Considerations on COM(2022)349 - Establishing the European defence industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act

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(1) The EU Heads of State or Government, meeting in Versailles on 11 March, committed to “bolster European defence capabilities” in light of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine. They agreed to increase defence expenditures, step up cooperation through joint projects, and common procurement of defence capabilities, close shortfalls, boost innovation and strengthen and develop the EU defence industry.

(2) The unjustified invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022 and the ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine has made it clear that it is critical to act now to address the existing shortfalls It has led to the return of high-intensity warfare and territorial conflict in Europe, requiring a significant increase in the capacity of Member States to fill the most urgent and critical gaps, especially those exacerbated by the transfer of defence products to Ukraine.

(3) The Commission and the High Representative presented a Joint Communication on “The Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward” on 18 May 2022. The Communication highlighted the existence, within the EU, of defence financial, industrial and capability gaps.

(4) A dedicated short-term instrument, designed in a spirit of solidarity, was indicated as a tool to incentivise Member States, on a voluntary basis, to pursue common procurement to fill the most urgent and critical gaps, especially those created by the response to the current Russia’s aggression, in a collaborative way.

(5) Such a new instrument will contribute to reinforce common defence procurement and, through the associated Union financing, to strengthen EU defence industrial capabilities.

(6) Reinforcing the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base should therefore be at the core of those efforts. Indeed difficulties and gaps still exist and the European defence industrial base remains highly fragmented, lacking sufficient collaborative action and inter-operability of products.

(7) In the current defence market context, marked by an increased security threat and the realistic perspective of a high intensity conflict, Member States are rapidly increasing their defence budgets and aiming at similar purchases. This results in an amount of demand which exceeds European Defence Technological and Industrial Base manufacturing capacities, currently tailored for peace time.

(8) As a result, strong price inflation can be anticipated, as well as longer delays in delivery time, potentially harming the security of the Union and its Member States. Defence industries need to secure the production capacity necessary to process orders, as well as critical raw materials and sub-components. In this context producers might privilege major orders, potentially leaving exposed the most vulnerable countries, lacking the critical size and financial means to ensure large orders.

(9) Furthermore, efforts should be made so that the increased spending results in a much stronger European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Indeed, without coordination and cooperation, the increased national investments are likely to deepen the fragmentation of the European defence industry.

(10) In the light of the above challenges and the related structural changes in the EU Defence industry, it appears necessary to speed up the adjustment of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, enhance its competitiveness and efficiency, and thereby contribute to strengthening and reforming Member States’ defence industrial capabilities. Addressing industrial shortfalls should include promptly tackling the most urgent gaps.

(11) Common investment and defence procurement should in particular be incentivised, as such collaborative actions would ensure that the necessary changes in the EU industrial base takes place in a collaborative manner, avoiding further fragmentation of the industry.

(12) To that end a Short Term Instrument for increasing the collaboration of the Member States in the defence procurement phase (the ‘Instrument’) should be established. It will incentivise Member States to pursue collaborative actions and in particular, when they procure in order to fill these gaps, to do so jointly, increasing the level of interoperability and strengthening and reforming their defence industrial capabilities.

(13) The Short Term Instrument should offset the complexity and risks associated with such joint actions while allowing economies of scale in the actions undertaken by Member States to reinforce and modernise the European Technological and Industrial Base, increasing thereby the Union’s capacity resilience and security of supply. Incentivizing common procurement would also result into diminished costs in terms of exploitation, maintenance and withdrawal of the systems.

(14) This Instrument will build on and take into account the work of the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force established by the Commission and the High Representative/Head of Agency, in line with the Joint Communication ‘Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward”, to coordinate very short-term defence procurement needs and engage with Member States and EU defence manufacturers to support joint procurement to replenish stocks, notably in light of the support provided to Ukraine.

(15) The Instrument is coherent with existing collaborative EU defence-related initiatives such as in the European Defence Fund as well as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and generates synergies with other EU programmes. The Instrument is fully coherent with the ambition of the Strategic Compass.

(16) As the instrument aims to enhance the competitiveness and efficiency of the Union’s defence industry, to benefit from the instrument, common procurement contracts will need to be placed with  legal entities which are established in the Union or in associated countries and are not subject to control by non-associated third countries or by non-associated third-country entities. In that context, control should be understood to be the ability to exercise a decisive influence on a legal entity directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediate legal entities. Additionally, in order to ensure the protection of essential security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, the infrastructure, facilities, assets and resources of the contractors and subcontractors involved in the common procurement which are used for the purposes of the common procurement shall be located on the territory of a Member State or of an associated third country.

(17) In certain circumstances, it should be possible to derogate from the principle that contractors and subcontractors involved in a common procurement supported by the Instrument are not subject to control by non-associated third countries or non associated third-country entities. In that context, a legal entity established in the Union or in an associated third country and controlled by a non-associated third country or a non-associated third country entity may participate as contractor and subcontractor involved in the common procurement if strict conditions relating to the security and defence interests of the Union and its Member States, as established in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy pursuant to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), including in terms of strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, are fulfilled.

(18) Furthermore, the common procurement procedures and contracts shall also include a requirement for the defence product to not be subject to control or restriction by a non-associated third country or a non-associated third country entity.

(19) Grants under the Instrument may take the form of financing not linked to cost based on the achievement of results by reference to work packages, milestones or targets of the common procurement process, in order to create the necessary incentive effect.

(20) Where the Union grant takes the form of financing not linked to costs, the Commission should determine in the work programme the funding conditions for each action, in particular (a) a description of action involving cooperation for common procurement with a view to addressing the most urgent and critical capacity needs, (b) the milestones for the implementation of the action, (c) the rough order of magnitude expected from the common procurement and (d) the maximum Union contribution available.

(21) To generate the incentive effect, the level of Union contribution may be differentiated based on factors such as (a) the complexity of the common procurement, for which a proportion of the anticipated size of the procurement contract, based on experience gained in similar actions, may serve as an initial proxy, (b) the characteristics of the cooperation, such as joint usage, stockpiling, ownership or maintenance, which are likely to induce stronger interoperability outcomes and long-term investment signals to industry, and (c) the number of participating Member States or associated countries or the inclusion of additional Member States or associated countries to existing cooperations.

(22) Member States should appoint a procurement agent to conduct a common procurement on their behalf. The procurement agent should be a contracting authority established in a Member State or an associated third country, including Union bodies or international organisations, such as the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement (OCCAR).

(23) In accordance with Article 193(2) of the Financial Regulation, a grant may be awarded for an action which has already begun, provided that the applicant can demonstrate the need for starting the action prior to signature of the grant agreement. However, financial contribution should not cover a period prior to the date of submission of the grant application, except in duly justified exceptional cases. In order to avoid any disruption in Union support which could be prejudicial to the interests of the Union, it should be possible to provide in the financing decision for financial contributions to actions that cover a period from the 24 February 2022, even if they have started before the grant application was submitted.

Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2018/1046 (the ‘Financial Regulation’) applies to this Programme. It lays down rules on the implementation of the Union budget, including the rules on grants.

(25) This Regulation lays down a financial envelope for the Fund, which is to constitute the prime reference amount, within the meaning of point 18 of the Inter-institutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources 2 (Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020), for the European Parliament and for the Council during the annual budgetary procedure.

(26) In accordance with the Financial Regulation, Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 3 , Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2988/95 4 , Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 5 and Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 6 , the financial interests of the Union are to be protected through proportionate measures, including the prevention, detection, correction and investigation of irregularities and fraud, the recovery of funds lost, wrongly paid or incorrectly used and, where appropriate, the imposition of administrative sanctions. In particular, in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 and Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) may carry out investigations, including on-the-spot checks and inspections, with a view to establishing whether there has been fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) may investigate and prosecute fraud and other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union as provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council 7 . In accordance with the Financial Regulation, any person or entity receiving Union funds is to fully cooperate in the protection of the Union’s financial interests, to grant the necessary rights and access to the Commission, OLAF, the EPPO and the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and to ensure that any third parties involved in the implementation of Union funds grant equivalent rights.

(27) Pursuant to Article 94 of Council Decision 2013/755/EU 8 , persons and entities established in overseas countries and territories (OCTs) are eligible for funding subject to the rules and objectives of the Instrument and possible arrangements applicable to the Member State to which the relevant overseas country or territory is linked.

(28) Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 TEU. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.