Annexes to COM(2000)393 - Common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services

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ANNEX I


List of markets to be included in the initial Commission recommendation on relevant product and service markets referred to in Article 15

1. Markets referred to in Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive)

Article 16 - Markets defined under the former regulatory framework, where obligations should be reviewed.

The provision of connection to and use of the public telephone network at fixed locations.

The provision of leased lines to end users.

2. Markets referred to in Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive)

Article 7 - Markets defined under the former regulatory framework, where obligations should be reviewed.

Interconnection (Directive 97/33/EC)

call origination in the fixed public telephone network

call termination in the fixed public telephone network

transit services in the fixed public telephone network

call origination on public mobile telephone networks

call termination on public mobile telephone networks

leased line interconnection (interconnection of part circuits)

Network access and special network access (Directive 97/33/EC, Directive 98/10/EC)

access to the fixed public telephone network, including unbundled access to the local loop

access to public mobile telephone networks, including carrier selection

Wholesale leased line capacity (Directive 92/44/EEC)

wholesale provision of leased line capacity to other suppliers of electronic communications networks or services

3. Markets referred to in Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000

Services provided over unbundled (twisted metallic pair) loops.

4. Additional markets

The national market for international roaming services on public mobile telephone networks.


ANNEX II


Criteria to be used by national regulatory authorities in making an assessment of joint dominance in accordance with Article 14(2), second subparagraph

Two or more undertakings can be found to be in a joint dominant position within the meaning of Article 14 if, even in the absence of structural or other links between them, they operate in a market the structure of which is considered to be conducive to coordinated effects. Without prejudice to the case law of the Court of Justice on joint dominance, this is likely to be the case where the market satisfies a number of appropriate characteristics, in particular in terms of market concentration, transparency and other characteristics mentioned below:

- mature market,

- stagnant or moderate growth on the demand side,

- low elasticity of demand,

- homogeneous product,

- similar cost structures,

- similar market shares,

- lack of technical innovation, mature technology,

- absence of excess capacity,

- high barriers to entry,

- lack of countervailing buying power,

- lack of potential competition,

- various kinds of informal or other links between the undertakings concerned,

- retaliatory mechanisms,

- lack or reduced scope for price competition.

The above is not an exhaustive list, nor are the criteria cumulative. Rather, the list is intended to illustrate only the sorts of evidence that could be used to support assertions concerning the existence of joint dominance.