachers and educators on tackling disinformation and promoting digital literacy through education and training101. Likewise, both Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps have dedicated funding for grassroots projects promoting media literacy102.
In parallel, the EU has supported community-led initiatives to fight disinformation through reinforced fact-checking, such as the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO)103 and the development of the European Code of Standards for Independent Fact-Checking Organisations104. This has proven to be instrumental in fighting disinformation related to the war of aggression against Ukraine105. As part of its broader mission to fight disinformation, EDMO has set up a special European elections task force dedicated to detect early signs of potentially dangerous disinformation campaigns that might spread across the EU and coordinate dedicated media literacy activities. The task force 106 will also provide its expertise to European institutions in the framework of the preparation to the European elections.
In parallel, the High Representative is advancing work on further strengthening the ‘whole-of-society’ approach for information sharing in the form of an Information Sharing and Analysis Center on FIMI . This is an integral part of the FIMI Toolbox to enable a stronger common situational awareness and further develop the common methodology for collecting systematic evidence on FIMI and putting in place a trusted framework for exchanging information between the relevant stakeholders, also bringing the defender community together to systematically collect and share information on FIMI incidents. It also follows up on the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence’s call for a FIMI Data Space. The Commission will also continue to strengthen its own capacity to detect, monitor, analyse and tackle disinformation activities, carried out both at EU and national level. Under Horizon Europe, more than a third of the over EUR 300 million support for research on democracy was mobilised for funding research and innovation to better detect and understand foreign information manipulation and interference, and other undue influences on political decision-making107. In future, it would be important to maintain this level of ambition and capitalise on the lessons learned.
Civil society actors are at the forefront of the fight against disinformation and uncovering foreign interference, including through grassroots initiatives and the expert community working to analyse and counter FIMI and disinformation. A strong involvement of civil society is key for assessing quickly and efficiently the constantly evolving threat landscape, the actors and tools they use. The Commission will continue to support the work of the EDMO hubs’ independent community. Research and awareness-raising focused on disinformation and foreign interference inside the EU, notably using the data generated by Code of Practice on Disinformation and its transparency and access to data provisions. To support the work of fact-checking in the implementation of the Code of Practice and to ensure high professional standards and independence of fact-checkers, the Commission will also continue to fund training activities to back up the Code of Professional Integrity of the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN).
2. Inclusive civic engagement and participation for European democratic resilience
Strengthening the links between people and the democratic institutions that serve and represent them is the bedrock for democratic resilience. A strong, safe and enabling civic space and engaged, informed and empowered citizens are an essential guarantee for the resilience of our democracies, whether at election time or beyond108. In the recent Eurobarometer, almost nine in ten respondents (87%) saw civil society (associations, NGOs) as important in promoting and protecting democracy and common values, including in terms of fostering a well-informed and pluralistic democratic debate. The data also shows that more than half of respondents think there is a need to increase the engagement of civil society organisations in the decision-making process at the national level (56%) and the European level (54%). Around two-thirds of respondents are in favour of an increased engagement of citizens in the policy-making process at the national (68%) and European level (66%)109.
Empowering citizens and civil society organisations, and providing them with appropriate tools for civic engagement, are cross-cutting priorities across the different pillars of the EDAP, as well as in the Charter and the Rule of Law Reports. A wide range of funding opportunities has also been made available to boost citizen participation, civic engagement and trust in democracy, most notably under EU programmes such as the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme; Creative Europe; Erasmus+; and Horizon Europe. Technical assistance for administrative reform in the Member States under the Technical Support Instrument110 has also been deployed to build capacity in public administrations and public authorities for participatory practices. Incorporating citizen engagement into policy design and implementation had also been a priority under the partnership principle of EU cohesion policy111. The Conference on the Future of Europe provided valuable experience on how to strengthen citizen engagement in policy-making by implementing deliberative processes. It also contributed to boosting democratic resilience, leading to the implementation of a new phase of citizen engagement with European Citizens Panels now embedded in the European Commission’s policy-making process.
In parallel, increasing support and funding under EU programmes has also been dedicated to promoting media and digital literacy, equipping people of all ages with the tools to navigate today’s information and media environment, identify different types of media and how they work, and have a critical understanding of different types of media, including social networks, so that they are able to make informed decisions. As the possibilities to engage online are widening and becoming more commonplace, online hate speech can deter people from expressing their views and participating in online discussions. Fostering a respectful, enabling a safer environment in which to express their views is a priority. To this end the Commission has proposed an initiative to extend the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime112. This will complement the regulatory framework under the Digital Services Act, the Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law113 and the efforts under the Code of conduct on tackling illegal hate speech114.
New and meaningful methods of citizen participation, deliberation and engagement, across all generations, can reinforce representative democracies. These forms of participation offer complementary ways for citizens to actively participate in the democratic debate and contribute to policy-making, taking into account the Member State’s constitutional traditions and specificities. Experiences with participatory and deliberative democracy, whether at the local, national and pan-European levels, demonstrate that these practices can help to bridge existing gaps between citizens and decision-makers and bring together diverse groups of people to develop collective recommendations. Building on the Conference on the Future of Europe, new ways to ensure citizens are given this closer role in EU policy-making115 have been set up. These forms of engagement complement established practices of involving citizens in policy-making processes at EU level, such as public and stakeholder consultations, regular dialogues with stakeholders, or transparency and access to information and documents rules. To strengthen the participation of stakeholders in different stages of policy-making processes, the Commission has adopted Better Regulation Guidelines setting out the principles it follows when preparing new initiatives and proposals and when evaluating and monitoring the implementation of existing legislation116.
Education plays a major role in forging appetite for citizen engagement and participation and the attachment to democratic values. Promoting and protecting European democratic values is a central dimension of the European Strategy for Universities adopted in 2022, as higher education institutions contribute to promoting active citizenship, tolerance, equality and diversity, openness and critical thinking. Erasmus+ (2021-2027) promotes participation and civic engagement in Europe’s democratic life through multiple funding streams, in the EU Member States and beyond. The promotion of inclusive participatory democracy is one of the guiding principles of the EU Youth Strategy (2019-2027)117. The 2023 Citizenship Package recognises the importance of citizenship education, including awareness of EU citizens’ rights 118, and voter education for promoting political participation, as well as building resilience to disinformation among citizens.
Civil society organisations are one of the main pillars of a functioning democracy. They act as watchdogs for democratic foundations and institutions. They hold governments to account and help protect and promote fundamental rights and the rule of law by assisting individual people and communities and helping to promote their interests. They also empower individuals to take part in matters of public interest and overall help in growing meaningful public participation.
The Commission engages with civil society organisations in policy-making on many fronts. Consultation and dialogue enable civil society organisations and human rights defenders to present their views on EU legislation and policy. The ‘Have Your Say’ portal is the entry point for consultation119 and makes it possible for all interested parties to contribute to initiatives before and after adoption120. Civil society organisations are part of the partnership with regional and local authorities and economic and social partners, which allows them to be involved throughout the preparation, implementation, and evaluation of EU-funded Cohesion policy programmes.
The Commission has also established regular dialogues with civil society actors in different policy areas providing for more effective communication and involvement in policy-making. Structural civil society dialogue takes place through forums and platforms, covering a broad range of policy areas121. Representations of the Commission in the Member States are important local actors for citizen engagement. They have organised thousands of events, ranging from citizens’ dialogues to ad-hoc participatory events, notably during the Conference on the Future of Europe, where more than 6000 events were organised in the Member States gathering more than 700 000 participants in total. This can be expanded and complemented by other initiatives to connect to the local level122.
Protecting, supporting, and empowering civil society organisations and human rights defenders is at the core of the EU’s work on ensuring a thriving civic space as underlined in the 2022 Report on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights123. The report highlights the importance of ensuring that civil society organisations and human rights defenders work in an enabling, safe and supportive environment. The 2022 Rule of Law Report set out how the operation of civil society organisations without unjustified interference is based on EU case law124 and European standards,125 and the reports provide an overview of the steps taken in Member States to improve the situation for civil society organisations. Examples include simplifying registration procedures, setting up structures to assist civil society organisations, and revising rules on the operation and access to funding of civil society organisations. The 2022 and 2023 Rule of Law Report made specific recommendations to a number of Member States. In addition, in September 2023 the Commission put forward a proposal for a legislative initiative on cross-border activities of associations126, which will aim to remove barriers in the single market to enable associations to thrive in the single market, will complement action taken in the current package.
To further foster citizen participation and empower civil society organisations and human rights defenders to participate in policy-making and complement other actions taken at EU level, the Commission is putting forward a Recommendation on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making processes127. The Recommendation aims to promote the participation of citizens and civil society organisations in public policy-making and to help build democratic resilience in the Union. The Recommendation also aims to facilitate the promotion of civic engagement and the protection of democracies and respect for fundamental rights in Member States. It encourages Member States to ensure effective and inclusive participation of citizens and civil society organisations128 in policy-making processes, with a wide representation of the different groups and instances in society, thus reducing exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination, and to support capacity-building of citizens, civil society organisations and public administrations, in both traditional and emerging public spaces. The Recommendation also draws on the lessons of the Conference on the Future of Europe and the ongoing work of the Competence Centre on Participatory and Deliberative Democracy, in line with the established standards and good practices of co-creation and deliberative democracy129. Acknowledging the need to ensure a common level of protection and engagement of civil society organisations across the Union (and beyond), it encourages Member States to create and maintain an enabling environment for civil society organisations and human rights defenders, allowing them to effectively engage in such policy-making processes. The Recommendation also proposes a list of measures Member States should take to protect and support civil society organisations and human rights defenders to safeguard a thriving civic space.
Financial support is essential for a thriving civil society. The EU already provides ample funding opportunities for civil society organisations to build their capacity and to implement projects that help foster EU values. One fundamental requirement for EU funding is respect for EU values. Respect for EU values already features as part of the grant agreement every beneficiary of EU funding must sign and the Commission has worked on guidelines to set out more clearly the consequences breaches of EU values have for beneficiaries. The Commission is also rolling out pilot projects on reinforcing checks and verification procedures for budgetary programmes in relevant spending areas that entail higher risk of abuse and disrespect of EU values. Member States should put in place effective mechanisms to apply the same approach when managing EU funds. The Citizens Equality Rights and Values programme (CERV) is focused heavily on supporting civil society organisations to protect and promote EU values and rights. The Commission will continue to ensure a targeted allocation of funding to priorities under the EDAP and mobilise dedicated funding from a range of the available EU Programmes to support the goals of today’s package in terms of countering disinformation, as well as promoting election integrity and media pluralism. To make it easier to navigate through the different programmes, the Commission will further improve and promote the tool it has put in place on available funding with simple search functionalities so that relevant information about funds on democracy can be accessed easily and quickly130. The Commission and the EEAS will continue to pro-actively engage with citizens and civil society organisations on the ground via the Commission Representations in Member State capitals and EU Delegations around the world to increase awareness and improve information sharing on the available opportunities under the various EU programmes. Figure 5 provides a brief overview of possibilities offered under EU Programmes, and other possibilities are available under EU structural funds and the Technical Support Instrument (for example to fund civil society and build capacity and institutional/administrative infrastructure for deliberative civic engagement and political participation).
4 CONCLUSION
In July 2019, President von der Leyen called for a new push for European democracy, with a greater say for Europeans and a greater effort from the EU to nurture, protect and strengthen our democracy. This translated in the December 2020 European Democracy Action Plan, which made a major contribution to fight against disinformation and information manipulation and to protect fair elections and media freedom and pluralism.
Since the beginning of this Commission’s mandate, the EU has had to face a succession of major geopolitical, economic, climate and health crises. The way the EU has managed to respond to these crises has shown that it can rely on its strong liberal democracy, trust in its institutions, and respect for our common principles and values. However, these crises have also shown the threat of foreign interference and the risks from a highly volatile international context: some actors have devoted huge resources to the goal of undermining democracy and trust in our institutions.
This Defence of Democracy package aims to reinforce this action ahead of the elections to the European Parliament. This package answers these challenges, in full respect of our fundamental rights and values, also building on the lessons learned from the Conference on the Future of Europe. The Commission looks forward to the full engagement of the European Parliament and the Council to make decisive progress on all legislative proposals in the democracy area before the European parliamentary elections; and for the wide circle of national actors involved, public and private, to ensure the implementation of the European Democracy Action Plan and of this new Defence of Democracy package.
1 Article 2 TEU.
2 Article 8 TEU, Article 21 TEU.
3 Civil society organisations are frequently referred to as non-State, not-for-profit, non-partisan and non-violent structure, through which people organise to pursue shared objectives and ideals. Operating from the local to the national, regional and international levels, they can comprise urban and rural, formal and informal organisations.
4Key trends identified are attempts to undermine trust in or attachment to democratic institutions and representative democracy, attempts to remove democratic checks and balances, destabilisation of electoral campaigns, pressure on free media and the civic space, and the illegal use of spyware against democratic actors.
5 COM(2023) 772 final.
6 On 1 June 2023 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, including disinformation (2022/2075(INI).
7 See: Commission response to European Parliament resolution on foreign interference in all democratic processes in the EU, including disinformation.
8 Flash Eurobarometer 528 (2023) on “Citizenship and Democracy”.
9 COM(2020) 790.
10 COM(2022) 404.
11 COM(2021) 775 final. The aim of this legal instrument is to deter third countries from restricting or threatening to restrict trade or investment to bring about a change of policy in the EU in areas such as climate change, taxation or food safety.
12 Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union.
13 The Cybersecurity Strategy | Shaping Europe’s digital future (europa.eu).
14An EU approach to enhance economic security (europa.eu).
15 JOIN/2016/018 final; JOIN/2018/16 final; 2020 EU Security Union Strategy. Council conclusions on a Framework for a coordinated EU response to hybrid campaigns” (June 2022)
16 See for example the media-related restrictions in Regulation (EU) 2022/350 of 1 March 2022 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine.
17 The Conference on the Future of Europe was itself a bold statement on deliberative democracy by the European institutions: a broad and deep grass-roots consultation with citizens, including the highly innovative randomly selected European Citizens’ Panels and the Conference Plenary, which reaffirmed citizens’ desire for an active European civic space which can bring value-added to our representative democracy and which amplifies the role available to civil society to play an active part in our democracy. See also the Commission’s follow-up communication: COM(2022) 404 final.
18 Communication on the fight against corruption, JOIN (2023) 12 final, with accompanying proposals COM (2023) 234, HR(2023)108 and JOIN(2023)13.
19 Communication on a Proposal for an interinstitutional ethics body COM(2023) 311 final.
20 Communication to the European Parliament and the Council No place for hate: Europe united against hatred, COM(2023)772 final.
21The Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, the EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025, the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation for 2020-2030, the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy, the Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030.
22 A thriving civic space for upholding fundamental rights in the EU, COM(2022) 716 final.
23 See European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles.
24 EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy (2020-2024).
25 In Flash Eurobarometer 522 (2023) on “Democracy”, 43% of Europeans referred to propaganda and/or false or misleading information from a non-democratic foreign source and covert foreign interference in the policy and economy of their country as amongst the most serious threats to democracy.
26 Estimating the amounts effectively spent by third countries in Member States and across the EU with the purpose of interfering with democratic processes is difficult due to the nature of those activities, which are by definition covert. A clearer overview on amounts spent by third countries on interest representation in the EU should be available once this Directive is implemented.
27 Flash Eurobarometer 528 (2023) on “Citizenship and Democracy”.
28COM (2023) 800 final.
29OECD (2021) Lobbying in the 21st Century which shows that ‘the increasing complexity of domestic policy-making processes and negotiations at the international level is blurring the lines between lobbying and diplomacy.
30 Some Member States are looking into introducing national rules of various types. See SWD(2023) 661.
31 The proposed directive would cover all interest representation activities on behalf of third countries, irrespective of the entity involved. Inclusion in the register should therefore not result in any negative labelling or questions of the credibility or legitimacy of the entity concerned, thereby significantly reducing the risk of stigmatisation.
32 COM(2023) 637.
33 While the provision of media services would not fall within the scope of application of the proposed Directive, interest representation activities carried out on behalf of third country entities by media service providers would be covered.
34 This is without prejudice to restrictive measures imposed under an EU sanctions regime.
35 Established under Regulation (EU) No 2018/1724.
36 To further limit administrative burden, administrative cooperation and exchanges of information between the national authorities, as well as the supervisory authorities and the Commission, should take place through the Internal Market Information (IMI) system established under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012for administrative cooperation between EU countries’ competent authorities in Single Market related policy areas. A targeted revision of this Regulation is also part of this package.
37 Registered entities may request that all or part of the information provided is not made publicly available where there are overriding interests that justify withholding publication, including fundamental right considerations, where for instance, the publication of such information would endanger the entity or its employees or partner associations.
38 Judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations), C-78/18, EU:C:2020:476.
39 Venice Commission Report on Funding of Associations CDL-AD(2019)002.
40For example, Member States would be prevented from requiring the entities fall within the scope of the initiative to register ‘as an organisation in receipt of support from abroad’ or indicate on their internet site and in their publications and other press material the information that they are organisations in receipt of support from abroad.
41 Broadening the scope of this proposal to all interest representation on behalf of any entity would affect an estimate of 3.5 million entities.
42 The Commission addressed recommendations in this area to a number of Member States in its annual Rule of Law reports in 2022 and 2023.
43 Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on a mandatory transparency register.
44 Transparency Register (europa.eu).
45 The Transparency Register is a general lobby register that covers interest representation activities directed at the EU institutions. It makes no differentiation for interest representation on behalf of third countries. The register does not apply to lobbying activities directed at public authorities of Member States. Its legal architecture is also different: contrary to the mandatory national registers envisaged by the proposal, the Transparency Register is generally voluntary, even though the EU institutions do require prior registration for certain types of activities.
46 This would include law firms, professional consultancies or standalone lobbyists hired by third country governments or public authorities to lobby the Union institutions, as well as any entities such as foreign agencies, investment funds and public-private structures without diplomatic status. Those actors would be expected to register and provide information in relation to their activities and, in the case of intermediaries, declare on the register their clients, and provide an indication of the annual amounts generated by the activities.
47 See section 3.1 below.
48 Staff Working Document on “Tackling R&I Foreign Interference” (SWD(2022)12).
49 Notably the Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying developed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 2009) and Council of Europe Recommendation on the legal regulation of lobbying activities in the context of public decision-making (CM/Rec(2017)2, 22 March 2017).
50 COM(2023) 667 final, Enhancing the European Administrative Space (ComPAct)
51Technical Support Instrument / Reform Support (europa.eu).
52 In June 2022, the European Court of Human Rights issued a judgement in the case Ecodefence and Others v Russia, in which the Court said the law violated the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights. The Venice Commission has also issued related opinions: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/?id=3271. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council have also on several occasions expressed similar concerns over the legislation, calling on Russia to stop the harassment, criminalisation and imprisonment of human rights defenders, the forced dissolution of human rights organisations, and lift the severe restrictions on the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association. The EU and its Delegations has also strongly condemned this law, see: EU-27 Declaration on the 10th anniversary of the Law on Foreign Agents, July 2022.
53 See Fifth Progress Report on the implementation of the EU Security Union Strategy (COM(2022) 745, 13.12.2022).
54 This also includes foreign information manipulation and interference.
55 See also Annex for a detailed overview and more information.
56 C(2023) 8626.
57 The Recommendation takes into account specific groups including persons with disabilities, younger voters and mobile citizens and those susceptible to marginalisation. In addition, as announced in the Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030 (COM(2021) 101, 3.3.2021), the Commission has prepared a Guide of good electoral practice addressing the participation of citizens with disabilities.
58 Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union.
59 Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities.
60 A first EU tabletop exercise was organised in April 2019 to test how effective Member States and the EU’s response practices and crisis plans were and to identify ways to prevent, detect and mitigate cybersecurity incidents that may affect the European elections.
61 Deep fakes are understood to be images, audio or video content generated or manipulated by artificial intelligence systems that appreciably resemble existing persons, places or events and would falsely appear to a person to be authentic. The AI Act proposal - COM(2021)206 - would ensure the labelling of AI content and the disclosure of its origin.
62 In a Eurobarometer survey in which respondents were asked to rate the most important aspects of free and fair electoral campaigns, the strongest responses concerned (i) debates and campaigns avoiding hate speech, manipulation and lies; (ii) the need for candidates and political parties to have equal opportunity to access the media and (iii) voters knowing who finances candidates and political parties. See Flash Eurobarometer 522 (2023) on “Democracy” and, respectively, Flash Eurobarometer 528 (2023) on “Citizenship and Democracy”
63 COM(2022) 457 final.
64 P9_TA(2023)0244 Investigation of the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (Recommendation).
65 See: Commission response to the European Parliament Recommendation following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware.
66 EUR-Lex – 32022R2065 – EN – EUR-Lex (europa.eu).
67 COM(2021) 731 final. A provisional agreement between the European Parliament and the Council was reached on 6 November 2023. Formal adoption is expected for early 2024. While the full set of rules will apply 18 months after entry into force, provisions such as the non-discrimination clause and the definitions will apply immediately, ahead of the European elections.
68 COM(2021) 734 final.
69 Compendium on e-Voting and other ICT Practices.
70 In the EU’s revised enlargement methodology, progress made on reforms related to upholding fundamental values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law are key for determining the overall pace of the accession process.
71 The EU has funded electoral assistance projects of over EUR 380 million over the last ten years. These country actions are supported by global democracy programmes, including the Team Europe Democracy Initiative (TED), launched in December 2021, which coordinates action by the EU and Member States. The programme for Women and Youth in Democracy Initiative supports civic and political participation around the world, notably in areas like election observations and democratic reforms.
72 The EU participation in the Summits for Democracy in 2021 and 2023 provided the occasion to reinforce alliances for democracy and to showcase the work done by the EU to support democracy globally. For more information see Annex.
73 Examples include a project to support electoral reform in the Western Balkans, running until mid-2024 (budget of EUR 1.715 million), implemented by ODIHR.
74 C(2021) 6650, 16 September 2021.
75 COM/2022/177 final and C/2022/2428 of 27 April 2022. On 30 November, the European Parliament and the Council reached a provisional political agreement on the anti-SLAPP directive. The Commission is working closely with Member States to support them in implementing the anti-SLAPP Recommendation.
76 See COM(2023) 800 final.
77 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/1634 of 16 September 2022 on internal safeguards for editorial independence and ownership transparency in the media sector (C/2022/6536). See also the Communication on European Media Industry Outlook COM(2020) 784 final.
78 COM(2020) 784 final.
79 See Annex for more details and examples of financing.
80Under the Global Europe Human Rights and Democracy programme 2021-2027, an estimated EUR 185 million are earmarked for support to independent media and harnessing digitalisation worldwide. The new Financial Framework Partnership Agreement on Protecting Independent Media was launched in October 2023 to provide sustainable support to NGOs that work to protect independent journalistm and fight disinformation across the world.. In the context of enlargement, numerous regional programmes support media freedom and pluralism, such as the Western Balkan media programme with a budget EUR 40.5 million. See annex for further information.
81 The Commission launched this year a call for proposals for a pilot project supporting exiled independent media and journalists from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia that have relocated and are working from the Member States so that they can continue producing content and distributing it to their audiences without editorial interference.
82 As well as the EDAP itself, see the work of the European Parliament Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes; and Council conclusions on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (18 July 2022); Complementary efforts to enhance resilience and counter hybrid threats (10 December 2019); and strengthening resilience and countering hybrid threats, including disinformation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (15 December 2020).
83 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/countering-disinformation/tackling-disinformation-information-work-eeas-strategic-communication_en?s=2803
84 Allegations that EU sanctions are the reason for food shortages and attempts to abuse the UN Security Council to engage in information manipulation are only two examples that illustrate how such activity can target the international community and international cooperation.
85The Commission is currently negotiating a new a new Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, with a view to establish it as a code of conduct under the DSA in early 2024. It should help improve prevention and anticipate a rising threat of hate speech before content has gone viral.
86 Flash Eurobarometer 522 (2023) on “Democracy”.
87 For an overview of the Rapid Alert System, see: Rapid Alert System | EEAS (europa.eu). For an overview on the Network against Disinformation, please consult: DG COMM Management Plan 2022 .
88 This includes social media communication and campaigns to de-bunk Russian disinformation on sanctions, food and energy security with a total of more than 10 million impressions in 2022. In the Member States, Commission Representations have been tailoring responses to local contexts with flagship initiatives like the “Decodeurs d’Europe” initiative in France. The Representation in Sofia launched an anti-disinformation network and led a successful de-bunking campaign in collaboration with Bulgarian fact checkers, while in Vilnius the Representation teamed up with independent journalists to produce inspiring videos about Ukrainian refugees successfully integrating into Lithuanian society. See also: EUvsDisinfo.
89 http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2022elmau/2022-05-06-rrm-data.pdf.
90 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/01/10/eu-nato-joint-declaration-10-january-2023.
91 US-EU-statement-final.pdf (europa.eu)
92 Set out in EDAP, this was based on the tasking in the Strategic Compass, see: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-security-and-defence-1_en.
93 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/1st-eeas-report-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-threats_en.
94 The EEAS also provides insights into how FIMI targets specific groups, and underlines the harmful impact of such manipulation to society: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/fimi-targeting-lgbtiq-people_en.
95 Flash Eurobarometer 522 (2023) on “Democracy”.
96 The Commission reinforced efforts to tackle harmful and illegal content online, specifically in the context of unprecedented period of conflict and instability. See Commission Recommendation of 20.10.2023 on coordinating responses to incidents in particular arising from the dissemination of illegal content, ahead of the full entry into application of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (the ‘Digital Services Act’).
97 Under the DSA, services need to adopt all necessary mitigation measures and are subject to public scrutiny and independent audits.
98 This followed Commission Guidance on Strengthening the Code of Practice on Disinformation of 26 May 2021 (COM(2021) 262 final): https://disinfocode.eu/. To date there are over 40 signatories.
99 In this context, the Commission is planning to launch an Artificial Intelligence (AI) Pact seeking the voluntary commitment of industry to anticipate the AI Act and start implementing its requirements ahead of the legal deadline, see: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/ai-pact.
100 See Annex for details.
101 COM/2020/624 final.
102 See also section 3.4 and more details and examples under Annex.
103 https://edmo.eu/.
104 https://eufactcheckingproject.com/ by the European Fact-Checking Standards Network (EFCSN).
105 EDMO established a dedicated Task Force, fostering collaboration among practitioners and leading to the identification of more than 2 000 disinformation instances related to the Ukraine war through fact-checks and the publication of reports and investigations on emerging and trending narratives.
106 EDMO Task Force on 2024 European Elections.
107 Horizon Europe call “Standing up for democracy” (2023), includes EUR18 M to finance up to 6 projects to address research gaps concerning FIMI. Overall, between 2021 and 2024 Horizon Europe has mobilised over EUR 100 M for research on foreign interference or very related issues like undue influence on political decision making, disinformation, digital literacy.
108 A recent working paper highlights that civic engagement at local levels can contribute not only to economic and social development but also to good functioning of democracy by increasing people’s trust in public institutions. See REGIO working paper, “The geography of EU discontent and the regional development trap in Europe.” Horizon Europe has also continued to support research to develop a better understanding of people’s dissatisfaction with democracy and how it can be addressed through democratic innovation, including civic engagement and deliberative democracy initiatives.
109 Flash Eurobarometer 528 (2023) on “Citizenship and Democracy”.
110 The total allocations under this instrument amounts to EUR 864 m for the period 2021-2027.
111 The partnership principle makes cohesion policy close and recognisable to EU citizens. Engagement of partners is essential for ensuring transparency and democratic accountability of public investments. The Commission and the OECD ran a pilot project to explore how to apply innovative citizen participation methods to cohesion policy, focusing on five authorities across Europe. Follow-up projects were launched in July 2022 in six Member States. See Annex for further examples of actions.
112 COM(2021) 777 final.
113 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law.
114 Code of conduct on tackling illegal hate speech online.
115 COM(2022) 404.
116 Better Regulation Guidelines.
117 See Annex for more details.
118A “Guide to EU citizenship” presented by the Commission with the Citizenship Package on 6 December 2023, is a useful tool in this context intended to further advance awareness of EU citizenship.
119 Have your say (europa.eu)
120 By providing general feedback or sharing views or knowledge during an Open Public Consultation or Call for Evidence via the ‘Have your Say’ portal. This can be complemented by targeted consultations. There are also opportunities to place formal complaints before the Commission if a breach of EU law is suspected, while the European Ombudsman can investigate complaints from individuals and organisations about maladministration by the institutions, bodies and agencies of the EU.
121 Some such examples include the Permanent Anti-racism Civil Society Forum, the Disability Platform, and the European Migration Forum. The Victims’ Rights Platform launched in 2020 was put in place to facilitate dialogue and the exchange of best practices and information among its members, two thirds of which are civil society. See COM(2022) 716 final, p. 31.
122 One example is the Building Europe with Local Councillors initiative. https://building-europe-with-local-councillors.europa.eu/index_en.
123 COM(2022) 716 final.
124 Judgment of 18 June 2020, Commission v Hungary, C-78/18.
125 See in particular Recommendation Rec(2007)14 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the legal status of non-governmental organisations in Europe.
126 Single market – Proposal for a legislative initiative on cross-border activities of associations (europa.eu) COM(2023) 516 final.
127 C(2023) 8627.
128 Generally understood as non-State, not-for-profit, non-partisan and non-violent structures, through which people organise to pursue shared objectives and ideals. Operating from the local to the national, regional and international levels, they comprise urban and rural, formal and informal organisations, in line with established EU definitions. This also includes ‘human rights defenders’.
129 The Commission is also drawing up internal guidelines establishing principles and providing a toolbox for participatory and deliberative formats and practices. This will include a Charter of Principles for successful citizen engagement. See also: Competence Centre on Participatory and Deliberative Democracy.
130 Funding & tenders (europa.eu).
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