Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2023)771 - Amendment of Regulations (EU) 2016/1139, (EU) 2018/973 and (EU) 2019/472 as regards the targets for fixing fishing opportunities - Main contents
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| dossier | COM(2023)771 - Amendment of Regulations (EU) 2016/1139, (EU) 2018/973 and (EU) 2019/472 as regards the targets for fixing fishing ... |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2023)771  |
| date | 06-12-2023 |
•Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
The European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulations (EU) 2016/1139 1 , (EU) 2018/973 2 and (EU) 2019/472 3 establishing multiannual plans for certain stocks fished in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and the Western Waters, and for fisheries exploiting those stocks (‘the MAPs’). The MAPs are one of the main instruments to achieve the objectives of the common fisheries policy (‘CFP’).
In accordance with the principles, objectives and content set out in Articles 9 and 10 of Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 (‘the CFP Regulation’) 4 , the MAPs set out targets and measures for the long-term management of certain stocks and fisheries at sea basin level, including safeguards and remedial actions where needed. In addition, the MAPs provide for flexibility by allowing the fixing of fishing opportunities within the ‘range of FMSY’, as defined in Article 2(2) of the Baltic and Western Waters MAPs, and in Article 2(1) of the North Sea MAP.
The MAPs contain an identical provision in Article 4(6) of the Baltic and North Sea MAPs and Article 4 i of the Western Waters MAP, which provides that ‘fishing opportunities shall in any event be fixed in such a way as to ensure that there is less than a 5 % probability of the spawning stock biomass falling below Blim’ (‘the 5% rule’) 5 .
However, under certain circumstances relating to the status of a given fish stock and the short-term forecast for its biomass development, the application of the 5% rule may result in a situation that would be inconsistent with the other rules of the MAPs governing the fixing of fishing opportunities and have potentially severe socioeconomic implications.
On the one hand, the 5% rule may mean that fishing opportunities cannot be set and the targeted fishery must be suspended. On the other hand, the safeguard provisions in the MAPs require the adoption of remedial measures to bring the stock above Btrigger, based on a case-by-case assessment on the appropriateness for choosing such measure, in accordance with the criteria set out in the MAPs. Moreover, the MAPs refer to the possibility, and not the obligation, to suspend the targeted fishery, provided that such a measure is considered appropriate in accordance with the criteria set out in the MAPs.
For those reasons, it is therefore appropriate to delete the 5% rule in the MAPs.
•Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area
The proposal is consistent with the CFP Regulation and will ensure the internal consistency of the rules of the MAPs governing the fixing of yearly fishing opportunities by the Council.
•Consistency with other Union policies
The proposal is consistent with other Union policies, in particular with the policies in the field of the environment.
2.LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
•Legal basis
The proposal amends the MAPs and is therefore based on the same legal basis, namely Article 43(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
•Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
The proposal falls under the Union’s exclusive competence as referred to in Article 3(1)(d) TFEU. Therefore, the subsidiarity principle does not apply.
•Proportionality
The objective of this proposal is to ensure the internal consistency of the rules of the MAPs governing the fixing of yearly fishing opportunities by the Council. The proposed modification is necessary to do so and the most suitable measure to achieve this objective.
•Choice of the instrument
Given that the proposal amends existing regulations, the most appropriate legal instrument is a regulation.
3.RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
•Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation
Not applicable.
•Stakeholder consultations
In 2023, the Commission discussed the 5% rule with stakeholders, notably the Baltic Sea Advisory Council and the regional CFP group of EU Member States of the Baltic Sea (‘BaltFish’). The majority of stakeholders expressed their deep concerns about the consistency of the 5% rule with the other rules of the MAPs governing the fixing of fishing opportunities and its potentially severe socio-economic implications.
•Collection and use of expertise
Each year, the Union seeks scientific advice on the state of important fish stocks from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (‘ICES’) 6 . ICES scientific advice is based on an internal advice framework developed by its expert groups and decision-making bodies, which incorporates a precautionary approach based on a risk of no more than 5% in the long term that a stock falls below Blim 7 . Moreover, ICES scientific advice is issued in line with the framework partnership agreement with the Commission.
•Impact assessment
The objective of this proposal is to ensure the internal consistency of the rules of the MAPs governing the fixing of yearly fishing opportunities by the Council. The proposed amendment of the MAPs is necessary to do so and the most suitable measure to achieve this objective. This is a targeted and limited amendment of a specific provisions of the MAPs, which aims to address an internal inconsistency in those regulations. Given that there are no policy options, no impact assessment or public consultation is necessary.
•Regulatory fitness and simplification
The proposal contains no new rules or new administrative procedures proposed for (Union or national) public authorities that could increase administrative burden. It also has no link with regulatory burdens, micro-enterprises, SMEs or digital matters.
•Fundamental rights
The proposal does not have any foreseeable consequences for the protection of fundamental rights.
The proposal has no implications for the Union budget.
5.OTHER ELEMENTS
•Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
Not applicable.
•Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
See Section 1 ‘context of the proposal’ above.