Explanatory Memorandum to COM(2002)158-2 - Specific stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships - Main contents
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This page contains a limited version of this dossier in the EU Monitor.
| dossier | COM(2002)158-2 - Specific stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships. |
|---|---|
| source | COM(2002)158  |
| date | 25-03-2002 |
Contents
- 1. Background
- 2. The SOLAS stability requirements and the Stockholm Agreement
- 3. The EU position towards the Stockholm Agreement
- JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSED COMMUNITY INITIATIVE
- CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE
- SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
- Article 2
- Article 3
- Article 4
- Article 5
- Article 6
- Article 7
- Article 8
- Article 12
- Article 13
- Article 15
The stability following collision damage is an issue of prime importance for the survivability of ro-ro passenger ships, due to their particular design. It is obvious that in general, the longer the period a ship remains afloat in case of serious damage, the more efficient the eventual evacuation or search and rescue operations can be. In that perspective the stability requirements applicable to these ships influence directly the safety of passengers and crew. These considerations become even more important in view of the escalating size of ro-ro ships serving Community ports and the increasing number of passengers and crew they carry.
As both practise and research has demonstrated, the most dangerous problem for a ro-ro ship with an enclosed ro-ro deck is the one posed by the effect of a build-up of significant amount of water on that deck. However, with the application of the appropriate technical standards a damaged vessel may stay afloat even when a certain amount of water made its way to the ro-ro deck (the car deck). Research has clearly shown that the residual freeboard of the ship and the waves height in a particular sea area had a significant effect on the amount of water which may accumulate following collision damage.
The stability of ro-ro passenger ships has been addressed at international level by the International Maritime Organisation and specific standards have been established in that respect, particularly on the basis of the SOLAS 90 Convention i and Resolution A265. These standards, implicitly include the effect of water entering the ro-ro deck in a sea state in the order of 1.5 m significant wave height and have a phasing-in timetable for existing ships ranging from 1 October 1998 to 1 October 2010.
Following the Estonia disaster, eight European countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) decided in February 1996 to require higher standards of damage stability for ro-ro passenger ships than those prescribed by SOLAS 90. These new standards were introduced in the context of the Stockholm Agreement (SA) to which the above eight countries became parties. The Stockholm Agreement stability requirements are complementary to the SOLAS 90 standard, aimed at increasing the survivability of the ro-ro vessels in sea states between 1,5 m and 4 m significant wave height. These complementary requirements take specifically into account the probability of water accumulation in the car deck, up to a height of 0,5 m. The Stockholm Agreement established a phasing-in period ranging from 1 April 1997 to 1 October 2002.
At the adoption of the Stockholm Agreement, noting its regional application, the Commission announced its intention to examine the prevailing local conditions, under which ro-ro passenger ferries sail in all European waters and that this examination would include the extent and effect of the application of the Agreement in the region covered by it. The statement concluded that in the light of this examination the Commission would take a decision with regard to the need for further initiatives.
The Council entered a similar statement into the meeting of the 2074th Council meeting of 17 March 1998 at which Council Directive 98/18/EC on safety rules and standards for passenger ships was adopted i. In this statement the need to ensure the same level of safety for all ro-ro passenger ferries operating in similar conditions was more precisely defined by referring to both international and domestic voyages. Directive 98/18/EC made mandatory the application of SOLAS 90 stability standards to domestic EU trades for new class A, B, C and D ships and existing class A and B ships i.
Following the last serious accident involving a ro-ro passenger ship, the 'Express Samina' which occurred in Greece in September 2000, the European Parliament invited the Commission to examine the effectiveness of the Stockholm Agreement and other measures for improving the stability and safety of passenger vessels i.
In this context and following a thorough analysis on the Stockholm Agreement, the Commission included this item in its work programme for 2001.
2.1. The question of stability of passenger vessels has been addressed repeatedly by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in the context of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the first damage stability requirements were introduced in 1948 followed by improvements in 1960 and 1974. However, the major step in the development of stability standards for ro-ro ships came in 1990 with the introduction of a new section i in the SOLAS Convention. These requirements (known as SOLAS 90 stability standard) are internationally accepted and apply to passengers vessels involved in international voyages from/to EU ports, as well as to domestic trades within Member States by means of the Directive 98/18/EC. The SOLAS 90 standard implicitly include the effect of water entering the ro-ro deck in a sea state in the order of 1.5 m significant wave height.
The SOLAS 90 requirements have a phasing-in period for all existing ro-ro passenger ships with dates of compliance ranging from 1 October 1998 to 1 October 2010 depending on a combination of different factors i.
2.2. In the aftermath of the Estonia disaster, 8 European countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom), agreed in February 1996 in Stockholm to require higher standards of damage stability for ro-ro passenger ships than what had been determined just a few years earlier by the IMO SOLAS 90 standard. The key idea behind this initiative was that a ship should be designed to resist capsize even when a certain quantity of water has made its way to the vehicle (ro-ro) deck.
The Stockholm Agreement (SA) was established in the context of IMO Resolution 14 of the 1995 SOLAS Conference, allowing contracting governments to conclude such an agreement if they consider that prevailing sea conditions and other local conditions require specific stability requirements in a designated area. It was notified to the IMO on 1 April 1996 in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of Resolution 14 and entered into force on 1 April 1997 in accordance with its article 10 i. In simplified terms, the SA standards are complementary to SOLAS 90 standards with the addition of technical requirements to satisfy explicitly the 'water in the car deck' probability. Compliance with these requirements is measured whether on basis of numerical calculations defined in the Agreement or by performing model experiments in accordance with the model testing method of SOLAS 95 Resolution 14.
According to the logic of the Agreement, the residual freeboard of the vessel and the significant wave height (hs) of the area where a ship operates determine the height of water on the car deck that would arise following the occurrence of an accidental damage. Consequently, a ship should be designed to withstand the significant wave heights that prevail in the routes, or areas, where she operates. Taking into account the above parameters, the result from the application of the SA stability requirements is that a vessel should resist capsize even with a flooded ro-ro deck up to a level of 0.5 metre. The maps indicating significant wave heights values by area that appear in the Stockholm Agreement, have been defined by the contracting governments and they are based on all year round statistics.
The specific stability requirements of the SA are applicable to ro-ro passenger ships regardless of flag, operating on regular international voyages carrying passengers between designated ports to or from designated ports in the area covered by the Agreement. As for their enforcement, the Agreement provided for a phasing-in period ranging from 1 April 1997 for ro-ro passenger ships with the lowest A/Amax values, to 1 October 2002 for ships already complying with the SOLAS 90 stability standard.
3.1. At the conclusion of the Conference at which the Agreement was adopted, the Commission services issued a statement, taking note of the Agreement concluded and expressing the opinion that the same level of safety should be ensured for all ro-ro passenger ferries operating in similar conditions. Noting that the Agreement is not applicable in other parts of the European Union, the Commission announced its intention to examine the prevailing local conditions, under which ro-ro passenger ferries sail in all European waters and that this examination would include the extent and effect of the application of the Agreement in the region covered by it. The statement concluded that in the light of this examination the Commission would take a decision with regard to the need for further initiatives.
This Commission statement was confirmed at the 1907th meeting of the Council, on 11 March 1996, at which the outcome of the Stockholm Agreement was discussed by the Ministers of Transport.
The Council agreed to enter a similar statement into the meeting of the 2074th Council meeting of 17 March 1998 at which Council Directive 98/18/EC on safety rules and standards for passenger ships was adopted In this statement the need to ensure the same level of safety for all ro-ro passenger ferries operating in similar conditions was more precisely defined by referring to both international and domestic voyages. Directive 98/18/EC made mandatory the application of SOLAS 90 stability standards to domestic EU trades for new class A, B, C and D ships and existing class A and B ships.
3.2. Furthermore, Directive 1999/35/CE on a system of mandatory surveys for the safe operation of regular ro-ro ferry and high speed passenger crafts, provides in its article 4.1.e that ro-ro ferries shall fulfil the specific stability requirements adopted at regional level, when operating in the region covered by such regional rules. This obliges host States to check that ro-ro ferries 'comply with specific stability requirements adopted at regional level, and transposed into their national legislation in accordance with the notification procedure laid down in Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on information society services, when operating in that region a service covered by that national legislation, provided those requirements do not exceed those specified in the Annex of Resolution 14 (Stability Requirements Pertaining to the Agreement) of the 1995 SOLAS Conference and have been notified to the Secretary-General of the IMO, in accordance with the procedures specified in point 3 of that resolution.'
3.3. Following its earlier commitment the Commission contracted a study to examine the extent and effect of the application of the Stockholm Agreement concerning specific stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships and the suitability of extending its scope of application to European waters not covered by it. Furthermore the economic impact of the application of the Stockholm Agreement has been analysed and found acceptable, as demonstrated in the following chapter.
3.4. The European Parliament with its Resolution B5-0783, 0787 and 0791/2000 of 5 October 2000, which followed the 'Express Samina' accident, stressed that it 'awaits the evaluation by the Commission of the effectiveness of the Stockholm Agreement and other measures for improving the stability and safety of passenger vessels'
3.5. Following the evaluation made by the Commission, based on consultation of interested parties and inputs from various sources including the findings of the above study, it is considered that a legislative initiative in the field covered by the Stockholm Agreement is justified.
Research following the accidents of Herald of Free Enterprise and Estonia, demonstrated that the worst stability related danger for a ro-ro ship with an enclosed ro-ro deck is caused by the effect of a build-up of significant amount of water on that deck.
The current IMO damage stability requirements applicable to ro-ro passenger ships (SOLAS 90), which also apply to domestic EU trades by means of the Directive 98/18/EC, implicitly include the effect of water entering the ro-ro deck in a sea state in the order of 1.5 m significant wave height. However, the damage stability requirements defined by the Stockholm agreement increase the survivability of the vessels in more severe sea states, since they complement the SOLAS requirements to take into account the effect of water which could accumulate on the ro-ro deck following damage.
The Commission has declared that it could propose the application of these specific stability requirements for the entire EU after having studied the local conditions in the South European waters. Although the expert study of the Commission sustains that other safety critical conditions (as visibility or water temperatures) may be generally less severe in the South European waters, the significant wave heights values are comparable or even higher than those in the Baltic sea, whilst waves are known to be steeper in South European waters.
The analysis shows that the introduction of the SA in the North of Europe took place without particular trouble for the industry or the contracting governments. Based on a sample of 82 vessels, out of a total of 140 that needed to comply with the Agreement, it appears that 36% of the vessels in that sample did not need any upgrade. Furthermore, 69% of the total 140 vessels were upgraded for less than 1 million EURO. The estimated total cost of upgrade was around 85 mio EURO. However it is important to note that most of that cost is related to the accelerated compliance with SOLAS 90 standards (a necessary step before compliance with the Stockholm Agreement) rather than just to compliance with the Agreement as such.
The economic analysis in the study concludes that, given the common value of significant wave heights in the Southern EU waters is around 2,5 metres, the modification cost of the South European fleet for compliance with the provisions of the SA will be approximately the same as the associated cost for compliance with the requirements of the SOLAS 90 two compartment standard i. Since full compliance with SOLAS Regulations is to take place by 2010, on the basis of the IMO timetable (international trades) and of Directive 98/18/CE (domestic EU trades) the industry should have already planned to invest in the coming years in the upgrade of the vessels concerned. The study states that 264, operating both in international and domestic trades, vessels will be affected from the SOLAS upgrade and that the cost of compliance will be among 106 and 250 million EURO (these figures do not take into account possible removals from service of aged ro-ro ships). As already mentioned, compliance of these ships with the specific stability requirements set out in the Stockholm Agreement will not increase their SOLAS compliance cost in a prohibitive way.
It appears therefore that the application of the SA stability requirements to the South European ro-ro passenger vessels will offer a uniformity of stability requirements and an increased level of survivability of ro-ro passenger ships throughout the EU, without increasing substantially the economic effort of the affected part of the industry, which has to comply anyway with the SOLAS 90 standard.
In light of the above, the Commission is of the opinion that the division of north/south as regards stability requirements for ro-ro vessels in damaged condition (Stockholm Agreement standards in the North and SOLAS 90 standards in the South) does not seem justified on grounds of the safety parameters or for techno-economic reasons.
A European Parliament and Council Directive imposing the specific stability standards as defined in the Stockholm Agreement to all ro-ro passenger ships engaged in international voyages from/to EU ports is the right way forward. It is to be noted that newly built ferries, both for operation in Northern and in Southern Europe, generally comply with the aforementioned increased stability standards. The upgrading of existing ro-ro passenger ships operating in southern Europe will require a transitional period, as it was the case with the introduction of the Stockholm Agreement standards for the fleet operating in northern Europe.
Taking into account that operating conditions for ro-ro passenger ships in domestic voyages in the Member States are often similar to those in international voyages, the Commission proposal amending Council Directive 98/18/EC contains specific provisions to that respect. In fact it provides for the introduction of the same or equivalent stability standards for ro-ro ships operating in domestic voyages, as those proposed for ro-ro ships operating in international voyages.
The proposed Directive will introduce the specific stability requirements of the Stockholm Agreement to the entire EU, covering all ro-ro passenger ships operating from/to EU ports in international voyages.
The specific stability requirements are a complement to the present international IMO standard (SOLAS 90) and are already applicable to 7 northern EU Member States, which are parties to the Stockholm Agreement established in the context of the IMO Resolution 14 of the 1995 SOLAS Conference. This Directive will create a uniformity of stability requirements for ro-ro passenger vessels operating under same conditions and will introduce in the EU framework a regional Agreement agreed under IMO auspices.
The main advantage of the proposed stability requirements is their contribution to an improved survivability of this type of ships following collision damage and the direct connection of the applicable standard to the specific service the ships are engaged in. The requirements are indeed established on the basis of the values of the significant wave heights occurring in the sea areas the ships travel. Taking into account the operating conditions of the ship, the specific stability requirements guarantee the ship's stability in damaged condition with up to 0,5 metres of water accumulated in its ro-ro deck.
In view of the structural modifications that the existing ships may have to undergo in order to comply with the new stability requirements, the Directive introduces a phasing-in period, taking into account the compliance dates of SOLAS 90.
Article 1
The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a uniform level of specific stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships, which will improve the survivability of this type of vessels in case of collision damage and provide a higher level of safety for the passengers and the crew. In view of the fact that 7 northern EU Member States already apply these specific stability requirements by means of a regional Agreement, the proposed Directive will result at the introduction of this regional Agreement in the Community framework and its extension to the Southern European waters and the Atlantic coast.
This article contains the definitions of the key terms used in the Directive and are based on the IMO SOLAS Convention (International Convention for the safety of life at sea) definitions, as well as existing Community legislation, particularly Directive 98/18/EC of 17 March 1998 on safety rules and standards for passenger ships.
Article 3 defines the scope of the Directive. This will apply to all ro-ro passenger ships operating to or from a port of a Member State on a regular service, regardless of their flag, when engaged on international voyages.
This article specifies that the value of the significant wave heights shall be used for determining the height of water on car deck when applying the specific stability standard.
This Article specifies that in the light of Article 4, Member States have to establish the sea areas under their jurisdiction as well as the areas between Member State and Member States and third countries, where ro-ro passenger ships which serve the Community ports undertake voyages.
These areas and the corresponding significant wave heights will be notified to the Commission and be publicly available by the competent maritime authorities of Member States.
This Article establishes the connection to the specific stability requirements set out in the Annex 1 of the Directive. These requirements will apply in addition to the requirements of SOLAS regulation II-1/8 on stability in damaged conditions.
The specific stability requirements are therefore complementary to the SOLAS 90 stability standard and take specifically into account the effect of water which could accumulate on the ro-ro deck following damage, in order to enable the ship to survive in more severe sea states than 1,5 m significant wave height.
The specific stability requirements introduced by this Directive are based on a mathematical formula which calculates the height of water on the ro-ro deck following a collision damage depending on two basic parameters: the ship's residual free board and the significant wave height in the sea area where the ship operates.
This article makes also reference to the guidelines to Member States for applying the specific stability requirements set out in Annex I, which are presented in the Annex II of the Directive. These guidance notes were presented to the International Maritime Organisation by the governments of Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom at the 40 session of the IMO sub-Committee on stability and Load Lines and Fishing vessels safety of 5 July 1996.
Article 7 specifies that new ships will comply with the specific stability requirements as from 1 October 2004, while it introduces a phasing-in period for the compliance of existing ships. Such period has been considered necessary in view of the structural modifications the existing ships will have to undertake, in addition to the modifications which they will have to undertake on the basis of the SOLAS 90 requirements. A final deadline for compliance has been set on 1 October 2010. This timetable takes into account that the large majority of ro-ro passenger ships will have to comply with SOLAS stability standards by 1 October 2005 and that the final date of compliance under SOLAS is also 1 October 2010.
Article 8 refers to the compliance certificate to be issued to all vessels falling under the scope of this Directive by the flag State Administration. Certificates of compliance issued by a Member State will be accepted by all Member states. Each Member State acting on its capacity as host state shall accept the operational certificate issued by a non Member State certifying that a ship complies with the specific stability requirements established in this Directive
Article 9
The provisions of that article authorise the specific treatment of ro-ro passenger ships operating only on seasonal basis in an area where the significant wave height during such season is of a lower value than that for a year round operation in the same area. In such case, the specific stability requirements introduced by this Directive will be based on the seasonal values of the significant wave heights to be defined by Member States. Such seasonal operation may offer certain flexibility to operators wishing to introduce additional ships on a high season, offering additional possibilities to the travelling public, without lowering at all the safety standard provided.
Article 10 & 11
Article 10 makes reference to the possible adaptation of the Annexes to the Directive, in the light of the technical progress, the experience gained or of regulatory developments in the international (IMO) level. As established in Article 11, in such case the Commission will be assisted by the Committee established pursuant to Article 12 i of Directive 93/75/EC i.
Following this article, Member Sates shall lay down a system of dissuasive measures, penalties for breaching the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive. In view of the complex technical nature of the standards introduced, particular vigilance is requested by the Member States in their implementation.
This article sets up a deadline for the transposition of this Directive in the national legislation of Member States, which is 1 January 2004
Article 14
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