Considerations on COM(2013)410 - Implementation of the Single European Sky (recast) - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2013)410 - Implementation of the Single European Sky (recast). |
|---|---|
| document | COM(2013)410  |
| date | October 23, 2024 |
| (2) | The adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of the first package of the Single European Sky legislation, namely, Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004, (EC) No 551/2004, and (EC) No 552/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6), laid down a firm legal basis for a seamless, interoperable and safe air traffic management (ATM) system. The adoption of the second package, namely, Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7), further strengthened the Single European Sky initiative by introducing the concepts of ‘performance scheme’ and ‘Network Manager’ to further improve the performance of the European ATM network. Regulation (EC) No 552/2004 has been repealed by Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council (8), as the rules necessary for interoperability of ATM systems, constituents and procedures have been incorporated in Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. |
| (3) | In order to take into account the changes introduced in Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, it is necessary to align this Regulation with that Regulation and to amend the latter. |
| (4) | Detailed rules on the use of airspace, operational provisions regarding services and procedures in air navigation and rules and procedures for the design of airspace structures are regulated under Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, whereas the classification of airspace should be regulated under this Regulation. |
| (5) | In Article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed in Chicago on 7 December 1944 (the ‘Chicago Convention’), the Contracting States recognise that ‘every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory’. It is within the framework of such sovereignty that the Member States of the Union, subject to applicable international conventions, exercise the powers of a public authority when controlling air traffic. |
| (6) | This Regulation should not affect Member States rights and responsibilities under the Chicago Convention. |
| (7) | Implementation of the common transport policy requires an efficient air transport system allowing the safe, regular and sustainable operation of air transport services, optimising the use of airspace and capacity, contributing to aviation sustainability and facilitating the free movement of goods, persons and services. |
| (8) | The simultaneous pursuit of the goals of augmentation of air traffic safety standards and improvement of the overall performance of ATM and air navigation services (ANS) for general air traffic in Europe requires that the human factor be taken into account. Therefore, the Member States should uphold ‘just culture’ principles. The opinions and recommendations of the Commission Expert Group on the Human dimension of the Single European Sky established by Commission Decision (EU) 2023/2109 (9) should be considered and taken into account. |
| (9) | Improvements in the climate and environmental performance of ATM also contribute to the achievement of the objectives contained in the Paris Agreement, in Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10), in Council conclusions on the Commission’s Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy and in the Digital Agenda for Europe, in particular through the reduction of aviation emissions. |
| (10) | A more efficient use of airspace, allowing for more options in terms of optimal flight trajectories, would lead to increased fuel efficiency and reduced emissions. Various climate and environmental elements should also be taken into account when optimising flight trajectories and flight profiles, in order to reduce emissions and air pollutants. A methodology on how to take into account those various elements and their interdependencies should be developed, in particular when designing performance indicators. |
| (11) | Airspace is a common resource for all categories of users that needs to be used flexibly by all of them, ensuring fairness and transparency while taking into account the security and defence needs of Member States and their commitments within international organisations. |
| (12) | In 2004, Member States adopted a general statement on military issues related to the Single European Sky (11), which they have reiterated. According to that statement, Member States should, in particular, enhance civil-military cooperation and, if and to the extent deemed necessary by all Member States concerned, facilitate cooperation between their armed forces in all matters of air traffic management. |
| (13) | Decisions relating to the content, scope or carrying out of military operations and training do not fall within the sphere of competence of the Union under Article 100(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. |
| (14) | Article 9a of Regulation (EC) No 550/2004 provided for the establishment by Member States of functional airspace blocks with a view to enhancing cooperation between air navigation service providers in order to improve performance and create synergies, and regulated such airspace blocks. Member States may maintain the cooperation and coordination within such formerly established airspace blocks with the view to fostering the performance of the air traffic management network within the Single European Sky, in particular by submitting joint performance plans, provided in particular that this does not affect the efficient implementation of this Regulation. |
| (15) | Member States should nominate a national supervisory authority in order to assume the tasks assigned to such authority under this Regulation. To ensure consistent and sound oversight of service provision across Europe, the national supervisory authorities should be guaranteed sufficient independence and resources. In particular, the financing of those authorities should guarantee their independence and should allow them to operate in accordance with the principles of fairness, transparency, non-discrimination and proportionality. This should not prevent a national supervisory authority from being joined with another regulatory authority, such as the national competent authority or the national competition authority, if the joint authority fulfils the independence requirements and provided that the decisions related to the tasks conferred on the national supervisory authority under this Regulation are taken independently from other tasks conferred on the joint authority. |
| (16) | Appropriate procedures for appointing the staff of national supervisory authorities should contribute to guaranteeing the independence of those authorities. Staff of national supervisory authorities should act independently, in particular by avoiding conflicts of interest between air navigation service provision and the execution of their tasks. The rules regarding conflicts of interest for staff and persons who take decisions exercising the powers defined in this Regulation should also prevent possible conflicts of interest arising from their active assignment to a national supervisory authority in connection with a new position in a regulated entity for the time immediately following the end of their assignment to that national supervisory authority. |
| (17) | Procedures should be put in place to ensure the cooperation and exchange of information between the national supervisory authority and the national competent authority with the view to ensuring the proper application of this Regulation. |
| (18) | Requirements for the granting of a certification regarding financial robustness, liability, insurance cover and ownership and organisational structure have a strong link to the safety and security requirements for the provision of services and to the operational and technical oversight to be carried out by a national competent authority. In respect of certification, oversight, and enforcement activities relating to the requirements regarding financial robustness, liability, insurance cover, ownership and organisational structure listed in point 7 of Annex VIII to Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Member States should arrange their administrative processes in accordance with their national arrangements to ensure proper and efficient execution of the tasks of both national competent and supervisory authorities. |
| (19) | National supervisory authorities have a key role to play in the implementation of the Single European Sky and they should therefore cooperate with each other in order to enable the exchange of information on their work and decision making principles, best practices and procedures as well as with regard to the application of this Regulation and to develop a common approach, including through enhanced cooperation at regional level. This cooperation should take place on a regular basis in the context of the National Supervisory Authorities Cooperation Board. |
| (20) | Cooperation between air navigation service providers is an important tool for improving the overall performance of the European ATM system and should be encouraged. |
| (21) | An air navigation service provider should be able to offer services in the Union under non-discriminatory conditions where it holds a certificate or a declaration pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139. |
| (22) | In accordance with Article 2(5) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 and subject to the conditions set out therein, Member States should be able to allow the provision of air navigation services referred to in Article 2(3), point (c) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 under their responsibility by the military without certification where the military offers such services primarily to aircraft movements other than general air traffic. In such cases, the Member State concerned should inform the Commission and the other Member States of its decision. |
| (23) | This Regulation does not require the certification of signals provided by Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). |
| (24) | There should be no discrimination between airspace users regarding the provision of equivalent air navigation services. |
| (25) | Air traffic services should be provided on an exclusive basis. Providers of such services should be subject to designation and public interest requirements. In that respect, it should be taken into account that the provision of air traffic services which are connected with the exercise of the powers of a public authority and are not of an economic nature is not subject to the application of Treaty rules on competition. |
| (26) | The designation process should take into account the need for service continuity and long-term investment planning by air traffic service providers. Notwithstanding the above, the fast-evolving context of air navigation requires that monitoring of the rights and obligations of designated air traffic service providers is performed to ensure that those rights and obligations remain fully applicable and that those obligations are fulfilled. Where Member States consider it necessary to launch a new designation process in the context of their monitoring, they should be able to designate the same air traffic service provider, in accordance with national law. |
| (27) | Member States should ensure that the designation of an air traffic service provider is not prevented by their national law on the grounds in particular that the service provider concerned has its principal place of business in another Member State or is owned by nationals of that Member State where the application of such national law entails an unjustified restriction of the freedom to provide services or the freedom of establishment, which should be assessed on a case-by-case basis in the light of all relevant circumstances. |
| (28) | Air traffic service providers may procure communication, navigation and surveillance services (CNS), aeronautical information services (AIS), air traffic data services (ADS), or meteorological services (MET) in cases where Member States have not designated a MET provider, under market conditions, or under other forms of agreements where Directives 2014/24/EU (12) and 2014/25/EU (13) of the European Parliament and of the Council do not apply, taking into account specific situations such as lack of solutions available on the market and considerations relating to the public interest. Member States may allow airport operators or a group of airport operators to procure terminal air traffic services for aerodrome control or air traffic services for approach control under market conditions. |
| (29) | Where air traffic services for aerodrome control and approach control are procured, they should not be subject to performance target setting set out in this Regulation. The service providers should nevertheless provide data on the performance of the air navigation services. Where air traffic services for aerodrome control and approach control are procured, technical requirements in the tender specifications should include requirements on service quality. |
| (30) | Air navigation service providers should keep separate accounts for each air navigation service as they would be required to do if these services were carried out by separate undertakings with a view to avoiding discrimination, cross-subsidisation and distortion of competition. |
| (31) | Where applicable, the procurement of air navigation services should be carried out in accordance with Directive 2014/24/EU, Directive 2014/25/EU, and with the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency as well as with the applicable provisions of the Treaty, in particular the Treaty rules on the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment. The tender procedures for the procurement of services should be designed so as to enable the effective participation of competing providers in these procedures, including through regular reopening of competition. |
| (32) | The traffic management of unmanned aircraft requires the availability of common information services (CIS). When CIS are provided by a single CIS provider designated by the Member State in respect of a specific U-space airspace, the prices of CIS should be regulated in order to contain the costs of such traffic management. Prices of CIS should therefore be based on cost and a reasonable mark-up for profit, and should be subject to approval by national supervisory authorities. Where CIS are not provided by a single CIS provider, the individual CIS should be provided for free. To enable the provision of the service, access to relevant operational data should be granted to CIS providers on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. |
| (33) | Availability of relevant operational data with respect to general air traffic is essential for enabling the flexible provision of air traffic data services, on cross-border and on Union-wide bases. Therefore, such data should be made available to relevant stakeholders including to entities having a proven interest in considering the provision of air navigation services, on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms. Accuracy of information including on airspace status and on specific air traffic situations and timely distribution of this information to civil and military controllers has a direct impact on the safety and efficiency of operations, including the environmental efficiency of flights. Timely access to up-to-date information on airspace status is essential for all parties wishing to take advantage of airspace structures made available when filing or re-filing their flight plans. |
| (34) | The performance and charging schemes should not apply to terminal air navigation services provided at airports with less than 80 000 air transport movements per year performed using instrument flight rules (IFR). The setting of performance targets for such services would have little added value as such targets would, in most cases, be close to zero. Moreover, submitting those services to the performance and charging schemes set up by this Regulation would lead to a disproportionate administrative and financial burden compared to the expected benefits in terms of performance improvement and better service quality. However, Member States may decide that such terminal air navigation services are subject to the performance and charging schemes. |
| (35) | Militaries which provide air navigation services primarily to aircraft movements other than general air traffic, including their financing, should not be subject to the performance and charging schemes set up by this Regulation. Therefore, the costs of their services should not be regarded as determined costs under this Regulation. However, Member States may decide to apply those schemes to militaries which provide such services. The performance and charging schemes should apply to militaries which provide air navigation services primarily to general air traffic. |
| (36) | The performance and charging schemes should ensure efficient, sustainable and continuous operation of the European ATM system and are also intended to make air navigation services provided under conditions other than market conditions more cost-efficient and to promote better service quality. To this end, they should include relevant and appropriate incentives. In view of this objective, the performance scheme should not cover services supplied under market conditions. The performance scheme should cover all air navigation services which a designated air traffic service provider provides or procures from other service providers, including when that service provider provides air navigation services and air traffic services. |
| (37) | Member States may develop joint performance plans for air navigation services with the aim of improving the level of performance of air traffic management beyond the level which would be achievable on an individual Member State’s basis, covering at least the duration of the reference period; Member States should include in those joint plans at least one joint target and initiatives on cross-border cooperation, while considering the added value of setting other joint targets, conducting joint procurement and establishing joint governance. |
| (38) | When adopting implementing acts to set out incentive schemes, the Commission should define the applicability of such schemes to situations where air navigation service providers go beyond or do not comply with the relevant binding performance targets for air navigation services during the reference period. Without prejudice to the measures that are to be implemented by the air traffic service provider to mitigate the impact of such events, the applicability criteria should take due consideration of unforeseeable and significant events outside the air traffic service provider’s control. In order to promote better service quality, those performance and charging schemes should include relevant and appropriate incentives. Financial incentives should be set with a view to encouraging better air navigation service performance in a balanced manner by rewarding or penalising actual performance in relation to binding performance targets. |
| (39) | Revenues from charges imposed on airspace users could result in financial surpluses or losses for air navigation service providers due to the application of the incentive schemes and the risk-sharing mechanisms. |
| (40) | A Performance Review Board (PRB) should be established to advise and assist the Commission in the implementation of the performance and charging schemes. The set up of the PRB should guarantee that its tasks are carried out with the required expertise and independence from public or private interests, and is able to rely on dedicated resources. The PRB should replace and succeed to the Performance Review Body established under Article 11(2) of Regulation (EC) No 549/2004. |
| (41) | The PRB should be supported by a secretariat provided by the Commission. For the purpose of preparing the content and orientations of the opinions, recommendations, reports and guidance material of the PRB, the secretariat should act without taking any directives except from the PRB itself in order to enable the PRB to fulfil its advisory role and to ensure the PRB independence. The main task of the secretariat should be to contribute to the independent execution of the tasks of the PRB. |
| (42) | The staff of the secretariat is subject to the rules on professional secrecy and on conflict of interest included in the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the Union, laid down in Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68 (14), which ensure their independence. The selection process and eligibility criteria should be detailed in an implementing act, which should not include the appointment of specific PRB members or make that appointment subject to approval of Member States in any way. |
| (43) | Given the cross-border and network elements inherent in the provision of air navigation services, en route performance should be assessed against Union-wide performance targets. |
| (44) | The national targets for the provision of terminal air navigation services should drive improvements in the performance of those services over time and enable a gate-to-gate approach for the regulation of air navigation services. |
| (45) | The Member States, the national supervisory authorities and the Commission should have clearly defined tasks in the performance and charging schemes, with respect in particular to the preparation of the performance plans, to the approval of those plans and to the monitoring of performance of air navigation service providers. |
| (46) | The key performance area of climate and environment should address the impact of aviation on the climate and environment that can be influenced by air navigation service providers, in particular the CO2 emissions. Performance plans should contain for each reference period en route performance targets consistent with Union-wide performance targets in the key performance areas of climate and environment, capacity and cost-efficiency, as well as terminal performance targets in the key performance areas of capacity and cost-efficiency. At the date of adoption of this Regulation, existing available data do not allow for the establishment, in the key performance area of climate and environment, of key performance indicators for terminal air navigation services which are valid, reliable, measurable and allow for measuring impacts in that area which can be directly influenced by the air navigation service providers. Therefore, Member States should be obliged to include in performance plans binding targets for terminal air navigation services in the key performance area of climate and environment only after the Commission has been able to set, in an implementing act, the key performance indicators meeting those conditions. The setting of binding performance targets for terminal air navigation services included in the performance plan should take into account local circumstances, in particular local environmental policy requirements. |
| (47) | The performance of the network functions should be subject to criteria specific to them, having regard to the peculiar nature of these functions. Those network functions should be subject to performance targets in the key performance areas of climate and environment, capacity and cost-efficiency. |
| (48) | The charging scheme set up by this Regulation should be consistent amongst others with Article 15 of the Chicago Convention. That scheme should be without prejudice to the possibility for Member States to finance the provision of air navigation services covered by this Regulation through public funds, insofar as it is in line with Treaty rules on competition where applicable. |
| (49) | The charging scheme should be based on the principle that airspace users should pay for the costs incurred in respect of services and functions for the benefit of airspace users which are not covered otherwise. The costs incurred in relation to the provision of air navigation services by Member States’ national authorities, including the national competent authorities and the national supervisory authorities as well as Eurocontrol and the Network Manager could be included in the determined costs eligible to be charged to airspace users. The charges should encourage safe, efficient, effective and sustainable provision of air navigation services with a view to achieving a high level of safety and cost-efficiency and meeting the performance targets and they should support the reduction of the environmental impact of aviation. |
| (50) | Costs stemming from the Eurocontrol International Convention relating to Cooperation for the Safety of Air Navigation of 13 December 1960, as last amended, could be included in the determined costs given that all activities covered by that Convention at the time of adoption of this Regulation are considered as related to air navigation services. |
| (51) | The Commission should carry out a feasibility study on the impact of the modulation of charges on air traffic, service provision, administrative costs and on stakeholders, as well as on the contribution of that modulation to the achievement of the Single European Sky objectives. Based on that study, the Commission should determine whether to adopt an implementing act to ensure the uniform application of modulation of charges to encourage airspace users to support improvements in climate and environmental performance, in particular through the use of the most fuel-efficient available routing, increased use of alternative clean propulsion technologies, including sustainable alternative fuels, while maintaining an optimum safety level. Even if the Commission does not adopt such an implementing act, Member States should have the right to modulate charges to encourage air traffic service providers and airspace users to support improvements in service quality such as increased capacity, reduced delays and sustainable development. |
| (52) | In the event of a network crisis, such as a geopolitical conflict, a health crisis or a natural disaster, which prevents the issuing of reliable traffic forecasts, the Commission should be able to adopt transitional provisions including a temporary suspension or adaptation of the performance scheme until the network crisis ends and the new reliable forecasts are available. |
| (53) | Without prejudice to the procedure laid down in Article 258 TFEU, the Commission should regularly review the compliance of Member States with this Regulation. When carrying out that review, the Commission should assess whether Member States ensure compliance by the air navigation service providers with their obligations. |
| (54) | Provision should be made for the transparency of the accounts of air navigation service providers, as one means of preventing cross-subsidisation and ensuing distortions. |
| (55) | ATM network functions should contribute to the sustainable development of the air transport system and support the achievement of Union-wide performance targets. They should lead towards the sustainable, efficient and environmentally optimal use of airspace and of scarce resources, reflect operational needs in the deployment of the European ATM network infrastructure and should provide support in the event of network crises. |
| (56) | A number of network functions, such as air traffic flow management, need to be coordinated centrally by a single body in support of actions taken by Member States and the relevant operational stakeholders. Therefore, a number of tasks contributing to the execution of these functions should be carried out by a Network Manager, whose action should involve all operational stakeholders concerned. The specific tasks of the Network Manager should be laid down in this Regulation. The Network Manager should be appointed by the Commission. |
| (57) | In 2011 and in 2019, the Commission appointed Eurocontrol as Network Manager. In order to ensure business continuity in the performance of the ATM network functions, that mandate could be renewed subject to the conditions laid down in this Regulation. |
| (58) | In the event that the Network Manager resides in another entity, there should be functional and hierarchical separation as well as separate accounting, from that entity. |
| (59) | Operational stakeholders which have to implement network functions at local and operational levels and Member States should be fully involved in the implementation of those functions and in the decision-making process. Accordingly, the Network Manager should take measures through cooperative decision-making based in particular on the consultation of operational stakeholders and Member States and on detailed working arrangements and processes for operation. In such a cooperative decision-making process, the parties should act to the maximum extent possible with a view to improving the functioning and performance of the network, including the achievement of Union-wide performance targets in the key performance area of climate and environment, and the interests of the network should prevail, without prejudice to security and defence needs, and that cooperative decision-making process should be such that issues are resolved and consensus found wherever possible. In the context of the cooperative decision-making process for the execution of the network functions, Member States should ensure adequate coordination at national level with the civil and military operational stakeholders. Moreover, to ensure the appropriate governance relating to the execution of the network functions, a Network Management Board, ensuring an appropriate representation of the interests of all the actors involved, in particular the operational stakeholders, in the implementation of those functions, should be set up. Without prejudice to the consultation of the Network Management Board on regulatory or strategic decisions such as the endorsement of the Network Strategy Plan, the measures adopted through cooperative decision-making and by the Network Management Board should be operational or technical in nature, ensuring the day-to-day operation of the network in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation. |
| (60) | To enhance the customer focus of air traffic service providers, relevant stakeholders should be consulted in major operational decisions of the air traffic service providers. |
| (61) | The provision of complete, high-quality and timely aeronautical information has a significant impact on safety and on facilitating access to Union airspace and the possibilities of moving within it. Therefore, access to those data should be facilitated through an appropriate information infrastructure. |
| (62) | The safe and efficient use of airspace can only be achieved through close cooperation between civil and military airspace users, which in practice is mainly based on the concept of flexible use of airspace and effective civil-military coordination as established by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). With a view to ensuring the uniform application of this concept, the Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing acts, within the limits of the common transport policy and without prejudice to Member States’ responsibilities for their airspace. |
| (63) | The Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) project is aimed at enabling the safe, efficient and environmentally sustainable development of air transport by modernising the European and global ATM system. In order to contribute to its full effectiveness, proper coordination between the phases of the project should be ensured. The European ATM Master Plan should result from the SESAR definition phase, and should contribute to achieving the Union-wide performance targets. For the period 2022-2027, the European Commission and the SESAR Deployment and Infrastructure Partnership (SDIP) – a consortium comprising 20 major European airspace users, air navigation service providers and airport operators, and Eurocontrol as Network Manager – signed a long-term Framework Partnership Agreement, in order for the SDIP to carry out tasks related to the timely and synchronised implementation of common projects (Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/116 (15) ) and monitoring by coordinating and supporting the stakeholders concerned. |
| (64) | The concept of common projects should aim at implementing, in a timely, coordinated and synchronised manner, the essential operational changes identified in the European ATM Master Plan which have a network-wide impact and have reached sufficient maturity for implementation. In particular, common projects should promote and accelerate the uptake of new digital technologies. The Commission should be charged with carrying out a cost-benefit analysis in respect of the funding of the implementation of common projects with a view to speeding up the deployment of the SESAR project. |
| (65) | Compliance with the requirements for ATM systems and constituents established by Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 should ensure the interoperability of those systems and constituents for the benefit of the Single European Sky. |
| (66) | In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, in particular with regard to the PRB, the implementation of the performance and charging schemes, including on the setting of Union-wide performance targets and complementary baseline values, alert thresholds, breakdown values and benchmark groups, the setting of performance targets and the criteria and conditions for their assessment, the preparation, assessment, approval and revision of the performance plans, including joint performance plans, and performance targets, the monitoring of performance, including of performance of network functions, the allocation of costs between en route and terminal air navigation services, the setting of key performance indicators and indicators for monitoring, methodology for benchmarking, incentive schemes, rules on the modification of a terminal charging zone, rules for the provision of information on costs and charges, the content and establishment of the cost bases for charges and the setting of unit rates for air navigation services, incentive mechanisms and risk-sharing mechanisms, the modulation of charges, rules on the modalities of the provision of data by the national supervisory authorities to the Commission, a mechanism to address unforeseeable and significant events which have a material impact on the implementation of the performance and charging schemes, rules on the execution of the network functions, on the appointment of the Network Manager and the terms and conditions of such appointment, as well as the tasks and functioning of the Network Manager, on the Network Management Board, on cooperative decision-making process and the network governance mechanisms, requirements regarding the availability of operational data, application of the concept of flexible use of airspace, the establishment of common projects and the governance mechanisms applicable to them, as well as implementation of the ICAO airspace classification, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council (16). Where the committee delivers no opinion, the Commission should not adopt the draft implementing act. |
| (67) | The social and professional staff organisations should respectively be consulted on all proposed measures having significant social, technological and human dimension or performance related implications. At Union level, the Sectoral Dialogue Committee set up under Commission Decision 98/500/EC (17) and the Commission Expert Group on the Human dimension of the Single European Sky should also be consulted. |
| (68) | The penalties provided for with respect to infringements of this Regulation should be effective, proportional and dissuasive, without reducing safety. |
| (69) | This Regulation should not prevent the application by Member States of measures necessary to safeguard essential security or defence policy interests. Moreover, it does not affect the power of Member States to adopt provisions in relation to the organisation of their armed forces. That power may lead Member States to adopt measures to ensure that their armed forces have sufficient airspace for adequate education and training purposes. Provision should therefore be made for a safeguard clause to enable that power to be exercised. |
| (70) | It is appropriate to integrate in Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 the requirements linked to certification of air navigation service providers that were previously laid down in Regulation (EC) No 550/2004, to allow for a simplified regulatory framework for certification and a single certification process. In particular, it is appropriate to provide that, in order to be certified, providers of air traffic management and air navigation services (ATM/ANS) should demonstrate sufficient financial robustness and obtain appropriate liability and insurance cover, comply with applicable requirements on ownership and organisational structure and manage security risks. The conditions that may be applied to the certificates issued should also be specified. |
| (71) | Moreover, essential requirements applicable to ATM/ANS and air traffic controllers should be supplemented with respect to requirements applicable to air traffic data services. |
| (72) | For the purpose of performing their tasks of certification, oversight and enforcement in relation to the essential requirements relating to financial robustness, liability, insurance cover, ownership and organisational structure, the competent authority should rely on the assessments made by the national supervisory authority, unless the national competent authority concerned is responsible for all tasks related to certification. |
| (73) | Since Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EC) No 551/2004 are replaced and repealed by this Regulation, it is appropriate to update the references made in Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 to Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004 and (EC) No 551/2004. |
| (74) | In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, in particular with regard to the conditions that may be applied to the providers of ATM/ANS’ certificates and concerning the rules and procedures for the assessment and oversight, by the national supervisory authority, of compliance of those providers with the essential requirements relating to financial robustness, liability, insurance cover, ownership and organisational structure, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011. |
| (75) | Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 should therefore be amended accordingly. |
| (76) | Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the implementation of the Single European Sky, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the transnational scale of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective, |