Annexes to COM(2020)605 - EU Security Union Strategy - Main contents

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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.

dossier	COM(2020)605 - EU Security Union Strategy.
document	COM(2020)605
date	July 24, 2020

agreement between the EU and the United States on cross-border access to e-evidence.

Stored in databases maintained by 2.500 registry and registrar operators based all around the world.

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assessing possible solutions, including whether legislation may be necessary to clarify rules for accessing such information.

Law enforcement and judicial authorities also need to be equipped to obtain the necessary data and evidence once the 5G architecture for mobile telecommunications is fully deployed in the EU, in a way which respects the confidentiality of communications. The Commission will support an enhanced and coordinated approach when building international standards, defining best practices, process, and technical interoperability in key technological areas such as AI, internet of things or blockchain technologies.

Today, a substantial part of investigations against all forms of crime and terrorism involve encrypted information. Encryption is essential to the digital world, securing digital systems and transactions and also protecting a series of fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, privacy and data protection. However, if used for criminal purposes, it may also mask the identity of criminals and hide the content of their communications. The Commission will explore and support balanced technical, operational and legal solutions to the challenges and promote an approach which both maintains the effectiveness of encryption in protecting privacy and security of communications, while providing an effective response to crime and terrorism.

Countering illegal content online

Bringing the security of the online and physical environments in line means continued steps in countering illegal content online. More and more, core threats to citizens such as terrorism, extremism or child sexual abuse rely on the digital environment: this calls for concrete action and a framework to ensure respect for fundamental rights. An essential first step is swiftly concluding the negotiations on the proposed legislation on terrorist content online⁶⁷ and ensuring its implementation. Strengthening voluntary cooperation between law enforcement and the private sector in the EU Internet Forum is also key to fight the misuse of the internet by terrorists, violent extremists and criminals. The EU Internet Referral Unit in Europol will continue to play a crucial role in monitoring the activity of terrorist groups online and the action taken by platforms,⁶⁸ as well as in further developing the EU Crisis Protocol⁶⁹. In addition, the Commission will continue to engage with international partners including by participating in the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism to tackle these challenges at global level. Work will continue to support the development of alternative and counter narratives through the Civil Society Empowerment Programme.⁷⁰

To prevent and counter the spread of illegal hate speech online, the Commission launched in 2016 the Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, with a voluntary commitment by online platforms to remove hate speech content. The latest evaluation shows that companies assess 90% of flagged content within 24 hours and remove 71% of the content deemed to be illegal hate speech. However, the platforms need to improve further transparency and feedback to users and to ensure consistent evaluation of flagged content⁷¹.

The EU Internet Forum will also facilitate exchanges on existing and developing technology to address the challenges related to child sexual abuse online. Tackling child sexual abuse online is at the heart of a new Strategy to step up the fight against child sexual abuse⁷²,

⁶⁷ Proposal on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online, COM(2018) 640, 12 September 2018.

⁶⁸ Europol, November 2019.

⁶⁹ A Europe that protects - EU Crisis Protocol: responding to terrorist content online. (October 2019).

⁷⁰ Linked to the work of the Radicalisation Awareness Programme, see section IV.3 below.

⁷¹ https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/codeofconduct_2020_factsheet_12.pdf

⁷² EU Strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse, COM(2020) 607.

which will seek to maximise the use of tools available at EU level to fight against these crimes. Companies must be able to continue their work to detect and remove child sexual abuse material online, and the damage caused by this material calls for a framework setting out clear and permanent obligations to tackle the problem. The Strategy will also announce that the Commission will also start preparing sector-specific legislation to tackle child sexual abuse online more effectively, in full respect of fundamental rights.

More generally, the forthcoming Digital Services Act will also clarify and upgrade the liability and safety rules for digital services and remove disincentives holding back actions to address illegal content, goods or services.

In addition, the Commission will continue to engage with international partners and with the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, including through the independent advisory committee, to discuss how to tackle these challenges at global level while preserving EU values and fundamental rights. New topics should also be addressed such as algorithms or online gaming.⁷³

Hybrid threats

The scale and diversity of hybrid threats today is unprecedented. The COVID-19 crisis saw more proof of this, with several state and non-state actors seeking to instrumentalise the pandemic – in particular through manipulation of the information environment and challenging core infrastructures. This risks weakening social cohesion and undermining trust in EU institutions and Member States’ governments.

The EU approach to hybrid threats is set out in the 2016 Joint Framework⁷⁴ and the 2018 Joint Communication on bolstering hybrid resilience.⁷⁵ Action at EU level is underpinned by a sizeable toolbox covering the internal-external nexus, based on a whole-of-society approach and on close cooperation with strategic partners, notably NATO and G7. A report on the implementation of the EU approach on hybrid threats is published together with this Strategy.⁷⁶ Based on the mapping⁷⁷ presented in parallel to this Strategy, the Commission services and the European External Action Service will create a restricted online platform for Member States’ reference on counter-hybrid tools and measures at EU level.

Whereas responsibility for countering hybrid threats lies primarily with Member States – due to the intrinsic links with national security and defence policies – some vulnerabilities are common to all Member States and some threats extend across borders, such as targeting cross-border networks or infrastructure. The Commission and the High Representative will set out an EU approach to hybrid threats that integrates the external and internal dimension in a seamless flow and brings the national and EU-wide considerations together. This must cover the full spectrum of action – from early detection, analysis, awareness, building resilience and prevention through to crisis response and consequence management.

In addition to reinforced implementation, with hybrid threats in constant evolution, a particular focus will be to mainstream hybrid considerations into policy making, to keep up to speed with dynamic developments and to ensure that no potentially relevant initiative

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Terrorists are increasingly using the messaging system of gaming platforms for exchanges and young

terrorists also re-play violent attacks in video games.

Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – a European Union response, JOIN (2016) 18.

Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats, JOIN (2018) 16.

SWD(2020) 153 Report on the implementation of the 2016 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats

and the 2018 Joint Communication on increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid

threats

SWD(2020) 152 Mapping of the measures related to enhancing resilience and countering hybrid threats.

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is overlooked. The effects of new initiatives will also be assessed through hybrid lenses, including initiatives in areas that have so far been outside the remit of the counter hybrid framework such as education, technology and research. This approach would benefit from the work done on the conceptualisation of hybrid threats, which provides a comprehensive view of the various tools that adversaries may use. The aim should be to ensure that the

decisi on-makin g process is underpinned by regular, comprehensive inte ll ig e nce - base d

reporting on the evolution of hybrid threats. This will rely heavily on Member States’ intelligence and on further enhancing intelligence cooperation with Member States’

competent services through EU I NTCEN.

To develop situational awareness, the Commission services and the European External Action Service will explore options to streamline information flows from different sources, including Member States, as well as EU agencies such as ENISA, Europol and Frontex. The EU Hybrid Fusion Cell will remain the EU focal point for hybrid threat assessments. Building resilience is central to preventing and protecting against hybrid threats. It is therefore crucial to systematically track and objectively measure progress in this area. A first step will be to identify sectoral hybrid resilience baselines for both Member States and EU institutions and bodies. Finally, to step up hybrid crisis response preparedness, the existing protocol should be reviewed, as defined in the 2016 EU Playbook , reflecting a broader review and strengthening of the EU crisis response system currently under consideration. The aim is to maximise the effect of EU action by swiftly bringing together

sectoral responses and ensuring seamless cooperation with our partners, NA TO in the first place.

Key a ctions

• Ensuring that the cybercrime legislation is implemented and fit for purpose

• A Strategy for a more effective fight against child sexual abuse

• Proposals on the detection and removal of child sexual abuse material

• An EU approach on Cou nter ing H y b rid Thre ats

• Review of the EU operational protocol for countering hybrid threats (EU Playbook)

• Assessment of how to enhance law enforcement capacity in digital investigations

3. Protecting Europeans from

terrorism and organised crime

Terrorism and radicalisation

The terrorist threat in the EU remains high. Despite the decrease in the number of attacks overall, these can still have a devastating effect. Radicalisation can also more broadly polarise and destabilise social cohesion. Member States retain the primary responsibility in the fight against terrorism and radicalisation. However, the ever-increasing crossborder/cross sectorial dimension of the threat calls for further steps in EU cooperation and coordination. Effective implementation of EU counter-terrorism legislation, including

The Landscape of Hybrid Threats: A conceptual Model, JRC117280, jointly developed by the Joint

Research Centre and the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.

EU operational protocol for countering hybrid threats (EU Playbook), SWD(2016) 227.

Following their video conference on 26 March 2020, the Members of the European Council adopted a

Statement on EU actions in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, inviting the Commission to make

proposals a more ambitious and wide-ranging crisis management system within the EU.

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restrictive measures⁸¹, is a priority. It remains an objective to extend the mandate of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to cross-border terrorist crimes.

Fighting terrorism starts with addressing the root causes. The polarisation of society, real or perceived discrimination and other psychological and sociological factors can reinforce people’s vulnerability to radical discourse. In this context, tackling radicalisation goes hand in hand with fostering social cohesion at local, national and European level. Several impactful initiatives and policies have been developed in the last decade, in particular through the Radicalisation Awareness Network and the EU Cities against Radicalisation Initiative.⁸² It is time now to consider actions to streamline EU policies, initiatives and funds to tackle radicalisation. Such actions can support the development of capabilities and skills, enhance cooperation, strengthen the evidence base and help evaluate progress, involving all relevant stakeholders, including first line practitioners, policy makers and academia.⁸³ Soft policies such as education, culture, youth and sports could contribute to the prevention of radicalisation, providing opportunities for at-risk youth and cohesion inside of the EU.⁸⁴ Priority areas include work on early detection and risk management, resilience building and disengagement, as well as rehabilitation and reintegration in society.

Terrorists have sought to acquire and to “weaponise” chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)⁸⁵ materials, as well as to develop the knowledge and capacity to use them.⁸⁶ The potential of CBRN attacks features prominently in terrorist propaganda. With the potential damage so high, particular attention is needed. Building on the approach used to regulate access to explosive precursors, the Commission will look into restricting access to certain dangerous chemicals that could be used to carry out attacks. The development of EU civil protection response (rescEU) capacities in the field in CBRN will also be key. Cooperation with third countries is also important to enhance a common culture of CBRN safety and security, making full use of the EU global CBRN Centres of Excellence. This cooperation will include national gap and risk assessments, support to national and regional CBRN action plans, exchanges of good practices and CBRN capacity building activities.

The EU has developed the most advanced legislation in the world to restrict access to explosives precursors⁸⁷ and detect suspicious transactions aiming to build improvised explosive devices. But the threat from home-made explosives remains high, used in multiple attacks throughout the EU.⁸⁸ The first step must be implementation of the rules, as well as ensuring that the online environment does not allow the by-passing of controls.

The effective prosecution of those who have committed terrorist crimes, including Foreign Terrorist Fighters currently in Syria and Iraq, is also an important element of counterterrorism policy. While these issues are primarily dealt with by Member States, EU

The Council adopted restrictive measures with respect to ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida, as well as specific

restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism. See

the EU Sanctions Map (https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main) for an overview of all restrictive measures.

The pilot initiative “EU Cities against Radicalisation” has the double objective to foster the exchange of

expertise among EU cities and to gather feedback on how to best support local communities at EU level.

For example funding under the European Security Fund and the Citizenship programme.

EU actions such as the Erasmus+ Virtual Exchanges, e-twinning.

In the past two years there have been for instance several cases both in Europe (France, Germany, Italy)

and elsewhere (Tunisia, Indonesia) involving biological agents (usually plant-based toxins).

The Council adopted restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

Chemicals that could be misused to manufacture homemade explosives. These are regulated in Regulation

(EU) 2019/1148 2019 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors.

Some examples of such devastating attacks include attacks in Oslo (2011), Paris (2015), Brussels (2016),

and Manchester (2017). An attack with a homemade explosive in Lyon (2019) wounded 13 people.

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coordination and support can help Member States to address common challenges. The steps under way to fully implement border security legislation⁸⁹ and make full use of all relevant EU databases to share information on known suspects will be an important step. As well as identifying high-risk individuals, a reintegration and rehabilitation policy is needed. Crossprofessional cooperation, including with prison and probation staff, will reinforce the judicial understanding of the processes of radicalisation to violent extremism and the judicial sector’s approach to sentencing and alternatives to detention.

The challenge of foreign terrorist fighters is emblematic of the link between internal and external security. Cooperation on counterterrorism and preventing and countering radicalisation and violent extremism is central to security inside the EU.⁹⁰ Further steps to develop counterterrorism partnerships and cooperation with countries in the neighbourhood and beyond is needed, drawing on the expertise of the Network of EU Counter-Terrorism/Security Experts. The Joint Action Plan on Counter-terrorism for the Western Balkans is a good reference for such targeted cooperation. In particular, efforts should be made to support partner countries’ capacity to identify and locate foreign terrorist fighters. The EU will also continue to promote multilateral cooperation, working with the leading global actors in this field, such as the United Nations, NATO, the Council of Europe, Interpol and the OSCE. It will also engage with the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the Global Coalition against Da’esh, as well as relevant civil society actors. The Union’s external policy instruments, including development and cooperation, play also an important role when working with third countries to prevent terrorism and piracy. International cooperation is also essential to cut off all sources of terrorism financing, for example through the Financial Action Task Force.

Organised crime

Organised crime comes at a huge economic and personal cost. The economic loss due to organised crime and corruption has been estimated to represent between €218 and €282 billion annually.⁹¹ More than 5,000 organised crime groups were under investigation in Europe in 2017 – a 50% rise compared to 2013.⁹² Organised crime is increasingly operating cross-border including from the immediate neighbourhood of the EU, calling for intensified operational cooperation and information exchange with partners in the neighbourhood.

New challenges are emerging and taking crime online: the COVID-19 pandemic saw a huge rise in online scams on vulnerable groups, as well as health and sanitary products being targeted in thefts and burglaries.⁹³ The EU needs to step up its work against organised crime, including at international level, with more tools to dismantle organised crime’s business model. Fighting organised crime also requires close cooperation with local and regional administrations as well as civil society, who are key partners in crime prevention as well as in providing assistance and support to victims, with a particular need amongst administrations in border regions. This work will be brought together in an Agenda for tackling organised crime.

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Including the new mandate of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex).

Council conclusions of 16 June 2020 underlined the need to protect EU citizens against terrorism and

violent extremism, in all their forms and irrespective of their origin, and to further strengthen the EU’s

external counter-terrorism engagement and action in certain priority geographic and thematic areas.

In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); Europol report: “Does crime still pay?” – Criminal asset

recovery in the EU, 2016.

Europol, Serious and Organised Threat Assessments (SOCTA), 2013 and 2017.

Europol, 2020.

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More than one third of the organised crime groups active in the EU are involved in the production, trafficking or distribution of drugs. Drugs addiction led to over eight thousand overdose deaths in the EU in 2019. The bulk of drug trafficking operates across borders with many of the profits infiltrating the legal economy.⁹⁴ A new EU Agenda on Drugs⁹⁵ will strengthen the efforts of the EU and Member States in the areas of drug demand and supply reduction, defining joint actions addressing a common problem and reinforcing the dialogue and cooperation between the EU and external partners on drug issues. Following an evaluation of the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drugs Addiction, the Commission will assess whether its mandate needs updating to meet new challenges.

Organised crime groups and terrorists are also key players in the trade of illegal firearms. Between 2009 and 2018, 23 mass-shooting incidents occurred in Europe, which killed over 340 people.⁹⁶ Firearms are often trafficked into the EU through its immediate neighbourhood.⁹⁷ This points to a need to reinforce coordination and cooperation both within the EU and with international partners, particularly Interpol, to harmonise the collection of information and reporting on firearm seizures. It is also essential to improve the traceability of weapons, including on the internet, and ensure information exchange between licensing and law enforcement authorities. The Commission is putting forward a new EU Action Plan against firearms trafficking⁹⁸ and will also assess whether the rules on export authorisation and import and transit measures for firearms are still fit for purpose.⁹⁹

Criminal organisations treat migrants and people in need of international protection as a commodity. 90% of the irregular migrants arriving in the EU are facilitated by a criminal network.¹⁰⁰ Migrant smuggling is also often intertwined with other forms of organised crime, in particular trafficking in human beings.¹⁰¹ Apart from the huge human cost of trafficking, Europol estimates that globally the generated annual profit for all forms of exploitation from human trafficking amounts to €29.4 billion. This is a transnational crime feeding on illegal demands from within and outside the EU and impacting all EU Member States. The poor record in identifying, prosecuting and convicting these crimes requires a new approach to step up action. A new comprehensive approach to trafficking in human beings will draw together the threads of action. In addition, the Commission will present a new EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling for 2021-2025. Both strands will focus on combatting criminal networks, boosting cooperation and support the work of law enforcement.

Organised crime groups – as well as terrorists – also seek opportunities in other fields, especially those generating high profits at a low detection risk, such as environmental crime. Illicit hunting and trading of wildlife, illegal mining, logging, and illegal waste disposal and shipments, have become the fourth largest criminal business around the

⁹⁴ EMCDDA and Europol, EU Drug Markets Report 2019. (November 2019).

⁹⁵ EU Drugs Agenda and Action Plan 2021-2025, COM(2020) 606.

⁹⁶ Flemish Peace Institute, Armed to kill. (October 2019).

⁹⁷ The EU has funded the fight against the proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in the region since 2002; it is notably funded the South-East Europe Firearms Expert Network (SEEFEN). Since 2019, Western Balkan partners have been fully involved in the Firearms priority of the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). COM(2020) 608.

Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 implementing Article 10 of the United Nations’ Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms.

¹⁰⁰ Source: Europol.

¹⁰¹ Europol, EMSC, 4^th Annual Report.

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world.¹⁰² There

has also been criminal exploitation of emission trading schemes and energy certificate systems, as well as the misuse of funding allocated to environmental resilience and sustainable development. As well as promoting action by the EU, Member States and the international community to step up efforts against environmental crime¹⁰³, the Commission is assessing whether the Environmental Crime Directive¹⁰⁴ is still fit for purpose. Trafficking in cultural goods has also become one of the most lucrative criminal activities, a source of funding for terrorists as well as organised crime and it is on the rise. Steps should be explored to improve the online and offline traceability of cultural goods in the internal market and cooperation with third countries where cultural goods are looted as well as providing active support to law enforcement and academic communities.

Economic and financial crimes are highly complex, but they affect millions of citizens and thousands of companies in the EU every year. Combatting fraud is crucial and requires EU-level action. Europol, along with Eurojust, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office support Member States and the EU in protecting the economic and financial markets and safeguarding EU taxpayers’ money. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office will become fully operational late in 2020 and investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment crimes against the EU budget, such as fraud, corruption and money laundering. It will also tackle cross-border VAT fraud costing taxpayers at least €50 billion every year.

The Commission will also support the development of expertise and of a legislative framework in emerging risks, such as crypto-assets and new payment systems. In particular, the Commission will look at the response to the emergence of crypto-assets such as bitcoin and the effect these new technologies will have on how financial assets are issued, exchanged, shared and accessed.

There should be zero tolerance for illicit money within the European Union. Over thirty years, the EU has developed a solid regulatory framework for preventing and combatting money laundering and terrorist financing, in full respect of the need to protect personal data. Nevertheless, there is growing consensus that the implementation of the current framework needs to be significantly improved. Major divergences in the way it is applied and serious weaknesses in the enforcement of the rules need to be addressed. As detailed in the Action Plan of May 2020¹⁰⁵, work is under way to assess options to enhance the EU’s framework for anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing. Areas to explore include the interconnection of national centralised bank account registries, which could significantly speed up access to the financial information for Financial Intelligence Units and competent authorities.

Profits of organised crime groups are estimated at €110 billion per year in the EU. The current response includes harmonised legislation on confiscation and asset recovery,¹⁰⁶ to improve the freezing and confiscation of criminal assets in the EU and to facilitate mutual trust and effective cross-border cooperation between Member States. However, only about 1% of these profits are confiscated¹⁰⁷, which allows organised crime groups to invest in the expansion of their criminal activities and to infiltrate the legal economy, and in particular small and medium enterprises, which have difficulties in access to credit, are a key target for

¹⁰² UNEP-INTERPOL Rapid Response Assessment: The Rise of Environmental Crime, June 2016.

¹⁰³ See The European Green Deal COM(2019) 640 final.

¹⁰⁴ Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law.

¹⁰⁵ Action Plan on preventing money laundering and terrorist financing COM(2020) 2800.

¹⁰⁶ EU law requires Asset Recovery Offices to be established in all Member States.

¹⁰⁷ Report on Asset recovery and confiscation: ensuring that crime does not pay, COM(2020) 217 final.

money laundering. The Commission will analyse the implementation of the legislation and the possible need for further common rules, including on non - c onviction based confiscation. The Asset Recovery Offices , key actors in the asset recovery process, could also be equipped with better tools to identify and trace assets in a speedier way across the EU in order to step up confiscation rates.

There is a strong link between organised crime and corruption. It has been roughly

estimated that corruption alone costs the EU economy €120 billion per year.¹¹⁰ The

prevention and fight against corruption will continue to be subject to regular monitoring under the rule of law mechanism as well as the European Semester. The European semester has assessed challenges in the fight against corruption such as public procurement, public

administration, the business environment or healthcare. The Commission’s new annual rule

of law report will cover the fight against corruption and enable a preventive dialogue with national authorities and interested stakeholders at EU and national level. Civil society organisations can also play a key role in stimulating the action of public authorities in preventing and fighting organised crime and corruption, and these groups could usefully be brought together in a common forum. Due to their cross-border nature, another key dimension is cooperation and assistance on organised crime and corruption with neighbouring regions to the EU.

Key a ctions

• Counter- Terrorism Agenda for the EU, including renewed anti-radicalisation actions in the EU

• New cooperation with key third countries and international organisations against terrorism

• Agenda

on tackling organised crime, including trafficking in human beings

EU Agenda on Drugs and Action Plan 2021-2025

• Assessment of the European Moni toring Ce ntre f o r Dru g s and D ru g Addiction

• 2020-2025 EU Action Plan on Firearms trafficking

• Review of legislation on freezing and confiscation and on Asset Recovery Offices

• An assessment of the Environmental Crime Directive

• An EU Action Plan a g a in st M ig ra nt S mugg li n g , 2021-2025

4. A strong European

security ecosystem

A genuine and effective Security Union must be the common endeavour of all parts of society. Governments, law enforcement, the private sector, education and citizens themselves need to be engaged, equipped, and properly connected to build preparedness and resilience for all, particularly the most vulnerable, victims and witnesses.

All policies need a security dimension and the EU can make a contribution at all levels. In the home, domestic violence is one of the most serious security risks. In the EU 22% of women have experienced violence by an intimate partner.¹¹¹ EU accession to the Istanbul

¹⁰⁸ Directive 2014/42/EU on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime.

¹⁰⁹ Council Decision 2007/845/JHA on cooperation between Asset Recovery Offices of the Member States in the field of tracing and identification of proceeds from, or other property related to, crime.

¹¹⁰ Estimating the total economic costs of corruption is difficult, though efforts have been made by bodies including International Chamber of Commerce, Transparency International, UN Global Compact, and the World Economic Forum, suggesting that corruption amounts to 5% of global GDP.

¹¹¹ A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, COM(2020) 152.

Convention on preventing and combatting violence against women and domestic violence remains a key priority. Should the negotiations remain blocked, the Commission will take other measures to achieve the same objectives as the Convention, including proposing to add violence against women to the list of EU crimes defined in the Treaty.

Cooperation and information exchange

One of the most critical contributions the EU can make to protecting citizens is through helping those responsible for security to work well together. Cooperation and information sharing are the most powerful tools to combat crime and terrorism and pursue justice. To be efficient, it needs to be targeted and timely. To be trusted, it needs to be used with common safeguards and controls.

A number of EU instruments and sector specific strategies¹¹² have been set up to further develop operational law enforcement cooperation between Member States. One of the main EU instruments supporting law enforcement cooperation between Member States is the Schengen Information System, used to exchange data on wanted and missing persons and objects in real time. The results have been felt in the arrest of criminals, seizures of drugs and the rescuing of potential victims.¹¹³ However, the level of cooperation could still be improved through streamlining and upgrading the available instruments. Most of the EU legal framework underpinning operational law enforcement cooperation was designed 30 years ago. A complex web of bilateral agreements between Member States, many outdated or underused, risks fragmentation. In smaller or landlocked countries, law enforcement officers working across borders have to carry out operational actions following, in some cases, up to seven different sets of rules: the result is that some operations, such as hot pursuits of suspects over internal borders, simply do not happen. Operational cooperation on new technologies such as drones are also not covered by the current EU framework.

Operational effectiveness can be supported by specific law enforcement cooperation, which may also help to provide key support to other policy goals – such as providing security input for the new assessment of foreign direct investment. The Commission will look at how a Police Cooperation Code might support this. Member States’ law enforcement authorities have increasingly made use of support and expertise at EU level, while EU INTCEN has played a key role in promoting the exchange of strategic intelligence between Member States Intelligence and Security Services providing intelligence situational awareness in favour of EU institutions.¹¹⁴ Europol can also play a key role in expanding its cooperation with third countries to counter crime and terrorism in coherence with other EU external polices and tools. However, Europol today faces a number of serious constraints – notably as regards the direct exchange of personal data with private parties – which hinders it from effectively supporting Member States in combating terrorism and crime. Europol’s mandate is now being assessed to see how it should be improved to ensure that the Agency can fully perform its tasks. In this context, relevant authorities at EU level (such as OLAF, Europol, Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office) should also cooperate more closely and improve the exchange of information.

Another key connection is with the further development of Eurojust to maximise the synergy between law enforcement cooperation and judicial cooperation. The EU would also

¹¹² Such as the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan which led to important achievements with the cooperation on coast-guard functions between relevant EU Agencies.

¹¹³ The EU fight against organised crime in 2019 (Council, 2020).

¹¹⁴ EU INTCEN serves as the only gateway for Member States Intelligence and Security Services to provide

intelligence-led situational awareness to the

EU.

benefit from more strategic coherence: EMPACT¹¹⁵, the EU policy cycle for serious and international organised crime, provides a criminal intelligence-led methodology for authorities to jointly tackle the most important criminal threats affecting the EU. It has resulted in important operational results¹¹⁶ in the past decade. Based on practitioners’ experience, the existing mechanism should be streamlined and simplified to better address the most pressing and evolving criminal threats for a new Policy Cycle 2022-2025.

Timely and relevant information is key for the daily work of pursuing crime. Despite the development of new EU level databases for security and border management, much information is still located in national databases or exchanged outside these tools. The result is a significant additional workload, delays, and an increased risk that key information is missed. Better, quicker and simplified processes, involving all the security community, would bring better results. The right tools are essential if information exchange is to meet its potential in the effective pursuit of crime with the necessary safeguards so that data sharing respects data protection laws and fundamental rights. In light of technological, forensic and data protection developments, and changed operational needs, the EU could consider if there is a need to modernise instruments such as the 2008 Prüm Decisions, establishing automated exchange of DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data, to enable the automated exchange of additional data categories that are already available in Member States’ criminal or other databases for the purpose of criminal investigations. In addition, the Commission will look into the possibility to exchange police records to help identify if any police record on a person exists in other Member States, and facilitate access to these records once identified, with all the necessary safeguards.

Information on travellers has helped to improve border controls, reduce irregular migration, and identify persons posing security risks. Advanced Passenger Information data are the biographic data for each passenger collected by air carriers during check-in and sent in advance to the border control authorities at destination. The revision of the legal framework¹¹⁷ could allow for more effective use of the information, while ensuring compliance with data protection legislation and facilitating the flow of passengers. Passenger Name Records (PNR) is the data provided by passengers when booking flights. The implementation of the PNR Directive¹¹⁸ is key, and the Commission will continue to support and enforce this. Moreover, as a mid-term action, the Commission will launch a review of the current approach on PNR data transfer to third countries.

Judicial cooperation is a necessary complement to police efforts to fight cross-border crime. Judicial cooperation has gone through a more profound change in the last 20 years. Bodies such as the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and Eurojust need to have the means to function to their fullest extent or be reinforced. Co-operation between judicial practitioners could also be enhanced, through further steps on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions, judicial training, and information exchange. The goal should be increased mutual trust among judges and prosecutors, central to smooth cross-border proceedings. The use of digital technologies can also improve the efficiency of our justice systems. A new digital exchange system is being set up to transmit European Investigation Orders, mutual legal assistance requests and related communications between Member States, supported by

¹¹⁵ EMPACT stands for European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats.

¹¹⁶ https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7623-2020-INIT/en/pdf.

¹¹⁷ Council Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data.

¹¹⁸ Directive 2016/681 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.

Eurojust. The Commission will work with Member States to accelerate the roll-out of the necessary IT systems at the national level.

International cooperation is also key to effective law enforcement and judicial cooperation. Bilateral agreements with key partners play a key role in securing information and evidence from beyond the EU. Interpol, one of the largest inter-governmental criminal police organisations, has an important role. The Commission will look at possible ways of reinforcing cooperation with Interpol, including possible access to Interpol databases and the strengthening of operational and strategic cooperation. Law enforcement authorities in the EU also rely upon key partner countries to detect and investigate criminals and terrorists. Security partnerships between the EU and third countries could be stepped up in order to increase cooperation to counter shared threats such as terrorism, organised crime, cybercrime, child sexual abuse and trafficking in human beings. Such an approach would be based on common security interests and builds on established cooperation and security dialogues.

As well as information, exchange of expertise can be of particular value in increasing the preparedness of law enforcement to non-traditional threats. As well as encouraging exchanges of best practice, the Commission will explore a possible EU-level coordination mechanism for police forces in case of force majeure events such as pandemics. The pandemic has also proven that Digital Community Policing, accompanied by legal frameworks to facilitate online policing, will be fundamental in tackling crime and terrorism. Police-community partnerships, off and online, can prevent crime and mitigate the impact of organised crime, radicalisation and terrorist activities. The connection from local to regional to national and EU police solutions is a key success factor for the EU Security Union as a whole.

The contribution of strong external borders

Modern and efficient management of external borders has the dual benefit of maintaining the integrity of Schengen and providing security for our citizens. Engaging all relevant actors to make the most of security at the border can have a real impact on the prevention of cross-border crime and terrorism. Joint operational activities of the recently strengthened European Border and Coast Guard¹¹⁹ contribute to the prevention and detection of crossborder crime at the external borders and beyond the EU. Customs activities in detecting safety and security risks in all goods before they arrive in the EU and in controlling goods when they arrive are crucial in the fight against cross-border crime and terrorism. The forthcoming Action Plan on the Customs Union will announce actions to also strengthen risk management and to enhance internal security, including in particular by assessing the feasibility of a link between relevant information systems for security risk analysis.

The framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the area of justice and home affairs was adopted in May 2019. This new architecture seeks to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the new or upgraded information systems.¹²⁰ It will lead to faster, more systematic information for law enforcement officers, border guards and migration officials. It will help correct identification and contribute to fighting identity fraud. To make this a reality, implementation of interoperability should be a priority, both at

¹¹⁹ Composed of European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the Member States’ border guard authorities and coast guard authorities.

¹²⁰ The Entry Exit System (EES), the European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS), the extended European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS-TCN), the Schengen Information System, the Visa Information System and the future updated Eurodac.

political and technical level. Close cooperation between EU agencies and all Member States will be paramount in order to achieve the goal of full interoperability by 2023.

Travel document fraud is considered one of the most frequently committed crimes. It facilitates the clandestine movement of criminals and terrorists, and plays a key role in trafficking in human beings and in the drugs trade.¹²¹ The Commission will explore how to extend existing work on the security standards of EU residence and travel documents, including through digitalisation. As of August 2021, Member States will start issuing identity cards and residence documents according to harmonised security standards, including a chip containing biometric identifiers that can be verified by all EU border authorities. The Commission will monitor the implementation of these new rules, including the gradual replacement of documents currently in circulation.

Strengthening security research and innovation

Work to ensure cybersecurity and to combat organised crime, cybercrime and terrorism all rely heavily on developing tools for this future: to help create safer and more secure new technologies, to address the challenges brought about by technologies, and to support the work of law enforcement. This in turn relies on private partners and industries.

Innovation should be seen as a strategic tool to counter current threats and to anticipate both future risks and opportunities. Innovative technologies can bring new tools to help law enforcement and other security actors. Artificial intelligence and big data analytics could harness high-performance computing to offer better detection and quick, comprehensive analysis.¹²² A key precondition to develop reliable technologies is high quality data sets, available to the competent authorities to train, test and validate algorithms.¹²³ More generally, the risk of technological dependence today is strong – the EU is for example a net importer of cybersecurity products and services, with all this entails for the economy and for critical infrastructures. To master technology and guarantee continuity of supply also in case of adverse events and crises, Europe needs presence and capacity in the critical parts of the relevant value chains.

EU research, innovation and technological development offer the opportunity to take the security dimension into account as these technologies and their application are developed. The next generation of EU funding proposals can act as a major stimulus.¹²⁴ Initiatives on European data spaces and cloud infrastructures have security factored in from the start. The European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres¹²⁵ aim to set up an effective and efficient structure to pool and share cybersecurity research capacities and outcomes. The EU Space

¹²¹ The link between document fraud and human trafficking is set out in Second report on the progress made in the fight against trafficking in human beings, COM(2018) 777 and the accompanying SWD(2018) 473 and Europol, Situation Report Trafficking in human beings in the EU, 2016.

¹²² This should draw on the Commission’s strategy on Artificial Intelligence.

¹²³ A European strategy for data, COM(2020) 66 final.

¹²⁴ The Commission’s proposals for Horizon Europe, the Internal Security Fund, the Integrated Border Management Fund, the EUInvest Programme, the European Regional Development Fund and the Digital Europe Programme will all support the development and deployment of innovative security technologies and solutions along the security value chain.

¹²⁵ Proposal of 12 September 2018 establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and the Network of National Coordination Centres, COM(2018) 630.

programme delivers services supporting the security of the EU, its Member States and

individuals.¹²⁶

With over 600 projects launched for an overall value close to €3 billion since 2007, EU-funded security research is a key instrument to drive technology and knowledge in support of security solutions. As part of the review of Europol’s mandate, the Commission will look into the creation of a European Innovation hub for internal security¹²⁷ that would seek to deliver common solutions to shared security challenges and opportunities, which Member States might not be able to exploit alone. Cooperation is fundamental to focus investment to best effect and to develop innovative technologies with both a security and an economic benefit.

Skills and awareness raising

Awareness of security issues and acquiring the skills to deal with potential threats are essential to build a more resilient society with better prepared enterprises, administrations and individuals. Challenges to IT infrastructure and e-systems have revealed the need to improve our human capacity for cybersecurity preparedness and response. The pandemic has also highlighted the importance of digitalisation across all areas of the EU economy and society.

Even a basic knowledge of security threats and how to combat them can have a real impact on society’s resilience. Consciousness of the risks of cybercrime and the need to protect oneself from it can work together with protection from service providers to counter cyber-attacks. Information about the dangers and risks of drug trafficking can make it more difficult for criminals to succeed. The EU can stimulate the spread of best practice such as through the network of Safer Internet Centres¹²⁸ and ensure that such goals are factored into its own programmes.

The future Digital Education Action Plan should include targeted measures to build security IT skills for the whole population. The recently adopted Skills Agenda¹²⁹ supports skills building throughout life. It includes dedicated actions to increase the number of graduates in science, technology, engineering, arts and mathematics needed in cutting-edge areas such as cybersecurity. Additional actions, financed by the Digital Europe Programme will allow professionals to keep pace with evolutions in the security threat landscape and, at the same time, fill the shortages in this field the EU labour market. The overall impact will be to allow individuals to acquire skills to deal with security threats and businesses to find the professionals they need in this area. The upcoming European Research Area and European Education Area will also promote careers in science, technology, engineering, arts and mathematics.

Also important is victims’ access to their rights; they must receive the necessary assistance and support they need given their specific circumstances. Particular efforts are required

¹²⁶ For instance, Copernicus provides services allowing the surveillance of EU external borders and maritime surveillance which helps action against piracy and smuggling, as well as supporting critical infrastructures. Once fully operational, this will be a key enabler for civil and military missions and operations.

¹²⁷ This would work also with EBCGA/Frontex, CEPOL, eu-LISA and the Joint Research Centre.

¹²⁸ See www.betterinternetforkids.eu: the central portal and the national Safer Internet Centres are currently funded under CEF/Telecom, future funding has been proposed under Digital Europe Programme.

¹²⁹ European Skills Agenda for sustainable competitiveness, social fairness and resilience, COM(2020) 274 final

when it comes to minorities and the most vulnerable victims, such as children or women trafficked for sexual exploitation or exposed to domestic violence.

There is a particular role for enhanced skills in law enforcement. The current and new technological threats calls for more investment in upskilling law enforcement personnel at the earliest stage and throughout their career. CEPOL is an essential partner to assist Member States in this task. Law enforcement training related to racism and xenophobia, and

citizens’ rights more generally, must be an essential component of an EU culture of security.

National justice systems and justice practitioners must also be equipped to adapt and respond to unprecedented challenges. T raining is essential to allow authorities on the ground to exploit these tools in an operational situation. In addition, all efforts should be made to

reinforce gender mainstreaming and strengthen women’s participation in law enforcement.

Key a ctions

• Strengthening of Europol mandate

• Exploring an EU ‘Police Cooperation Code’ and police coordination in times of crisis

• Strengthening Eurojust to link judicial and law e nforce m e nt author ities

• Revision of the Advance Passenger Information Directive

• Communication on the external dimension of Passenger Name Records

• Strengthening cooperation between the EU and Interpol

• A framework to negotiate with key third countries on sharing of information

• Better security standards for travel documents

• Exploring a European Innovation hub for internal security____________________________________________

V. Conclusions

In an ncreasingly turbulent world, the European Union is still widely regarded as one of the safest and most secure places. However, this is not something that can be taken for granted.

The new Security Union strategy lays the foundations for a security ecosyste m that spans the entire breadth of European society. It is grounded in the knowledge that security is a shared responsibility. Security is an issue that affects everyone. All government bodies, businesses, social organisations, institutions and citizens must fulfil their own responsibilities in order to make our societies more secure.

Security issues now need to be viewed from a much broader perspective than in the past. False distinctions between the physical and digital need to be overcome. The EU Security Union Strategy brings together the full range of security needs and focuses on the areas most critical to EU security in the years to come. It also acknowledges that security threats do not respect geographical borders, as well as the increasing inter-connection between internal and external security. In that context, it will be important for the EU to cooperate with

international partners for the safeguard of all the EU citizens and to maintain close coordination with EU external action in the implementation of this Strategy.

Our security is linked to our fundamental values. All the proposed actions and initiatives in this strategy will fully respect fundamental rights and our European values. These are the foundation of our European way of life and must remain at the core of all our work.

¹³⁰ See Gender equality strategy, COM(2020) 152; Victims’ rights strategy, COM(2020) 258; and the European Strategy for Better Internet for Children, COM(2012) 196.

¹³¹ See the EU Global Strategy

Lastly, the Commission remains fully aware of the fact that any policy or action is only ever as good as its implementation. Relentless emphasis is therefore needed on the proper implementation and enforcement of existing and future legislation. This will be monitored through regular Security Union reports and the Commission will keep the European Parliament, the Council and stakeholders fully informed and engaged in all relevant actions. In addition, the Commission stands ready to participate in and organise joint debates with the institutions on the Security Union Strategy in order to take stock together of progress achieved while looking together at the challenges ahead.

The Commission invites the European Parliament and the Council to endorse this Security Union Strategy as the basis for cooperation and joint action on security in the next five years.