Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2009)453 - Signing of the Cooperation Agreement on a Satellite Navigation between the EC and Norway

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1. CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL

1.1. Grounds for and objectives of the proposal Technological, geographical and financial reasons have ensured Norway an important role in the European GNSS. Norway provides critical technology to Galileo and is the host for two important ground installations on Svalbard and Antarctica that contribute to the proper functioning of the system. This Agreement aims to settle the principles of cooperation in general and the rights and obligations of Norway mainly in relevant areas, such as security, that are not covered by existing Galileo acquis. The Agreement has been negotiated on the basis of negotiation directives adopted by the Council on 8 July 2005. The Agreement was initialled on 17 July 2009. The Agreement will be complemented by a proposed EEA Joint Committee Decision (Doc No 25100, Case No. 25099) amending Protocols 31 and 37 to the EEA Agreement by which Norway subscribes to Council Regulation (EC) No 1321/2004 of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of structures for the management of the European satellite radio-navigation programmes, Regulation (EC) No 1942/2006 of 12 December 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 1321/2004 on the establishment of structures for the management of the European satellite radio-navigation programmes and Regulation (EC) No 683/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on the further implementation of the European satellite navigation programmes (EGNOS and Galileo). Articles 4 §5 and 6§4 of this Regulation open up the possibility for third countries to provide additional funding to the European GNSS programmes in accordance with conditions to be laid down in Agreements pursuant to Article 300 of the Treaty. The Agreement is limited to topics that are necessary to allow close cooperation with Norway. The construction and management of Galileo and EGNOS as EC-wide programs highlight the need for common approaches and working methods between all the EU member states and some non-EU states (Norway and Switzerland). The rules for these topics need to be set by the governments and coherently enforced Europe-wide. The Commission as program manager acting on behalf of the Community, the owner of the system, needs to take all reasonable measures to induce this coherence. Failing to do this would increase security risks and the exposure of the EC and its Member States for liability claims in case of serious incidents.

1.2. General context Norway is our closest non-EU cooperation partner in Galileo since the early days of the programme. Norway has contributed politically, technically and financially to all phases of Galileo through its membership in the European Space Agency and its informal participation in the Galileo-specific EC governance structures over the years. This Agreement and a parallel, related decision through the EEA Joint Committee will formalise and deepen this close integration of Norway in European GNSS Programs. Without this agreement, the participation of Norway would continue within the limits of the EEA agreement. This would cause uncertainty about the nature of the collaboration in the sectors of security, standardisation, certification and radio spectrum. Moreover, the Agreement allows the EC on the one hand to set overall principles including a conditionality clause for cooperation in security. On the other hand the Agreement includes a political commitment from Norway to subscribe to future EC policy aimed to protect European GNSS.

1.3. Existing provisions in the area of the proposal Cooperation of Norway in Galileo will be organised in two complementary instruments: an EEA Joint Committee decision to cover Galileo acquis and the enclosed mixed agreement to provide an umbrella for the cooperation including principles of future cooperation and complementary provisions concerning cooperation in security, standardisation and certification.

1.4. Consistency with the other policies and objectives of the Union The proposal is in line with the policy of the EC of integrating Norway in Community programmes through the EEA Agreement. Moreover, it supports the objectives of the Commission in reinforcing the Community aspect of cooperation in policies relevant to non-proliferation.

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2. CONSULTATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT


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2.1. Consultation of interested parties


Consultation methods, main sectors targeted and general profile of respondents The Special Committee of the Council, security authorities of the Member States and Norway have been consulted through the Galileo Security Board Working Group 2 and through bilateral meetings with Norwegian authorities both at the stage of negotiation directives and during negotiations. The respondents included technical, security and transport experts of EU MS and Norwegian National Security Authorities, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior, European Space Agency and national space agencies.

Summary of responses and how they have been taken into account These stakeholders have supported the close integration of Norway in cooperation in Galileo relevant security matters and underlined the importance of including issues such as security of ground facilities in the Agreement.

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2.2. Collection and use of expertise


Scientific/expertise domains concerned Space technology/ ground facilities, Security/ Industrial and governmental security, information security and international law/ privileges and immunities

Methodology used Meetings mainly

Main organisations/experts consulted EU MS ministries and space agencies, EEA Secretariat, ESA, space industry

Summary of advice received and used The existence of potentially serious risks with irreversible consequences has not been mentioned.

There was a broad consensus over the principles of cooperation foreseen in the Agreement and the objective of closely integrating Norway in the programme including rights and corresponding obligations. The security profile of Norway gave confidence to the experts.

Means used to make the expert advice publicly available The conclusions of security experts have not been made publicly available.

2.3. Impact assessment The action aims at ensuring a close involvement of Norway in the construction and operations phases of Galileo and EGNOS. These two initiatives contain significant industrial, economic and strategic components. The governance of the European GNSS Programmes has been reformed in Regulation (EC) No 683/2008 whereby the focus has been shifted from a Public-Private-Partnership to programmes managed and systems owned by the Community. This evolution and the content of the cooperation with security implications require formal regulatory measures. Consequently, three options were considered to achieve this goal: The first one was an association of Norway to the programme through a specific international cooperation body (Galileo International Board) grouping all third countries interested in Galileo. After long discussions over this body with Norway and other third countries, the option was abandoned. Norway felt it was unjust to treat it the same way as considerably less integrated non-European third countries that have not contributed financially to the programme. The second option was to use the EEA framework as the only instrument to formalise the cooperation. This was closely studied including the possibilities in legal terms to cover all the scope of cooperation desired. At the end it was concluded that the EEA was the best option for incorporating existing EC acquis concerning Galileo. This includes committees, decision shaping without voting rights, ownership rules, procurement, financial contributions etc. However, EEA was considered insufficient in certain sectors such as security, spectrum and standardisation. Also, from the EC point of view, it was not practical to introduce principles and conditionality provisions that are not present in Galileo acquis. The third option was a combination of the EEA Joint Committee decision and the enclosed mixed agreement. This combination allowed practically differentiating between Norway and Iceland (members of the EEA), to introduce additional commitments/obligations for Norway, to reinforce provisions on security and to provide principles and messages paving way for a mutually beneficial long term cooperative relationship.

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LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL



3.1. Summary of the proposed action The Commission proposes to the Council to authorise the signature and provisional application of a Cooperation agreement on satellite navigation between EC its Member States and the Kingdom of Norway. Provisional application is a necessary measure to speed up the application of the Agreement due to the provisions concerning in particular the security of Galileo ground facilities on Norwegian territories.

3.2. Legal basis Articles 133 and 170, in conjunction with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300(2) of the Treaty establishing the European community.

3.3. Subsidiarity principle The subsidiarity principle applies insofar as the proposal does not fall under the exclusive competence of the Community.

The objectives of the proposal cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States for the following reason(s).

Galileo, whose costs are estimated at several billions of Euro, is a European initiative that no single state alone is willing to finance. The content of the proposed Agreement cannot be limited to any single Member State or a group of Member States but affects the EU as a whole and in some aspects (e.g. ground station services) has even a worldwide impact.

The industrial and technical (including security) knowledge in the space sector is spread over several European countries including Norway with no one state capable of mastering all of it. Without a coordinated effort and information sharing, the risks of agreeing on sub-optimal solutions with Norway would increase. Errors in the area of security could compromise the security of supply of export controlled components to the European GNSS in particular from the United States. This would drive up the costs of the programmes.

Community action will better achieve the objectives of the proposal for the following reason(s).

The infrastructure of European GNSS is being deployed over the whole world and its security will largely depend on the enforcement of coherent protection measures by all Member States and non-EU states hosting this critical infrastructure.

The size and complexity of the European GNSS require centralised and simple management structures and clear interfaces between the EU side and third countries. A large network of bilateral relations with Norway would bear a high risk of inefficiencies, delays and contradictions which in an industrial project quickly translate into higher costs to be born by the Community budget. Also, Member States acting individually might have smaller chances to impose principles and conditionality towards Norway than what is achieved through cooperation.

The Agreement is limited to the common principles and commitments of cooperation and to the specific issues covering ground infrastructure forming a part of the EC owned GNSS. The agreement relies on existing capabilities of the Member States (e.g. in export control, exchange of sensitive information) in the implementation of most provisions of the Agreement.

The proposal therefore complies with the subsidiarity principle.

3.4. Proportionality principle The proposal complies with the proportionality principle for the following reasons.

The Agreement sets the objectives and principles but includes a clause referring to the definition of details of actions in separate arrangements that will be defined in cooperation with Member State experts and Norway.

The Agreement is a traditional well-known instrument in international relations defined in collaboration with existing expert working groups and to be approved by the existing decision-making structures. It does not establish new administrative structures.

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3.5. Choice of instruments


An international agreement is the sole instrument which ensures EU-wide coherency in relations with Norway in satellite navigation. Uniformity in application is particularly important in security which forms a major part of the Agreement. At the same time the Agreement allows flexibility as to the implementing measures in particular in the area of standardisation and certification where the Member States are key actors in the international organisations. The Treaty does not provide other viable options for regulating the relationships with a third country.

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BUDGETARY IMPLICATION



The proposal has no implication for the Community budget.

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5. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION


The proposal includes a review clause.

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B) PROPOSAL


The Commission proposes to the Council, on the basis of (Articles 133 and 170), in conjunction with the first sentence of the first subparagraph of Article 300(2) of the Treaty establishing the European community, to authorise the signature and the provisional application of the Cooperation Agreement on Satellite Navigation between the European Community and its Member States and the Kingdom of Norway.