Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2020)842 - Contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act)

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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.



1. CONTEXTOFTHE PROPOSAL

Reasons for and objectives of the proposal

Digital services have brought important innovative benefits for users and contributed to the internal market by opening new business opportunities and facilitating cross-border trading. Today, these digital services cover a wide range of daily activities including online intermediation services, such as online marketplaces, online social networking services, online search engines, operating systems or software application stores. They increase consumer choice, improve efficiency and competitiveness of industry and can enhance civil participation in society. However, whereas over 10 000 online platforms operate in Europe’s digital economy, most of which are SMEs, a small number of large online platforms capture the biggest share of the overall value generated.

Large platforms have emerged benefitting from characteristics of the sector such as strong network effects, often embedded in their own platform ecosystems, and these platforms represent key structuring elements of today’s digital economy, intermediating the majority of transactions between end users and business users. Many of these undertakings are also comprehensively tracking and profiling end users.1 A few large platforms increasingly act as gateways or gatekeepers between business users and end users and enjoy an entrenched and durable position, often as a result of the creation of conglomerate ecosystems around their core platform services, which reinforces existing entry barriers.

As such, these gatekeepers have a major impact on, have substantial control over the access to, and are entrenched in digital markets, leading to significant dependencies of many business users on these gatekeepers, which leads, in certain cases, to unfair behaviour vis-à-vis these business users. It also leads to negative effects on the contestability of the core platform services concerned. Regulatory initiatives by Member States cannot fully address these effects; without action at EU level, they could lead to a fragmentation of the Internal Market.

Unfair practices and lack of contestability lead to inefficient outcomes in the digital sector in terms of higher prices, lower quality, as well as less choice and innovation to the detriment of European consumers. Addressing these problems is of utmost importance in view of the size of the digital economy (estimated at between 4.5% to 15.5% of global GDP in 2019 with a growing trend) and the important role of online platforms in digital markets with its societal and economic

implications.2

Although some of these phenomena specific to the digital sector and to core platform services are also observed to some extent in other sectors and markets, the scope of the proposal is limited to the digital sector as there the problems are the most pressing from an internal market perspective.

Such tracking and profiling of end users online is as such not necessarily an issues, but it is important to ensure that this is done in a controlled and transparent manner, in respect of privacy, data protection and consumer protection.

For example, the importance of ensuring a level playing field that supports essential values such as cultural diversity and media pluralism was for instance stressed by the Council in its conclusions on the strengthening of European content in the digital economy and on safeguarding a free and pluralistic media system.

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Weak contestability and unfair practices in the digital sector are more frequent and pronounced in certain digital services than others. This is the case in particular for widespread and commonly used digital services and infrastructures that mostly directly intermediate between business users and end users. The enforcement experience under EU competition rules, numerous expert reports and studies and the results of the OPC show that there are a number of digital services that have the following features: (i) highly concentrated multi-sided platform services, where usually one or very few large digital platforms set the commercial conditions with considerable autonomy; (ii) a few large digital platforms act as gateways for business users to reach their customers and vice-versa; and (iii) gatekeeper power of these large digital platforms is often misused by means of unfair behaviour vis-à-vis economically dependent business users and customers.3 The proposal is therefore further limited to a number of ‘core platform services’ where the identified problems are most evident and prominent and where the presence of a limited number of large online platforms that serve as gateways for business users and end users has led or is likely to lead to weak contestability of these services and of the markets in which these intervene. These core platform services include: (i) online intermediation services (incl. for example marketplaces, app stores and online intermediation services in other sectors like mobility, transport or energy) (ii) online search engines, (iii) social networking (iv) video sharing platform services, (v) number-independent interpersonal electronic communication services, (vi) operating systems, (vii) cloud services and (viii) advertising services, including advertising networks, advertising exchanges and any other advertising intermediation services, where these advertising services are being related to one or more of the other core platform services mentioned above.

The fact that a digital service qualifies as a core platform service does not mean that issues of contestability and unfair practices arise in relation to every provider of these core platform services. Rather, these concerns appear to be particularly strong when the core platform service is operated by a gatekeeper. Providers of core platform providers can be deemed to be gatekeepers if they: (i) have a significant impact on the internal market, (ii) operate one or more important gateways to customers and (iii) enjoy or are expected to enjoy an entrenched and durable position in their operations.

Such gatekeeper status can be determined either with reference to clearly circumscribed and appropriate quantitative metrics, which can serve as rebuttable presumptions to determine the status of specific providers as a gatekeeper, or based on a case-by-case qualitative assessment by means of a market investigation.

The identified gatekeeper-related problems are currently not (or not effectively) addressed by existing EU legislation or national laws of Member States. Although legislative initiatives have been taken or are under consideration in several Member States, these will not be sufficient to address the problems. Whilst such initiatives are limited to the national territory, gatekeepers typically operate cross-border, often at a global scale and also often deploy their business models globally. Without action at EU level, existing and pending national legislation has the potential to lead to increased regulatory fragmentation of the platform space.

The objective of the proposal is therefore to allow platforms to unlock their full potential by addressing at EU level the most salient incidences of unfair practices and weak contestability

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See also Section 5.2.1 of the Impact Assessment


for further details.

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so as to allow end users and business users alike to reap the full benefits of the platform economy and the the digital economy at large, in a contestable and fair environment.

The need to address these concerns in the digital economy was stressed in the Commission Communication ‘Shaping Europe’s digital future’4 which considered that, ‘based on the single market logic, additional rules may be needed to ensure contestability, fairness and innovation and the possibility of market entry, as well as public interests that go beyond competition or economic considerations’. It also announced that the Commission ‘will further explore,(…), ex ante rules to ensure that markets characterised by large platforms with significant network effects acting as gatekeepers, remain fair and contestable for innovators, businesses, and new market entrants’.

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area

This proposal builds on the existing P2B Regulation5, without conflicting with it. The definitions used in the present proposal are coherent with that Regulation, in particular the definitions of ‘online intermediation services’ and ‘online search engines’. In addition to the baseline of transparency and fairness rules applicable to all online platforms regardless of their size or position introduced in the P2B Regulation, the present proposal establishes clearly defined obligations vis-a-vis a very limited number of cross-border providers of core platform services that serve as important gateways for business users to reach end users. Finally, the Commission can benefit in its enforcement of those obligations from the transparency that online intermediation services and online search engines have to provide under the P2B Regulation on practices that could be illegal under the list of obligations if engaged in by gatekeepers.

The proposal is also fully coherent with the proposal for a Digital Services Act (‘DSA’). The DSA is a horizontal initiative focusing on issues such as liability of online intermediaries for third party content, safety of users online or asymmetric due diligence obligations for different providers of information society services depending on the nature of the societal risks such services represent. In contrast, the DMA proposal is concerned with economic imbalances, unfair business practices by gatekeepers and their negative consequences, such as weakened contestability of platform markets.

Consistency with other Union policies

The proposal is coherent with the Commission’s digital strategy in its contribution to ensuring a fair and competitive digital economy, one of the three main pillars of the policy orientation and objectives announced in the Communication ‘Shaping Europe's digital future’. It will constitute a coherent, effective and proportionate framework to address problems in the digital economy that currently cannot be tackled or cannot be tackled effectively.

The proposal complements existing EU (and national) competition rules. It addresses unfair practices by gatekeepers that either fall outside the existing EU competition rules, or that cannot be as effectively addressed by these rules, considering that antitrust enforcement concerns the situation of specific markets, inevitably intervenes after the restrictive or abusive conduct has occurred and involves investigative procedures to establish the infringement that

Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57.

Regulation (EU) 2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 186, 11.7.2019, p. 57.

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take time. The current proposal minimises the detrimental structural effects of unfair practices ex ante, without limiting the ability to intervene ex post under EU and national competition rules.

The proposal is aligned with other EU instruments, including with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’), the General Data Protection Regulation6, and the EU’s consumer law acquis.

The proposal complements the data protection laws. Transparency obligations on deep consumer profiling will help inform General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’) enforcement, whereas mandatory opt-out for data combination across core platform services supplements the existing level of protection under the GDPR. The proposal clarifies that it is for the gatekeepers to ensure that compliance with the obligations laid down in the Regulation should be done in full compliance with other EU law, such as protection of personal data and privacy or consumer protection.

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The


proposal is also coherent with the targeted and tailor-made ex ante regulation of specific

sectors, including the rules applicable to electronic communication services or short-selling as well as with existing initiatives targeting harmful trading practices in the offline world.7

2. LEGALBASIS, SUBSIDIARITYAND PROPORTIONALITY

Legal basis

Member States apply or are considering to apply divergent national rules to address the problems arising from the significant degree of dependency of business users on core platform services provided by gatekeepers and the consequent problems arising from their unfair conduct vis-à-vis their business users. That situation creates regulatory fragmentation insofar as the rules on addressing unfairness in dependency relationships with such gatekeepers and contestability regarding those services diverge in particular as to the preconditions to intervene and as to the depth of the intervention, and increase compliance costs for companies operating in the internal market. Without action at EU level, this will be further aggravated with the adoption of new initiatives pending in several Member States, whereas in other Member States the unfairness and reduced contestability of core platform services provided by gatekeepers remain unaddressed. Given the intrinsic cross-border nature of the core platform services provided by gatekeepers, regulatory fragmentation will seriously undermine the functioning of the Single Market for digital services as well as the functioning of digital markets at large. Therefore, harmonisation at EU level is necessary and Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) is the relevant legal basis for this initiative.

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1.

See for example Directive (EU) 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain. To improve farmers’ and small and medium sized businesses’ position in the agri-food supply chain, the EU adopted this legislation prohibiting certain unfair trading practices between weaker supplier towards stronger buyers. These include (but are not limited to): late payments for perishable food products, last minute order cancellations, unilateral changes to contracts, refusal to enter into a written contract, returning unsold or wasted products or payment for buyer’s marketing.

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Subsidiarity

The objectives of the proposal cannot be achieved by Member States acting alone, as the problems are of a cross-border nature, and not limited to single Member States or to a subset of Member States. The digital sector as such and in particular the core platform services provided or offered by gatekeepers are of a cross-border nature, as is evidenced by the volume of cross-border trade, and the still untapped potential for future growth, as illustrated by the pattern and volume of cross-border trade intermediated by digital platforms. Almost 24% of total online trade in Europe is cross-border.

Digital players typically operate across several Member States, if not on an EU-wide basis, which, today, is particularly the case for services such as online advertising, online social networking services, online marketplaces, cloud computing services, online search services, video-sharing platform services, number-independent interpersonal communication services or operating systems. Accordingly, the problems identified have Union relevance, as they arise across borders and affect several Member States, thus not being limited to the territory of a Member State.8 That is in particular the case for core platform services provided or offered by gatekeepers.

Even those Member States who have not yet adopted legislation to address unfairness and reduced contestability of core platform services provided or offered by gatekeepers are increasingly considering national measures to that effect. Different national legislation within the EU, besides being insufficiently effective, may lead to increased fragmentation and compliance costs for large market players and the business users that rely on them. At the same time, start-ups and smaller businesses are also negatively impacted by this situation, as it impedes them from scaling-up and from cross-border expansion, thereby reaching new markets, offering better and diversified products at more competitive prices and, as the case may be, growing into challengers of established players in the digital sector. Therefore, by addressing unfair practices in respect of core platform services operated by gatekeepers at Union-level, the functioning of the internal market will be improved through clear behavioural rules that give all stakeholders legal clarity and through an EU-wide intervention framework allowing to address effectively harmful practices in a timely and effective manner. One of the conditions for the designation as gatekeeper is that the provider of core platform services has a significant impact on the internal market.

Proportionality

The proposal aims to contribute to the proper functioning of the Single Market for digital services by ensuring that markets across the Union where gatekeepers are present are contestable and fair. This should promote innovation, high quality of digital products and services, fair and competitive prices, and free choice for users in the digital sector.

In this context, the proposal focuses only on those digital services that are most widely used by business users and end users (“core platform services”) and where, based on current conditions, concerns about weak contestability and unfair practices by gatekeepers are more apparent and pressing from an internal market perspective. The core platform services in

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The replies of citizens and stakeholders to the Commission’s Open Public Consultation (‘OPC’) and the feedback of the National Competition Authorities (‘NCAs’) replying to the Commission’s questionnaire indicate that market failures appear to be widespread across the Union, in particular in digital markets of cross-border nature. See Summary of the Stakeholder Consultation on the New Competition Tool and Summary of the contributions of the NCAs to the impact assessment of the new competition tool. While respondents indicated that market failures may occur in all industry sectors, several respondents emphasised that they are particularly prominent in the digital sphere. See also Annex 5.4 of the Impact Assessment.

scope are only those where there is strong evidence of (i) high concentration, where usually one or very few large online platforms set the commercial conditions with considerable autonomy from their (potential) challengers, customers or consumers; (ii) dependence on a few large online platforms acting as gateways for business users to reach and have interactions with their customers; and (iii) the power by core platform service providers often being misused by means of unfair behavior vis-à-vis economically dependent business users and customers.

The proposal therefore applies only to those providers that meet clearly defined criteria for being considered a gatekeeper, which are set out above. The use of quantitative thresholds, as the basis of a rebuttable presumption, is complemented by the use of qualitative criteria specified in the proposal. That allows the Commission to designate as gatekeepers the providers of core platform services that exhibit the same or similar risks for fairness and contestability of the market and at the same time guarantees that the obligations apply to the relevant providers of core platform services only.

The list of obligations foreseen by the proposal has been limited to those practices (i) that are particularly unfair or harmful, (ii) which can be identified in a clear and unambiguous manner to provide the necessary legal certainty for gatekeepers and other interested parties, and (iii) for which there is sufficient experience. The proposal provides for the possibility of a tailored application of some of the obligations through a dialogue between the Commission and the gatekeepers concerned. In addition, it allows to cover in a flexible way additional practices that are similarly unfair or that equally put fairness or contestability at risk after a thorough market investigation on the impact of those practices. This mechanism ensures that there is no over-regulation while at the same time avoiding a lack of intervention in relation to similar practices by the same gatekeepers, where practices may evolve over time.

The proposed measures are proportionate since they achieve their objective by only imposing a burden on undertakings in the digital sector in a targeted manner. The proposal requires the cooperation of those companies that are subject to an investigation, but the administrative costs would be proportional and would be unlikely to require significant additional costs in view of the already existing regulatory structures due to the application of other pieces of EU legislation (e.g. EU Merger Regulation; Consumer Protection Cooperation (‘CPC’) Regulation). As regards the compliance costs for gatekeepers, they would be reasonable, since they would largely substitute for the high costs that large providers of core platform services incur for complying with divergent regulatory measures gradually put or likely to be put in place in different Member States. Such costs would imply some additional legal compliance officers to check company policies against the new rules and some employees to interface with the Commission and respond to requests for information.9

Choice of the instrument

Only a legislative instrument can effectively address the problems identified. A Regulation is in addition necessary, as it is directly applicable in Member States, establishes the same level of rights and obligations for private parties, and enables the coherent and effective application of rules in the inherently cross-border online intermediated trade generated in the online platform economy. This is most suited to address the problems of fairness and contestability identified and prevent fragmentation of the Single Market for core platform services provided or offered by a gatekeeper.

9 See Section 6.6.1. of the Impact Assessment for further analysis.

3. RESULTS OF STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT

ASSESSMENTS

Stakeholder consultations

The Commission has consulted widely on a broad range of online platform-related issues, including the economic power of very large online platforms with a gatekeeping role.

First, between 2 June and 8 September 2020, the Commission ran two separate open public consultations which were referring to two separate Inception Impact Assessments for (i) the Digital Services Act package: Ex ante regulatory instrument for large online platforms with significant network effects acting as gate-keepers in the European Union’s internal market;10

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and the other one for


(ii) the New Competition Tool.11

Second, the Commission ran a stakeholder consultation on the interim reports by the Observatory for the Online Platform Economy12, supporting the current initiative.13

Thirdly, workshops,14 conferences15 as well as research conducted by the JRC informed the problem definition and helped identify preliminary policy options. In addition to the consultation tools used, the Commission's services also met bilaterally with stakeholders in the context of the public consultations and the feedback period for the inception impact assessments.

Finally, a structured dialogue with Member States, notably through the e-Commerce expert group and bilateral and multilateral exchanges and conferences contributed to the design of policy options.

In general, the public consultations offered strong support for an intervention tackling unfair practices engaged in by gatekeepers. In fact, the large majority of the respondents to the public consultations and to a separate questionnaire addressed to national competition authorities agreed that there are structural problems that cannot be addressed under the existing competition rules; the same majority believed that the Commission should be able to intervene in markets where gatekeepers are present. This view was expressed by a large majority of businesses and business associations, all civil society organisations (including Non-Governmental Organisations (‘NGOs’) and trade unions) and all public authorities.16 Consumer organisations like BEUC have also prominently flagged the particular concerns

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12418-Digital-Services-Act-package-ex-ante-regulatory-instrument-of-very-large-online-platforms-acting-as-gatekeepers and https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12416-New-competition-tool. The detailed overview of the results of these consultations is presented in Annex 2 to the Impact Assessment. https://platformobservatory.eu/.

https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/commission-expert-group-publishes-progress-reports-online-platform-economy.

Observatory for the Online Platform Economy Workshop on Market power and Online Advertising, 29 January 2020; on 28 July 2020 and 10 September 2020 ICF, WIK-Consult GmbH, Cullen International, and CEPS organised high-level academic expert panels to support the Commission in the preparation of the Impact Assessment of platforms with significant network effects acting as gatekeeper. Such as the conference “Shaping competition policy in the era of digitisation”: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/scp19/.

Summary of the Open Public Consultation Ex Ante Rules, Summary of the Stakeholder Consultation on the New Competition Tool and Summary of the contributions of the NCAs to the impact assessment of the new competition tool please see Annex 2 to the Impact Assessment.

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markets.17 Those

surrounding online platforms and digital markets. Those respondents considered that an intervention tackling these concerns would both create the right innovation incentives, and contribute to increased consumer choice paving the way for new platforms and innovative and privacy-friendly services.

Online platforms were split on the issue, with the majority of large online platforms and their representative associations questioning the need for a new gatekeeper instrument. On the other side, many small and medium sized platforms, in particular those that are business users of large online platforms, expressed their support for a new gatekeeper instrument.

Those disagreeing referred to the fact that the concept of a gatekeeper is too broad and should instead be assessed on a case-by-case basis and that the Commission can already intervene in the case of the conduct of a gatekeeper contravening Article 102 TFEU. However, the Commission considered that Article 102 TFEU is not sufficient to deal with all the problems associated with gatekeepers, given that a gatekeeper may not necessarily be a dominant player, and its practices may not be captured by Article 102 TFEU if there is no demonstrable effect on competition within clearly defined relevant markets. Moreover, Article 102 TFEU does not always allow intervening with the speed that is necessary to address these pressing practices in the most timely and thus most effective manner.

The vast majority of respondents also considered that dedicated rules on platforms should include prohibitions and obligations for gatekeeper platforms. They also suggested that remedies could be more procedural in nature rather than prescribing a given course of conduct. The large majority of stakeholders believed that the proposed list of problematic practices, or “blacklist”, should be targeted to clearly unfair and harmful practices of gatekeeper platforms.

As regards the definition of a gatekeeping position, the stakeholder views were split. Some platforms argued that incorporating different services into the offering of a single platform company says little about the strength of a platform, as would also be the case for the ability to leverage assets from one area to another. It was suggested that gatekeeper designations should be business model agnostic, gatekeeper assessments should be reviewed periodically, gatekeeper designations should apply to identified activities, and some rules should apply on a sector-wide basis.

In general, stakeholders of all categories pointed out the need to ensure a high level of coherence and legal certainty, the need to ensure that the criteria used to identify gatekeepers should be transparent, objective and easily measurable. Users mostly referred to a combination of both quantitative and qualitative criteria.

National Authorities expressed their support for a new gatekeeper instrument and the need for an EU-level approach to avoid regulatory fragmentation, whilst emphasizing the importance of involving the responsible national government representatives in the legislative project in advance.

Civil society and media publishers also strongly supported a new gatekeeper instrument. Both called for an adequate degree of transparency in the market as well as the guarantee of a certain degree of media diversity and the respect of consumers' autonomy and choice.

Collection and use of expertise

17 For example, BEUC’s reply to the OPC states that the “challenges posed in particular by large players in digital markets require new instruments in addition to traditional competition law enforcement in order to protect consumers’ interests in an effective and timely manner.

The present initiative is supported by an impact assessment study and several external support studies.18 In addition, several public consultations and multiple studies and reports were carried out by the Commission or external contractors between 2018 and 2020. The Observatory for the Online Platform Economy supported by its expert group of 15 academic experts as well as by a large support study, provided a number of reports and analytical papers feeding into the work on the definition of problems. In-house economic research as well as policy design support by the Joint Research Centre (‘JRC’) further informed the Impact Assessment underlying this initiative. Member States were in addition consulted through an online consultation, which fed into a meeting of the e-commerce expert group dedicated to this initiative. Finally, the Commission organised a number of conferences, workshops and meetings with academic experts, whose views have contributed to the problem framing and evidence collection strategy. A number of Member States’ position papers on gatekeeper platforms, as well as numerous reports and studies from countries outside the EU, all contributed to the shaping of the instrument.19

Impact assessment

The Impact Assessment underpinning the proposal was considered by the Commission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board, which issued a positive opinion on 10 December 2020. The opinion of the Board, the recommendations and an explanation of how they have been taken into account are included in Annex 1 of the Staff Working Document accompanying this proposal. Annex 3 provides an overview of who would be affected by this proposal and how.

The Commission examined different policy options to achieve the general objective of the present initiative, which is to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market by promoting effective competition in digital markets and in particular a contestable and fair online platform environment.

In order to address the problems stemming from problematic gatekeeper conduct, three main policy options were compared: Option 1 - Pre-defined list of gatekeepers and self-executing obligations; Option 2 - Partially flexible framework of designation and updating of obligations, including regulatory dialogue for the implementation of some; and Option 3 - Flexible option based exclusively on qualitative scoping thresholds. Each of these options left more detailed design choices open for political consideration, for example around the precise combination and level of the quantitative scoping thresholds to be used or the exact scope of the remedies available in case of a systematic non-compliance with the obligations by the designated gatekeeper.

All options envisaged implementation, supervision and enforcement at the EU level by the Commission as the competent regulatory body. Given the pan-European reach of the targeted companies, a decentralised enforcement model does not seem to be a conceivable alternative, including in light of the risk of regulatory fragmentation that the initiative is meant to address, nor would it be proportionate given the limited number of gatekeepers that would be in scope of the proposed framework. However, to integrate the national expertise in the platform economy, the initiative envisages that the Commission consults before taking certain decisions (e.g. on non-compliance; fines) a committee composed of representatives of Member States – the Digital Markets Advisory Committee.

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Impact Assessment Support Study (ICF); M. Motta & M. Peitz (2020), Intervention trigger and underlying theories of harm - Expert advice for the Impact Assessment of a New Competition Tool; G. S. Crawford, P. Rey, & M. Schnitzer (2020), An Economic Evaluation of the EC’s Proposed “New Competition Tool”. See also Section 5 of Annex 1 of the Impact Assessment on the various sources of evidence used.

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The preferred option (Option 2) is constituted by (a) a closed list of core platform services; (b) a combination of quantitative and qualitative criteria to designate providers of core platform services as gatekeepers; (c) directly applicable obligations, including certain obligations where a regulatory dialogue may facilitate their effective implementation; and (d) a possibility for the Commission to update the instrument, following a market investigation, as regards the obligations for gatekeepers, by way of delegated acts insofar as new practices are identified that are equally unfair and likely to impair contestability and through amending proposals in the other cases. Market investigations may also point to the need for an amendment of the list of core platform services.

This option was considered to be able to address in the most effective way the objectives of this initiative. It provides for timely intervention for all the identified problematic practices, while allowing for some of these a regulatory dialogue for implementing measures by the designated gatekeeper. It further allows tackling new unfair practices, thus enabling to address market failures in the dynamically changing digital environment. At the same time, for those gatekeepers that are foreseen to have an entrenched and durable position in their operations in the near future, but who do not yet enjoy such a position, the proposal identifies a proportionate sub-set of obligations that are particularly relevant to safeguard and enhance contestability.

The preferred option will increase the contestability of core platform services and the broader digital sector, and it will help businesses overcome the barriers stemming from market failures or from gatekeepers’ unfair business practices. This will help to foster the emergence of alternative platforms, which could deliver high-quality, innovative products and services at affordable prices. Fairer and more equitable conditions for all players in the digital sector would allow them to take greater advantage of the growth potential of the platform economy.

The benefits can be expected to lead to a greater innovation potential amongst smaller businesses as well as an improved quality of service, with associated increases in consumer welfare. The improved contestability of core platform services under the preferred option has the potential to yield a consumer surplus estimated at EUR 13 billion, i.e. an increase of around 6% as compared to the baseline scenario.20

The main cost relates to compliance costs for gatekeepers as a result of the new rules. Businesses other than gatekeeper platforms may incur certain administrative costs when complying with information requests. These latter costs are, however, unlikely to represent a substantial increase from compliance costs businesses would otherwise incur due to information requests in EU competition law cases or under different specific national rules.

The impacts of the policy options on different categories of stakeholders (gatekeepers, competitors, business users, consumers, regulatory authorities) are explained in detail in Annex 3 of the Impact Assessment supporting this initiative. The annex also assesses the impact of each obligation per stakeholder category impacted. The assessment is both quantitative and qualitative to the extent possible.

Concerning the impact of the initiative on SMEs, since they are very unlikely to qualify as gatekeepers and would not be targeted by the list of obligations, this initiative would not impose an additional burden on them. The new rules, by levelling the playing field would instead allow SMEs (including business users and other providers of core platforms services) to grow throughout the internal market as a result of the removal of important barriers to entry and expansion. It could be expected that the measures envisaged would also result in more

20 See Annex 3 to the Impact Assessment.

competition among platforms for business users. This is expected to lead to higher quality services at more competitive prices, coupled with a higher productivity. Business users would also have more confidence in selling online, as they would be protected from unfair practices.

A more comprehensive enforcement toolkit will allow businesses to thrive on the merits of their abilities. This will result in economic growth, which in turn translates into higher tax revenues for national administrations. The burden on the Commission for implementing this initiative is low (mainly redeployment of existing job positions) compared to the benefits for the economy. National authorities would have to bear some minor administrative costs.

Fairness and enhanced contestability in the digital sector would result in higher productivity, which would translate into higher economic growth. The promotion of greater contestability of core platform services and digital markets is also of particular importance in increasing trade and investment flows.

Regulatory fitness and simplification

This proposal lays down measures that will apply to large providers of core platform services that meet the conditions to be designated as gatekeepers. Other providers of core platform services and of ancillary services, business users and end users will benefit from the clearly defined and circumscribed obligations that are laid down therein. The proposal also specifically aims at facilitating the sustainable growth of core platform services and the platform economy more broadly and is designed to be fully technologically-neutral.

Fundamental rights

The proposal is aligned with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) as well as the GDPR.

The introduction of the dynamic updating of unfair practices would be subject to ensuring a full respect for the fundamental rights to fair proceedings and good administration as enshrined in the ECHR, which are binding on the EU institutions.

When acting under the new framework the Commission’s investigation powers would be subject to the full scope of fair process rights such as the right to be heard, the right to a reasoned decision and access to judicial review, including the possibility to challenge enforcement and sanctioning measures. These rights apply in case of administrative

proceedings.21

Moreover, the fair and trusted legal environment that this proposal aims to create shall contribute to safeguarding an appropriate balance between the respective freedoms to conduct a business of providers of core platform services and their business users (Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union).

4. BUDGETARYIMPLICATIONS

In order to optimally achieve the objectives of this initiative, it is necessary to finance a number of actions both at the Commission level, where the redeployment of 80 FTEs is envisaged, and at Member State level through their active participation in the Digital Markets Advisory Committee, composed of the representatives of Member States. The total financial resources necessary for the implementation of the proposal in the 2021-2027 period will amount to EUR 81,090 million, including EUR 50,640 million of administrative costs and

21 Ibid, at Chapter V and Chapter X.

EUR 30,450 million entirely covered by the allocations foreseen in the MFF 2021-27 under the financial envelopes of the Single Market Programme and the Digital Europe Programme. The financing will support inter alia activities such as carrying out the designation of providers of core platform services, carrying out market investigations and performing any other investigative actions, enforcement actions and monitoring activities. The financing will also support carrying out a regular review of specific elements of the Regulation and an evaluation of the Regulation, a continuous evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the measures implemented, as well as costs linked to maintaining, developing, hosting, operating and supporting a central information system. A detailed overview of the costs involved is provided in the “’financial statement” linked to this initiative.

5. OTHERELEMENTS

Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements

Given the dynamic nature of the platform economy, the monitoring and evaluation of the initiative constitutes an important part of the proposal. It also responds to explicit demands by stakeholders, including Member States, for a dedicated monitoring function, and reflects the importance given to a self-standing monitoring policy option considered in the Inception Impact Assessment. The monitoring therefore will be divided into two parts: (i) continuous monitoring, which will report on the latest developments in the market every second year, potentially involving the EU Observatory of the Online Platform Economy, and (ii) operational objectives and specific indicators to measure them.

Regular and continuous monitoring will cover the following main aspects: (i) monitoring on scope-related issues (e.g. criteria for the designation of gatekeepers, evolution of the designation of gatekeepers, use of the qualitative assessment in the designation process); (ii) monitoring of unfair practices (compliance, enforcement patterns, evolution); and (iii) monitoring as a trigger for the launch of a market investigation with the purpose of examining new core platform services and practices in the digital sector.

The monitoring will also take due account of the conceptual work of the Expert Group of the Online Platform Economy under its work stream on Measurement and Economic Indicators.22

The effectiveness and efficiency of the proposal will in addition be monitored using predefined indicators to establish whether additional rules, including regarding enforcement, may be required to ensure that digital markets across the EU are contestable and fair. Consequently, the impact of the intervention will be assessed in the context of an evaluation exercise and activate, if so required, a review clause, which will allow the Commission to take appropriate measures, including legislative proposals.

Member States will also provide any relevant information they have that the Commission may require for the evaluation purposes.

Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal

Chapter I sets out the general provisions, including the subject matter, aim and scope of the Regulation, including its harmonising effect in relation to certain national laws (Article 1), and the definitions of the terms used in, as well as the objectives of the proposal (Article 2).

https://platformobservatory.eu/app/uploads/2020/07/ProgressReport Workstream on Measurement and Economic Indicators 2020.pdf.

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Chapter II contains the provisions concerning the designation of gatekeepers. More specifically, it establishes the conditions under which providers of core platform services should be designated as gatekeepers either based on the quantitative criteria (through a presumption subject to counter-demonstration) or following a case-by-case assessment during a market investigation (Article 3). Furthermore, it also establishes conditions under which a designation of a gatekeeper may be reconsidered and an obligation to regularly review such a designation (Article 4).

Chapter III sets out the practices of gatekeepers that limit contestability and that are unfair. In particular, it lays down self-executing obligations (Article 5) and obligations that are susceptible to specification (Article 6) that the designated gatekeepers should comply with in respect of each of their core platform services listed in the relevant designation decision. In addition, it establishes a framework for a possible dialogue between the designated gatekeeper and the Commission in relation to measures that the gatekeeper implements or intends to implement in order to comply with the obligations set out in Article 6 (Article 7). It also lays down conditions under which the obligations for an individual core platform service may be suspended in exceptional circumstances (Article 8) or an exemption can be granted on grounds of public interest (Article 9). Additional provisions in this Chapter establish a mechanism for updating the list of obligations (Article 10); a clarification that the obligations laid down in the Regulation apply regardless of whether the relevant practice of the designated gatekeeper is of a contractual, commercial, technical or any other nature (Article 11); an obligation to notify any intended concentration within the meaning of the EU Merger Regulation (Article 12); and an obligation on the designated gatekeeper to submit any techniques for profiling of consumers that the gatekeeper applies to or across its core platform services to an independent audit (Article 13).

Chapter IV provides rules for carrying out market investigations, notably procedural requirements for the opening of a market investigation (Article 14) and rules for carrying out different types of market investigations: (i) designation of a gatekeeper (Article 15), (ii) investigation of systematic non-compliance (Article 16) and (iii) investigation of new core platform services and new practices (Article 17).

Chapter V contains the provisions concerning the implementation and enforcement of this Regulation. It provides for procedural requirements for the opening of proceedings (Article 18). It then establishes rules in relation to different tools that can be used in the context of the market investigations or procedures under the Regulation. These include the ability of the Commission to request information (Article 19), conduct interviews and take statements (Article 20) and on-site inspections (Article 21), adopt interim measures (Article 22) and make voluntary measures binding on the gatekeepers (Article 23), as well as monitor their compliance with the Regulation (Article 24).

In case of non-compliance, the Commission can issue non-compliance decisions (Article 25), as well as impose fines (Article 26) and periodic penalty payments (Article 27) for breaches of the Regulation by gatekeepers, as well as for the supply of incorrect, incomplete or misleading information in the context of the investigation. The Regulation sets also a limitation period for the imposition of penalties and for their enforcement (Articles 28 and 29).

Several provisions in this Chapter set the procedural guarantees before the Commission, in particular the right to be heard and of access to the file (Article 30) and the protection of professional secrecy (Article 31). It also provides for the consultation of the Digital Markets

Advisory Committee set up by this Regulation before adopting identified individual decisions addressed to gatekeepers (Article 32). Finally, the Regulation provides for a possibility for three or more Member States to request the Commission to open a market investigation pursuant to Article 15 (Article 33).

Chapter VI contains further general provisions, such as an obligation to publish an identified set of individual decisions adopted under the Regulation (Article 34), a clarification that the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have unlimited jurisdiction in respect of fines and penalty payments (Article 35), and the possibility to adopt implementing (Article 36) and delegated (Article 37) acts.

Finally, the remaining provisions in this Chapter are the review clause (Article 38) and the specification of the entry into force and dates of application of the Regulation (Article 39).