Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2016)67 - Further macro-financial assistance to Tunisia - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2016)67 - Further macro-financial assistance to Tunisia. |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2016)67  |
| date | 12-02-2016 |
1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL
• Grounds for and objectives of the proposal
In parallel to a protracted and fragile political transition process since the 2011 revolution, the Tunisian economy has suffered from continuous domestic unrest, regional instability (including the impact of the Libyan conflicts), and a weak international environment (particularly in the euro area). These unfavourable developments substantially weakened its growth performance, as well as its fiscal and balance of payments positions. In 2015, largely as a result of the negative economic impact of terrorist attacks (particularly on tourism, the transport sector and investment) and of production disruptions due to social unrest, growth projections have been revised markedly down, while the situation is negatively affecting an already vulnerable balance of payments and fiscal position, creating important financing needs.
At the same time, the country has continued taking significant steps towards the consolidation of democratic mechanisms, including the approval of a new Constitution in January 2014, although the political transition has not been without difficulties and episodes of instability.
Tunisia reached in mid-April 2013 an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a 24-month Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) in the amount of USD 1.75 billion, which was approved by the IMF Board on June 2013, and which was subsequently extended until December 2015. It also requested in August 2013 complementary Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) from the EU. In response, the European Commission proposed a MFA of EUR 250 million in December 2013 in the form of loans (MFA-I), which the co-legislators raised to EUR 300 million and approved in May 2014. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) defining the policy conditions related to this loan entered into force in March 2015.
Following the completion of the 6th review of the IMF programme last September, Tunisia requested a successor arrangement with the IMF, probably of a 4-year duration. The new IMF programme is still under negotiation but expected to be sent for IMF Board approval in the spring of 2016. The MFA-I operation is on track, despite some delays in its implementation. The first tranche was disbursed on 7 May 2015 and, with Tunisia having met the conditions agreed with the EU in the MoU, the second tranche was disbursed on 1 December 2015. The third and last tranche is expected to be disbursed in the second quarter of 2016, provided that the MoU conditions are met.
In this context, the Tunisian Prime Minister, in a letter sent to President Juncker in August 2015, and reiterated in December by a letter from the Minister of Development Cooperation and Investment, requested a second MFA operation from the EU in the amount of EUR 500 million, which would accompany the successor IMF programme. In view of the strong impact the security situation is having on Tunisia's economy and external financing needs during a period of consolidation of its political transition, and after an updated assessment of the country’s external financing needs conducted in liaison with the IMF, the European Commission is submitting to the European Parliament and the Council a proposal to grant a second MFA (MFA-II) to the Republic of Tunisia amounting to a maximum of EUR 500 million, in the form of medium-term loans. The proposed amount is also consistent with the expected size of the IMF programme, with the significant risks the Tunisian economy is currently facing, and with the strong commitment of the EU to support Tunisia's political and economic transition.
The proposed new MFA would help Tunisia cover part of its residual external financing needs, estimated at about USD 2.9 billion for the period 2016-17, in the context of the new IMF programme. It would reduce the economy’s short-term balance of payments and fiscal vulnerabilities, while coordinating with the adjustment and reform programmes to be agreed with the IMF and the World Bank, as well as with the reforms agreed under the EU’s budgetary support operations, in particular the State Building Contracts Programme d’appui à la relance (PAR). The proposed MFA-II is consistent with the orientations of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and with efforts of the international community, including the G-7 Deauville Partnership initiative, to assist Tunisia in these challenging times.
In this context, and as elaborated in the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying this proposal, the Commission considers, based also on the assessment of the political situation made by the European External Action Service, that the political and economic pre-conditions for a MFA operation of the proposed amount and nature are satisfied.
• General context
Following two years of stable, but low, GDP growth, in the context of the IMF programme (2.3% in both 2013 and 2014), growth for 2015 has been revised down to 0.5% compared to a forecast of 3% at the beginning of the year. Tunisia's economy has suffered a strong setback largely as a consequence of the terrorist attacks of 2015, which have affected key economic sectors. The negative effect of the attacks on the tourism sector (which contributes about 7% of GDP and accounts for around 15% of the workforce) and the transport sector (contributing also about 7% of GDP, 20% of which depends on tourism travel), as well as on foreign investors' sentiment, coupled with disruptions in phosphate production, transport and other sectors (due to work stoppages and strikes), have contributed to this downward revision. Tunisian authorities, and the IMF, expect growth to pick up in 2016, in the absence of additional shocks, supported by a slow recovery of the tourism sector and a normalisation of domestic production. Nevertheless, this baseline scenario has strong risks to the downside.
These low growth rates will, in any case, not suffice to make a significant dent on unemployment, which remains high at 15%, and is particularly high among the young and graduates (over 30%) and among women (21.6%). Furthermore, employment in the informal economy still accounts for around 50% of workers aged between 15 and 24.
Inflation averaged 5.5% in 2014 and is on a downward trend, in view of declining international commodity prices, stable domestic food production, the weakening of domestic demand and a prudent monetary policy. Headline inflation is expected to moderate to an average of 4.9% in 2015 and stay at around 4% over the next 5 years.
After tightening monetary policy between 2012 and mid-2014 in response to inflationary pressures and the deterioration in external and fiscal balances, the central bank cut its benchmark rate by 50 basis points (to 4.25%) last October, to help reignite the faltering GDP growth amid slowing CPI inflation.
Regarding the public finances, Tunisia achieved a certain degree of fiscal consolidation in 2014, as the structural fiscal balance (which notably excludes banking recapitalisation costs and other one-off items) declined from 5.1% of GDP in 2013 to 4.2% of GDP in 2014. However, in 2015, largely driven by expenditure measures taken in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, and despite expenditure savings generated by the lower than expected oil prices, the structural deficit is expected to increase to 4.7% of GDP. The 2016 budget law foresees a reduction in the structural deficit back to 4.2% of GDP, to be achieved largely through an increase in revenues (in part due to the introduction of a VAT), and lower expenditure on subsidies (due mostly to the assumptions of a lower international oil price and a stable exchange rate). Nevetherless, the foreseen hiring of around 15,000 additional public employees (mostly for the defense and security sectors) will increase the wage bill.
Meanwhile, the debt of the general government has continued to increase, reaching 50% of GDP in 2014 and is forecast to peak at 61% of GDP by the end of 2018 before starting to reverse the trend. Also, a substantial increase in public debt amortisations is scheduled to take place in the coming two years (from about USD 600 million in 2015 to more than USD 1.4 billion in 2017, and almost USD 1.2 billion in 2018).
Turning to the balance of payments, the current account deficit further widened in 2014, reaching 8.9% of GDP compared to 8.3% of GDP in 2013, and is expected to remain at an unsustainable large level in 2015, despite the decline in oil prices, weaker domestic economic activity and improved export performance. The negative effects on tourism of the Sousse terrorist attack are expected to put additional pressure on the current account deficit, pushing the deficit back towards 8.8% of GDP. Private capital inflows in Tunisia have also weakened since 2011, contributing to the vulnerabilities of the balance of payments. Net foreign direct investments, which averaged almost 5% of GDP during 2005-2010, have declined to just over 2% of GDP in the last two years.
In this context of wide current account deficit and weaker capital inflows, Tunisia has had to increasingly rely on official financial inflows. In 2015, Tunisia also managed to cover part of its external financing gap through the issuance in January 2015 of a 10-year, USD 1 billion Eurobond at 5.75%, which was oversubscribed by international investors despite not including a sovereign guarantee by a foreign donor.
Official foreign exchange reserves ended 2014 at USD 7.7 billion, or the equivalent of barely 3 months of imports, which compares to an initial target of USD 9.0 billion under the IMF programme. The USD 1 billion international bond issued in January 2015 raised the reserve level but, by the end of October, reserves had dropped back to about USD 6.5 billion, or just under 4 months of imports, as tourism income fell in the wake of the terrorist attacks. The reserve level at the end of 2015 is now expected to be USD 7.5 billion. This is well below the USD 8.2 billion the IMF had foreseen for the end of the year in the context of the 6th review of the programme (completed in September 2015) and compares to a USD 10.1 billion reserve target under the original programme.
External debt increased from 48% of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 56.2% of GDP in 2014, and it is expected to peak at 72.3% of GDP in 2018 before starting to reverse this trend. Tunisia’s sovereign ratings have been downgraded several times since 2011, the last time in 2014 (from Ba2 to Ba3 by Moody’s and from BB to BB- by Standard & Poor’s.
Tunisia continues to face significant structural reform challenges. While the country enjoyed during 2000-2010 a period of relatively high per-capita economic growth (one of the highest among the oil importers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region), it continues to suffer from a number of structural deficiencies. In particular, it has an excessive reliance on an export-oriented, low-value added industry located near the coastline, which contributes to an unbalanced pattern of regional economic development, and suffers from rigid labour markets and skill mismatches, which contributes to high unemployment, particularly among the youth. Coupled with the perception of transparency and economic governance as weak, the growth model has resulted in an unfair distribution of economic gains among the population.
Overall, reform progress remains limited, in part due to the delicate political transition, although the recent positive momentum is encouraging and the government remains committed to continuing on a positive reform path. The bulk of the groundwork for some key reforms (notably on tax policy and administration, improvement of the business and investment climate, and the reform of the financial sector) has been substantial and should pave the way for the implementation of deeper reforms. Other reforms will still require further intermediate steps, strong political commitment and support to be fully implemented (such as price subsidy reform and the improvement of the social safety net).
On 7 June 2013 the IMF Board approved, as noted, an USD 1.75 billion (400% of the Tunisian quota), two-year, Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) and which was subsequently extended until December 2015. Tunisia has requested a successor arrangement with the IMF, which is expected to have a 4-year duration and is likely to be supported by an Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The programme, which still being negotiated, is expected to be sent for IMF Board approval in the spring of 2016. Although its final amount remains to be determined, it is expected to be larger than the current SBA.
The revised projections that were produced in November by the IMF point towards significant balance of payments needs for the period 2016-2017, with the total external financing gap estimated at USD 5.1 billion (USD 2.7 billion in 2016 and USD 2.4 billion in 2017). This financing gap can broadly be attributed to three factors: a persistently large current account deficit, the need to build up foreign exchange reserves over the period 2016-17, and the large debt amortization requirements expected, especially for 2017. The proposed new MFA operation of EUR 500 million would cover 19.2% of the estimated residual financing gap.
Tunisia has also enjoyed the financial support in the past of a number of bilateral donors (in particular from the US and Japan, but also from Algeria), as well as from other multilateral donors (the World Bank and the African Development Bank in particular) and they are likely to contribute additional funds in the coming period. Among the assistance provided by the EU, the MFA-I of EUR 300 million, which is being successfully implemented, is strongly contributing towards the implementation of key reforms, and providing much needed financial support.
• Existing provisions in the area of the proposal
Previously, Decision No 534/2014/EU providing a first macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Tunisia in the amount of EUR 300 million was adopted by the European Parliament and of the Council on 15 May 2014 1 .
• Consistency with the other policies and objectives of the Union
The EU seeks to develop a close relationship to Tunisia and to support Tunisia’s economic and political reforms. In 1995, Tunisia became the first country in the Southern Mediterranean to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. This agreement, which came into force in 1998, continues to be the legal basis for bilateral cooperation. Bilateral relations have been further reinforced under the EU’s ENP, including through the adoption of five-year ENP Action Plans establishing strategic objectives for this cooperation, the latest of which covers 2013-2017. Tunisia is also a member of the Union for the Mediterranean. Economic ties with the EU are also important. Tunisia finalized the dismantling of tariffs for industrial products in 2008, thus becoming the first Mediterranean country to conclude a free trade agreement with the EU. Tunisia is the neighbouring country that conducts the largest share of its trade with the EU. In 2014, the EU was the source of 64.7% of Tunisia’s imports and the destination of 72.5% of its exports. Tunisia has also a high dependence on the EU in terms of FDI and other financial flows, remittances and tourism inflows. The EU and Tunisia formally started negotiations on a DCFTA in October 2015, with the goal to allowing the full access of Tunisia to the EU’s single market.
The EU MFA would complement the grants mobilised under the ENI and the Umbrella Programme, and in particular the conditionalities envisaged under the PAR-IV and PAR-V budget support packages being implemented by the EU. By supporting the adoption by the Tunisian authorities of an appropriate framework for macroeconomic policy and structural reforms, the EU’s MFA would enhance the added value of the overall EU involvement increasing the effectiveness of the EU’s overall intervention including through other financial instruments.
Since the Arab Spring, the EU has declared on various occasions its commitment to support Tunisia in its economic and political reform process. The EU has doubled its financial support in the form of grants, making of it the largest recipient of funding under the SPRING and Umbrella Programmes so far.
While Tunisia’s road to full democracy is not without difficulties and significant uncertainties remain, the country has taken very significant steps towards political reform. There is also a strong and intensifying framework of bilateral relations between the EU and Tunisia under the Association Agreement, the ENP and other recent initiatives.
In this context, the Tunisia is deemed to meet the political preconditions for the granting of MFA to third countries, notably in terms of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and of being a country with which the EU maintains close political and economic relations. A detailed assessment of the satisfaction of these political criteria for MFA produced by the European External Action Service is annexed to the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the proposal. And the MFA proposal is consistent with the EU's commitment to support Tunisia's economic and political transition.
2. RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT
• Consultation of interested parties
MFA is provided as an integral part of the international support to the economic stabilisation of Tunisia. In the preparation of this proposal for MFA, the Commission services have consulted with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which have already put in place sizeable financing programs and are preparing new ones. The Commission has consulted the Economic and Financial Committee on 10 December 2015, receiving an endorsement for the proposal. The Commission has also been in regular contact with the Tunisian authorities.
• Collection and use of expertise
An Operational Assessment verifying the quality and reliability of Tunisia's public financial circuits and administrative procedures was carried out by the Commission with the assistance of external experts during the month of December 2013. Its results, which were broadly positive, were shared with Tunisian authorities and the EU Delegation in January 2014 for further work on possible areas for improvement.
• Impact Assessment
The Union's macro-financial assistance is an exceptional emergency instrument and addresses balance-of-payment crises in third countries. Therefore, this MFA proposal is exempted from the requirement to carry out an Impact Assessment in accordance with the Commission's Better Regulation Guidelines (SWD(2015) 111 final) as there is a political imperative to move ahead quickly in this emergency situation requiring a rapid response.
More generally, the MFA and the economic adjustment and reform programme attached to it will help alleviate Tunisia's short-term financing needs while supporting policy measures aimed at strengthening medium-term balance of payments and fiscal sustainability and raising sustainable growth, as agreed to be agreed the IMF in the context of the new programme. It will notably help improve the efficiency and transparency of public finance management; and promote structural reforms supporting, as ultimate goals, fiscal consolidation and balance of payments adjustment, as well as productivity and employment growth, and promoting regulatory harmonisation and economic integration with the EU, including in the context of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement currently under negotiation.
3. LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL
• Summary of the proposed action
The European Union shall make MFA available to Tunisia for a total maximum amount of EUR 500 million, provided in the form of a medium term loan. The assistance will contribute to cover Tunisia's residual external financing needs in 2016-17, as identified by the Commission based on the estimates of the IMF.
The assistance is planned to be disbursed in three loan instalments of EUR 200 million, EUR 150 million and EUR 150 million, respectively. The disbursement of the first instalment is expected to take place in the middle of 2016. The second instalment, conditional on a number of policy measures, could be disbursed in the fourth quarter of 2016. The third and last instalment could be made available, provided the policy measures are met, during the first half of 2017. The assistance will be managed by the Commission. Specific provisions on the prevention of fraud and other irregularities, consistent with the Financial Regulation, are applicable.
As usual with the MFA instrument, the disbursements would be conditional on successful programme reviews under the new IMF's financial arrangement. In addition, the Commission and the Tunisian authorities would agree on specific structural reform measures in a Memorandum of Understanding. The Commission will target structural reforms aimed at improving the overall macroeconomic management and the conditions for sustainable growth (e.g. targeting the transparency and efficiency of public finance management; fiscal reforms; reforms to strengthen the social safety net; labour market reforms; and reforms to improve the regulatory framework for trade and investment). These reform measures would support the authorities’ reform agenda and complement the programmes agreed with the IMF, the World Bank and other donors, as well as the policy programmes associated with the EU’s budgetary support operations. They would be consistent with the main economic reform priorities agreed between the EU and Tunisia in the context of the ENP Joint Action Plan and other strategic documents. They will also build upon the structural reforms implemented under MFA-I.
The decision to disburse the full MFA in the form of loans is justified by Tunisia's level of development (as measured by its per-capita income) and debt indicators. It is also consistent with the treatment given to Tunisia by the World Bank and the IMF. Indeed, Tunisia is not eligible for concessional financing from either the IDA or the IMF's Extended Credit Facility.
• Legal basis
The legal basis for this proposal is Article 212 TFEU.
• Subsidiarity principle
The subsidiarity principle is respected as the objectives of restoring short-term macroeconomic stability in Tunisia cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States alone and can be better achieved by the European Union. The main reasons are the budgetary constraints faced at the national level and the need for strong donor coordination in order to maximise the scale and effectivenes of the assistance.
• Proportionality principle
The proposal complies with the proportionality principle: it confines itself to the minimum required in order to achieve the objectives of short-term macro economic stability and does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose.
As identified by the Commission based on the estimates of the IMF in the context of the future EFF Arrangement, the amount of the MFA-II assistance corresponds to 19.2% of the residual financing gap for the period 2016-2017. This is consistent with standard rules on burden-sharing for MFA operations. Given the assistance pledged to Tunisia by other bilateral and multilateral donors and creditors, it is deemed an appropriate level of burden-sharing for the EU. If taken into account the undisbursed third tranche from MFA-I, the total financial assistance of MFA-I and MFA-II in the period 2016-2017 corresponds to 23.4% of the estimated residual financing gap.
• Choice of instruments
Project finance or technical assistance would not be suitable or sufficient to address these macroeconomic objectives. The key value added of the MFA in comparison to other EU instruments would be to alleviate the external financial constraint and to help create a stable macroeconomic framework, including by promoting a sustainable balance of payments and budgetary situation, and an appropriate framework for structural reforms. By helping to put in place an appropriate overall policy framework, MFA can increase the effectiveness of the actions financed in Tunisia under other, more narrowly focused EU financial instruments.
4. BUDGETARY IMPLICATION
The planned assistance would be provided in the form of a loan and should be financed through a borrowing operation that the Commission will conduct on behalf of the EU. The budgetary costs of the assistance will correspond to the provisioning, at a rate of 9%, of the amounts disbursed in the guarantee fund for external lending of the EU, from budget line 01 03 06 ("the provisioning of the Guarantee Fund"). Assuming that the first and second loan disbursements will be made in 2016 for a total amount of EUR 350 million and the third loan disbursement in 2017 for the amount of EUR 150 million, and according to the rules governing the guarantee fund mechanism, the provisioning will take place in the 2018-19 budgets. Based on current projections on the utilisation of the budget line 01 03 06, the Commission assesses that the budgetary impact of the operation can be accommodated.
5. OPTIONAL ELEMENTS
• Review/revision/sunset clause
The proposal includes a sunset clause. The proposed MFA would be made available for two and a half years, starting from the first day after the entry into force of the Memorandum of Understanding.