Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2021)278 - Establishment and operation of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis

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dossier COM(2021)278 - Establishment and operation of an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis.
source COM(2021)278
date 02-06-2021


1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

• General context

The Schengen area 1 is one of the most significant achievements of the European Union. It has enhanced the freedom of movement by enabling more than 420 million people to move without being subject to internal border controls, as well as facilitating the cross-border delivery of goods and services, bringing significant social and economic benefits to our societies.

The Schengen cooperation, which started between five Member States under an intergovernmental framework with the signing of the ‘Schengen Agreement’ on 14 June 1985, has considerably expanded since it was first established. For the last 35 years, the EU has witnessed a continuous evolution towards the establishment of a well-functioning area without internal border controls and a reinforced sense of mutual trust among Member States. Today, it faces a different reality and different challenges than when it was established. Instability in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond, the 2015 refugee crisis and its consequences, the persistent terrorist threat and the COVID-19 pandemic have put considerable strain on Schengen and even led to some Member States reintroducing internal border controls for a protracted period.

To address the challenges faced by the Schengen area, Commission President von der Leyen announced a strategy on Schengen in her 2020 State of the Union address 2 . In the New Pact on Migration and Asylum 3 , the Commission indicated that the Schengen Strategy would combine legislative and operational initiatives aimed at ensuring a stronger, more resilient area without internal border controls, while reinforcing its governance and monitoring structures. One such initiative is the revision of the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism (hereinafter: ‘the Schengen evaluation mechanism’ or ‘the Mechanism’).

The Schengen area is supported by a significant body of measures that compensate for the absence of controls at internal borders, facilitate free movement, and ensure a high level of security and justice. The Schengen acquis comprises the provisions integrated into the framework of the Union in accordance with Protocol No 19 annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU), together with the acts building upon them or otherwise related to them. The acquis thus includes i measures at the external borders (external border management), i compensatory measures (common visa policy, police cooperation, return policy and the Schengen Information System), and i a robust evaluation and monitoring mechanism. The Schengen acquis also comprises requirements on data protection and the respects for other fundamental rights. The above-mentioned three essential and complementary pillars underpin Schengen and make the area without controls at internal borders possible. The overall stability of this complex architecture depends on the strength of each individual pillar and on the coherence and cohesion of the whole system.

A well-functioning Schengen area depends on the correct and efficient implementation of the common rules, i.e. the Schengen acquis and, in more general terms, on mutual trust among Member States. A deficiency or lack of implementation in one Member State can affect all others and subsequently put the Schengen area at risk. The monitoring of how Member States implement the Schengen acquis and the follow-up based on commonly agreed recommendations for improvement are a core element of the governance structures of Schengen. Already in 1998, the contracting parties of the Schengen Convention set up a Standing Committee with a mandate to identify shortcomings in the implementation of the Schengen acquis and to propose solutions 4 . Following the integration of the Schengen acquis into the EU legal framework, the Decision setting up the Standing Committee was replaced by Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 5 (hereinafter: ‘the Regulation’) which currently provides the legal basis for the Mechanism. The Regulation became operational in 2015.

The purpose of the Schengen evaluation mechanism is to maintain a high level of mutual trust among participating Member States and thereby contribute to a well-functioning Schengen area by guaranteeing that Member States apply Schengen rules effectively. The Mechanism should achieve these goals by impartial and objective evaluations that are able to identify deficiencies in the application of the legislation in practice and ensure that those deficiencies are swiftly addressed.

Although the Mechanism can legally cover the entire Schengen acquis, the practice is that the specific policy areas for evaluation are decided for each multiannual evaluation cycle by the Commission together with the Member States. Based on this practice, the first and the second multiannual evaluation cycles covered specific evaluations to assess the implementation of measures in the areas of external border management, return, common visa policy, police cooperation, the Schengen Information System (SIS), data protection and the absence of controls at the internal borders. Other policy areas falling under the Schengen acquis in the future could be part of the Mechanism if so decided in the multiannual evaluation programme established by the Commission. In this context and based on this practice, the Mechanism also covers, but only with a view to concluding whether a Member State is ready to apply all or parts of the Schengen legal framework, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, legislation on firearms, and drugs policy.

According to the Regulation, the Commission is responsible for the overall coordination and organisation of the evaluation and monitoring, while keeping the European and national Parliaments informed on the results of evaluations. In accordance with Article 70 TFEU, the Mechanism remains a shared responsibility: the Commission carries out evaluations jointly with experts from the Member States and supported by Union bodies, offices and agencies. This peer-to-peer approach is crucial to ensure accountability, ownership of results, and mutual trust. Member State experts check what their peers are doing, recommending solutions and urging for action if the Member State does not implement them. Furthermore, the Council is associated in the decision-making process when it comes to adopting recommendations upon a Commission proposal.

• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

Given the challenges faced by the Schengen area in recent years and the role of the Mechanism in the governance of Schengen, it is important that the Mechanism remains fit for purpose and reaches its full potential to be able to adapt to recent legislative developments, address new challenges and include new Member States that are fully or partly applying the Schengen acquis.

Article 22 of the Regulation required the Commission to undertake a review of the operation of the Regulation within six months of the adoption of all evaluation reports under the first multiannual evaluation programme (2015-2019). The Commission presented its review in a report 6 and accompanying staff working document 7 on 25 November 2020, covering all the elements of the Regulation, including the functioning of the procedures for adopting acts under the Mechanism.

The review concludes that the Mechanism has brought about tangible improvements. Member States are, overall, implementing the Schengen acquis adequately and serious deficiencies have been duly addressed. It confirms that the Mechanism as such provides a solid framework for evaluating and monitoring the implementation of the Schengen acquis.

However, the review identifies significant shortcomings in the cumbersome process of the Mechanism, with the evaluation process and follow-up and implementation of the action plans taking an excessive amount of time. The Council recommendations have also not proved to be a sufficiently effective tool to ensure that Member States take rapid action, as the technical nature of the process has not generated sufficient political pressure to act. While evaluations identified serious deficiencies in 10 evaluation visits 8 , ministerial discussion only took place once, in the case of Greece’s serious deficiencies in the external border management.

The Mechanism also does not appear to be generating enough trust amongst Member States, given that several Member States have for the last five years continued to prolong internal border controls, despite positive evaluations in external border management, police cooperation and the Schengen Information System, and an overall assessment that Member States are implementing the Schengen acquis adequately. In addition, the review finds that the current rigidity of the Mechanism does not allow it to adapt to new circumstances and new operational and legislative developments.

The review concludes that a number of shortcomings prevent the Mechanism from working as effectively as it could and should, undermining its full potential. These shortcomings are:

(1)the excessive length of the evaluation process (10-12 months) and the time for Member States to implement recommendations (2 years);

(2)insufficient capacity of Member States to contribute an adequate number of experts for the evaluations, with 5 Member States providing one third of all experts and with chronic deficit of experts in specific policy fields;

(3)suboptimal use and efficiency of unannounced visits as well as of the other evaluation and monitoring tools, in particular thematic evaluations;

(4)slow follow-up and implementation of the action plans and lack of a comprehensive and consistent approach to monitoring the implementation; and

(5)apart from the evaluation of the right to protection of personal data, the assessment of the respect for fundamental rights in the implementation of the Schengen acquis is not sufficiently integrated in the Mechanism.

The review indicated that some of these shortcomings could be addressed at operational level, but others would require legislative changes.

The European Parliament and the Council have both stressed the need to reform the Mechanism. The European Parliament, in its 2017 resolution 9 , and the Council, already through the consultation launched by the Finnish Presidency in 2019 10 , invited the Commission to act. More recently, the Council adopted Conclusions on the Mechanism 11 inviting the Commission to put forward initiatives for improvement of the overall efficiency of the Mechanism and to ensure it remains flexible, adaptable to the evolving circumstances and developments of the Schengen acquis in order to address new challenges and to adapt to new realities.

Following the conclusions of the 5-year review, the Commission concluded that the above-mentioned shortcomings could be summarised as three interlinked challenges:

–Limited strategic focus and significant fragmentation, preventing an overview of the functioning of the Schengen area as a whole that could otherwise facilitate political discussion;

–Insufficient capacity to identify, adapt and quickly react or adapt to new circumstances, legislative and operational developments ; and

–Slow adoption and implementation of remedies, with a peer-to-peer system that does not exert the expected pressure.

On the basis of the input gathered from relevant stakeholders in the accompanying impact assessment, the Commission identified several policy options summarised under section 3 aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the Mechanism and thereby ensuring a more transparent, effective and consistent implementation of the Schengen acquis.

To address the above-mentioned problems, this proposal intends to: i increase the strategic focus of the Mechanism and ensure a more proportionate use of the different evaluation tools; i shorten and simplify the procedures to make the process more effective and efficient, and increase peer-pressure; i optimise the participation of Member State experts and the cooperation with Union bodies, offices and agencies; and i strengthen the evaluation of the respect for fundamental rights under the Schengen acquis. These objectives will be met notably by the following approach:

(1) Increase the strategic focus of the Mechanism and ensure a more proportionate and strategic use of the different evaluation and monitoring tools

–Increasing the flexibility to adapt the scope of the specific evaluations and evaluation priorities to the new realities in the Schengen acquis by removing the current list of specific policy fields to be evaluated and establishing a procedure to decide on the priority fields at the beginning of each evaluation cycle. Under the current Regulation, each Member State has been evaluated in six policy fields through six individual evaluations that result in six evaluation reports and six sets of recommendations. However, those policy fields are no longer fully adapted to the new realities. For example, a new series of IT systems will become operational in 2023 and complement the Schengen Information System. As the security acquis develops, evaluations will need to take into account additional elements, particularly in police cooperation. Various policy areas, given legislative developments, are becoming increasingly interlinked and interdependent (for example Schengen Information System and return or Schengen Information System and police cooperation). Therefore, the articulation of evaluations into specific policy field evaluations might not be the most appropriate way to assess these interconnected activities. By removing the list of policy fields, the proposal increases flexibility to articulate evaluations differently, and evaluate different aspects or possible new elements, allowing the Mechanism to adapt quickly to the dynamic nature of the Schengen acquis. At the same time, it creates legal certainty as to the procedure to agree on the priorities for evaluation at the beginning of each evaluation cycle.

–Creating a flexible programming. In addition, the proposal creates a flexible legislative framework for programming. It adapts the rules on the multiannual and annual programming to be able to react more rapidly to emerging problems and challenges, by reducing the details that are currently included in the multiannual and annual evaluation programmes, and reducing the need for amendments.

–Moving progressively towards fully risk-based evaluations. The proposal creates an obligation to take into account the results of previous evaluations as well as other Union and national evaluation and monitoring mechanisms (e.g. the vulnerability assessment of Frontex or the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT)). In addition (as explained below), it creates additional obligations to request risk assessments and situational awareness from Union bodies, agencies and offices, where relevant. The new flexible framework and additional obligations would make it possible, over time, for example, to carry out a comprehensive risk-based Member State evaluation covering only the elements identified through risk analysis and situational awareness, with a single evaluation per Member State covering all relevant policy areas in a single evaluation report. It would also allow the concurrent evaluation of several Member States facing the same challenges.

–Ensuring there are no gaps when evaluating the implementation of the Schengen acquis in a Member State. As the Schengen legal framework evolves and becomes more complex, Member States are resorting to other actors to support them in the implementation of tasks that are under their responsibility. This is for example the case of private companies in the field of visa policy (e.g. the external service providers) or external borders (e.g. airlines or airports managed by private companies). It is also the case of Union bodies, agencies and offices that in recent years have seen their mandates strengthened to provide support to Member States, for example in carrying out border checks or surveillance, or second-line security checks. As the Mechanism strives to provide an overview of the situation in a Member State, the proposal clarifies that the Mechanism can support the verification of the activities of Union bodies, offices and agencies in so far as they perform functions on behalf of the Member States to assist in the operational application of provisions of the Schengen acquis. The objective is therefore not to evaluate these bodies, offices and agencies per se. The verification of these activities will be embedded in the evaluation of the Member States, similarly to the current situation when, for instance, during the evaluations in the field of common visa policy, the teams check the activities of those private companies (external service providers) that are involved in the reception of visa applications; or at the external borders when the teams check the infrastructure of an airport managed by a private company. This aspect of the evaluations will be carried out without prejudice to and in full respect of the responsibilities attributed to the Commission and to the relevant governing bodies of the agencies, offices and bodies concerned. Should evaluations identify deficiencies in relation to activities fulfilled or supported by Union bodies, offices and agencies, the Commission will inform the relevant governing bodies.

–Extending the evaluation cycle from five to seven years allowing for Member States to be evaluated at least twice during the seven-year cycle. This would also allow for a more balanced, flexible and strategic use of all available evaluation and monitoring tools, ensuring a closer and more targeted monitoring of Member States.

–Strengthening the forms and methods of evaluation and monitoring activities. Programmed periodic visits remain the primary method of evaluations but it will be possible to increase the proportion of unannounced visits. Evaluations and monitoring activities by remote means (e.g. via videoconference) will become possible. ‘Thematic evaluations’ will have an increasing role with an obligation to carry out at least one thematic evaluation per year. Thus far only two thematic evaluations have been carried out (one related to national integrated border management strategies and one regarding Local Schengen cooperation in the field of the common visa policy). Provisions on monitoring activities (revisits and a new tool called ‘verification visits’) are made clearer and more flexible.

–Unannounced evaluations would, as a general rule, not require any prior notification. This would ensure better use of unannounced evaluations, in particular for evaluations to take place for the purpose of investigate compliance with obligations under the Schengen acquis, in particular in response to indications of problems that have a significant impact on the functioning of the Schengen area, or serious allegations of fundamental rights violations. Limited prior notification will remain applicable for unannounced visits, the purpose of which is to carry out a ‘random health check’ of the Member States’ implementation of the Schengen acquis. Unannounced visits will not be subject to programming and they can be organised at short-notice depending on the circumstances.

–The yearly reports on the results of the evaluations carried out and state of play regarding the remedial actions taken by Member States foreseen under this Regulation should be part of the yearly ‘State of Schengen Report’. It is crucial that political discussion comprehensively covers all elements of the complex architecture supporting the proper functioning of Schengen. To this end, the Commission will relaunch the adoption of the ‘State of Schengen Report’ to serve as a basis for discussions at the recently created Schengen Forum. The Schengen evaluations, the situation as regards the absence of internal border checks and the state of implementation of recommendations will be an important part of that report.

(2) Shorten and simplify the procedures to make the process more effective and efficient and increase peer-pressure

–Significant acceleration of the evaluation process, with clear procedural deadlines. As a general rule, the Commission will adopt the evaluation reports and the recommendations in a single act within four months of the evaluation activity (and even faster in case the evaluation identifies a serious deficiency). This would not only ensure more clarity as regards the causal link between the findings in the report and recommendations, but also accelerate the process. It would avoid any delays in adopting recommendations, which now occurs in a two-step decision-making process (i.e. evaluation reports adopted by the Commission and recommendations adopted by the Council). The Council’s full involvement in the evaluation process and recommendations remains ensured through the examination procedure (positive opinion of the Schengen Committee in which all Member States participate and vote on the single act that comprises both the evaluation findings and recommendations).

–Increasing the peer-pressure by focusing the Council’s decision-making powers on politically relevant cases and by increasing its role in the follow-up and monitoring of the implementation of recommendations. While the current two-step procedure was intended to promote political discussion at Council level and exert peer-pressure in case of serious deficiencies or when a Member State is not implementing the recommendations, experience to date has clearly shown that the use of this approach in all cases and for all reports did not achieve the intended objective, but added considerably to the length and complexity of the process, compromising its effectiveness.

Member States are already heavily involved in the evaluation process (carrying out evaluations with the Commission, co-drafting the evaluation reports and draft recommendations) and in the adoption process of the evaluation report through the Committee examination procedure. In addition, most issues identified during the evaluations are of a technical rather than political character. The heavy workload in the Council (examination of 40 reports a year and resulting Council implementing decisions with hundreds of recommendations), and the very detailed and localised nature of recommendations prevented any real discussion. The 5-year review has shown the fact that the Council adopts the recommendations in every case did not generate the expected peer pressure, and the Mechanism did not provide the basis for a political discussion on the state of Schengen. Even when the Mechanism identified serious deficiencies, discussions on findings reached the ministerial level only once. Moreover, the Council has a very limited role in the follow-up and monitoring of the implementation of Member States’ action plans.

The proposed revision seeks to remedy these shortcomings by ensuring that the Council adopts recommendations in cases considered to have the biggest added value and impact to steer political discussion on matters of general interest for the functioning of the Schengen area. These cases are the following: thematic evaluations, ‘first-time evaluations’ (when deciding if a Member State is ready to apply the Schengen acquis in full or a specific area) as well as in the case of a serious deficiency with a view to increasing peer-pressure and political discussion at Council level. At the same time, procedures are proposed to be simplified for cases of more technical nature.

The proposal also significantly increases the role of the Council in the follow-up and progress monitoring of these cases providing as well for an escalation mechanism in case of lack of progress. In particular, in case of a serious deficiency, the Council will set time limits for the implementation of the recommendations and the Council will specify the frequency of the progress reports by the Member State concerned, which will have to submit these progress reports to both the Commission and the Council. The Council will be required to express its position on the Commission report following the revisit as well as on the closure of action plans. Similar provisions apply for the closure of action plans related to ‘first time evaluations’.

Furthermore, an increased role will be provided, in all cases, for the Council in the monitoring phase: the proposal provides that the Commission will inform the European Parliament and the Council at least twice a year about the state of implementation of the action plans. Besides, the Commission will also adopt annually a comprehensive report on the evaluations carried out which should be discussed by the Council in view of adopting conclusions on the matter. Finally, the Commission will inform the Council when a Member State is not making adequate progress in the implementation of the action plan.

–Strengthening and accelerating the provisions related to cases where evaluations identify a serious deficiency: a fast-track procedure for a serious deficiency is introduced to ensure that the deficiencies identified are addressed promptly. The proposal incorporates into the normative text the definition of serious deficiencies currently in the Schengen evaluation guidelines to increase legal certainty and ensure a common understanding of the concept. The evaluated Member State will have to start immediately implementing actions to remedy the deficiency even before the report is adopted and will have to inform the Commission and Member States without delay of the measures taken. In case of serious deficiency the recommendations should be adopted by the Council within 2 and a half months from the end of the evaluation activity; a revisit to verify the implemention of remedial actions will take place no later than one year after the evaluation (it could be earlier depending on the deadlines for implementing remedial actions set by the Council); the Commission will immediately inform the Council and the European Parliament of the existence of a serious deficiency, for closer political scrutiny, as shown in the point above.

–Removing and simplifying provisions that create unnecessary procedural obstacles. The proposal would no longer require that the evaluation reports are to be treated as ‘EU Restricted’ documents. This change will ‘increase transparency, simplify and speed-up the procedure by allowing quicker handling of reports and facilitating their transmission to the national Parliaments and the European Parliament 12 . Evaluation reports would nevertheless be treated as ‘sensitive’ 13 and Member States would retain the possibility to ask for their classification. The proposal would simplify the adequacy assessment of Member State action plans: the Commission will no longer adopt a Communication on the assessments, but it would still inform the Member State concerned (and the Council) about its observations for example, through an administrative letter. Finally, a reduced frequency of follow-up reports (Article 16 i and (4)), by requiring, a progress report every six months instead of the current three months, would decrease the overall administrative burden for Member States.

(3) Strengthen the evaluation of the respect for fundamental rights under the Schengen acquis

–Further strengtening the evaluation of fundamental rights when implementing the Schengen acquis (in addition to data protection which is evaluated as a specific policy field) throughout the Mechanism, including increased submission of risk analyses by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights; strengthening the reference to fundamental rights in the provision on training and including a specific provision in the Regulation regarding the use of the evidence supplied by third parties, including national monitoring mechanisms, as well as the possibility to carry out unannounced evaluations without prior notice, if there are indications of serious fundamental rights violations.

(4) Optimise the participation of Member State experts and the cooperation with Union bodies, offices and agencies, as well as synergies with other evaluation and monitoring mechanisms, for more targeted, strategic and tailored evaluations

–Creation of a pool of experts. Currently, the Commission issues invitations to nominate experts ahead of each and every evaluation (three months ahead of the specific evaluation). This is a very time-consuming exercise and the Member States are not always able to designate sufficient numbers of qualified experts as the current procedure offers them very little time to plan. In such cases, the Commission has to extend the calls for experts several times for evaluations. In addition, there is a chronic deficit of experts in specific policy fields.

This system will be replaced by an annual call to designate experts to a pool. Member States will have to designate at least an expert per policy field identified in the multiannual evaluation programme (e.g. visa, external border management, return, data protection) per year and ensure their availability for evaluations. The Commission will confirm the selection of experts to the pool and keep a list of the members of the pool up to date. The pool will then provide the main source of Schengen evaluators for specific evaluations (i.e. establishing teams for specific evaluations) and will also greatly facilitate the organisation of unannounced visits. When establishing the teams, due account will be taken of the capacity of the national administrations as well as the need to ensure geographical balance. The fact of being designated in the pool does not mean that every expert in the pool will be needed at all times. The pool will ensure that the teams are established in a less cumbersome way and will also provide more predictability and flexibility both for the Commission and the Member State experts also as the planning for evaluations will be distributed to all Member States well in advance. Ahead of each evaluation, the Commission can directly turn to individual members in the pool to set up teams, making the process considerably faster and simpler. When setting up the specific teams, the Commission should also ensure as far as possible geographical balance. If for a specific evaluation, a particular profile is needed and is not possible to mobilise an expert from the pool, the Commission can still resort to specific calls for experts. The creation of a pool of experts would in the long-term allow an interdisciplinary team to be set up to evaluate all relevant areas of the Schengen acquis.

–Strengthening the cooperation with Frontex, eu-LISA, Europol, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the European Data Protection Supervisor. The proposal provides that cooperation should be reciprocal so that those agencies and bodies can also make use of the information gathered through the evaluation process. The Commission will also be able to obtain a broader variety of information and risk analysis products from the bodies and agencies.

The proposal also increases the synergies with the evaluation and monitoring mechanisms implemented by Union agencies and bodies. In recent years, other quality control and monitoring mechanisms have been established at EU and national levels that can complement the Mechanism. The proposal provides for increased coherence and synergies with the activities of Frontex and the process of vulnerability assessment in particular. The vulnerability assessment carried out by Frontex is a complementary instrument to the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism for guaranteeing quality control at EU level and ensuring constant preparedness at both European and national levels to respond to any challenges at the external border. The vulnerability assessment offers a snapshot of a Member State’s operational capacity in the area of external borders with a view to identifying potential weaknesses in the system. It is a future oriented approach aimed at preventing crisis. The Commission is already sharing the results of the vulnerability assessment process with the team of Member State experts ahead of an evaluation in accordance with Article 33 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 14 and has established formal channels for information exchange with Frontex. To further increase synergies, the proposal provides for specific provisions to maximise the information gathered through the vulnerability assessment process with a view to establishing an improved situational picture on the functioning of the Schengen area. The aim is also to avoid, to the extent possible, duplication of efforts and conflicting recommendations.

Relevant examples, in other policy fields where increased synergies will be possible under the new provisions foreseen in the proposal are the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (‘EMPACT’) or the oversight conducted by the Commission with the support of eu-LISA as regards the preparation of the Member States for the implementation of relevant IT systems. National quality control mechanisms (encouraged under Regulation (EU) 2019/1896) could become similarly important in the future and the proposal lays down the basis for ensuring synergies and information exchange. In addition, results of the independent monitoring mechanism developed under the proposal introducing a screening of third country nationals at the external borders would also be taken into account in evaluations.

The proposal provides an ambitious deadline for the full application of the Regulation (from [1 September 2022]).

The analysis of the Commission, which is provided in the impact assessment 15 accompanying this proposal and summarised in section 3 is the basis for this proposal for a comprehensive review of the Regulation.

• Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

This proposal accompanies the Communication on ‘A strategy towards a fully functioning and resilient Schengen area’ 16 which puts forward a comprehensive approach to make the area of freedom, security and justice stronger and more resilient to any future challenges and threats.

The Mechanism should provide a robust legal framework to cover the entirety of the evolving legislation underpinning the functioning of the Schengen area. In this context, one of the specific objectives of the proposal is to increase strategic focus in the evaluation and monitoring process. This requires ensuring consistency with existing and future provisions forming part of the Schengen acquis. To that end, the Mechanism should be adapted to the evolving scope of the relevant EU law. Over the past few years, the Union has undertaken several initiatives to make the Schengen area stronger and more resilient. These changes include several new elements, in particular in relation to the management of the external borders. In addition to the Schengen Information System and the Visa Information System, by the end of 2023, the management of the external borders will be supported by new IT-systems, such as the Entry and Exit System 17 and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System 18 . In addition, interoperability 19 will be ensured between relevant databases. Furthermore, the adoption, later in 2021, of a proposal for an EU Police Cooperation Code under the EU Security Union Strategy 20 as well as the adoption of the proposal for an amendment to the Schengen Borders Code 21 to address lessons learnt from Covid-19 as well as from the negotiations on the 2017 proposal for the amendment of the Schengen Borders Code will be important initiatives to increase security and re-establish the integrity of the Schengen area.

The role of EU agencies involved in the implementation of the Schengen acquis has also gained further importance. In 2019, the creation of the European Border and Coast Guard, including the set-up of a 10 000 standing corps by 2027, was a key step towards the genuine European control of the external borders and the progressive establishment of a common EU system for returns. Europol’s mandate is in the process of being upgraded following a proposal by the Commission of 9 December 2020 22 .

As described in above, some of the legal acts in the various policy areas covered by the Mechanism contain their own evaluation and monitoring tools at European or national levels. Therefore, creating and ensuring synergies to avoid duplications and to make the best use of sectorial monitoring tools is necessary. Maintaining and fine-tuning this interplay is an important element of this proposal. In this regard, the proposal provides provisions to further increase coherence in particular with the activities of Frontex and the process of vulnerability assessments. The Mechanism and its recommendations should complement those under the vulnerability assessment process. Relevant examples, in other policy fields where increased synergies will be possible are EMPACT (priority actions in the field of police cooperation), or the fundamental rights officer at Frontex (monitoring of compliance with fundamental rights at external borders by Frontex). National quality control mechanisms (encouraged under Regulation (EU) 2019/1896), which are ‘national’ Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanisms, could become similarly important in the future. In addition, results of the national independent monitoring mechanism developed under the proposal introducing a screening of third country nationals at the external borders 23 would also be taken into account in evaluations.

The proposal was developed to be consistent with existing provisions in the policy area (i.e. policy areas covered by the Schengen acquis), and due account has also been taken of ongoing and envisaged initiatives which are not yet in force. In broader terms, by better linking the different policy fields, the initiative may reinforce the effectiveness of the holistic approach proposed by the Commission’s strategies and reinforce the complementarity of all tools developed as part of new legislative efforts.

• Consistency with other Union policies

The proposal is consistent with the objectives and initiatives envisaged under the EU Security Union Strategy that go beyond the Schengen acquis, such as the proposal to reinforce the automated exchange of important data categories under the Prüm Council Decisions 24 and with future initiatives under the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 25 . It is equally consistent with the initiatives included in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum 26 .

Looking beyond the area of freedom, security and justice, the Schengen area contributes to the functioning of the Single Market and its creation has brought social and economic benefits to European society 27 in many fields from trade to employment, education, culture, tourism, transport and beyond. Measures aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the Mechanism and thus the better functioning of the Schengen area are, by nature, also coherent with the objectives of these policy fields. The disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic has shown better than any crisis before, how important it is to preserve Schengen’s integrity. A well-functioning Schengen is essential for the post-Covid economic recovery. A robust and effective Mechanism will contribute to that and thus to the positive economic and social impacts that Schengen brings to citizens and businness across Europe.

2. LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

• Legal basis

The legal basis of the proposal is Article 70 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 70 provides specifically for the competence of the Council to adopt, on a proposal from the Commission, measures laying down the arrangements whereby Member States, in collaboration with the Commission, conduct objective and impartial evaluation of the implementation of the Union policies by Member States’ authorities in the area of freedom, security and justice. The proposal repeals and replaces Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013, which is also based on this provision of the Treaty.

In line with the statement 28 from the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission accompanying the Regulation, the proposal is to be submitted to the consultation of the European Parliament in order to take into consideration its opinion before the adoption of a final text. However, it is to be adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure.

• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)

Article 70 TFEU provides the legal basis for measures whereby Member States, in collaboration with the Commission, conduct objective and impartial evaluation of the implementation of the Union policies by Member States’ authorities in the area of freedom, security and justice. While this proposal brings about many changes, it does not fundamentally alter the objectives and scope of the Mechanism. The proposal is within the limits set by Article 70 TFEU.

The objective of the proposal is to further develop, improve and render the already existing Mechanism more efficient. The review of the Regulation carried out in 2020 confirmed the need to have a robust mechanism at EU level. It remains the case that the EU added-value of the Mechanism stems foremost from sharing the responsibilities between the Commission and the Member States. This creates a strong basis to generate mutual trust. Evaluations carried out at EU level can ensure the timely identification of deficiencies that arise from asymmetries, divergences and incorrect implementation of the Schengen acquis that may otherwise put at risk the integrity of Schengen. Furthermore, the peer pressure exercised at EU level creates the necessary incentive to ensure that Member States swiftly remedy the deficiencies particularly in the case of serious deficiencies.

In addition, the initiative takes due account of the subsidiarity principle by laying down the basis for improved coordination with evaluations carried out under national quality control and monitoring mechanisms. One of the objectives is to shift the focus of the Mechanism to shortcomings that may have adverse effects on the well-functioning of the Schengen area as a whole. Issues of limited scope should rather be dealt with at national level. This approach is also consistent with Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, which encourages the development of national quality control mechanisms under the European integrated border management components.

In conclusion, to effectively deal with the shortcomings identified by the review and analysed further in the impact assessment legislative changes are required.

• Proportionality

Article 5 i of the Treaty on European Union provides that the content and form of Union action must not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties. The form chosen for this action must enable the proposal to achieve its objective and be implemented as effectively as possible.

The Mechanism was established in 2013 by means of a Regulation since this specific Mechanism which is implemented at EU-level and coordinated by the Commission requires clear rules regarding the responsibilities and procedures. The proposed initiative constitutes a revision of a Regulation and must therefore also take the form of a Regulation.

As to the content, the proportionality of the main new aspects were examined in the accompanying impact assessment (section 7.3).

Amongst other things, the proposal is intended to streamline the evaluation process by simplifying the current two-step decision-making process, so that, as a general rule, the Commission would adopt not only the evaluation reports but also the recommendations by means of a single implementing act (currently the Commission adopts the report and a proposal for Council Recommendations). The experience of the past years has shown that the adoption of the recommendations by the Council makes the procedure considerably longer (2-3 months average) while the excessive workload limits the power of the Council to exert the required peer pressure and have general discussions on the state of Schengen. The revised approach seeks to remedy in a proportionate way these shortcomings by ensuring the Council recommendations are adopted in the cases considered to have the biggest added value and impact to steer political discussion on matters that are of general interest for the functioning of the Schengen area, namely first-time evaluations and serious deficiencies as well as thematic evaluations, while simplifying the procedure in cases of a more technical nature. The proposal also significantly increases the role of the Council in the follow-up and progress monitoring of these cases, providing as well for an escalation mechanism in case of lack of progress.

In conclusion, none of the changes proposed in this initiative go beyond what is needed to achieve the objectives outlined in section 1 and thus the proposal respects the proportionality principle. In fact, several elements of the proposal will reduce the administrative burden on Member States and the Commission.

• Choice of the instrument

Given that the proposed initiative is intended to revise and update an existing evaluation mechanism established by a Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013), it will also take the form of a Regulation.

3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

• Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation

In accordance with Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013, the Commission reviewed the operation of the Regulation and presented a report and accompanying staff working document on 25 November 2020 29 . As explained in section 1, this was the starting point of drafting the proposal.

• Stakeholder consultations

The consultation of interested parties is covered in detail in the impact assessment 30 accompanying this proposal. Stakeholders are generally supportive of strengthening the Mechanism to increase its effectiveness and to ensure that it is able to adapt to recent legislative developments and address new challenges.

• Impact assessment 31

Based on available data and the results of a broad stakeholder consultation, the Commission drew up four policy options each containing a series of measures to achieve the objectives. Option 1 only contains operational measures to align the implementation with current needs. Option 2 is targeted legislative amendments to the Regulation to clarify the scope of specific provisions to increase legal certainty about the obligations of the different actors involved, and streamline and simplify existing procedures. Option 3 is a more ambitious approach that would bring the simplifications of the first two options and important changes to the functioning of the Mechanism. Option 4 is a combined approach bringing elements from the various options depending on the area of intervention. These options build on each other being in most cases cumulative rather than alternative, depending on the degree of ambition. The preferred policy package (Option 4) combines a series of measures from options 1, 2 and 3.

Contents

1.

Specific objective 1: Avoid gaps in the evaluation findings and increase strategic focus


The preferred option is to keep the current scope covering all aspects of the Schengen acquis, while adapting the priorities (policy fields) to the new realities with a more flexible programming and extending the evaluation cycle from five to seven years. Enlarging the scope of the Mechanism to cover issues beyond the Schengen acquis (e.g. to the field of asylum policy) was discarded for mainly legal reasons but equally for political reasons, such an option not retaining the support of many Member States. The current articulation of evaluations per policy fields will also be maintained but it would be made more flexible. Moving to one all-encompassing evaluation per Member State was not found to be feasible in practice immediately (but aimed at in the medium term). However, ambitious legislative changes are proposed as regards the forms and methods of evaluations and monitoring activities to broaden the range of tools available and clarify the criteria and conditions for their use: systematic thematic evaluations, two types of unannounced visits with or without a 24-hour notice depending on the purpose and two types of revisits (‘serious deficiencies revisits’ and ‘verification visits’).

2.

Specific objective 2: Rationalise the roles and distribution of responsibilities and simplify processes and procedures


The preferred policy package contains amendments to accelerate processes and simplify procedures as well as ambitious legal changes to modify the decision-making procedure. The declassification of evaluation reports, as a rule, setting legal time limits for the adoption of the evaluation reports and recommendations, the simplified assessment of the action plans by the Commission and the reduced frequency of reporting obligations for the Member States will speed-up and ease the procedures and they are broadly supported by stakeholders. As regards the proposed change in the decision-making procedure, according to which the Commission adopts both the evaluation reports and recommendations (while maintaining the role of the Council in most politically relevant cases), Member States will continue to be fully involved in the adoption of the evaluation reports and recommendations via the examination procedure.

3.

Specific objective 3: Strengthen the implementation of fundamental rights safeguards under the Schengen acquis


The preferred option is to introduce changes to increase legal certainty on elements relevant for fundamental rights and highlight their importance. It is proposed to include a reference to the regular submission of risk analyses by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, strengthen the reference to fundamental rights in the provision on trainings, increase the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights’ participation in evaluation visits, and include a specific article regarding the use of evidence provided by third parties.

In addition to the above-mentioned elements, the proposal contains several technical changes to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Mechanism. Each, individually, only brings a rather limited positive impact (and that is why they were not subject of the impact assessment), but the overall impact of these measures is positive.

4.

Specific objective 4: Optimise the participation of Member State experts and the involvement of Union bodies, offices and agencies


The preferred policy package contains legal amendments to change the process of designating experts by creating a yearly permanent pool of experts managed by the Commission while providing flexibility in the determination of the size of the teams. In addition, the proposed changes maximise the input and improve the coordination with Union bodies, offices and agencies and other quality control mechanisms by improved risk analysis, enhanced coordination and strengthened participation with new legal obligations. These measures found broad support among stakeholders.

• Regulatory fitness and simplification

Several elements of the proposal will reduce the administrative burden on Member States, the Commission, and the Council especially in the decision-making phase (as the Council would not need to issue recommendations in all cases) and in the monitoring phase, by less frequent reporting requirements on the implementation of the action plans and the simplified assessment of those action plans by the Commission. Simplified and faster procedures are proposed also for the evaluation phase as regards the evaluation methods and tools, the establishment of the teams and the adoption of the evaluation reports. Quantified estimates, to the extent possible, were provided in the impact assessment.

• Fundamental rights

This proposal respects the fundamental rights set out in the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union and it introduces specific legislative changes to ensure that fundamental rights obligations are clearly covered by the Mechanism.

4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS

A financial statement is annexed to this proposal. Annually it costs approximately EUR 2 million for the Commission to run the Mechanism. This level of spending will be maintained; the proposal does not require an increase of the human and financial resources that are already allocated for the Commission. This is primarily due to the series of changes resulting in decreasing the administrative burden on the Commission and the provisions allowing for more targeted (and even shorter) evaluations with smaller teams. During the work on the impact assessment, the Commission was guided by the principle that the efficiency and effectiveness of the Mechanism should be increased without requiring additional human and financial resources.

Costs incurred by the Member States’ experts will continue to be reimbursed and no increase is expected in this regard either. Due to the proposed changes more will be done in a more efficient manner with the same resources.

5. OTHER ELEMENTS

• Monitoring

The Commission will review the operation of the Regulation and submit a report to the Council and the European Parliament within 6 months of the adoption of all evaluation reports regarding the evaluations covered by the first seven-year multiannual evaluation cycle under the new Regulation.

As part of the impact assessment and in line with better regulation rules, a non-exhaustive list of qualitative and quantitative indicators have been developed that will be used for the review. In addition, the Commission is in the process of developing a new IT tool to modernise the monitoring of the implementation of the action plans by the Member States. This tool is expected to become operational already in 2021.

• Consequences of the various protocols annexed to the Treaties and of the association agreements concluded with third countries

Because the legal basis for this proposal is to be found in Title V of Part Three of the TFEU, the system of ‘variable geometry’, as provided for in the protocols on the position of Denmark and Ireland and the Schengen protocol, applies. The proposal is a development of the Schengen acquis. The consequences for the various protocols and Schengen association agreements therefore have to be considered with regard to Denmark and Ireland; Iceland and Norway; and Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Likewise, the consequences for the various Acts of Accession must be considered. The detailed situation of each of the States concerned is set out in the final recitals of this proposal.

• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

Article-by-article comparison with the provisions of the current Regulation:

Article 1 – Subject matter and scope

The article remains essentially unchanged, but it clarifies the purpose of the Mechanism (‘ensure that Member States apply the Schengen acquis effectively, thereby contributing to a well-functioning area without internal border controls’). Paragraph 3 has moved to Article 15 (‘Member State experts’).

Article 2 – Definitions

A number of new definitions have been added to provide legal clarity and to increase the readability of the Regulation. The definition of ‘serious deficiency’ is added to increase legal certainty and ensure a common understanding of the concept . The definition relies on the one currently used in the ‘Schengen Evaluation Guide’ of the Commission. The article also provides definitions for ‘first time evaluation’, ‘periodic evaluation’, ‘unannounced evaluation’, ‘thematic evaluation’, ‘visit’, ‘revisit’, ‘verification visit’, ‘evaluation activity’ and ‘team’.

Article 3 – Responsibilities and duty of cooperation

No significant changes are introduced. The new paragraphs 4 and 5 have been moved here from Article 13 as they essentially contain responsibilities for the Member States and the Commission.

Article 4 – Forms of evaluations

To provide clarity, the article compliments the definitions by listing the forms of evaluations and specifies the conditions for unannounced evaluations and thematic evaluations.

Article 5 – Forms of monitoring activities

To provide clarity, the article lists the forms of monitoring activities.

Article 6 – Evaluation and monitoring methods

Similarly, to provide clarity, the article lists the methods to be used for evaluations and monitoring activities, i.e. visits (announced or unannounced), questionnaires or other remote methods, e.g. videoconferences. It specifies that they may be used independently or in combination with one other.

5.

Article 7 - Cooperation with Union bodies, offices and agencies


This new article reinforces the importance of establishing close cooperation for the purposes of this Regulation with relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies which are involved in the implementation of the Schengen acquis (in particular Frontex, eu-LISA and Europol). It explicitly refers to the need to reinforce cooperation also with the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. On the basis of the article the Commission will (continue to request) relevant information, statistical data and risk analyses from these bodies, offices and agencies. The information sharing will be reciprocal: a subsequent article (Article 10) provides that Commission may share with them details of evaluation reports, action plans and updates on the implementation of the action plans to increase the synergies and to avoid the duplication of efforts.

6.

Article 8 - Cooperation with Frontex


The article is an adapted version of Article 7 of the current Regulation, taking into account the evolution of the Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard.

Article 9 – Cooperation with Europol

Based on the Commission proposal 32 to amend the Europol Regulation, the article provides a cross-reference to Article 4(1)(s) of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 33 , according to which Europol will have to support the implementation of this Regulation with expertise, analysis, reports and other relevant information. The text is pending the adoption of the proposal.

Article 10 – Synergies with other evaluation and monitoring activities

In order to increase the strategic focus and more targeted evaluation design, the article requires increasing synergies with the relevant mechanisms and platforms operated by EU agencies and national administrations, e.g. the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (‘EMPACT’) or the oversight conducted by eu-LISA as regards the preparation of the Member States for the implementation of relevant IT systems as well as the findings of the national quality control mechanisms or independent monitoring mechanisms. The article also provides that the bodies and agencies should not only be providers of inforrmation, but also beneficiaries and thus, the Commission should be able to share with them details of evaluation reports, action plans and updates on the implementation of the action plans.

Article 11 – Information from third parties

The article provides a legal basis for the use of information provided by third parties (e.g. ombudspersons, authorities monitoring the respect of fundamental rights, non-governmental and international organisations) to increase the efficiency of the programming and implementation of evaluation activities. Such information could be particularly useful to evaluate the respect of fundamental rights in the implementation of the Schengen acquis.

7.

Article 12 - Multiannnual evaluation programme


In order to be in a position to carry out all the required evaluations in the most effective manner, to be able to react to emerging challenges, to make more flexible and balanced use of all available tools, and to provide for closer and more targetted monitoring, the term of the multiannual programme is extended from five to seven years. The article outlines the content of the multiannual evaluation programme which will identify the specific priority areas to be covered by the periodic evaluations. It will also set out a provisional list of Member States to be subject to periodic evaluations in a given year. A simplified procedure is also introduced to adjust the programme, according to which adjustments necessitated as a result of force majeure events and circumstances, may not require an amendment to the programme, i.e. the implementing act concerned. Experience of the past years have clearly shown the need for such flexibility. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the 2020 annual evaluation programme had to be amended. In addition, evaluations in the field of common visa policy are prone to unforeseen events given that they are taking place in third-countries. Such events have also resulted in amending the programme which is a time-consuming exercise.

Article 13 – Annual evaluation programme

No major changes compared to the corresponding current article (Article 6). The annual evaluation programme will contain proposals for periodic evaluations of Member States as specified in the multiannual evaluation programme; first time evaluation of a Member State (if necessary) and at least one thematic evaluation. It will include a provisional time-schedule of these evaluations, but not necessarily the sites to be visited / evaluated. Unannounced evaluations will no longer be programmed but organised on short-notice as needed. This has no impact on the Member States but it will facilitate internal planning and procedures in the Commission and increase flexibility and capacity to react to new circumstances. Similarly to the multiannual programme, a simplified procedure is introduced for the adjustment of the programme necessitated as a result of force majeure events and circumstances.

Article 14 – Standard questionnaire

No substantial changes compared to the corresponding current article (Article 9). It will not be required to adopt a new standard questionnaire due to the adoption of the new Regulation (Article 31). The current one should continue to be in use. The deadline for sending out the questionnaire and for receiving the replies from the Member States has been adjusted ensuring that the bulk of the work on the Member States’ side should not (necessarily) be done during the summer holiday period. In addition, it is specified that on request of the Commission, Member States should update their replies to the standard questionnaire and answer, if requested, complimentary questions before specific evaluations, as well as provide the findings of national quality control mechanisms and internal audits. This provision ensures that the teams will have all relevant and up to date information at their disposal to efficiently carry out specific evaluations.

Article 15 – Member State experts

No substantial changes compared to the current article (Article 12). Paragraph 2 has been moved here from the current Article 1.

Article 16 – Training of experts

It was considered desirable to reinforce the provision on training by introducing a specific article on the matter; highlighting the importance of all relevant fundamental rights considerations in training courses and the systematic involvement of the Fundamental Rights Agency in this respect. A specific reference is made to the need for keeping the initial training curricula up to date and organising refresher training. In addition, each evaluation team may include an ‘observer’ either from a Member State or the Commission. These ‘junior’ experts will experience evaluations before they actually participate in them as fully-fledged team members. As observers, they could be tasked to provide technical assistance (as specified in Article 18) but they should not be involved in the core work of the teams (assessment of findings and drafting). However, the costs will be borne by the Commission in accordance with Article 3.

Article 17 – Pool of Member State experts

This new article, as already explained in detail under section 1, aims at ensuring that a sufficient number of experienced experts are participating in evaluation and monitoring activities and that the teams are established in a faster and less burdensome way. The pool will provide more predictability and also greater flexibility. The article provides detailed rules and deadlines regarding the establishment of the pool and defines the obligations for the Commission and the Member States. It is expected that the members of the pool as well as national authorities respond positively to specific invitations; turning them down should be based on serious professional or personal reasons only.

Article 18 – Establishment of the teams

The article merges and amends the corresponding current Articles 10 and 11. It provides, as a general rule, that the team members will be selected from the newly established pool of experts (see Article 17) taking into account the capacity of smaller national administrations. Issuing a call for all Member States, which is the current way of getting experts, is nevertheless maintained as a supplementary possibility for cases the Commission is not able to get sufficient number of experts from the pool. Flexibility will be provided as regards the number of experts in the teams. The Commission will define the size of the teams depending on the needs and challenges related to each evaluation and monitoring activity. When setting up the teams, geographical balance and rotation will be ensured by the Commission and account will be taken of the capacity of national administrations and the need for a variety of profiles. The article also provides rules for designating and selecting the lead experts and outline their main responsibilities.

Article 19 – Conduct of visits

The main change compared to the corresponding current article (Article 13) is that as a general rule, unannounced on-site visits will take place without any prior notification to the Member State concerned. This is particularly the case when the purpose of the visit is to evaluate practices at internal borders (as it is currently the case); if the Commission becomes aware of emerging or systemic problems having a potential significant negative impact on the functioning of the Schengen area; or if a Member State is allegedly seriously neglecting its obligations under the Schengen acquis, including serious allegations of potential fundamental rights violations related to the implementation of the Schengen acquis. A 24-hour advanced notice will be an exception for the cases when the main purpose of the unannounced visit is a routine verification of the implementation of the Schengen acquis. The article also makes clear that the detailed programme of visits may include visits to and meetings with national authorities and bodies, non-governmental and international organisations as well as other entities, agencies and bodies involved in, participating in or concerned by the implementation of the Schengen acquis while cooperating with the evaluated Member State.

Article 20 –Remote methods

The article states that the Commission in cooperation with the Member States may establish guidelines for conducting evaluation and monitoring activities by questionnaire or other remote methods (e.g. videoconferences). Although guidelines exist for conducting visits, no such guidelines exist for conducting evaluations by questionnaire or remote methods. A similar provision already exists (and is maintained in Article 19) as regards conducting unannounced visits.

8.

Article 21 - Evaluation reports


Important changes are introduced to speed up and increase the efficiency of the procedure, notably by providing s shorter and new deadlines and by requiring that the reports are adopted no later than four months of the evaluation.

Evaluation reports will be more focused, containing substantial findings; chiefly, either best practices or non-compliant ones. The category of ‘compliant but improvement necessary’ is nevertheless maintained, not the least because it proved to be a useful tool to raise the level of implementation of the Schengen acquis to high standards while also ensuring further harmonisation. The reports, as a general rule, will also contain recommendations and they will continue to be adopted as implementing acts under the examination procedure. Further explanation is provided in this regard under section 2 (‘Proportionality’) and exceptions from the general rule are set out in Articles 23, 24 and 25 (see below).

Article 22 – Follow up and monitoring

Several substantial changes are introduced, first and foremost to ensure that the deficiencies are remedied quicker and also to reduce the administrative burden that currently flows from the frequency of the reporting obligation. All evaluation reports will be followed up by an action plan. The Commission services will provide observations to the action plans through for example administrative letters as opposed to formal Communications from the Commission which is the case under the current Regulation. If the Commission services do not consider the action plan adequate, the Member State shall submit a revised action plan within one month of the receipt of the observations. As a general rule, the frequency of the follow-up reporting will be reduced from three to six months. However, as a new element the follow-up reports should not only be submitted to the Commission, but to the Council as well. As part of its monitoring activities, the Commission may organise revisits and verification visits. In terms of the organisational and reporting requirements, these visits will be lighter than evaluation visits. The role of the European Parliament and the Council will be reinforced in the monitoring phase: the Commission will inform them at least twice a year about the state of implementation of the action plans, the outcome of revisits and verification visits as well as if it observes considerable lack of progress in the implementation of an action plan.

Article 23 – Specific provisions in case of a serious deficiency identified by the evaluation report

This article provides specific provisions where the evaluation identifies a serious deficiency. A closer involvement of the Council, faster procedures and tighter deadlines are provided. The evaluation report is adopted by the Commission while the recommendations will be adopted by the Council separately from the evaluation report. Strict deadlines will be imposed both on the Commission (to adopt the report) and on the Council (to adopt the recommendations). Stricter procedural rules will apply in the monitoring phase: the Member State shall start implementing remedial actions immediately after being informed of the serious deficiency and shall inform the Commission and the Member States without delay. The Member State will be required to provide its action plan within one month and the Commission shall organise a revisit that is to take place no later than one year from the date of the evaluation activity. Following the revisit, the Commission shall present a revisit report to the Council that shall express its position on the report. The Commission will inform the European Parliament and the Council of its intention to close the action plan and the Council will be invited to express its position on the proposed closure. For serious deficiencies at the external borders, Article 21 and 29 of the Schengen Borders Code may apply.

Article 24 – Specific provisions for first time evaluations

Specific rules are also necessary for first time evaluations. Similar to cases when the evaluation identifies a serious deficiency, a closer involvement of the Council, fast procedures and tigh deadlines (but not as tight as the ones in Article 23) are provided as well as stricter rules in the monitoring phase.

Article 25 – Specific provision for thematic evaluations

Closer involvement of the Council is provided for in thematic evaluations, similar to first time evaluations. For the monitoring phase, specific provisions were not found to be necessary.

Article 26 – Sensitive information

Evaluation and revisit reports will, in principle, no longer be classified as ‘EU Restricted’ documents. Their status shall be determined in accordance with the applicable security rules. Classification also remains possible upon a duly justified request of the evaluated Member State.

Article 27 – Conditions for the participation of Ireland

The article follows the corresponding current article (Article 18) without mentioning the United Kingdom.

9.

Article 28 - Reporting to the European Parliament and to the Council


The article follows the corresponding current article (Article 20). The yearly comprehensive report complements the reinforced reporting obligations under Article 22. The Council shall discuss the report and adopt conclusions.


Article 29 – Committee procedure

The article follows, to a large extent, the corresponding current article (Article 21).


Article 30 – Review

The article follows the corresponding current article (Article 22).


Article 31 – Repeal

The article repeals Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 with effect from the entry into application of the new Regulation.


Article 32 – Transitional provisions

The article provides a transitional provision for the adoption of a new multiannual programme, which would be established by 1 November 2022 and it would commence on 1 January 2023. These dates can be adapted depending on the pace of negotiations on the proposal.

Given that the ongoing multiannual programme would be terminated mid-way (in January 2023), the provision specifies that the new multiannual programme should take into consideration the evaluations already carried out under the second multiannual programme adopted under the current Regulation. In practice it means that the new seven-year multiannual programme would start with the evaluation of Member States that have not been evaluated under the current cycle while the ones already evaluated between 2020 and the entry into force of the new rules will be added at the end of the new evaluation cycle.


The article also clarifies that the standard questionnaire adopted under the current Regulation will be used until the standard questionnaire provided for under Article 14 of this Regulation has been established.


Article 33 – Entry into force and application

In order to utilise all efficiency gains of the new Regulation at the earliest, the article sets an ambitious deadline for the application of the new Regulation (from [1 September 2022]), which can be adjusted during the course of the negotiations on the proposal.