Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2011)841 - Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2011)841 - Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation. |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2011)841  |
| date | 07-12-2011 |
Since the early 1990s, support for the promotion of nuclear safety and nuclear safeguards in third countries has been an essential part of the Community’s work, both in Central Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union, under the nuclear safety programme components of the TACIS and PHARE programmes. From 2007, nuclear safety cooperation was extended to include ‘third countries’ under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, while the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) provided for nuclear safety cooperation with the countries engaged in the process of accession to the EU.
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 highlighted the global importance of nuclear safety. The Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011 confirmed the need to continue the efforts to improve nuclear safety to meet the highest standards. Both accidents clearly demonstrated that the health, social, environmental and economic consequences of a nuclear accident may extend well beyond national borders and, potentially, worldwide.
The importance of nuclear safety was recognized by the Council of the European Union in its Resolution of 18 June 1992 on the technological problems of nuclear safety, which emphasized “the particular importance it attaches to nuclear safety in Europe, and therefore requests the Member States and the Commission to adopt as the fundamental and priority objective of Community cooperation in the nuclear field, in particular with the other European countries, … bringing their nuclear installations up to safety levels equivalent to those in practice in the Community …”.
The Community decided to accede to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1999 and to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in 2005, both Conventions aiming to enhance national measures and international cooperation in these fields.
The Council of the European Union adopted Directive 2009/71/Euratom of 25 June 2009, establishing a Community framework for nuclear safety of nuclear installations in order to maintain and promote the continuous improvement of nuclear safety and its regulation. In 2011, the Council of the European Union also adopted the Directive establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste. These directives and the high standards of nuclear safety and radioactive waste and spent fuel management implemented in the European Union are examples that can be used to encourage third countries to adopt similar high standards.
The Community already pursues close cooperation, in accordance with Chapter 10 of the Euratom Treaty, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in relation both to nuclear safeguards (in furtherance of the objectives of Chapter 7 of Title Two of the Euratom Treaty), and to nuclear safety.
The promotion of regulatory and other forms of cooperation with emerging economies, and the promotion of EU approaches, rules, standards and practices are external policy objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy
In order for the European Union to fulfil its role as a global player in the promotion of human and strategic security, it is essential that the Community should have the capability and means to respond to challenges arising in the field of nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear safeguards in any third countries, building on the experience of the Community and of its Member States in these fields within the European Union. With this in mind, the proposed Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) will continue the actions initiated in the 1990s in Central Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union, which have been extended since 2007 to ‘third countries’.
It is expected that the basic motivations which led to engaging in cooperation with third countries will remain valid over the period 2014 to 2020. However, as major projects carried out under the INSC (in particular those related to the remediation of the Chernobyl site and nuclear plant improvement projects) will have been mostly completed by 2014, this will free up resources to address other areas of concern. Remediation of mining sites (the legacy of uranium mining which did not respect basic environmental requirements), disposal of spent fuel, waste management and decommissioning of installations will need to be dealt with as a programme priority.
A shift in the intervention of the European Union, from technical assistance to cooperation, is also taking place. It focuses on core activities designed to improve nuclear safety culture, radiation protection and safeguards.
Under the Euratom Framework Programmes research and innovation actions encourage the prevention and mitigation of severe accidents and in improving radiation protection with the aim to enhance safety culture. The bilateral international cooperation agreements under Euratom on nuclear safety are also to be seen as an additional way to contribute to improve nuclear safety, radiation protection and safe management of radioactive waste, through increased research and innovation efforts with third country partners.
The lessons learnt in the wake of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident will play an important role in the improvement of nuclear safety in the coming years. The results of the EU Member States’ comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessments (“stress tests”), which are due to be extended to the EU neighbouring countries and possibly other third countries, are expected to have a considerable impact on the design, operation, maintenance and regulation of nuclear power plants. The experience gained within the EU will be important to other third countries.
The cooperation under the INSC must be complementary to that provided by the European Union under other development cooperation instruments, and the measures adopted must be consistent with the European Community's overall strategic policy framework for the partner countries concerned. Given the international commitments related to nuclear safety improvements, cooperation under the INSC should further exploit synergies with the Euratom Framework Programmes on nuclear research and training activities.
Contents
- RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS
- LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL
- BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
- WITH INTERESTED PARTIES, AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS
- Impact Assessment
- Subsidiarity and Proportionality
- 5. OPTIONAL ELEMENTS
- Explanation of the major articles of the Regulation and changes relative to the current INSC
- Article 1 -Subject matter and scope
- ANNEX
Public Consultation
The Commission held a public consultation from 26 November 2010 to 31 January 2011 on future funding for EU external action. This process was based on an online questionnaire, accompanied by a background paper What funding for EU external action after 2013? prepared by Commission and EEAS services involved. The 220 contributions received in response to the public consultation reflect a broad and diverse spectrum representing the variety of structures, views and traditions characterising the external action community.
In general, the responses did not suggest the need for a substantial change in the current structure of the existing instruments. Nevertheless, several issues were identified which are relevant to the INSC and, as appropriate, are taken into account in the preparation of the new Regulation.
A majority of the respondents (around 70%) confirmed that EU financial intervention provides substantial added value in the main policy areas supported through EU financial instruments for external action. The criterion of EU added value is mentioned by many respondents as the main driver for the future: the EU should exploit its comparative advantage linked to its global field presence, its wide-ranging expertise, its supranational nature, its role as a facilitator of coordination, and economies of scale.
Nearly all respondents (92%) support a more differentiated approach, tailored to the situation of the beneficiary country, based on sound criteria and efficient data collection, to be used as a way to increase the impact of EU financial instruments.
Over two thirds of respondents believe that EU interests are sufficiently taken into account in its external action, and that the latter should be based to a larger extent on EU values and principles, and on the development objectives of the partner countries. Conversely, a minority considers that EU external action should concentrate more on the EU's own interests in the global economy, particularly in relation to emerging economies.
The overwhelming majority of respondents support a stronger focus on monitoring and evaluations systems in the future instruments and in the implementation of projects/programmes.
With regard to ways of enhancing the visibility of EU external funding, a majority of stakeholders support greater efforts in the area of information and communication activities, particularly in beneficiary countries; however, EU visibility appears to be better served by effective policies, strategies and presence in third countries than by additional spending on communication.
The ideas of reinforcing EU's coordinating role among other donors and of ensuring that implementing partners give more visibility to EU funding also receive strong support from stakeholders.
The Commission carried out an Impact Assessment, which reviewed four options as follows:
(a) No further EU action (no Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument). Some cooperation activities on nuclear safety could be included in the geographical cooperation instruments and be implemented as such. However, this might create complications with the legal basis and unsatisfactory implementation due to the highly technical nature of the issues.
(b) ’No change’ (cooperation with third countries would continue under the existing INSC Regulation). This option would not allow the incorporation of lessons learnt, the revision of the geographic scope and the setting of criteria for cooperation and priorities in the regulation. It would miss an opportunity to improve the implementation and effectiveness of the Regulation.
(c) Amend the INSC Regulation. The amended Regulation could provide for a revision of the geographical scope to include all third countries (including those currently covered by the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA)) and specify the priorities and criteria for cooperation. This would lead to a simplification and a more efficient implementation than is the case with the current regulation.
(d) A new instrument, which could include the current INSC scope plus part of the scope of the existing Instrument for Stability (IFS). This could provide a unified approach towards nuclear safety, security and safeguards (the ‘3S’); however, it would require a dual legal basis (the Euratom Treaty and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union). The dual legal basis would be likely to lead to increased complexity in implementation and perpetuate the need for close coordination with other risk mitigation actions (chemical and biological).
The option to amend the Regulation was found to be the preferred one. In comparison with the options of no change and a new Instrument, it would allow continuity and using the experience of a well tried system, while resolving a number of issues which have been identified, including a clearer understanding of the limits of intervention. This, as well as the utilization of a single legal basis (as compared with the new instrument option), would simplify implementation.
The legal basis of the current INSC Regulation is the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (the ‘Euratom Treaty’), and in particular Article 203 thereof. Considering the legislative framework for nuclear safety at EU level, and the fact that the revised scope does not entail a change in the legal basis, this should continue to be the case for the future Regulation.
With 27 Member States acting within common policies and strategies, the EU alone has the critical mass to respond to global challenges, whereas the action of Member States may be limited and fragmented, with projects which are often too small to make a sustainable difference in the field. This critical mass also puts the EU in a better position to conduct policy dialogue with partner governments.
The EU is in a uniquely neutral and impartial position to deliver on external action on behalf of and with Member States, lending enhanced credibility in the countries in which it works. It is best placed to take on the role of global leader on behalf of its citizens.
The Commission proposes to allocate €70 billion for the period 2014-2020 for the external instruments. The allocation earmarked for the INSC over the period 2014 to 2020 is EUR 631.1 million (EUR 560 million at 2011 prices). The indicative yearly budget commitments for the INSC are identified in the table below.
Year| TOTAL
INSC allocation (Million EUR)| 84.| 86.| 88.| 90.| 91.| 93.| 95.| 631.1
The indicative financial allocations per specific objective are set out in the Legislative Financial Statement.
Simplification
Articles of horizontal nature were deleted as they are covered by the Regulation No …. /… establishing common implementation rules for external relations financing instruments.
In order to simplify the programming and implementation of the INSC, a definition of the criteria for cooperation and the thematic and geographic priorities for the selection of cooperation projects is provided in an annex to the Regulation.
TITLE I – Objectives
Article 1 sets out the objectives and scope of the Regulation. The Regulation will apply to all third countries (as further explained in the Annex).
Three specific objectives are established:
(a) promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture and implementation of the highest nuclear safety standards and radiation protection;
(b) responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, decommissioning and remediation of former nuclear sites and installations;
(c) establishment of frameworks and methodologies for the application of efficient and effective safeguards for nuclear material in third countries.
Relative to the current INSC Regulation the presentation is simplified. Articles 1 and 2 of the current INSC have been merged. The article defines the major areas of cooperation, while the Annex defines the specific measures.
TITLE II – Programming and indicative allocation of funds
Article 2 – Strategy papers
This article stipulates that the multi-annual strategy paper(s) shall constitute the general basis for the cooperation setting out the Union's strategy for cooperation under the Regulation.
Article 3 – Multiannual indicative programmes
This article stipulates that multiannual indicative programmes shall set out the priority areas selected for financing, the specific objectives, the expected results, the performance indicators and the indicative financial allocations.
TITLE III – Implementation
This Title was greatly simplified as Article 4 stipulates that the decision shall be implemented in accordance with Regulation No …. /… establishing common implementation rules for external relations financing instruments.
TITLE IV – Final provisions
This title provides the definition of the financial reference amount (Article 7) and entry into force (Article 8).
The Annex on specific supported measures and criteria applying to nuclear safety cooperation was introduced in order to further simplify the body of the text of the Regulation and its implementation, by defining the areas of cooperation, technical and geographical scope, criteria for cooperation and priorities .
Under the terms of the proposal, the annex may be amended using a lighter procedure than would be required for the Regulation as a whole (Article 5 of the Regulation).
The Annex defines the specific measures supported by the Regulation (a revised version the current INSC, redefining the areas of cooperation), the criteria for nuclear safety cooperation with third countries, the priorities and coordination. The criteria for cooperation take into account and follow essentially those proposed by the Council in 2008.