Annexes to COM(2017)712 - Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2017)712 - Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents. |
|---|---|
| document | COM(2017)712  |
| date | November 29, 2017 |
Efficiency considerations, reasonable licence fee expectations on both sides, the facilitation of the uptake by implementers to promote wide diffusion of the standard should be taken into account. It should be stressed in this respect that there is no one-size-fit-all solution to what FRAND is: what can be considered fair and reasonable differs from sector to sector and over time. For this reason, the Commission encourages stakeholders to pursue sectoral discussions with a view to establishing common licensing practices, based on the principles reflected in this Communication.
The Commission considers that the following IP valuation principles should be taken into account:
·Licensing terms have to bear a clear relationship to the economic value of the patented technology. That value primarily needs to focus on the technology itself and in principle should not include any element resulting from the decision to include the technology in the standard. In cases where the technology is developed mainly for the standard and has little market value outside the standard, alternative evaluation methods, such as the relative importance of the technology in the standard compared to other contributions in the standard, should be considered.
·Determining a FRAND value should require taking into account the present value added 29 of the patented technology. That value should be irrespective of the market success of the product which is unrelated to the patented technology.
·FRAND valuation should ensure continued incentives for SEP holders to contribute their best available technology to standards.
·Finally, to avoid royalty stacking, in defining a FRAND value, an individual SEP cannot be considered in isolation. Parties need to take into account a reasonable aggregate rate for the standard, assessing the overall added value of the technology 30 . The implementation of measures on SEP transparency can already support this objective. It can be addressed further, within the scope of EU competition law, by the creation of industry licensing platforms and patent pools, or based on indications by standardisation participants on the maximum cumulative rate that could be reasonably envisaged or expected.
2.2.Efficiency and non-discrimination
The non-discrimination element of FRAND indicates that rightholders cannot discriminate between implementers that are 'similarly situated' 31 .
Given that FRAND is not one-size-fits-all, solutions can differ from sector to sector and depending on the business models in question.
As mentioned above, FRAND negotiations imply good faith negotiations from both parties. Efficiency considerations can come into play as well. Transaction costs relating to the negotiation of a licence should be kept to the minimum necessary. Furthermore, in sectors where cross-licencing practices are widespread, efficiency gains related to such practices should be taken into account. These points need to be taken into account when assessing on a case by case basis whether a licensing offer is compatible with FRAND.
In line with the approach presented above, the Commission considers that the same principles of efficiency support the practice of SEP portfolio licensing for products with global circulation 32 . As noted in a recent ruling 33 , a country-by-country licensing approach may not be efficient and may not be in line with a recognised commercial practice in the sector.
2.3.Patent pools and licensing platforms to facilitate SEP licensing
The creation of patent pools or other licensing platforms, within the scope of EU competition law, should be encouraged. They can address many of the SEP licensing challenges by offering better scrutiny on essentiality, more clarity on aggregate licensing fees and one-stop- shop solutions. For IoT industries, and particularly SMEs, newly exposed to SEP licensing disputes, this will bring more clarity to licensing conditions of SEP holders in a specific sector.
Measures to encourage the setting up of pools for key standardised technologies should be encouraged, e.g. facilitating access to pool management offers and technical assistance by SDO 34 . The Commission will consider further measures if these efforts are ineffective in IoT sectors.
2.4.Exploiting and deepening FRAND expertise
There is a need to increase accessibility of experience, expertise and know-how around FRAND determination. Valuable insight has been gained and approaches developed from licensing agreements, mediations, arbitrations and court decisions over many years. Significant resources and efforts have been devoted to clarifying, analysing and valuing patents and technology. As there is no common repository for such expertise, work and research may be unnecessarily duplicated at serious cost to the parties involved. More accessible FRAND-related information could increase predictability for businesses such as IoT players, facilitate the licensing process in general and provide support and benchmarks in dispute settlement.
The Commission will therefore set up an expert group with the view to gathering industry practice and additional expertise on FRAND licencing. In addition, the Commission will use all appropriate tools available to obtain further information to support its policy making with sufficient evidence.
In view of current developments, the Commission considers that SEP licencing should be based on the basis of the following principles:
- There is no one-size-fit-all solution on what FRAND is: what can be considered fair and reasonable can differ from sector to sector and over time. Efficiency considerations, reasonable licence fee expectations on both sides, the facilitation of the uptake by implementers to promote wide diffusion of the standard should be taken into account.
- Determining a FRAND value should require taking into account the present value added of the patented technology. That value should be irrespective of the market success of the product which is unrelated to the value of the patented technology.
- In defining a FRAND value, parties need to take account of a reasonable aggregate rate for the standard.
- The non-discrimination element of FRAND indicates that rightholders cannot discriminate between implementers that are 'similarly situated'.
- For products with a global circulation, SEP licences granted on a worldwide basis may contribute to a more efficient approach and therefore can be compatible with FRAND.
The Commission calls on SDOs and SEP holders to develop effective solutions to facilitate the licensing of a large number of implementers in the IoT environment (especially SMEs), via patent pools or other licensing platforms, while offering sufficient transparency and predictability.
The Commission will monitor licencing practices, in particular in the IoT sector. It will also set up an expert group with the view to deepening expertise on industry licensing practices, sound IP valuation and FRAND determination.
3.A predictable enforcement environment for SEPs
Disputes on SEPs are an important factor in the licensing system when negotiations fail. A balanced and predictable enforcement environment has particularly positive effects on parties’ behaviour during negotiations, which in turn can speed up the spread of standardised technologies. IoT stakeholders report however that uncertainties and imbalances in the enforcement system have serious implications for market entry. SEPs show a higher degree of litigation than other patents 35 , which reinforces the need for a clear dispute framework in this area. While this Communication focuses on specific guidance on Standard Essential Patents, the Guidance on certain aspects of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the enforcement of intellectual property rights 36 clarifies the IPRED regime more generally. The possibility to enforce is one of the key aspects of intellectual property rights 37 . The debate in the SEPs area has mainly focused on the availability of injunctive relief. Such relief aims to protect SEP holders against infringers unwilling to conclude a licence on FRAND terms. At the same time, safeguards are needed against the risk that good-faith technology users threatened with an injunction accept licensing terms that are not FRAND, or in the worst case, are unable to market their products (hold-ups).
3.1.availability of injunctive relief under the Huawei vs ZTE jurisprudence
In its Huawei judgment 38 , the CJEU established obligations applying to both sides of a SEP-licensing agreement, when assessing whether the holder of a SEP can seek an injunction against a potential licensee without being in breach of Article 102 TFEU. SEP holders may not seek injunctions against users willing to enter into a licence on FRAND terms, and the CJEU established behavioural criteria to assess when a potential licensee can be considered willing to enter into such a licence.
The Commission considers that the elements below – which arise from national case-law in applying the Huawei judgment 39 , provide useful additional guidance for stakeholders.
A number of courts have stressed that a prospective SEP licensee has to receive sufficiently detailed and relevant information to determine the relevance of the SEP portfolio and compliance with FRAND 40 . The concrete requirements may vary according to the individual case, but the Commission believes that to assess a FRAND offer and make an appropriate counter-offer, clear explanations are necessary on: the essentiality for a standard, the allegedly infringing products of the SEP user, the proposed royalty calculation and the non-discrimination element of FRAND.
Concerning the counter-offer, it follows from Huawei that it should be concrete and specific, i.e. it cannot be limited to contesting the SEP holder’s offer and a general reference to third-party determination of the royalty. It should also contain information on the exact use of the standard in the specific product. The willingness of the parties to submit to binding third-party FRAND determination - should the (counter-)offer be found not to be FRAND - is however an indication of a FRAND behaviour.
In terms of timeliness of the counter-offer of the potential licensee, no general benchmark can be established, as case-specific elements play a role. These include the number of asserted SEPs and the details contained in the infringement claim. However, there is a probable trade-off between the time considered as reasonable for responding to the offer and the detail and quality of the information provided in the SEP holder’s initial offer. In this respect, measures that improve the upstream transparency on SEP exposure 41 will have a very positive impact on the enforcement system.
If more reliable information on SEPs is available upfront via the declaration system, as highlighted in section 1 above, the number of declared SEPs would be considerably reduced. This should be taken into account when assessing acceptable response times for SEP users to react to a FRAND offer.
With respect to the security to be provided by the SEP user as protection against an injunction, the amount should be fixed at a level that discourages patent hold-out strategies. Similar considerations could apply when assessing the magnitude of damages. The Commission will support an exchange of best practice by experts and stakeholders on the calculation method of damages in SEP cases.
3.2.Proportionality considerations
When assessing the availability of injunctive relief, courts are bound by Article 3(2) of the IPR Enforcement Directive 42 , and notably the requirement to ensure that injunctive relief is effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Given the broad impact an injunction may have on businesses, consumers and on the public interest, particularly in the context of the digitalised economy, the proportionality assessment needs to be done carefully on a case-by-case basis. The Commission feels that considerations need to be given to the relative relevance of the disputed technology for the application in question and the potential spill-over effects of an injunction on third parties.
3.3.Litigation on the basis of patent portfolios
In line with the Huawei judgment, which refers to recognised commercial practices in the field 43 , national courts have also considered portfolio licences granted outside national territories to be compliant with FRAND, provided that the portfolio is limited to all the SEPs that a licensee needs to produce/market its product (see section 2.2 above). In this context, SEP holders may offer more patents, including non-SEPs, but cannot require a licensee to accept a licence for these other patents as well. The general non-willingness or non-acceptance to offer or accept all SEPs that a licensee needs may be an indication of bad faith. In order to be FRAND, the counteroffer needs to be related to all SEPs that a licensee needs and cannot be based on individual patent(s) only. Portfolios should however not include competing technologies, but only complementary technologies if necessary 44 . While putative licensees may always question the validity/essentiality of individual patents, the licensing of all SEPs that a licensee needs can be particularly efficient. The Commission will therefore work with stakeholders (including where appropriate courts, arbitrators and mediators) to develop and use consistent methodologies, such as sampling, which allow for efficient and effective SEP dispute resolution, in compliance with the industry practice of portfolio licensing.
3.4.Alternative Dispute Resolution
The Commission takes the view that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration can offer swifter and less costly dispute resolution 45 . While there can be no obligation for parties to use ADR, the Commission believes that the potential benefits of this tool are currently underexploited.
Recourse to ADR is often hampered by unpredictability and criticised for lack of transparency of previous decisions. The success of such mechanisms depends not only on appropriate procedures, but also on the quality of experts. When it enters into operation, the Unified Patent Court should provide a dedicated arbitration and mediation centre benefitting from a pool of specialised judges, thus ensuring high quality and efficient proceedings, coherent practice and limited scope for forum shopping. As announced in its November 2016 strategy on IP for SMEs, the Commission is, together with the EUIPO, mapping IP mediation and arbitration tools with the view to facilitating the further roll-out of IP mediation and arbitration services, for SMEs in particular 46 .
The Commission considers that the outcomes of disputes should also be included in SDOs' databases as mentioned in the chapter on transparency 47 .
3.5.Patent assertion entities And SEPs
Patent Assertion Entities 48 (PAEs) are becoming increasingly involved in the SEP licensing market. Studies 49 suggest that the European litigation system - including the one that is due to be established under the Unified Patent Court - has sufficient safeguards to protect against the potentially harmful effects of certain PAEs in the EU 50 . PAEs should be subject to the same rules as any other SEP holder, including after the transfer of SEPs from patent holders to PAEs. Increased transparency and predictability should further reduce the margin for abuse. The application of the proportionality principle by courts provides yet another safeguard. The Commission will closely monitor the ongoing impact of these market players on the SEP licensing market in Europe, in particular once the EU unitary patent is operational.
3.6.Awareness raising
There is a need for relevant stakeholders, in particular SDOs and SEP holders, to proactively raise awareness of the FRAND licensing process and its implications, particularly for SMEs (both patent holders and implementers of the standards). The Commission will support awareness actions on this issue.
The Commission considers that the FRAND process requires both parties to negotiate in good faith, including responding in a timely manner. Injunctive relief can, however, be sought against parties acting in bad faith (i.e. parties unwilling to take up a licence on FRAND terms), but it must be used proportionally.
The Commission will:
- work with stakeholders to develop and use methodologies, such as sampling, which allow for efficient and effective SEP litigation, in compliance with the industry practice of portfolio licensing;
- further facilitate the roll-out of mediation and alternative dispute resolution tools; and
- monitor the impact of PAEs in Europe.
4. Open source and standards
In the context of current advances in technology, open source software (OSS) implementation is, in addition to standards, also driving innovation, and is becoming increasingly widespread, including in the area of ICT standards. Integration between open source projects and standards development processes is a win-win situation: on one side the alignment of open source and standardisation can speed-up the standards development process and the take-up of ICT standards (especially for SMEs) and on the other side standards can provide for interoperability of open source software implementations 51 . Activities in this direction are taking place within different SDOs 52 .
Open source and standardisation processes both have similarities in common (e.g. collaborative open processes, contribution to innovation) and differences (IPR policies, agility, maintenance, transparency, balance of the processes etc.). There is therefore a need to pay attention to the interaction between open source community projects and SDOs processes.
The Commission supports open source solutions, i.e. through R&I projects funded under Horizon 2020. Flexible and effective interactions between standardisation and open source communities will promote and accelerate the uptake of advanced technology developments.
The Commission will continue to collaborate with stakeholders, open source communities and SDOs to promote an effective relationship between standardisation and open source. It will also fund studies to analyse complementarities, ways of interacting and differences between the two processes, and recommend solutions for smooth collaboration between the two communities.
The Commission will work with stakeholders, open source communities and SDOs for successful interaction between open source and standardisation, by means of studies and analyses.
5. Conclusion
For Europe to reap the full benefit of the Single Market and the Digital Single Market, a balanced IPR framework is needed that supports a sustainable and efficient standardisation ecosystem and SEP licensing environment.
This Communication proposes a holistic approach and sets out key principles for SEP licensing taking into account how industrial sectors are organised as well as efficiency considerations. Working together with all stakeholders will be necessary for a successful implementation of the principles and to ensure concrete results of the actions announced, notably by fostering the participation of start-ups in the roll-out of the Internet of Things. The Commission therefore invites all stakeholders to actively engage in their implementation.
The Commission will closely monitor the SEP licensing markets with a particular focus on IoT technologies, by making use of the expert group that will be created and launching further studies if necessary. It will take stock of progress achieved and assess the need for further measures to ensure a balanced framework for smooth, efficient and effective licensing of SEPs on that basis.
(1)
Regulation (EU) 1025/2012 on European standardisation defines the meaning of the terms “standard” and “technical specification”. In this document the term “standard” is used with both meanings for the sake of brevity.
(2)
For instance, company X marketing residential alarm systems connected to the internet both via WiFi and LTE to provide consumers with enhanced security in case of power cut, would need a licence for these standardised technologies.
(3)
McKinsey, 2015. See also the objective set by President Juncker for 5G and the IoT in the State of the Union speech, 14.9.2016.
(4)
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015 and Boston Consulting Group, 2015. See also: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digitising-european-industry#usefullinks
(5)
See McKinsey (2015).
(6)
The economic stakes are very high: for example, the royalty income for 2G, 3G and 4G standards is approximately EUR 18 billion per year (CRA 2016).
(7)
The public consultation organised by the Commission in 2014 clearly shows divergent opinions on the challenges and solutions concerning the SEP environment. See http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=7833 .
(8)
Patents declared to the ETSI represent 70% of worldwide SEPs (IPlytics, 2017).
(9)
For instance, more than 23 500 patents have been declared essential to the Global System for Mobile Communication standard and the 3G or Universal Mobile Telecommunication System standards developed at the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Such standard apply to all smartphones and devices having a mobile connection. For more figures, see 'Landscaping study on SEPs' IPlytics (2017) and 'Patents and Standards - A modern framework for IPR-based standardization' ECSIP (2014).
(10)
Some SDOs require specific patent disclosures as they recognise their benefits, while others permit blanket declarations. This section of the Communication refers to SDOs with specific patent disclosure.
(11)
See for example the long running 'DARE' project to improve the ETSI’s database.
(12)
For further details, please see the summary report of the public consultation organised by DG GROW in 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/14482/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native.
(13)
See CRA (2016).
(14)
See section 3 below in relation to effective enforcement.
(15)
For instance, a potential patent or patent application initially declared for a candidate technology may not be retained in the released standard, or the declared patent application may be revised during the granting process.
(16)
For instance, 71% of SEPs declared at major SDOs (73% at the ETSI) are only granted after the standard has been released (IPlytics, 2017).
(17)
See ECSIP (2014).
(18)
See IPlytics (2017) and CRA (2016) and the summary of DG GROW public consultation on SEPs (2015).
(19)
A number of studies on various key technologies suggests that when rigorously tested, only between 10% and 50% of declared patents are essential (CRA, 2016 and IPlytics, 2017).
(20)
The cost of essentiality checks may be negligible compared to licensing revenues for key technologies (see CRA, 2016).
(21)
For an analysis of cost and benefits, please see IPlytics (2017).
(22)
See CRA (2016).
(23)
See IPlytics (2017).
(24)
Public consultation on patents and standards: A modern framework for standardisation involving intellectual property rights.
(25)
Licensing Terms of Standard Essential Patents: A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases, JRC 2017
(26)
Study on Transparency, Predictability and Efficiency of SDO-based Standardization and SEP Licensing, Published on: 12/12/2016, (CRA study).
(27)
See, in particular, Unwired Planet v. Huaweï [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).
(28)
Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477, paragraph 53
(29)
The present value is the value discounted to the time of the conclusion of the licence agreement. Allowing for the discounting over time is important against the backdrop of licence agreement running over several years in sometimes technologically fast moving business environments.
(30)
On royalty stacking see CRA study.
(31)
Unwired Planet v. Huaweï [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).
(32)
However, FRAND licensing requires remuneration to be calculated in a manner that implementers wishing to develop a product for a specific, geographically limited area are not placed at a disadvantage.
(33)
Unwired Planet v. Huaweï [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).
(34)
For instance, the creation of pools may be encouraged by means of measures such as strengthening the relationship between SDOs and pools, providing incentives to participation and making universities and SMEs more aware of the advantages of becoming a licensor in a pool (ECSIP, 2015).
(35)
ECSIP (2014).
(36)
COM(2017)708
(37)
Directive 2004/48/EC of 29.4.2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, pub. OJ L 195 of 2.6.2004, recital 3
(38)
Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477.
(39)
The CJEU held that Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a patent essential to a standard established by a standardisation body, which has given an irrevocable undertaking to that body to grant a licence to third parties on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) terms, does not abuse its dominant position, within the meaning of that article, by bringing an action for infringement seeking an injunction prohibiting the infringement of its patent or seeking the recall of products for the manufacture of which that patent has been used, as long as:
(1) prior to bringing that action, the proprietor has, first, alerted the alleged infringer of the infringement complained about by designating that patent and specifying the way in which it has been infringed, and, secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms, presented to that infringer a specific, written offer for a licence on such terms, specifying, in particular, the royalty and the way in which it is to be calculated, and
(2) where the alleged infringer continues to use the patent in question, the alleged infringer has not diligently responded to that offer, in accordance with recognised commercial practices in the field and in good faith, this being a matter which must be established on the basis of objective factors and which implies, in particular, that there are no delaying tactics.
(40)
OLG Düsseldorf, Case I-15 U 66/15, Order of 17 November 2016 and OLG Karlsruhe, Case 6 U 58/16, Order of 8 September 2016.
(41)
See section 1 above.
(42)
Directive 2004/48/EC of 29.4.2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 195 of 2.6.2004, p. 16.
(43)
Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies, EU:C:2015:477 (para 65)
(44)
See mutatis mutandis Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agreements, OJ C 89, 28.3.2014, p. 3, paragraph 250-55.
(45)
Different ADR mechanisms already exist, such as the WIPO's Arbitration and Mediation Centre.
(46)
Commission Staff Working Document, 'Putting intellectual property at the service of SMEs to foster innovation and growth', SWD(2016)373 of 22.11.2016.
(47)
See section 1.2.1 above.
(48)
For the attempt of a definition see the JRC study 'Patent Assertion Entities in Europe', chapter 3. http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC103321/lfna28145enn.pdf
(49)
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC103321/lfna28145enn.pdf
(50)
JRC study above.
(51)
In relation to Cloud computing, see the report on standards and open source: bridging the gap.
(52)
OASIS, ECMA, ITU-T, ETSI, etc.