Considerations on COM(2023)642 - Amendment of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 as regards the revision of the suspension mechanism

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(1)Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council 22 lists the third countries whose nationals are to be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the Member States and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement for stays of no more than 90 days in any 180-day period.

(2)The mechanism for the temporary suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement for the nationals of a third country listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 (‘the suspension mechanism’) should be strengthened for the Union to have at its disposal a more efficient safeguard aimed at preventing a wider range of irregular migration, public policy and security risks arising from the third countries listed in that Annex II, as well as the abuse of the visa exemption through the operation of investor citizenship schemes by those third countries.

(3)In particular, the use of the suspension mechanism should be facilitated by broadening the possible grounds for suspension, adapting the relevant thresholds and procedures, and strengthening the Commission’s monitoring and reporting obligations.

(4)The Union has concluded a number of agreements on the short-stay visa waiver with countries listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 which may include different grounds for suspension or different procedures than the ones set out in the suspension mechanism, and may conclude further of those agreements in the future. As the Union respects international agreements and, thus, is bound by these agreements, the relevant different provisions set out in those agreements should be applied instead of the relevant provisions of the suspension mechanism.

(5)In its conclusions of 22 October 2021, the European Council invited the Commission to propose any necessary changes to the Union’s legal framework and concrete measures to ensure an immediate and appropriate response to hybrid threats in line with Union law and international obligations. Therefore, it should be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism in case of risks or threats to the public policy or internal security of the Member States arising from hybrid threats such as situations of state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants aimed at destabilising or undermining society and key institutions. 

(6)Investor citizenship schemes operated by third countries listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 allow visa-free travel to the Union to third-country nationals that would otherwise be visa required. Under an investor citizenship scheme, citizenship is granted in return for pre-determined payments or investments without any genuine link to the third country concerned. While the Union respects the right of sovereign countries to decide on their own naturalisation procedures, visa-free third countries should be deterred from using visa-free access to the Union as a tool for leveraging individual investment in return for their citizenship. To prevent visa-free access to the Union being used for this purpose, it should be possible to suspend the visa exemption for a third country which chooses to operate such investor citizenship schemes, whereby citizenship is granted without any genuine link to the third country concerned.

(7)Where the visa policy of a third country listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 is not aligned with the visa policy of the Union as regards the list of third countries whose nationals are required to be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States, this could result in irregular migration to the Union, in particular where the concerned third country is in close geographic proximity to the Union. Therefore, it should be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism where, following an assessment, the Commission concludes that there is a risk of a substantial increase in the number of third-country nationals, other than nationals of that third country, who arrive legally in the territory of that third country and then irregularly enter the territory of the Member States.

(8)The thresholds to trigger the suspension mechanism in case of a substantial increase in the number of nationals of a third country refused entry or found to be staying in the Member State’s territory without a right to do so, or in the number of asylum applications from the nationals of that third country for which the recognition rate is low, or in the number of serious criminal offences linked to the nationals of that third country, should be subject to a case-by-case assessment by the Commission. In particular, the Commission should be able to assess whether there are specific circumstances, in the cases notified by Member States or under its own analysis, which would justify the application of lower or higher thresholds than those indicated in relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806. The Commission’s assessment should take into account, for example, the number of unauthorised crossings of the external borders of the Member States, unfounded asylum applications or criminal offences in proportion to the number and size of Member States affected and the impact of those numbers on the overall migratory situation, functioning of the asylum systems or internal security of the Member States affected, as well as actions taken by the third country concerned to remedy the situation.

(9)For the purpose of notifying to the Commission the circumstances that may amount to a ground for suspension, Member States should be able to take into account reference periods longer than two months in order to identify not only sudden changes in the relevant situation, but also longer-term trends that may justify the use of the visa suspension mechanism. 

(10)Whenever it considers it necessary, or upon request by the European Parliament or by the Council, the Commission should report on the outcome of its systematic monitoring of the visa-free regimes with all the third countries listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806. The report should focus on those third countries which, according to the Commission’s analysis, present specific problems that, if not addressed, may lead to trigger the suspension mechanism. In particular, the Commission should consider reporting on countries which have been newly listed in Annex II without undergoing a visa liberalisation dialogue, where it considers it necessary and in particular in the first years following the entry into force of the visa exemption for those countries.

(11)Where a decision to temporarily suspend the visa exemption for a third country has been taken, there should be an adequate timeframe for the enhanced dialogue between the Commission and the concerned third country aimed at remedying the circumstances that led to the suspension. For this purpose, the duration of the temporary suspension decided by a Commission implementing act should be 12 months in a first phase, with a possibility to extend it by a further 24 months with a delegated act in a second phase. Where no solution is found before the end of the period of validity of the delegated act and the Commission presents a legislative proposal to transfer the concerned third country from Annex II to Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806, the Commission should adopt a delegated act extending the temporary suspension until the entry into force of the adopted proposal.

(12)The Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases related to the triggering of the suspension mechanism, imperative grounds of urgency require expedited action, in particular to prevent any abuse of visa-free travel causing a mass influx of third-country nationals arriving irregularly in the territory of the Member States or a serious damage to the public policy or internal security of Member States.

(13)The temporary suspension should be lifted at any time where the circumstances that led to the suspension are remedied before the end of the period of the suspension. To this end, the Commission should adopt, respectively, an implementing act before the end of the period of suspension set out in the relevant implementing act, and a delegated act before the end of the period of suspension set out in the relevant delegated act.  

(14)As regards Iceland and Norway, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters’ association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, point B, of Council Decision 1999/437/EC 23 .

(15)As regards Switzerland, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement signed between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis 24 , which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points B and C, of Decision 1999/437/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/146/EC 25 .

(16)As regards Liechtenstein, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Protocol between the European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis 26 , which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points B and C, of Decision 1999/437/EC, read in conjunction with Article 3 of Council Decision 2011/350/EU 27 .

(17)This Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in which Ireland does not take part, in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC 28 ; Ireland is therefore not taking part in the adoption of this Regulation and is not bound by it or subject to its application.

(18)This Regulation constitutes an act building upon, or otherwise relating to, the Schengen acquis within, respectively, the meaning of Article 3(1) of the 2003 Act of Accession and Article 4(1) of the 2005 Act of Accession.