Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2018)213 - Rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of certain criminal offences - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2018)213 - Rules facilitating the use of financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of ... |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2018)213  |
| date | 17-04-2018 |
1. CONTEXTOFTHEPROPOSAL
• Reasons for and objectives of the proposal
Criminal groups, including terrorists, operate across different Member States and their assets, including bank accounts, are usually located across the EU or even outside of it. They make use of modern technology that allows them to transfer money between several bank accounts and between different currencies in a matter of hours.
Timely information is essential for criminal investigations on serious crimes. Lack of financial information may result in missed opportunities to investigate serious crimes, disrupt criminal activities, stop terrorist plots, and detect and freeze proceeds of crime. Lack of information on all accounts belonging to a suspect may lead to only partial freezing of assets which may alert the suspect, who is then able to remove the undetected funds from the other accounts. Many investigations come to a dead end because of failure to secure timely, accurate and comprehensive access to the relevant financial data.1
The current mechanisms for accessing and exchanging financial information are slow compared to the fast pace at which funds can be transferred across Europe and globally. Too much time is required to obtain financial information, reducing the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions. There is a need to find quicker and more effective ways to access and exchange information on bank accounts, financial information and financial analysis. An increased number of successful criminal investigations will result in an increased number of convictions and asset confiscations. This will contribute to disrupting criminal activities and increasing the security in the Member States and across the Union.
On 2 February 2016, the Commission adopted an Action Plan on strengthening the fight against terrorist financing2 which presented how the Commission would seek to upgrade the the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (4AMLD).3 Furthermore, the plan also called for a mapping of obstacles to the access to, exchange and use of information and to the operational cooperation between FIUs to be followed up by legislative proposals if appropriate.
The Union co-legislators agreed in December 2017 on a number of significant changes to the 4AMLD (5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (5AMLD)). They include the mandatory establishment of national centralised bank account registries or data retrieval systems in all Member States, to which Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and anti-money laundering authorities would have access.
However, the Money Laundering Directives, due to their legal basis in Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), do not set out the precise conditions under which Member States' authorities and bodies competent for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences (hereafter competent authorities) can use financial and other information for the prevention, detection, investigation or
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The Europol Report “From suspicion to action: converting financial intelligence into greater operational impact”, which was published in 2017, highlighted these problems and the need for better access of law enforcement authorities to financial information. COM(2016) 50 final.
Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission
prosecution of certain criminal offences. Instead, they mostly deal with the preventive efforts to address money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, and the thrust of the obligations they lay down are directly linked to the 'obliged entities', i.e. economic operators, undertakings and professionals.
Most competent authorities currently do not have direct access to the information on the identity of bank account holders, held in the centralised bank account registries or data retrieval systems. Such registries and systems are currently operational in 15 Member States, while only in 6 Member States competent authorities (and not all of them) have direct access. Therefore, they usually request the information either via blanket requests sent to all financial institutions in their Member State or, if they have been granted indirect access, via a request to an intermediary.
A blanket request implies that the competent authority has to wait for a reply from each financial institution. This carries the real risk of significant delays which may prejudice criminal investigations. This has also implications for cross-border cooperation. The time needed to obtain financial information from banks in different Member States often varies and may further delay cooperation. Article 32a i of the 5AMLD requires the Commission to submit, by June 2020, a report to the European Parliament and to the Council assessing the possible future interconnection of centralised bank account registries. The Commission will present its assessment and findings by mid-2019.
This proposal therefore provides for direct access to the national centralised bank account registries or data retrieval systems to competent authorities. The competent authorities to which access is provided for also include tax authorities and anti-corruption authorities in their capacity to conduct criminal investigations under national law. They also include the Asset Recovery Offices which are responsible for the tracing and identification of criminal assets in view of their possible freezing and confiscation. In order to ensure that “crime does not pay” and that criminals are deprived of their profits,4 it is necessary to ensure that Asset Recovery Offices are provided with adequate tools to access information which is required for the execution of their tasks. Europol will also be provided with indirect access through Member States' National Units. Europol does not conduct criminal investigations, but supports actions by the Member States. Having no access to financial information, including the one contained in the national centralised bank account registries and data retrieval systems, prevents Europol from exploiting the full potential of its analytical capabilities. These limitations were stressed and explained in the Europol Report 'From suspicion to action' published in 2017.
As regards the cooperation between FIUs and between FIUs and competent authorities despite the fact that this is already regulated under the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive (4AMLD) both FIUs and competent authorities continue to be faced with obstacles in their interactions. The 28 FIUs5 within the EU presented a joint mapping report in December 2016 to identify which are these obstacles and propose solutions. The Commission's Staff Working
In the report, “Does crime still pay?: criminal asset recovery in the EU" (2016), Europol estimated that, between 2010 and 2014, the value of the assets frozen or seized in the European Union represented 2.2% of the estimated proceeds of crimes, while the value of the assets confiscated represented about 1.1% of such estimated proceeds. www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news">https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news FIUs are operationally independent and autonomous units with the authority and capacity to take autonomous decisions to analyse, request and disseminate their analyses to competent authorities,
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Document on improving cooperation between FIUs, published in June 20176, takes stock of the results of the mapping report and identifies issues that could be addressed through guidance and enhanced cooperation as part of the work carried out by the EU FIUs' Platform and other issues that would require regulatory solutions.
In addition, the European Parliament, expressing regret at "the lack of greater harmonisation in Member States’ approaches to fighting financial crime", called for the Union to tackle the need for more effective exchange of information and closer coordination between national authorities concerned in order to achieve better results, including by enacting the necessary Union legislation.
This proposal therefore provides for measures to facilitate the use of financial and other information in order to prevent and combat serious crime more effectively, including across borders. More specifically, it increases the competent authorities’ timely access to information contained in the centralised bank account registries or data retrieval systems as established by the 4AMLD. It also maintains a high level of protection of fundamental rights, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, and reduces the administrative burden, related to the procedure of blanket requests, for both competent authorities and the banking sector. Direct access is the most immediate type of access to financial information.
The proposal also facilitates cooperation between FIUs and between FIUs and competent authorities. It defines what type of information (financial information, financial analysis, law enforcement information) can be requested by competent authorities and FIUs respectively as well as the exhaustive list of criminal offences for which each authority can exchange information always on a case-by-case basis, which means for a specific case under investigation. It provides for deadlines within which FIUs should exchange the information and requires the use of a secure channel of communication so as to improve and speed up their exchanges. Finally, it requires Member States to designate all the competent authorities entitled to request information. It ensures a broader and more effective but at the same time proportionate exchange of information.
In this context, the Commission stresses the need to provide Financial Intelligence Units with adequate resources to fulfil their tasks, as required by the 4AMLD. Moreover, as required by Article 65(2) of the 5AMLD, the Commission will, by June 2019, assess the framework for FIUs cooperation with third countries and obstacles and opportunities to enhance cooperation between FIUs in the Union, including the possibility of establishing a coordination and support mechanism.
Consistency
with existing policy provisions in the policy area
The current proposal for a Directive is part of the European Agenda on Security adopted in April 20157 that called for additional measures in order to disrupt serious and organised crime and its follow up Action Plan on strengthening the fight against terrorist financing.
As stated above, the 4AMLD and 5AMLD are based on an internal market legal basis and deal with preventive efforts to address money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist financing. This proposal complements and builds on the preventive side of the Money Laundering Directives and reinforces the legal framework from the point of view of police cooperation.
SWD (2017)275.
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Furthermore, this proposal for a Directive reinforces and builds the Union criminal law framework with regard to the fight against serious offences, in particular Regulation (EU) 2016/794 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol)8.
• Consistency with other Union policies
The proposed Directive is in line with policy aims pursued by the Union, and in particular the reformed data protection regime, stemming from Directive (EU) 2016/680, and in line with the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
This legislative initiative is also consistent with the aims of the Union’s internal market
Contents
innovative payment services across the EU, namely rules laid down in Directive (EU) 2015/23669.
2. LEGALBASIS, SUBSIDIARITYAND PROPORTIONALITY
• Legal basis
The power to act is conferred by Article 87 (2) TFEU which enables the European Union to establish measures on police cooperation involving all the Member States' competent authorities (including police, customs and other specialized law enforcement services), in particular concerning the collection, storage and exchange of information relevant for the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences (letter a) and common investigation techniques in relation to the detection of serious forms of organised crime (letter b).
• Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)
According to Article 67 TFEU, it is the Union’s objective to provide citizens with a high level of security by preventing and combating crime. Action of the Union in this field should be taken only if, and in so far as, this objective cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can be better achieved by the Union.
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the objectives of the proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States and can therefore be better achieved at the Union level. The proposal does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives. In line with existing rules, under this proposal Member States have the right to adopt or retain measures that are more stringent than those set out in Union law.
The perpetrators of criminal offences are often active across various Member States. In particular, organised crime groups are often set up internationally and operate with financial assets across borders. Due to their transnational nature, the terrorist and criminal threats affect the EU as a whole and, therefore, require a European response. Criminals may exploit, and will benefit from, the lack, or the lack of an efficient use, of financial information by competent authorities.
Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA. Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and
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Union action aims to generate added value by providing a harmonised approach that would strengthen domestic and cross-border cooperation in financial investigations on serious crimes and terrorism. In addition, action at the Union level will help to ensure harmonised provisions, including on data protection, whereas if Member States are left to legislate independently, a harmonised level of safeguards will be difficult to achieve.
• Proportionality
In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in Article 5 i TEU, this proposal is limited to what is necessary and proportionate in order to facilitate the use and sharing of relevant financial and other information by the public authorities that have a duty to protect Union citizens.
The proposed initiative aims to grant certain competent authorities with direct access to the national centralised bank account registries and data retrieval systems. It requires Member States to designate, among its authorities competent for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of criminal offences, competent authorities empowered to access and search these registries. They shall include the Asset Recovery Offices and the Europol National Units. In addition, Europol will be granted indirect access, only on a case-by-case basis, to the information held in the national centralised bank account registries and data retrieval systems, in order to fulfil its tasks in accordance with its mandate.
Access to the national centralised bank account registries and data retrieval systems will be granted solely to a limited set of information (e.g. the owner’s name, date of birth, bank account number) which is strictly necessary to identify in which banks the subject of an investigation holds bank accounts. The authorities will not be able to access the content of the bank accounts; neither the balance of the accounts nor details on the transactions. Once the competent authorities identify in which financial institution the subject of an investigation holds a bank account, in most cases they will have to approach the respective institution and request further information, e.g. a list of transactions (usually on the basis of a judicial authorisation).
The proposed measures will not bring any changes to the core functions or the organisational status of the FIUs, which will continue to perform the same functions as set out in national and Union legislation already in force.
The proposal facilitates the cooperation between FIUs as well as cooperation between FIUs and competent authorities. This framework for exchange of information is granted under specific conditions and is limited to specific crimes (money laundering and predicate offences, financing of terrorism) as well as to serious crimes. It contains a number of safeguards for protection of privacy and personal data, always with a view to improve domestic and cross-border cooperation and exchange of information and to prevent criminals from exploiting the differences between national legislations to their advantage. The cases and conditions where exchange of financial data is permitted are also limited to an exhaustive list of competent authorities. Those competent authorities will only be enabled to access and exchange financial data in respect to a set list of criminal offences and subject to national procedural safeguards and privacy safeguards.
• Choice of the instrument
This proposal takes the form of a Directive, so as to only set out a goal that Member States must achieve, while allowing them to devise their own laws on how to reach these goals. Other means would not be adequate because the aim of the measure is the approximation of the Member States’ legislation on which authorities shall be granted access to the national
centralised bank account registries and data retrieval syste ms. Hence, no i nstrument other than a Directive would be appropriate.
3. RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
Stakeholder consultations As regards the access of competent authorities to centralised bank account registries:
The following authorities were consulted by the Commission in respect of this proposal: law enforcement authorities, the Asset Recovery Offices, the national authorities that investigate corruption and financial crime cases, Financial Intelligence Units, OLAF and Europol, national Data Protection Authorities and the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), banks, financial institutions, banking associations at national or EU level, the authorities responsible for managing the existing centralised bank account registries and data retrieval systems (or entrusted with their development where none have been established yet), and the general public.
The methods and tools used included:
• the consultation on the Inception Impact Assessment (launched on 9 August 2017 until 6 September 2017, where any i nte rested party could provide feedback);
• a public consultation (open to feedback from any interested party for 12 weeks from 17 October 2017 to 9 January 2018);
• a targeted survey addressed to the Asset Recovery Offices and Anti-Corruption Authorities of the Member States in June 2016;
• an expert meeting on broadening law enforcement access to centralised bank account registries, which took place on 25-26 October 2017;
• as a follow-up of the expert meeting on broadening law enforcement access to centralised bank account registries the Commission sent additional questions to several delegations;
• a consultation with the Asset Recovery Offices during the EU Asset Recovery Offices' Platform meeting on 12-13 December 2017;
• a high level meeting assessing the need for additional measures to facilitate access to financial inform ation - 20 Nove m ber 2017;
• a meeting to discuss cooperation between FIUs and law enforcement authorities, on 6-7 March 2018.
As regards access to centralised bank account registries, the law enforcement authorities fully supported the initiative and confirmed that:
• swift access to information on bank accounts is crucial for the effective performance of their tasks;
• the current practice of issuing “blanket requests” is highly unsatisfactory from an
“efficiency” point of view; results in a considerable administrative burden for both
the banks and themselves and slows down investigations;
• different approaches are deployed in the Member States regarding law enforcement access. In some Member States, a number of police authorities, Asset Recovery Offices and anti-corruption agencies have access, whereas in others they do not.
The banking associations reiterated their full commitment to the fight against money laundering and terr o ri st financ ing and argued that:
• the decision whether a system should be centralised or decentralised should be taken at the national level;
• the initiative should duly take care not to harm the individuals’ fundamental rights to
data privacy.
The EDPS and the national data protection authorities emphasised that:
• the practice of sending blanket requests is not satisfactory from a data protection point of view;
• there is a need for a strong justification to broaden access and the necessary safeguards have to be provided;
• any future legislative proposal needs to be fully compliant with the European data protection framework.
proposal.
As regards the exchange of information between FIUs and competent authorities:
Consultation of FIU and competent authorities
The Commission organised in March 2018 a meeting to discuss cooperation between FIUs and law enforcement authorities. Member States were consulted and provided input on the following issues:
(i) FIU access to law enforcement authorities information domestically, where it seems that all FIUs have access, whether direct or indirect (through liaison officers of the police sitting in the FIUs). The main difference in Member States is to the type of information that FIUs have access. FIUs acknowledged that harmonisation of the types of information they have access to would be important;
(ii) competent authorities access to financial information via the FIUs, where it seems that no FIU gives direct access to competent authorities to its databases. However, the police FIUs are able to easily respond to requests for information from competent authorities. For administrative FIUs it is not so easy;
(iii) Diagonal cooperation, i.e. cooperation between an FIU in one Member States with competent authorities in another Member States, which can be direct or indirect (i.e. via the FIU in the Member State of the requesting competent authorities), where all Member States opposed to the idea of direct diagonal cooperation and all were in favour of indirect diagonal cooperation;
(iv) Cooperation with Europol, where 8 FIUs already exchange information with Europol. FIUs in general expressed an interest in exchanging information with Europol, on the condition that exchanges are reciprocal.
Collection
and use of expertise
A mapping exercise has been conducted within the Union FIUs' Platform to identify practical obstacles to access to, exchange and use of information as well as operational cooperation, with a view to provide results before the end of 2016.
The consultation started with an online EUSurvey that was launched on 14 April 2016 to gather information from FIUs. This survey was divided into nine thematic areas, ranging from FIUs’ domestic features to the capacity to engage in FIU-to-FIU cooperation in its various forms and comprised of 290 questions.
The final report adopted in December 2016 is made public on the website for the 'Register Commission of expert groups and other similar entities' as an annex to the meeting minutes of the 31st meeting of the EU FIUs' Platform at ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/.
The Commission also relied on a Report by the Financial Intelligence Group of Europol, “From suspicion to action: converting financial intelligence into greater operational impact”, issued in 2017.
Impact
assessment
This proposal is supported by an impact assessment which assessed the ways to expand access to financial information for competent authorities for the investigation of crimes, looking at two issues: the issue of access of competent authorities to centralised bank account registries or retrieval systems, and the issue of enhancing cooperation between Financial Intelligence Units and competent authorities.
An impact assessment report was submitted to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on 31 January 2018. The Regulatory Scrutiny Board issued a positive opinion with reservations on 26 March 2018.
The Impact Assessment examined the following options:
Baseline Option.
Non-legislative Option - Option 0.
Legislative Options:
• Option A related to the types of crimes for the prevention and combat of which the competent authorities would be able to access and exchange information.
Option A.1 was limited to the prevention and combat of money laundering, the associated predicated offences and terrorism financing.
Option A.2 was limited to the prevention and combat of Eurocrimes.
Option A.3 was limited to the prevention and combat of serious crimes as per the Europol Regulation.
• Option B examined the modalities of access to the data.
Option B.1 related to modalities of access of competent authorities to the central bank account registries with Option B.1.a providing for direct access and Option B.1.b providing for indirect access.
Option B.2 related to the modalities of access of competent authorities to all financial information with Option B.2.a providing for a direct access to information from financial institutions and Option B.2.b with an indirect access via the Financial Intelligence Units.
Option B.3 related to the exchange of information between Financial Intelligence Units and for requests for information by Financial Intelligence Units to the competent authorities, of which Option B.3.a examined a direct cooperation, whilst Option B.3.b examined the option of establishing a central EU FIU.
Option C examined the categories of authorities which would benefit from access to and exchanges of information. Option C.1 included the competent authorities of the Data Protection Police Directive, while Option C.2 extended the cooperation with other authorities, namely the Asset Recovery Offices, Europol and OLAF.
were assessed against economic, social and fundamental rights impacts.
This proposal corresponds to the preferred policy options considered in the Impact Assessment.
The preferred option, as far as access to centralised bank account registries is concerned, is the adoption of an EU legislative instrument which would give direct access to competent authorities. This access should be given for the purposes of criminal investigations on all forms of serious crimes referred to in Article 3(1) of the Europol Regulation. Europol's access should be an indirect access, but investigations supported by Europol would also benefit from an access to information held in centralised bank account registries.
Direct access to the central bank account registries and retrieval systems is allowed under the preferred option since they contain limited information. The interference with the right to the protection of personal data will be kept to the minimum under the preferred option. The access rights are limited and are targeted only to the authorities necessary in each case, thereby ensuring proportionality in the interference with the protection of personal data.
The preferred option would also include provisions in order to facilitate the exchanges of data between FIUs, as well as reciprocally between FIUs and competent authorities. The possibility of Europol to also request information from FIUs would also be regulated. Given the sensitivity of the information, the preferred option would foresee strict data protection safeguards.
• Regulatory fitness and simplification
In October 2000, Council Decision 2000/642/JHA was adopted concerning arrangements for cooperation between FIUs of Member States with respect to exchanging information. The subject-matter of this Council Decision is regulated by other Union acts and the Council Decision has therefore currently no added value. Therefore, this proposal repeals the Decision.
• Fundamental rights
This initiative will provide competent authorities with access to mechanisms that centralise personal data relating to natural persons or from which personal data can be retrieved. This will have an impact on the fundamental rights of the data subjects. In particular, it will interfere with the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data, respectively under Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
With respect to the right to privacy under Article 7 of the Charter, although the scale of the impact is significant given the number of people that would be affected, the interference will be relatively limited in terms of gravity as the accessible and searchable data does not cover financial transactions or the balance of the accounts. It will only cover a limited set of information (e.g. the owner’s name, date of birth, bank account number) which is strictly necessary to identify in which banks the subject of an investigation holds bank accounts.
Regarding the right to the protection of personal data under Article 8 of the Charter, bank account information as well as other type of financial information constitutes or can constitute personal data and access to this data in accordance with this legislative initiative constitutes processing of personal data. All provisions in the Data Protection Police Directive apply.
The proposal specifies the purposes for processing personal data and requires a list of designated competent authorities entitled to request information. Exchanges of information will be limited on a case-by-case basis, meaning only where relevant to a specific case for the purpose of combating an exhaustive list of specified serious criminal offences.
The proposal also sets specific provisions regarding logging, records of information requests, restrictions to rights and processing of special categories of personal data ("sensitive data").
Europol through the European National Units will also be granted indirect access to the information held in the national centralised bank account registries and data retrieval systems and offered the possibility to exchange data with Financial Intelligence Units, for the purpose of fulfilling its tasks (support and strengthen action by Member States to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute specific offences within its competence) in accordance with its mandate. All safeguards foreseen in Chapters VI and VII of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 apply.
As regards procedural rights, removing the need for judicial authorisation that exists in some Member States would have a very serious impact. Therefore the exchanges of information between Financial Intelligence Units and competent authorities will be subject to national procedural safeguards.
4. BUDGETARYIMPLICATIONS
The proposal has no implications for the EU budget.
5. OTHERELEMENTS
• Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements
The proposal provides for reporting to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Directive, three years after the date of transposition, and every three years thereafter.
The Commission will also evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value of the resulting legal framework, no sooner than six years after the date of the transposition to ensure that there is enough data relating to the functioning of the Directive. The evaluation shall include stakeholders’ consultations to collect feedback on the effects of the legislative changes. The benchmark against which progress will be measured is the baseline situation when the legislative act enters into force. The Commission will present a report on the functioning of the Directive to the European Parliament and the Council. The report shall also include an evaluation of how fundamental rights and principles recognised by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union have been respected.
In order to ensure an effective implementation of the measures foreseen and monitor its results, the Commission will work closely with relevant stakeholders from national authorities of the Member States. The Commission will adopt a programme for monitoring the outputs, results and impacts of this Directive. The monitoring programme shall set out the means by which and the intervals at which the data and other necessary evidence will be collected. Member States should report to the Commission on an annual basis, some information that is considered essential to effectively monitor the application of this Regulation. The annual reporting from Member States should cover, in particular, the number of searches the designated national competent authorities carried out for the purposes of obtaining bank account information from the national centralised bank account registries and/or data retrieval systems, as well as the conditions for issuing a request, the grounds for refusal, the conditions for further use, the time limits for responding to a request, the application of safeguards when processing personal data, and an account of the international cooperation and information exchange between Financial Intelligence Units and competent authorities.
For the purposes of reporting, the Commission shall take into account the specific statistics that Member States will be required to submit.
• Explanatory documents (for directives)
The proposal does not require explanatory documents for transposition.
• Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal
Article 1 sets out the subject matter, indicating that the act facilitates access by competent authorities to financial information and bank account information for the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of serious criminal offences. It also sets out that the act facilitates access by Financial Intelligence Units to law enforcement information.
proposal.
Article 3 provides for an obligation to Member States to designate which are their competent authorities empowered to access and search the national centralised bank account registries and to request and receive information. The Article also provides for the publication of such competent authorities in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Article 4 provides for a direct access to the registries for the designated competent authorities and sets out the purposes for which direct access and search is provided, namely for preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting the offences listed in Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2016/794, the Europol Regulation, or supporting a criminal investigation, including the identification, tracing, freezing and confiscation of the assets related to such investigations.
Article 5 lays down the conditions for the access and search by the designated competent authorities.
Article 6 requires Member States to monitor the access and search by the designated competent authorities. Any access in accordance with this Directive has to be logged by the authorities operating the centralised bank account registries, and particular elements of the logs are listed.
Article 7 provides for an obligation to ensure that each Financial Intelligence Unit is required to reply to requests for financial information or financial analysis by a Member State's designated competent authorities. National procedural safeguards apply to this procedure.
Article 8 provides for an obligation to ensure that a Member State's designated competent authorities are required to reply to requests for law enforcement information issued by a Financial Intelligence Unit. National procedural safeguards apply to this procedure.
Article 9 provides for the exchange of information between Financial Intelligence Units of different Member States, including time limits to reply and secure channels for exchanging the information.
Article 10 lays down the conditions for access by Europol to bank account information and for the exchange of information between Europol and Financial Intelligence Units.
Article 11 provides an obligation that the processing of personal data be performed only by the persons within Europol that have been specifically designated and authorised to perform these tasks.
Article 12 sets out the scope of application of Chapter V.
Article 13 provides for the conditions for the processing of sensitive personal data.
Article 14 provides for an obligation for Member States to maintain records relating to all requests under the proposal.
Article 15 sets out conditions for limiting the data subject's rights of access to personal data in certain cases.
Article 16 sets out that the Commission will establish a detailed programme for monitoring the outputs, results and impacts of this Directive. It requires that Member States will provide the Commission with this information with a view to assist the Commission in the exercise of the duties under Article 18. This provision also provides for an obligation on Member States to maintain specific statistics relating to this proposal and to communicate them to the Commission.
Article 17 provides for the relationship of this proposal with bilateral or multilateral agreements either by the Member States or the Union.
Article 18 provides for an obligation on the Commission to report on the implementation of this Directive to the European Parliament and the Council three years after the transposition and every 3 years thereafter.
Article 19 sets out the periods for the transposition of this Directive.
Article 20 repeals Council Decision 2000/642/JHA, which is currently redundant given the 4 AMLD.