Annexes to JOIN(2016)31 - Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform

Please note

This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.

agreement with the partner state, the EU may decide to engage in SSR support activities even in the absence of important conditions, such as real commitment to change.

Action box

The EEAS/Commission services will prepare a dedicated risk management methodology for EU support. This will include mitigating measures drawing inter alia on the ‘risk management framework mechanism for budget support operations’. 34  

As provided for in its 2015-2019 Action plan for human rights and democracy 35 , the EU has to develop a ‘human rights due diligence policy’ outlining measures to ensure that EU and Member States’ support to the security sector is in compliance with/contributes to the promotion, protection and enforcement of international human rights and international humanitarian law, and is consistent with the EU’s human rights policies.

Make best use of EU SSR expertise

The EU should mobilise staff with the appropriate expertise and experience and with a strong understanding of technical and political issues relating to SSR. It must draw on the expertise of the Member States and, in specific areas where they bring clear added value, relevant EU agencies (e.g. Europol, CEPOL, FRONTEX) subject to their respective mandates, priorities and resources.

This EU-wide SSR policy framework envisages strong coordination and cooperation between EU actors and Member States to foster synergies and complementarities between instruments and missions in a ‘whole EU’ approach. It also provides for coordination with the activities of international and regional organisations and relevant NGOs.

At headquarters

The Commission and the HR will establish a permanent informal inter-service SSR task force, with representatives from relevant thematic EEAS and Commission services, which will advise and support EU Delegations, EEAS and Commission services and CSDP missions. It will contribute to ensuring coherence and complementarity of EU SSR activity and support the planning and design of SSR development cooperation projects and CSDP planning documents. Its role should also be reflected in the next edition of the crisis management procedures. It will develop methodological tools, standards, procedures and practices for EU SSR activities and provide training, inter alia by supporting the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). The task force will oversee the monitoring, evaluation, learning framework and risk management mechanisms.

In the field

Responsibility for the coordination of security sector support on the ground rests with the Head of the EU Delegation in the partner country or region in question. Where a CSDP mission is present in the country, the Council is invited to ensure that its mandate allows it to assist the EU Delegation on SSR-related issues. In this respect, the head of the mission will be available to advise the Head of Delegation.

EU Delegations and Member State diplomatic missions should share information and analysis, participate in joint analysis and contribute to the formulation of SSR coordination matrices.

Where the EU has a particularly significant and diversified security sector engagement and relevant coordination structures are not in place, it will seek to establish coordination task forces for security sector support at country level (with the political and operational sections of EU Delegations, CSDP missions, Member States and, where possible, relevant partners such as the UN, the World Bank and nonEU countries involved in the security sector).

Action box

A permanent informal inter-service SSR task force will be established to oversee EU SSR activities.

The ESDC’s SSR training curricula should be updated to take account of this EU-wide strategic framework. Also, cooperation between the ESDC and relevant Commission training services should be strengthened to reflect the EU-wide approach.

Instructions to Heads of Delegation will include the task to ensure the local coordination of all EU stakeholders in security sector dialogue and support. This will not impact on the CSDP missions’ line of command.

The mandate of CSDP missions should include the provision of technical advice to EU Delegations.

In countries where the EU has a significant SSR commitment, it should be ensured that the Delegation has appropriate security sector expertise.

4. Areas of engagement

The EU may support all components of the security sector, including the military, within the limits of EU legislation through the following activities (nonexhaustive list):

• Institutional support

Support for security and justice institutions includes assistance in developing partner countries national defence, security and justice policies and strategies, national coordination mechanisms, administrative, communication and operational procedures, internal accountability mechanisms, human resources planning and management, information and data, and budgeting and financial management systems, in full compliance with human rights principles and compliance with international humanitarian law.

Institutional support may include assistance in the planning of reforms which should be tailored and context-sensitive and aim to help partner states assess their own needs, and express and achieve their vision by setting realistic short-, medium- and long-term outcomes. It should help them allocate human, technical and financial resources as appropriate. In so doing the EU will also engage with non-state and civil society actors.

The EU should ensure that its efforts to strengthen institutions generate direct shortterm benefits for the population in terms of improved security service provision.

• Training

EU support includes building the capacity of national or regional training institutions. This may include technical assistance and mentoring, assessing training needs, developing new curricula and ‘training the trainers’. EU training assistance will specify the knowledge, skills and/or attitudes it is intended to pass on, so as to promote behavioural change in security sector personnel, units and institutions. It will also seek to ensure that training is valued in terms of career perspectives and that staff perform the duties for which they have been trained.

Support may be linked to dialogue on and support for national human resource management systems involving the identification of profiles needed by security and justice institutions, fair and transparent recruitment and promotion, etc.

Where there is a need to restore basic justice and security services rapidly, the EU may provide training directly, in particular through CSDP missions. As far as possible, it will do this in cooperation with national training institutions, with a view to strengthening them and eventually handing over responsibility for the training.

• Equipment

The EU can provide non-lethal equipment 36 to security sector actors. This will be done within a broader security support framework for the country. The EU will need to seek appropriate guarantees that equipment will not be used to violate human rights, fundamental freedoms or the rule of law. To avoid the risk of equipment becoming unserviceable, abandoned, unaccounted for or misused, the existence and functioning of logistical support and registry/tracing chains will be assessed and, where required, support will be provided to improve their effectiveness. The development of basic good practice in the area of equipment management will be an integral part of any equipment package to ensure its maintenance, re-supply and disposal.

• Support for oversight mechanisms

The EU should support the establishment or strengthening of effective civilian control and oversight, inter alia by:

promoting and supporting the formulation and enforcement of relevant legislation and procedures; and

increasing the capacity of independent complaints and civilian oversight institutions and mechanisms.

Beneficiaries may be national legislative bodies and independent or quasi-independent bodies such as ombudsmen, human rights institutions or commissions, anti-corruption commissions, independent police complaints commissions, and judicial authorities in their role of overseeing law enforcement agencies, etc.

The EU should promote the active participation of civil society in these oversight mechanisms and, where relevant, support civil society initiatives to monitor the conduct of the security forces. It will also promote the freedom of the media and strengthen its capacity to report responsibly on the security sector.

• Community security

Where violence and conflicts are linked to political, social and economic issues that are strictly local or national security forces are unable to provide vital security services, the EU can finance support initiatives whereby the population is provided with security and justice benefits through a community security approach, involving (official and/or traditional) local authorities, where possible, the residents of the communities and neighbourhoods in question and local security forces. The aim will be to improve the security of local communities, resolve conflict and address local root causes of violence, and ultimately to ensure that national authorities are able to address security and conflict problems at local level.

• Links between SSR and other areas of engagement

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) refers to a set of interventions in a process of demilitarising official and unofficial armed groups by disarming and disbanding non-state groups or downsizing armed forces and reintegrating them into civilian life 37 . DDR processes should respond to immediate security needs and help lay the foundations for longer-term stability in a country or region. They should therefore link in with an overall peace process and preferably with a broader SSR. In conflict and postconflict contexts, EU SSR and DDR support will balance the need to restore basic security services as an urgent stabilisation measure with the need to avoid hindering longer-term stability by, for instance, legitimising non-inclusive security forces.

Transitional justice

Transitional justice encompasses “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”. 38 Transitional justice measures should ultimately help to re-establish and strengthen the rule of law.

In post-conflict and transition countries, SSR as a component of institutional reform can contribute to prevent conflict from flaring up again; it thus helps to ensure accountability and respect for human rights and prevent future violations. The Council conclusions on support to transitional justice 39 underline the importance of SSR.

Small arms and light weapons (SALWs)

The availability of SALWs is often a key factor in triggering and spreading insecurity. ‘Residual conflicts’ sustained by the illicit spread of SALWs often blur the dividing line between armed conflict and criminality 40 . SALW control is intrinsically linked to SSR efforts, not least in limiting the perceived or actual need or propensity of individuals or communities to provide for their own defence.

5. Monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation

The implementation of this policy framework will be regularly monitored and evaluated. Each year an inter-service team composed of EEAS and Commission representatives, with the support of external consultants where needed, will review the EU’s overall engagement in the security sector in at least one priority country.

The evaluation criteria will be based on the objectives and principles outlined in this Joint Communication, on the shared monitoring and evaluation guidelines and on the actual implementation of the relevant risk management framework.

The relevance of the EU’s engagement will also be evaluated, on the basis of criteria such as:

- the quality and comprehensiveness of its analysis of the security sector;

- its responsiveness to urgent crises and emerging opportunities; and

- consistency between EU support, broader EU security and development goals and the security goals of partner countries.

Evaluations will be made publicly available. Recommendations will be drafted and followup action will be monitored. The evaluations will also be used to gather best practices and lessons identified, to be fed into EU staff training and reflections on EU financial instruments. This will help to improve internal procedures and the efficiency of the support.

The overall performance of this strategic framework will be evaluated within five years’ time.

The European Commission and the High Representative invite the European Parliament and the Council to endorse and support the approach set out in this Joint Communication and to engage fully in the move towards more coherent and effective EU engagement in assisting SSR in its partner countries.

(1)

     In line with the OECD-DAC’s SSR guidelines, a national security sector is seen as including the law enforcement institutions (police, gendarmerie, customs, border guards, etc.), the criminal justice system (i.e. penal courts, prosecutor’s office, corrections), the armed forces, the intelligence services, the institutions that provide political, financial and judicial oversight (line ministries, parliamentary committees, court of auditors, the judiciary, etc.) and non-state security actors, including customary authorities, traditional courts, guerrillas and liberation armies, private military and security companies. See The OECD DAC handbook on security system reform: supporting security and justice (OECD Publishing, Paris)

(2)

     JOIN(2015) 50, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy

(3)

     43% of those living in absolute poverty reside in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

(4)

     COM(2011) 637 and Council conclusions Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change, 3166th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 14 May 2012

(5)

     Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015; UNGA A/RES/70/1); Goal 16: ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’

(6)

     In line with the provisions in the EU Treaties for the EU’s external action in general (Articles 21-22 TEU), CFSP/CSDP (Articles 23-46 TEU), development cooperation policy (Articles 208-211 TFEU) and other cooperation policies (Articles 212-213 TFEU).

(7)

     European Agenda on Security, Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (COM(2015) 185)

(8)

     SWD(2016) 221

(9)

     In line with JOIN(2013) 30 final, humanitarian aid is to be provided in accordance with its specific modus operandi, respectful of the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, solely on the basis of the needs of affected populations.

(10)

     Initiative No 21 in Annex I of the Commission’s 2016 Work Programme (COM(2015) 610 final)

(11)

     Council conclusions on CSDP, Council of the European Union (document 8971/15, May 2015)

(12)

     JOIN(2015) 17 final, Capacity building in support of security and development – Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises

(13)

     JOIN(2013) 30 final, The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises

(14)

     A concept for European Community support for security sector reform, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (SEC(2006) 658); and EU concept for ESDP support to SSR (Council 12566/4/05), which was produced on the basis of the European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World, adopted by the European Council on December 2003

(15)

     Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, June 2016

(16)

     COM(2015) 185 final, The European Agenda on Security 

(17)

     For example the agreement to ‘update and modernise the ODA reporting directives on peace and security expenditures’; see high-level meeting final communiqué (OECD DAC, 19 February 2016)

(18)

     For the purpose of this Communication, crisis response does not encompass humanitarian aid.

(19)

     See Council document 8831/16.

(20)

     While the principles outlined in this Joint Communication also apply to enlargement countries, the accession process involves different measures and procedures to ensure that the countries meet the accession criteria.

(21)

     Starting with freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf.

(22)

     See Council conclusions on the 2016-2020 Gender Action Plan (document 13201/15)

(23)

     For the purposes of this document, a security sector is deemed legitimate when: i. it respects internationally accepted human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles; ii. it applies the good governance principles of transparency and openness, participation and inclusivity, and accountability; and iii. it fights corruption.

(24)

     This is in line with Articles 3 and 21c TEU, which require the Union, in its relations with the wider world, to uphold and promote its values and interests, including democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Lisbon Treaty requires that the EU’s policies, including those on external relations, are in accordance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

(25)

     In the specific case of the judiciary, the separation of powers should be ensured so that judicial independence is guaranteed and the courts are not subject to improper influence from the other branches of government or from private or partisan interests.

(26)

     See European Governance: A White Paper (COM(2001) 428); two other good governance principles (effectiveness and coherence) are outlined under objective A and in chapter 3 respectively.

(27)

     UNSC S/RES/1325 (2000); UNSC S/RES/2242 (2015) on women and peace and security

(28)

     As outlined in the HORIZON 2020 - Work Programme 2016–2017, Societal Challenge 7: Secure societies – Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens and Societal Challenge 6: Europe in a changing world - inclusive, innovative and reflective societies. 

(29)

     See OECD-DAC Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008); Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation; Fourth High-Level Forum On Aid Effectiveness (Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011).

(30)

     See the joint EEAS-Commission services Guidance note on the use of Conflict Analysis in support of EU external action.

(31)

     Budget Support Guidelines. Programming, Design and Management – A modern approach to Budget Support, Working document, Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, European Commission, September 2012

(32)

For example memoranda of understanding, joint statements, arrangements, etc.

(33)

     COM(2010) 126, Humanitarian Food Assistance

(34)

     Budget Support Guidelines: Programming, Design and Management – A modern approach to Budget Support, Working document, Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, European Commission, September 2012

(35)

     JOIN(2015) 16

(36)

     JOIN(2015) 17 final

(37)

     EU concept for support to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), approved by the Commission on 14 December 2006 and by the Council of the European Union on 11 December 2006

(38)

     UN Security Council, document S/2004/616

(39)

     Council conclusions on the EU’s support to transitional justice, 16 November 2015 (13576/15)

(40)

     EU strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, Council conclusions (5319/06)